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The  Franco -German  War 

OF 
1870-71 


^1 


KIKI.D-MAltSllAI.    COT-NT    HEI-MITII    VOX    MOLTKK 


THE 


FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAR 

I — 


OF 


1870-71 


By   Field-Marshal 
COUNT  HELMUTH  VON  MOLTKE 


TRANSI,AJED  BY 
CLARA  BELL  AND  HENRY  W.  FISCHBB 


WITH    A    MAP 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 


TEANSLATORS'  NOTE. 

Except  in  a  few  instances,  such  as  Meuse  for  Maas, 
Treves  for  Trier,  Alsace  for  Elsass,  and  Lorraine  for 
Lothringen,  the  names  in  the  text  and  the  accompany- 
ing map  correspond. 

Our  best  acknowledgments  are  due  to  Captain  Percy 
Schletter,  of  the  King's  Regiment,  for  valuable  assist- 
ance in  correcting  proofs  of  the  entire  work. 


PREFACE. 

Field-Maeshal  von  Moltke  began  this  history  of 
the  War  of  1870-71  in  the  spring  of  the  year  1887,  and 
during  his  residence  at  Creisau  he  worked  at  it  for 
about  three  hours  every  morning.  On  his  return  to 
Berhn,  in  the  autumn  of  that  year,  the  work  was  not 
quite  finished,  but  he  completed  it  by  January,  1888, 
at  Berlin,  placed  it  in  my  hands,  and  never  again 
alluded  to  the  matter. 

The  origin  of  the  book  was  as  follows.  I  had  sev- 
eral times  entreated  him,  but  in  vain,  to  make  use  of 
his  leisure  hours  at  Creisau  in  noting  down  some  of 
his  rich  store  of  reminiscences.  He  always  objected, 
in  the  same  words :  "  Everything  official  that  I  have 
had  occasion  to  write,  or  that  is  worth  remembering, 
is  to  be  seen  in  the  Ai'chives  of  the  Staff  Corps.  My 
personal  experiences  had  better  be  buried  with  me." 
He  had  a  dislike  to  memoirs  in  general,  which  he  was 
at  no  pains  to  conceal,  saying  that  they  only  served  to 
gratify  the  writer's  vanity,  and  often  contributed  to 
distort  important  historical  events  by  the  subjective 
views  of  an  individual,  and  the  intrusion  of  trivial 
details.  It  might  easily  happen  that  the  character  of 
a  man  which  in  history  stood  forth  in  noble  simplicity 
should  be  hideously  disfigured  by  the  narrative  of 
some  personal  experiences,  and  the  ideal  halo  which 
had  surrounded  him  be  destroyed.  And  highly  char- 
acteristic of  Moltke's  magnanimity  are  the  words  he 


Vlll  PEEFACE. 

once  uttered  on  such  an  occasion,  and  which  I  noted 
at  the  time :  "All  that  can  be  published  of  the  history 
of  a  war  is  necessarily  colored  by  the  event ;  but  it  is 
a  pious  and  patriotic  duty  never  to  disturb  the  prestige 
which  connects  the  glory  of  our  army  with  certain 
high  personages." 

Not  long  after  our  arrival  at  Creisau,  early  in  1887, 
I  repeated  my  suggestion.  In  reply  to  my  request  that 
he  would  write  an  account  of  the  campaign  of  1870-71, 
he  said:  "You  have  the  official  history  of  the  war. 
That  contains  everything.  To  be  sure,"  he  added, 
"  that  is  too  full  of  detail  for  the  general  run  of  readers, 
and  far  too  technical.  An  abridgment  must  be  made 
some  day."  I  asked  him  whetner  he  would  allow  me 
to  lay  the  work  on  his  table,  and  next  morning  he  had 
begun  the  narrative  contained  in  this  volume,  compar- 
ing it  as  he  went  on  with  the  official  history,  and  car- 
ried it  through  to  the  end. 

His  purpose  was  to  give  a  concise  account  of  the 
war.  But,  while  keeping  this  in  view,  he  involuntarily 
— as  was  inevitable  from  his  position — contemplated 
the  task  from  his  own  standpoint  as  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  and  arranged  events  in  connection  with  a 
general  scheme  which  could  only  be  known  at  head- 
quarters. Thus  this  work,  which  was  undertaken  in 
all  simplicity  of  purpose,  as  a  popular  history,  is  prac- 
tically from  beginning  to  end  the  expression  of  a  pri- 
vate opinion  of  the  war  from  the  Field-Marshal  himself. 

The  Appendix :  "  On  a  supposed  Council  of  "War  in 
the  Wars  of  William  I.  of  Prussia,"  was  wi'itten  in 
1881.  In  a  book  by  Fedor  von  Koppen,  "  Manner  und 
Thaten,  vaterlandische  Balladen"  {Men  and  Deeds: 
Patriotic  Songs),  which  the  poet  presented  to  the  Field- 
Marshal,  there  is  a  poem  entitled,  "A  German  Council 
of  War  at  Versailles  "  (with  a  historical  note  appended), 


PREFACE.  ix 

describing  an  incident  wliicli  never  occurred,  and 
which,  under  the  conditions  by  which  the  relation  of 
the  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  his  Majesty  was  regulated, 
never  could  have  occurred.  To  preclude  any  such 
mistakes  for  the  future,  and  to  settle  once  and  for  all 
the  truth  as  to  the  much-discussed  question  of  the 
Council  of  War,*  the  Field-Marshal  wrote  this  paper,  to 
which  he  added  a  description  of  his  personal  experience 
of  the  battle  of  Koniggratz.  It  is  this  narative  which, 
shortly  after  the  writer's  death,  was  published  in 
the  Munchener  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  in  the  somewhat 
abridged  and  altered  form  in  which  the  Field-Marshal 
had  placed  it  at  the  disposal  of  Professor  von  Treit- 
schke  the  well-known  historian. 

Count  Helmuth  von  Moltke, 

Major  and  Adjutant  to  his 
Imperial  Majesty. 

Beklin,  June  25th,  1891. 

*  He  alludes  to  it  on  p.  218,  footnote. 


CONTENTS. 


Fighting  on  the  Frontier. 

Preparations  for  "War      .... 

The  Engagement  at  Weissenberg  (August  4tli) 

The  Battle  of  Worth  (August  6th) 

The  Battle  of  Spicheren  (August  6th) 

The  German  Army  wheels  to  the  Eight 

The  Battle  of  Colombey— Nouilly  (August  14th) 

The  Battle  of  Vionville— Mars-la-Tour  (August  16th) 

The  Battle  of  Gravelotte— St.  Privat  (August  18th) 

New  Distribution  of  the  Army 

The  Army  of  Chalons      .... 

The  Battle  of  Beaumont  (August  30th) 

The  Battle  of  Sedan  (September  1st)     . 


FA6E 

2 
12 
15 
19 
26 
30 
35 
50 
64 
66 
77 


n. 

The  Advance  on  Paris  and  Capitulation  op  Metz. 

The  Sortie  from  Metz  (August  26th)      ....  103 

The  Battle  of  Noisseville  (August  31st)              ...  106 

Change  of  Administration  in  Paris         ....  114 

General  Vinoy's  Eetreat              .....  117 

The  Third  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  march  on  Paris  120 

The  Investment  of  Paris  (September  19th)         .            .             .  125 

The  First  Negotiations  for  Peace           ....  129 

The  Taking  of  Toul  (September  23rd)    ....  130 

The  Siege  of  Strasburg  (September  28th)          ...  132 

Operations  round  Paris  to  the  18th  of  October             .            .  139 


CONTENTS. 


The  Battle  of  Artenay  (October  10th) 
Engagement  at  Orleans  (October  11th) 
The  Taking  of  Soissons  (October  15th) 
The  Storming  of  Chateaudun  (October  18th) 
A  Sortie  towards  Malmaison  (October  21st) 
The  Storming  of  Le-Bourget  (October  30th) 
Sortie  from  Metz  on  Bellevue  (October  7th) 
Capitulation  of  Metz  (October  27th) 


TASK 

146 
147 
150 
152 
154 
157 
163 
166 


m. 

Operations  in  the  East  and  on  the  Loire. 

New  Distribution  of  the  Army  ....  167 

Operations  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  in  the  South-East  (October)  167 

The  Taking  of  Schlettstadt  (October  24th)         ...  174 

The  Taking  of  Breisach  (November  10th)  ...  175 

The  Taking  of  Verdun  (November  9th)  .  .  .  176 

The  Advance  of  the  First  and  Second  Armies  in  November      .  178 

The  Engagement  at  Coulmiers  (November  9th)  .  .  182 

The  Grand  Duke's  Movements  ....  188 

The  Position  of  Affairs  in  the  Second  Army  Corps  (latter  half 

of  November)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .         190 

Battle  of  Beaune-la-Eolande  (November  28th)  ^    .  .  193 

The  Advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Loire  to  the  Relief  of  Paris  198 

The  Battle  at  Loigny — Poupry  (December  2nd)  .  .  200 


IV. 

Fighting  round  Paris. 

Paris  in  November          ......  206 

The  Attempt  to  Eelease  the  Army  of  Paris  (November  30th 

and  December  2nd)              .....  209 

The  Advance  of  the  First  Army  in  November               .            .  219 


CONTENTS. 


The  Battle  of  Amiens  (November  17th) 

The  Taking  of  La-Fere  (November  27th) 

The  Taking  of  Diedenhof  (November  24th) 

The  Investment  of  Belfort  in  November 

Battle  of  Orleans  (December  3rd  and  4th) 

The  German  Advance  on  the  South,  East,  and  "West 

The  Grand  Duke's  Battle  (December  7th,  8th,  9th,  and  10th) 

The  Interruption  of  Serious  Offensive  Operations  in  December 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  in  December 

The  First  Army  in  December 

The  Taking  of  M^zi^res 

Paris  in  December 

The  Fight  at  Le  Bourget  (December  21st) 

The  Reduction  of  Mont-Avron  (December  27th) 


PAGE 

220 
224 
225 
226 
227 
236 
239 
248 
254 
256 
261 
262 
264 
268 


V. 

Active  Operations  in  the  Provinces. 

The  Army  of  the  East  under  General  Bourbaki 

The  Advance  on  Le-Mans 

Battle  of  Le-Mans  (10th,  11th,  and  12th  of  January) 

Operations  on  the  North  of  Paris  during  January 

The  Battle  of  Bapaume  (January  3rd) 

Actions  on  the  Lower  Seine       .  .  . 

Occupation  of  P^ronne 

Battle  of  St.  Quentin  (January  19th)     . 

Operations  at  the  South-eastern  seat  of  War  up  to  17th  of 

January        .... 
Transfer  of  the  French  Eastern  Army  to  the   South-eastern 

Seat  of  War,  towards  the  end  of  December 
Action  of  Villersexel  (January  9th) 
Battle  of  the  Lisaine  (January  15th  to  17th) 
The  Bombardment  of  Paris  (January,  1871) 
Battle  of  Mont-Val4rien  (January  19th) 
The  Bombardment  of  Paris  till  the  Armistice 


270 
273 
289 
309 
311 
314 
316 
321 

331 

335 
338 
345 
357 
363 
368 


xiv  CONTENTS. 

VI. 

The  Progress  of  the  War  in  the  South  and  West. 

FAOK 

The  Army  of  the  South  under  General  von  Manteuffel  .  374 

General  Hann  von  Weyhern's  March  on  Dijon  .  .  399 

Occupation  of  the  Departments  of  Doubs,  Jura,  and  Cote-d'Or  401 

The  Siege  of  Belfort       ......  402 

vn. 

Surrender  and  Peace. 
The  Armistice     .......  410 

The  Return  March  of  the  German  Army  .  .  .  416 


APPENDIX. 

Memorandum  on  the  Councils  of  War  said  to  have  been 

held  during  the  Wars  under  King  Willlim  .  423 


THE  FRANCO-GERMAIN  WAR. 


I. 

FIGHTINa  ON  THE  FRONTIER. 

The  days  are  gone  by  when,  for  dynastical  ends, 
small  armies  of  professional  soldiers  went  to  war  to 
conquer  a  city,  or  a  province,  and  then  sought  winter 
quarters  or  made  peace.  The  wars  of  the  present  day 
call  whole  nations  to  arms,  there  is  scarcely  a  family 
that  does  not  suffer  by  them.  The  entire  financial 
resources  of  the  State  are  appropriated  to  the  pm'- 
pose,  and  the  different  seasons  of  the  year  have  no 
bearing  on  the  unceasing  progress  of  hostilities.  As 
long  as  nations  continue  independent  of  each  other 
there  will  be  disagreements  that  can  only  be  settled  by 
force  of  arms ;  but,  in  the  interest  of  humanity,  it  is 
to  be  hoped  that  wars  will  become  less  frequent,  as 
they  have  become  more  terrible. 

Generally  speaking,  it  is  no  longer  the  ambition  of 
monarchs  which  endangers  peace;  the  passions  of 
the  people,  its  dissatisfaction  with  interior  conditions 
and  affairs,  the  strife  of  parties,  and  the  intrigues  of 
their  leaders  are  the  causes.  A  declaration  of  war,  so 
serious  in  its  consequences,  is  more  easily  carried  by  a 
large  assembly,  of  which  none  of  the  members  bear 
the  sole  responsibility,  than  by  a  single  man,  however 
1 


2  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

high  his  position ;  and  a  peace-loving  sovereign  is  less 
rare  than  a  parliament  composed  of  wise  men.  The 
gTeat  wars  of  the  present  day  have  been  declared  against 
the  wish  and  will  of  the  reigning  powers.  Now-a- 
days  the  Bourse  has  assumed  such  influence  that  it  has 
the  power  to  call  armies  into  the  field  merely  to  protect 
its  interests.  Mexico  and  Egypt  have  been  swamped 
with  European  armies  simply  to  satisfy  the  demands 
of  the  haute  finance.  To-day  the  question,  "  Is  a  na- 
tion strong  enough  to  make  war  ? "  is  of  less  impor- 
tance than  that,  "  Is  its  Government  powerful  enough 
to  prevent  war  ? "  Thus,  united  Glermany  has,  up  to 
now,  used  her  strength  only  to  maintain  European 
peace ;  a  weak  Government  at  the  head  of  our  neighbor- 
ing State,  must,  on  the  other  hand,  be  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  standing  menace  to  peace. 

The  war  of  1870-71  arose  from  just  such  relations. 
A  Napoleon  on  the  throne  of  France  was  bound  to 
establish  his  rights  by  political  and  military  successes. 
Only  for  a  time  did  the  victories  won  by  French  arms 
in  distant  countries  give  general  satisfaction;  the 
triumphs  of  the  Prussian  armies  excited  jealousy,  they 
were  regarded  as  arrogant,  as  a  challenge;  and  the 
French  demanded  revenge  for  Sadowa.  The  liberal 
spirit  of  the  epoch  was  opposed  to  the  autocratic 
Government  of  the  Emperor ;  he  was  forced  to  make 
concessions,  his  civil  authority  was  weakened,  and  one 
fine  day  the  nation  was  informed  by  its  representatives 
that  it  desired  war  with  Germany. 

PREPARATIONS   FOR   THE   WAR. 

The  wars  carried  on  by  France  on  the  other  side  of 
the  ocean,  simply  for  financial  ends,  had  consumed 
immense  sums  and  had  undermined  the  discipline  of 
the  army.    The  French  were  by  no  means  archiprets 


PREPAKATIONS   IN   FEANCE.  3 

for  a  great  war,  but  the  Spanish  succession  to  the 
throne,  nevertheless,  had  to  serve  as  a  pretext  to  declare 
it.  The  French  Reserves  were  called  to  arms  July 
15th,  and  only  four  days  later  the  French  declaration 
of  war  was  handed  in  at  Berlin,  as  though  this  were 
an  opportunity  not  to  be  lost. 

One  division  was  ordered  to  the  Spanish  frontier  as 
a  corps  of  observation ;  only  such  troops  as  were  abso- « 
lutely  necessary  were  left  in  Algiers  and  in  Civita 
Vecchia ;  Paris  and  Lyons  were  sufficiently  garrisoned. 
The  entire  remainder  of  the  army :  332  battalions,  220 
squadrons,  924  cannon,  in  all  about  300,000  men, 
formed  the  army  of  the  Rhine.  This  was  divided  into 
eight  corps,  which,  at  any  rate  in  the  first  instance, 
were  to  be  directed  by  one  central  head,  without  any 
kind  of  intervention.  The  Imperator  himself  was  the 
only  person  to  assume  this  difficult  task;  Marshal 
Bazaine  was  to  command  the  army  as  it  assembled, 
until  the  Emperor's  arrival. 

It  is  very  probable  that  the  French  were  counting 
on  the  old  dissensions  of  the  German  races.  True, 
they  dared  not  look  upon  the  South  Glermans  as  allies, 
but  they  hoped  to  reduce  them  to  inactivity  by  an  early 
victory,  or  even  to  win  them  over  to  their  side.  Prussia 
was  a  powerful  antagonist  even  when  isolated,  and  her 
army  more  numerous  than  that  of  the  French,  but  this 
advantage  might  be  counterbalanced  by  rapidity  of 
action. 

The  French  plan  of  campaign  was  indeed  based  on 
the  delivery  of  unforeseen  attacks.  The  strong  fleets 
of  war  and  transport  ships  were  to  be  utilized  to  land 
a  considerable  force  in  Northern  Prussia,  and  there 
engage  a  part  of  the  Prussian  troops,  while  the  main 
body  of  the  army,  it  was  supposed,  would  await  the 
French  attack  behind  the  fortresses  on  the  Rhine.    The 


4  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN   WAE. 

Frencli  intended  to  cross  the  Rhine  at  once,  at  and 
below  Strasburg,  thus  avoiding  the  gi'eat  fortresses; 
and  also,  at  the  start,  preventing  the  South-Grerman 
army,  which  was  destined  to  defend  the  Black  Forest, 
from  uniting  with  the  North-Grermans.  To  execute 
this  plan  it  would  have  been  imperative  to  assemble 
the  main  forces  of  the  French  army  in  Alsace.  Rail- 
way accommodation,  however,  was  so  inadequate  that 
in  the  first  instance  it  was  only  possible  to  carry  100,- 
000  men  to  Strasburg ;  150,000  had  to  leave  the  rail- 
ways near  Metz,  and  remain  there  till  they  could  be 
moved  up.  Fifty  thousand  men  were  encamped  at 
Chalons  as  reserves,  115  battahons  were  ready  to  march 
as  soon  as  the  National  Guard  had  taken  their  places 
in  the  interior.  The  various  corps  were  distributed  as 
follows : — 

Imperial  Guard,  General  Bourbaki — Nancy. 

First  Corps,  Marshal  MacMahon — Strasburg. 

Second  Corps,  General  Frossard — St.  Avoid. 

Third  Corps,  Marshal  Bazaine — Metz. 

Fourth  Corps,  General  Ladmirault — Diedenhofen. 

Fifth  Corps,  General  Failly — Bitsch. 

Sixth  Corps,  Marshal  Canrobert — Chalons. 

Seventh  Corps,  General  Felix  Douay; — Belfort. 

Thus  there  were  only  two  corps  in  Alsace,  and  five 
on  the  Moselle ;  and,  on  the  day  of  the  declaration  of 
war,  one  of  these,  the  Second  Corps,  was  pushed  for- 
ward close  to  the  German  frontier,  near  St.  Avoid  and 
Forbach.  This  Second  Corps,  however,  received  in- 
structions not  to  engage  in  any  serious  conflict. 

The  regiments  had  marched  out  of  quarters  incom- 
plete as  to  numbers,  and  insufficiently  equipped. 
Meanwhile  the  reserves  called  out  to  fill  their  place  had 
choked  the  railway  traffic ;  they  crowded  the  depots, 
and  filled  the  railway  stations. 


DISTRIBUTION   OF  THE  FRENCH  AEMY.  5 

The  progress  to  their  destination  was  delayed,  for  it 
was  often  unknown  at  the  railway  stations  where  the 
regiments  to  which  the  reserves  were  to  be  sent  were 
at  the  time  encamped.  When  they  at  last  joined  they 
were  without  the  most  necessary  articles  of  equipment. 
The  corps  and  divisions  had  no  artillery  or  baggage, 
no  ambulance,  and  only  a  very  insufficient  number  of 
officers.  No  magazines  had  been  estabhshed  before- 
hand, and  the  troops  were  to  depend  on  the  fortresses. 
These  were  but  ill-supphed,  for  in  the  assured  expecta- 
tion that  the  armies  would  be  almost  immediately  sent 
on  into  the  enemy's  country  they  had  been  neglected. 

In  the  same  way  the  Staff-officers  had  been  provided 
with  maps  of  Germany,  but  not  of  their  own  provinces. 
The  Ministry  of  War  in  Paris  was  inundated'  with 
claims,  protestations,  and  expostulations,  and  finally  it 
was  left  to  the  troops  to  help  themselves  as  best  they 
could.  On  se  debrouillera  was  the  hope  of  the  authori- 
ties. 

When  the  Emperor  arrived  at  Metz,  a  week  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  the  regiments  were  not  yet  com- 
plete, and  it  was  not  even  exactly  known  where  whole 
divisions  were  at  that  time  encamped.  The  Emperor 
ordered  the  troops  to  advance,  but  his  Marshals  de- 
clared that  the  condition  of  the  troops  made  this 
impossible  for  the  time  being. 

It  was  gradually  dawning  upon  them,  that  instead 
of  attacking  the  enemy  in  his  country,  they  would  have 
to  defend  their  own.  Rumor  had  it,  that  a  strong 
army  of  the  enemy  had  assembled  between  Mayence 
and  Coblentz ;  instead  of  sending  reinforcements  from 
Metz  to  Strasburg,  they  were  ordered  to  proceed  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Saar.  The  determination  to  invade 
South  Germany  was  already  abandoned ;  the  fleet  had 
sailed  round,  but  without  any  troops  to  land. 


6  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Germany  had  been  surprised  by  the  declaration  of 
war,  but  she  was  not  unprepared.  The  possibility  of 
such  an  event  had  been  foreseen. 

When  Austria  had  separated  her  interests  from  those 
of  the  other  German  States,  Prussia  undertook  the  sole 
leadership,  and  paved  the  way  to  more  intimate  rela- 
tions with  the  South-German  States.  The  idea  of 
national  unification  had  been  revived,  and  found  an 
echo  in  the  patriotic  sentiments  of  the  entire  people. 

The  means  of  mobilizing  the  North-German  army 
had  been  reviewed  year  by  year,  in  view  of  any  changes 
in  the  military  or  political  situation,  by  the  Staff,  in 
conjunction  with  the  Ministry  of  War.  Every  branch 
of  the  administration  throughout  the  country  had  been 
kept  informed  of  all  it  ought  to  know  of  these  matters. 
The  Berlin  authorities  had  hkewise  come  to  a  confiden- 
tial understanding  with  the  army  chiefs  of  the  South- 
German  States  on  all  important  points.  It  had  been 
conceded  that  Prussia  was  not  to  be  reckoned  on  for 
the  defence  of  any  particular  point,  as  the  Black  Forest 
for  instance ;  and  it  was  decided  that  the  best  way  of 
protecting  South  Germany  would  be  by  an  incursion 
into  Alsace  across  the  central  part  of  the  Rhine ;  which 
could  be  backed  up  by  the  main  forc^  assembled  at 
that  point. 

The  fact  that  the  Governments  of  Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg,  Baden,  and  Hesse,  denuding  their  own  countries 
as  it  were,  were  ready  to  place  then*  contingents  under 
the  command  of  King  William,  proves  their  entire  con- 
fidence in  the  Prussian  generals. 

As  soon  as  this  understanding  was  arrived  at  the 
other  preparations  could  be  made.  The  orders  for 
marching,  and  travelling  by  rail  or  boat,  were  worked 
out  for  each  division  of  the  army,  together  with  the 
most  minute  directions  as  to  theii*  different  starting 


DISTEIBrXION   OF  THE   GEKMAN   AEMY.  7 

points,  the  day  and  horn-  of  departm-e,  the  duration  of 
the  journey,  the  refreshment  stations,  and  place  of 
destination.  At  the  meeting-point  cantonments  were 
assigned  to  each  corps  and  division,  stores  and  maga- 
zines were  established ;  and  thus,  when  war  was  de- 
clared, it  needed  only  the  Royal  signature  to  set  the 
entire  apparatus  in  motion  with  undistui-bed  precision. 
There  was  nothing  to  be  changed  in  the  directions 
originally  given ;  it  sufficed  to  carry  out  the  plans  pre- 
arranged and  prepared. 

The  mobilized  forces  were  divided  into  thi'ee  inde- 
pendent armies  on  a  basis  worked  out  by  the  general 
of  the  Prussian  staff. 

The  First  Army,  under  the  command  of  General  von 
Steinmetz,  consisted  of  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Corps, 
and  one  division  of  cavahy;  60,000  men  all  told.  It  was 
ordered  to  encamp  at  Wittli'^h  and  form  the  right  wing. 

The  Second  Army,  under  tne  command  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles,  was  131,000  strong,  and  constituted 
the  central  army.  It  consisted  of  the  Third,  Fourth, 
and  Tenth  Corps  of  Guards,  and  two  divisions  of 
cavalry.  Its  meeting-point  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Hombiir^x  p.riA  N"unkirr>hon. 

The  Thii'd  Army,  under  the  command  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia,  was  to  form  the  left  wing,  near  Lan- 
dau Rv^  Rastatt,  a  strength  of  about  130,000  men.  It 
consisted  of  the  Fifth  and  Eleventh  Prussian,  and  the 
First  and  Second  Bavarian  Corps,  the  Wiirtemberg  and 
the  Baden  Field  Divisions,  and  one  division  of  cavalry. 

The  Ninth  Corps,  consisting  of  the  18th  and  the 
Hesse  divisions,  was  united  with  the  Twelfth  Royal 
Saxon  Corps  to  form  a  reserve  of  60,000  men,  and 
was  encamped  before  MnvpTipp,  to  reinforce  the  Sec- 
ond Army,  which  was  thus  brought  up  to  the  strength 
of  194,000  men. 


8  THE  FBANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

The  three  armies  combined  numbered  384,000  men. 

There  were  still  the  First,  Second,  and  Fourth  Corps, 
100,000  men ;  but  they  were  not  at  first  included,  as 
the  means  of  railway  transport  were  engaged  for 
twenty-one  days. 

The  17th  Division  and  the  Landwehr  troops  were 
told  off  to  defend  the  coast. 

During  the  night  of  July  16th  the  Royal  order  for 
the  mobilization  of  the  army  was  issued,  and  when  His 
Majesty  arrived  in  Mayence  a  fortnight  later,  he  found 
300,000  men  assembled  on  and  in  front  of  the  Rhine. 

In  his  plan  of  war,  submitted  by  the  Chief  of  the 
Gi-eneral  Staff,  and  accepted  by  the  King,  that  of&cer 
had  his  eye  fijj:ed,  from  the  first,  upon  the  capture  of 
the  enemy's  capital,  the  possession  of  which  is  of  more 
importance  in  France  than  in  other  countries.  On  the 
way  thither  the  hostile  forces  were  to  be  driven  as 
persistently  as  possible  back  from  the  fertile  southern 
states  into  the  narrower  tract  on  the  north. 

But  above  all  the  plan  of  war  was  based  on  the 
resolve  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once,  wherever  found, 
and  keep  the  German  forces  so  compact,  that  a  superior 
force  could  always  be  brought  into  the  field.  By  what- 
ever special  means  these  plans  were  to  be^accompUshed, 
was  left  to  the  decision  of  the  hour ;  the  advance  to 
the  frontiers  alone  was  pre-ordained  in  every  detail. 

It  is  a  delusion  to  believe  that  a  plan  of  war  may  be 
laid  for  a  prolonged  period  and  carried  out  in  every 
point.  The  first  collision  with  the  enemy  changes  the 
situation  entirely,  according  to  the  result.  Some  things 
decided  upon  wiU  be  impracticable;  others,  which 
originally  seemed  impossible,  become  feasible.  AU 
that  the  leader  of  an  army  can  do,  is  to  get  a  clear  view 
of  the  circumstances,  to  decide  for  the  best  for  an  un- 
known periods  and  carry  out  his  purpose  unflinchingly. 


THE  FRENCH  INITIATIVE.  9 

The  departure  of  the  French  troops  to  the  frontier, 
before  they  were  thoroughly  prepared  for  service  in 
the  field,  which  is  a  very  serious  step  to  take,  was 
evidently  ordered  for  the  pui'pose  of  suiprising  the 
German  army,  with  the  forces  immediately  at  com- 
mand, and  thus  interfering  with  the  formation  of  their 
advance.  But  in  spite  of  this,  the  German  command- 
ers did  not  deviate  from  their  purpose  of  massing 
their  armies  on  the  Rhine  and  crossing  that  river. 
The  railway  transport  of  the  troops  of  the  Second  and 
Third  Corps,  however,  was  to  end  at  the  Rhine ;  thence 
they  were  to  march  on  foot  into  the  cantonments  pre- 
pared on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  They  moved  in 
echelon,  advancing  only  so  many  at  a  time  as  would 
make  room  for  the  division  behind  them,  as  far  as  the 
line  marked  by  the  towns  of  Bingen,  Diii'kheim,  and 
Landau. 

The  final  advance  towards  the  frontier  was  not  to 
be  undertaken  until  the  divisions  and  corps  were  all 
collected,  and  provided  with  the  all-necessary  baggage 
train ;  and  then  proceed  in  a  state  of  readiness  to  con- 
front the  enemy  at  any  moment. 

The  assembling  of  the  First  Army  appeared  to  be 
less  threatened,  as  its  route  lay  through  neutral  ter- 
ritory, and  was  protected  by  the  garrisons  of  Treves, 
Saarlouis,  and  Saarbriicken,  the  German  outposts  on 
the  Saar. 

The  First  Army,  50,000  strong,  was  concentrated  at 
Wadern,  in  the  first  days  of  August.  The  Second  Army, 
which  meanwhile  had  been  increased  to  a  strength  of 
194,000  men,  had  pushed  forward  its  cantonments  to 
Alsenz-Giinnstadt,  at  the  termination  of  the  Haardt 
Mountains,  a  position  which  had  been  thoroughly 
reconnoitred  by  an  ofiicer  of  the  Staff,  and  where  the 
troops  might  boldly  await  an  attack. 


10  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

The  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  were  recon- 
noitring the  country  in  front.  The  regiments  and 
squadrons  of  the  Third  Ai"my  were  still  gathering  on 
both  banks  of  the  Rhine. 

The  French  so  far  had  made  no  serious  attempt  at 
Saarbriicken ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pestel  was  able  to 
successfully  withstand  their  petty  attacks  with  one 
battalion  and  thi*ee  squadrons  of  cavalry. 

It  had  meanwhile  been  observed  that  the  French 
were  moving  further  to  the  right,  towards  Forbach 
and  Bitsch,  which  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  two 
French  corps,  known  to  be  drawn  up  at  Belfort  and 
Strasburg,  might  purpose  crossing  the  Rhine  and 
marching  on  the  Black  Forest.  It  was  therefore  of 
very  great  importance  to  set  the  Third  Ai^my  moving 
at  the  earliest  opportunity,  first  to  protect  the  right 
bank  of  the  Upper  Rhine  by  an  advance  on  the  left ; 
secondly  to  cover  the  progress  of  the  Second  Army 
towards  that  point. 

A  telegraphic  order  to  that  effect  was  dispatched  on 
the  evening  of  July  30th,  but  the  Colonel  in  command 
of  the  Third  Ai*my  Corps  desired  to  wait  for  the  arrival 
of  the  Fourth  and  its  baggage  train.  In  spite  of  this 
hesitancy  the  Second  Army  was  ordered  to  proceed 
towards  the  Saar,  where  the  French  were  showing  much 
uneasiness. 

The  time  had  gone  by  when  they  might  have  taken 
advantage  of  their  over-hasty  mobilization ;  the  condi- 
tion of  the  men  had  prohibited  any  action.  France 
was  waiting  for  news  of  a  victory ;  something  had  to 
be  done  to  appease  public  impatience,  so,  in  order  to 
do  something,  the  enemy  resolved  (as  is  usual  under 
such  circumstances)  on  a  hostile  reconnoissance,  and 
it  may  be  added,  with  the  usual  result. 

On  August  2nd  three  entire  divisions  were  sent  for- 


FIGHTING  IN  ALSACE.  11 

ward  against  three  battalions,  four  squadrons,  and  one 
battery  in  Saarbriicken.  The  Emperor  himself  and 
the  Prince  Imperial  watched  the  operations.  The 
Third  Corps  advanced  on  VolMingen,  the  Fifth  on 
Saargemiind,  the  Second  on  Saarbriicken. 

The  Germans  evacuated  Saarbriicken  after  a  gallant 
defence  and  repeated  sorties,  but  the  French  did  not 
cross  the  Saar.  They  may  have  convinced  themselves 
that  they  had  wasted  their  strength  by  hitting  in  the 
air,  and  had  gained  no  information  as  to  the  resources 
and  position  of  the  enemy. 

After  this  the  French  generals  hesitated  for  a  long 
while  between  contrary  resolutions.  Orders  were 
given  and  recalled  on  the  strength  of  mere  rumors. 
The  left  wing  was  reinforced  on  account  of  a  current 
story  that  40,000  Prussians  had  marched  through 
Treves,  the  Guards  received  contradictory  orders,  and 
when  a  small  German  force  showed  itself  at  Lorrach  in 
the  Black  Forest,  it  was  at  once  decreed  that  the 
Seventh  Corps  must  remain  in  Alsace.  Thus  the  French 
forces  were  spread  over  the  wide  area  between  the  Nied 
and  the  Upper  Ehine,  while  the  Germans  were  advanc- 
ing in  compact  masses  on  the  Saar. 

This  scattered  state  of  the  army  finally  induced  the 
French  leaders  to  divide  their  forces  into  two  distinct 
armies.  Marshal  MacMahon  took  provisional  com- 
mand of  the  First,  Seventh,  and  Fifth  Corps,  the  latter 
being  withdrawn  from  Bitsch.  The  other  divisions 
were  placed  under  Marshal  Bazaine,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Guards,  the  command  of  which  the  Emperor 
reserved  to  himself. 

It  had  now  become  a  pressing  necessity  to  protect 
the  left  wing  of  the  advancing  Second  German  Army 
against  the  French  forces  in  Alsace ;  the  Third  Army 
was  therefore  ordered  to  cross  the  frontier  on  August 


12  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

4th,  without  waiting  any  longer  for  the  batteries  to 
come  up.  The  First  Army,  forming  the  right  wing,  was 
already  encamped  near  Wadern  and  Losheim,  three  or 
four  days'  march  nearer  to  the  Saar  than  the  Second 
Army  in  the  centre.  They  were  ordered  to  concentrate 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Tholey  and  there  await  further 
orders.  In  the  first  place  this,  the  weakest  of  the  two 
divisions,  was  not  to  be  exposed  single-handed  to  an 
attack  of  the  enemy's  main  force ;  and  secondly,  it  was 
to  be  used  for  a  flank  movement  in  case  the  Second 
Army  should  meet  the  enemy  on  emerging  from  the 
forests  of  the  Palatinate. 

To  execute  this  order,  the  First  Army  had  to  extend 
its  cantonments  in  a  southerly  direction  as  far  as  the 
line  of  march  of  the  Second  Army,  and  evacuate  its 
quarters  near  Ottweiler.  This  was  a  difficult  matter 
to  accomplish,  as  all  the  towns  and  villages  to  the 
north  were  billeted,  and  quarters  had  also  to  be  found 
for  the  First  Corps,  now  advancing  by  the  Birkenfeld 
route.  General  von  Steinmetz  therefore  decided  to 
march  his  entire  forces  in  the  direction  of  Saarlouis 
and  Saarbriicken.  The  Second  Army  had  assembled, 
and  was  ready  for  action  on  August  4th,  and  received 
orders  to  take  the  field  on  the  farther  side  of  the 
wooded  zone  of  Kaiserslautern. 

THE  BATTLE   OF  WEISSENBUEG. 

(August  4th.) 

On  this  day  the  united  corps  of  the  Third  Army, 
consisting  of  128  battalions,  102  squadrons  cavalry, 
and  80  batteries,  which  had  been  encamped  behind  the 
River  Klingsbach,  crossed  the  French  frontier,  and 
advanced  on  a  wide  front  to  the  banks  of  the  Lauter, 
from  Weissenburg  to  Lauterburg.    This  stream  offers 


THE  BATTLE  OF  WEISSENBUEG.  13 

opportunities  for  a  strong  defence,  but  on  August  4th. 
only  one  weak  division  and  a  cavalry  brigade  belong- 
ing to  the  First  French  Corps  covered  this  point,  the 
main  body  of  that  corps  being  still  on  the  march 
towards  the  Palatinate. 

The  Bavarians,  forming  the  right  wing,  encountered 
a  lively  resistance  before  the  exposed  walls  of  Weissen- 
bui'g  the  first  thing  in  the  morning.  But  very  soon 
after  the  Prussian  corps  crossed  the  Lauter  further 
down  the  river.  General  von  Bose  led  the  Eleventh 
Corps  up  the  Geisberg,  in  order  to  outflank  the  French 
right  wing,  while  General  von  Kirchbach,  with  the  Fifth 
Corps,  advanced  against  the  enemy's  front.  Thirty 
field  pieces  had  at  the  same  time  been  drawn  up  against 
the  railway  station  of  Weissenburg.  That  and  the 
town  were  subsequently  taken,  after  a  bloody  combat. 

By  ten  o'clock  General  Douay  had  ordered  a  retreat, 
which  was  seriously  threatened  by  the  movement 
against  the  Geisberg ;  and  the  castle  of  that  name,  a 
very  formidable  fortress,  was  most  obstinately  de- 
fended, to  enable  the  French  to  retire.  The  grenadiers 
of  the  7th  King's  Regiment  stormed  it  repeatedly,  with 
immense  loss,  but  in  vain ;  nor  did  the  garrison  sur- 
render until,  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  artillery  had 
been  dragged  to  the  summit. 

The  French  division,  which  had  been  attacked  by 
three  German  coips,  effected  a  retreat,  after  an  obsti- 
nate struggle,  though  in  great  disorder,  having  suffered 
much  loss.  Its  gallant  commander  had  been  killed. 
The  Germans  had  also  suffered  a  proportionately  con- 
siderable loss :  91  officers  and  1460  men  killed.  General 
von  Kirchbach  had  been  wounded  while  fighting  in  the 
foremost  rank. 

The  4th  Division  of  cavalry  had  met  with  much  delay 
in  the  course  of  a  four  miles'  march  by  the  crossing  of 


14  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

the  columns  of  infantry.  It  never  arrived  on  the  field, 
and  aU  touch  of  the  enemy  now  retiring  to  the  west- 
ward was  lost. 

Uncertain  as  to  the  direction  whence  a  fresh  attack 
of  the  French  might  be  expected,  the  Third  Ai'my  ad- 
vanced on  the  5th  of  August  by  diverging  roads  in 
the  direction  of  Hagenau  and  Reichshofen ;  but  were 
ordered  to  proceed  only  so  far  as  would  be  needful  to 
reunite  with  the  corps  in  a  short  day's  march. 

The  Crown  Prince  intended  to  let  his  men  rest  the 
next  day,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  lead  them  to  a  renewed 
attack  as  soon  as  the  situation  was  made  clear.  But 
already,  that  same  evening,  the  Bavarians,  on  the  right, 
and  the  Fifth  Corps  in  the  centre,  had  a  sharp  encoun- 
ter with  the  French,  who  were  drawn  up  behind  the 
Saner  in  considerable  numbers. 

It  was  to  be  assumed  that  Marshal  MacMahon  had 
brought  up  the  Seventh  Corps  from  Strasburg,  but  it  re- 
mained to  be  seen  whether  he  intended  to  join  Marshal 
Bazaine  in  the  neighborhood  of  Bitsch,  or  if  he  meant 
to  accept  battle  at  Worth,  after  securing  his  retreat  on 
that  point.  It  was  also  possible  that  he  might  com- 
mence the  attack.  The  Crown  Prince,  to  secure  a  pre- 
ponderating force,  therefore  determined  to  coUect  his 
forces  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sulz  on  August  6th. 
The  Second  Bavarian  Corps  received  special  instruc- 
tion to  watch  Bitsch  with  one  division ;  the  other  divis- 
ion was  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  on  the  western 
bank  of  the  Sauer,  as  soon  as  they  should  hear  heavy 
firing  at  Worth. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  done  his  utmost  to  coUect 
his  three  corps  in  their  entirety,  and  he  reaUy  intended 
to  arrest  the  advance  of  the  Germans  by  an  immediate 
attack.  A  division  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  which  had  but 
just  been  sent  to  Miilhausen  to  strengthen  the  defence 


BATTLE   OF  WORTH.  15 

of  Alsace,  was  at  once  recalled  to  Hagenau,  where  it 
formed  the  right  wing  of  the  strong  position  held  by 
the  First  Corps  behind  the  Saner,  and  in  front  of 
Froschwiller,  Elsasshaussen,  and  Eberbach.  On  the 
left  the  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  commanded  by 
Lespart,  was  expected  from  Bitsch ;  the  rest  of  that 
corps  was  to  come  up  from  Saargemlind,  by  Rohrbach. 
Meanwhile  Ducrot's  division  formed  a  rear  flank. 

Neither  the  German  nor  the  French  leaders  expected 
the  attack  before  the  following  day,  but  where  the  con- 
tending forces  are  so  close  upon  each  other,  as  in  this 
case,  the  conflict  may  occui'  at  any  moment,  even 
against  the  wish  of  the  commanders. 

BATTLE  OF  WORTH. 

(August  6th.) 

After  a  good  deal  of  skirmishing  between  the  out- 
posts during  the  night,  the  Commander  of  the  20th 
Grerman  brigade  thought  it  expedient  to  secure  the  pas- 
sage over  the  Sauer  river,  which  lay  just  in  front  and 
was  a  serious  obstacle.  The  bridge  over  it  to  Worth 
had  been  destroyed,  but  the  sharp-shooters  waded 
through  the  stream,  and  at  seven  o'clock  entered  the 
town,  which  the  French  had  left  unoccupied. 

They  soon  became  aware  of  the  fact  that  they 
were  confronting  a  numerous  enemy  in  a  strong  po- 
sition. 

The  broad  meadows  by  the  Sauer  all  lie  within 
range  of  the  commanding  heights  on  the  right ;  and 
the  long  range  of  the  Chassepot  rifle  must  here  prove 
invaluable.  On  the  other  side  of  the  river  the  plain 
was  dotted  with  vineyards  and  hop-gardens,  thus 
offering  great  advantages  for  defensive  purposes. 

The  preliminary  combat  at  Worth  was  hardly  of 


16  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

thirty  minutes'  duration ;  but  as  tlie  artillery  of  both 
sides  had  taken  active  part  in  it,  the  signal  was  given 
for  the  Bavarian  Division,  under  Hartmann,  to  come  up 
from  Langensulzbach,  and  they  soon  engaged  the  left 
flank  of  the  French  in  a  fierce  conflict.  The  French, 
on  their  part,  had  attacked  Gunstett  on  their  right, 
where  they  were  confronted  by  the  advancing  Eleventh 
Corps. 

The  battle  was  now  raging  opposite  Worth,  as  well  to 
the  north  as  the  south,  the  Fifth  Corps  being  likewise 
engaged ;  and  it  became  imperative  to  seriously  engage 
the  enemy's  centre  to  prevent  them  from  turning  all 
their  force  on  the  German  flank. 

The  artillery  were  brought  up,  and  by  ten  o'clock  108 
guns  were  in  position  on  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Sauer, 
and  had  opened  fire. 

Some  infantry  waded  through  the  river,  breast  high, 
but  this  attack,  undertaken  with  inadequate  numbers, 
failed,  and  it  was  only  by  strenuous  efforts  that  a  foot- 
hold was  obtained  on  the  other  side. 

The  Crown  Prince  sent  orders  that  nothing  was  to 
be  done  that  would  bring  on  a  battle  on  that  day ;  but 
by  this  time  the  Fifth  Corps  was  so  seriously  engaged 
that  the  fight  could  not  be  stopped  without  grave  con- 
sequences: General  von  Kirchbach'^  therefore  deter- 
mined to  continue  the  battle  on  his  own  responsibility. 

The  frontal  attack  was  an  undertaking  of  great  diffi- 
culty, and  could  hardly  succeed  unless  seconded  by  an- 
other in  flank ;  and  at  this  juncture  the  Bavarians,  in 
accordance  with  the  Crown  Prince's  orders,  ceased  hos- 
tilities, and  retired  in  the  direction  of  Langensulzbach. 

There  remained,  however,  the  Eleventh  Corps  on 
the  left,  ready  for  immediate  action.  They  seized  the 
Albrechts-hauser  farm  and  pressed  forward  into  the 
Niederwald. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  WORTH.  17 

In  front  of  Worth,  the  battle  was  a  succession  of 
attacks  on  both  sides ;  the  aggressor  each  time  getting 
worsted,  in  consequence  of  the  nature  of  the  country. 
By  degi'ees,  however,  all  the  battalions,  and  at  last  the 
artillery  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  got  across  to  the  west 
bank  of  the  Sauer ;  the  Eleventh  Corps  having  previ- 
ously secured  a  good  basis  there  for  further  advance. 

About  this  time,  notwithstanding  the  evident  unfa- 
vorable nature  of  the  ground,  two  regiments  of  cuiras- 
siers and  one  of  lancers  of  Michel's  brigade  made  a 
determined  attack  on  the  G-erman  infantry,  near  Mors- 
bronn,  just  as  it  was  wheeling  to  the  right.  But  the 
men  of  the  32nd  Regiment,  without  looking  for  cover, 
received  while  deployed  the  advancing  force  of  about 
1000  horse  with  a  steady  fire,  which  did  great  execu- 
tion. The  cuirassiers  especially  suif  ered  immense  loss. 
Only  a  few  broke  through  the  line  of  firing  and  gained 
the  open  ground ;  many  were  taken  prisoners  in  the 
village,  the  remainder  rode  madly  off  towards  Walburg. 
There  they  encountered  the  Prussian  13th  Hussars,  ex- 
perienced further  losses  and  disappeared  from  the  field. 

The  infantry  of  the  French  right  wing  succeeded  in 
driving  in  the  most  advanced  parties  of  the  enemy  at 
Albrechts-hauserhof,  but  their  further  progress  was 
stopped  by  the  newly-unmasked  artillery. 

When  finally  the  last  battalions  had  crossed  the 
Sauer,  the  Eleventh  Corps  made  its  way  through  the 
Niederwald,  fighting  for  every  foot  of  ground.  The 
northern  edge  of  the  forest  was  reached  by  2.30,  and 
there  the  Eleventh  were  joined  by  the  left  wing  of  the 
Fifth  Corps.  The  burning  village  of  Elsasshaussen 
was  taken  by  storm,  as  also  the  little  thicket  south  of 
Froschwiller,  after  a  gallant  defence. 

Thus  crowded  together  in  a  limited  area,  the  situa- 
tion had  become  one  of  eminent  danger  to  the  French. 
2 


18  THE   FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

Tlieir  left  flank,  it  is  true,  still  held  out  against  the 
renewed  attack  of  the  Bavarians,  who  had  re-entered 
the  action,  but  the  centre  and  the  right  flank  were 
closely  pressed,  and  even  their  safe  retreat  was  seri- 
ously threatened.  Marshal  MacMahon  therefore  tried 
to  regain  the  open  by  a  powerful  counter-attack  to  the 
south.  By  this  he  succeeded  in  repulsing  the  German 
troops  posted  to  the  east  of  Elsasshaussen,  who  were 
thrown  into  confusion,  and  in  part  driven  back  into 
the  Niederwald,  but  only  to  be  at  once  re-assembled 
and  brought  back  to  the  attack.  Here  the  French 
cavalry  again  made  an  attempt  to  change  the  fortunes 
of  the  day.  The  division  under  Bonnemains,  notwith- 
standing the  unfavorable  nature  of  the  ground,  threw 
itself  on  the  open  front  of  the  adversary,  suffered  ter- 
rible losses,  and  was  scattered  before  it  had  really  got 
home. 

The  Wiirtembergers  now  advanced  from  the  south, 
while  the  Bavarians  marched  down  from  the  north. 
General  von  Bose,  though  twice  wounded,  led  as  many 
of  his  division  as  he  could  collect  to  storm  the  burning 
town  of  Froschwiller,  which  was  the  enemy's  last  post. 
The  artillery  advanced  to  a  point  within  range  of  grape- 
shot  and  thus  cleared  the  road  for  the  infantry  which 
was  pushing  forward  from  all  sides.  Tlie  French  kept 
up  a  steady  and  gallant  resistance  until  5  o'clock,  and 
then  retreated  towards  Reichshofen  and  Niederbronn, 
in  great  disorder. 

At  the  Falkenstein  stream,  Lespart's  Division,  just 
arrived  on  the  field,  made  a  short  stand,  but  these 
fresh  forces  offered  only  brief  resistance,  and  were 
swept  away  in  the  general  rout. 

This  victory  of  the  Third  Army  had  been  dearly 
paid  for ;  489  officers  and  10,000  men  were  laid  low. 
The  loss  on  the  French  side  is  not  exactly  known,  but 


THE   BATTLE   OF  WOETH.  19 

they  left  200  officers  and  9000  men  as  prisoners,  be- 
sides 2000  draught-horses  and  33  guns. 

The  demoralization  of  the  French  troops  must  have 
been  so  complete  as  to  render  them  unmanageable. 
Only  one  brigade  of  Lespart's  Division  took  the  road 
to  Bitsch,  to  join  the  main  army  at  St.  Avoid ;  all  that 
remained  following  an  irresistible  impulse,  fled  wildly 
in  a  south-western  direction  towards  Zabern. 

As  the  General  in  command  of  the  Thii'd  Army  had 
not  foreseen  a  battle  on  August  6th,  the  4th  Division 
of  cavalry  had  not  left  its  quarters  in  the  rear,  and 
was  therefore  unable  to  follow  in  pursuit ;  nor  did  it 
arrive  at  Gunstett  until  9  o'clock  in  the  evening.  But, 
in  order  to  be  at  hand  at  any  rate  for  the  next  day. 
Prince  Albrecht,  who  was  in  command,  marched  on 
during  the  night  as  far  as  Eberbach;  after  a  three 
hours'  rest  he  set  forth  again,  and  after  covering  nine 
miles  (German),  came  upon  the  rearguard  of  the  enemy 
near  Steinberg,  at  the  foot  of  the  hills.  Without  in- 
fantry it  would  have  been  impossible  to  go  further, 
but  the  presence  of  the  division  had  scared  the  enemy. 
The  First  Corps  had  resumed  their  march  during  the 
night,  and  reached  Saarburg,  where  it  joined  the  Fifth 
Corps.  Thus  the  French  had  a  start  of  five  miles, 
and  continued  retreating  on  Luneville,  unmolested 
by  the  Germans. 

BATTLE   OF   SPICHEEEN. 

(August  6th.) 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  events  which  occurred,  on 
that  same  6th  of  August,  on  another  part  of  the  theatre 
of  war. 

The  Second  Army,  protected  on  its  southern  flank  by 
the  Third  Army,  had  moved  to  the  westward,  while  the 


20  THE   FEAJ^CO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

corps  that  had  remained  behind  were  brought  up  by 
railway.  Its  front  column  had,  on  the  5th,  reached  the 
hne  between  Neunkirchen  and  Zweibriicken,  marching 
unchecked  through  the  defiles  of  the  forest-zone  of 
Kaiserslautern.  The  cavalry,  skirmishing  in  French 
territory,  reported  that  the  enemy  was  retreating.  All 
seemed  to  indicate  that  the  French  were  preparing  to 
await,  in  a  strong  defensive  position,  the  attack  of  the 
Germans.  The  nearest  position  of  the  kind  that  offered 
was  on  the  other  side  of  the  Moselle,  where  Metz  and 
Diedenhofen  secured  both  wings. 

It  was  decided  that  if  the  French  were  found  there, 
the  First  Army  was  to  engage  the  enemy  in  front,  while 
the  Second  made  a  circuit  south  of  Metz,  so  as  to  force 
the  enemy  either  to  retire  or  to  accept  battle.  In  case 
of  defeat  the  Second  Army  was  to  fall  back  on  the 
Third,  now  advancing  over  the  Vosges. 

The  extended  position  of  the  First  Army  in  a  south- 
erly direction  towards  the  Saar,  which  had  not  been 
intended  by  the  Commander-in-chief,  had  brought  its 
left  wing  into  contact  with  the  line  of  march  laid  down 
for  the  Second,  and  they  crossed  each  other  at  Saar- 
brlicken  on  the  6th.  Thus  there  was  no  lack  of 
strength  at  that  point,  but  as  a  battle  ^on  that  day  was 
neither  expected  nor  probable,  a  simultaneous  arrival 
of  troops  had  not  been  prearranged,  and  the  several 
sections  arrived  there  by  different  routes  and  at  differ- 
ent hours. 

The  14th  Division  of  the  Seventh  Corps  reached 
Saarbriicken  first,  towards  noon  on  the  6th. 

General  Frossard,  who  considered  his  position  there 
one  of  great  risk,  had  left  the  night  before,  without 
waiting  for  permission  to  retreat,  and  had  retired  with 
the  Second  Corps  on  Spicheren,  where  they  threw  up 
entrenchments.    The  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  Corps 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SPICHEREN.  21 

were  in  a  position  to  his  rear,  at  distances  of  from  two 
to  four  miles,  and  the  Guards  were  not  more  than  five 
miles  behind.  The  Emperor  was,  therefore,  fully  able 
to  collect  five  corps  for  a  battle  in  the  vicinity  of  Co- 
cheren,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  to  support  Frossard  with 
at  least  four  divisions,  if  the  General  thought  his  posi- 
tion strong  enough  to  hold. 

The  range  of  hills  which  rise  quite  close  to  Saar- 
briicken  can  be  made  a  formidable  obstacle  to  crossing 
the  Saar.  It  was  known  that  the  French  had  evacu- 
ated these  points,  but  General  von  Kameke  thought  it 
prudent  to  occupy  them  at  once,  in  order  to  secure  the 
debouching  of  the  columns  in  rear.  When,  in  the 
forenoon,  two  squadi'ons  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
had  disappeared  on  the  di-ill-ground  on  the  further 
bank,  they  met  with  a  hot  fire  from  the  Spicheren  hills. 
But  as  it  seemed  highly  probable,  from  the  previous 
attitude  of  the  French,  that  they  were  only  the  rear- 
guard of  the  retiring  enemy.  General  von  Kameke 
ordered  an  immediate  attack,  especially  as  he  was 
promised  help.  General  von  Zastrow,  as  soon  as  he 
observed  that  the  14th  Division  had  entered  upon  a 
serious  engagement,  sent  forward  the  13th.  General 
von  Alvensleben  also  ordered  up  all  that  could  be 
spared  of  the  Third  Corps  to  Saarbriicken,  and  Gen- 
eral von  Goeben  directed  the  entire  16th  Division  to 
advance  on  that  point.  Generals  von  Doring  and  von 
Barnekow  had  turned  their  forces  in  the  direction 
whence  the  fighting  was  heard,  from  Dudweiler  and 
Fischbach  respectively,  even  previous  to  receiving 
orders  to  that  effect. 

The  position  occupied  by  the  French  was  one  of  ex- 
treme advantage.  The  centre  was  protected  by  the 
Red  Mountain  (Der  rothe  Berg),  a  precipitous  and  al- 
most inaccessible  cliff,  while  the  steep  slopes  on  both 


22  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

sides  were  densely  wooded.  To  the  left  a  group  of 
buildings,  the  iron-works  of  Stiering-Wendel,  formed 
an  additional  post  of  defence. 

Had  the  strength  of  the  enemy  been  fuUy  known  the 
attack  would  certainly  have  been  delayed  until  the  14th 
Division  had  completely  formed  up.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  about  noon,  only  the 
brigade  under  Francois  had  come  up,  and  this,  with  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  centre, 
which  was  well  placed,  turned  first  on  his  two  flanks. 
At  first  it  made  some  progress.  The  39th  Regiment 
drove  the  sharp-shooters  of  the  enemy  out  of  the 
Grifert  woods,  but  then  exposed  themselves  to  the 
merciless  fire  of  a  French  battalion  drawn  up  on  the 
further  side  of  a  deep  hollow.  On  the  right  the  3rd 
Battalion,  together  with  the  74th,  seized  the  wood  of 
Stiering.  But  the  enemy's  superior  strength  soon  dis- 
played itself  in  violent  counter-attacks,  and  when  von 
Woyna's  Brigade  appeared  on  the  field  it  was  required 
to  lend  support  on  both  sides.  Thus,  at  an  early  stage, 
a  mixing  of  battalions  and  companies  began  which 
increased  with  every  repulse,  and  made  the  control  of 
the  battle  a  matter  of  the  gi-eatest  difficulty.  Added 
to  this  it  happened  that  three  Generals  in  succession 
came  up  to  the  scene  of  the  conflict,  and  each  in  turn 
took  the  command. 

At  about  1  o'clock,  when  the  wings  were  advancing, 
the  Fusilier  Battalion  of  the  74th  Regiment  had  also 
pushed  forward  under  a  severe  fire  across  the  open 
ground  at  the  foot  of  the  Rotheberg,  and  under  such 
cover  as  they  could  established  themselves  at  the  foot 
of  the  cliff.  When,  at  about  3  o'clock,  the  Prussian 
artillery  compelled  the  foe  to  move  their  guns  further 
up  the  hill,  the  Fusiliers,  with  General  von  Francois 
at  their  head,  began  the  ascent  of  the  rock.  The  French 


THE  BATTLE   OF   SPICHEREN.  23 

Chasseurs,  evidently  taken  by  surprise,  were  driven 
from  the  outer  entrenchments  with  clubbed  rifles  and 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  9th  Company  of  the 
39th  Regiment  followed  close  upon  the  Fusiliers,  and 
the  gallant  General,  leading  their  attack,  fell,  pierced 
by  five  bullets.  Nothing  daunted,  the  small  body  of 
Fusiliers  made  good  their  position  on  the  narrow  spur 
of  the  cliff. 

Nevertheless  a  crisis  had  set  in.  The  14th  Division 
was  extended  over  three-quarters  of  a  mile ;  its  left 
wing  had  been  repulsed  by  greatly  superior  forces  into 
the  wood  of  Gif  ert,  the  right  wing  was  hard  pressed  at 
Stiering.  But  at  this  moment,  nearly  four  o'clock,  the 
heads  of  the  5th  and  16th  Divisions  arrived,  shortly 
after  their  batteries,  which  had  been  sent  ahead,  had 
been  brought  into  action. 

The  left  wing,  now  strongly  reinforced,  again  ad- 
vanced. General  von  Barnekow  led  efficient  help  up 
the  Rotheberg  where  the  Fusiliers  had  almost  ex- 
hausted their  ammunition,  and  the  French  were  driven 
out  from  their  entrenchments.  FinaUy,  after  a  deter- 
mined struggle,  the  Geraians  also  succeeded  in  taking 
possession  of  the  western  part  of  the  Gif  ert  Wald,  wiiile 
the  right  wing  had  fought  its  way  to  Alt- Stiering  and 
drew  near  to  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat,  the  Forbach 
highway.  General  Frossard  had,  however,  observed 
the  danger  at  this  point,  and  reinforced  his  left  wing 
to  the  strength  of  a  division  and  a  half.  These  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack  at  five  o'clock.  The  Germans  had 
no  complete  force  to  oppose  them,  so  all  their  previous 
advantages  were  lost. 

If  the  13th  Division  could  here  have  made  a  decisive 
attack,  the  battle  would  have  been  ended. 

This  division  had  reached  Puttlingen  at  1  o'clock 
and  was  not  more  than  a  mile  away  from  Stiering, 


24  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

having  marched  four  (German)  miles.  When  the  noise 
of  the  fighting  at  Saarbriicken  was  heard,  the  advanced 
guard  moved  forward  to  Rossel;  this  was  at  four 
o'clock.  It  would  seem  that  the  roar  of  cannon  was 
not  distinguishable  in  the  woods  of  Rossel ;  the  officers 
were  under  the  impression  that  the  combat  was  over, 
and  the  division  bivouacked  at  Volkingen,  which  place 
had  been  previously  appointed  as  the  end  of  its  march 
by  the  Commander  of  the  corps  at  a  time  when  he  was, 
of  course,  unable  to  foresee  the  change  in  the  situation. 

The  French  attack  had  meanwhile  been  brought  to 
a  stand  by  the  seven  batteries  in  position  on  Folster 
Hohe;  the  infantry  then  succeeded  in  making  fresh 
progress,  under  the  personal  leadership  of  General  von 
Zastrow. 

The  nature  of  the  ground  entirely  prohibited  the 
twenty-nine  squadi'ons  of  cavahy,  which  had  arrived 
from  all  directions  and  were  drawn  up  out  of  the  range 
of  fire,  from  taking  part  in  the  action.  The  Hussars 
tried  in  vain  to  ride  up  the  Rotheberg,  but  in  spite  of 
incredible  difficulties  Major  von  Lyncker  finally  gained 
the  summit  with  eight  guns,  amid  the  loud  cheering 
of  the  much-distressed  infantry.  The  guns,  as  each 
one  came  up,  at  once  opened  fire,  returning  the  fire  of 
three  French  batteries ;  but  quite  half  of  the  gunners 
were  shot  down  by  the  French  tirailleurs,  who  were 
under  cover,  at  about  800  paces  off.  A  small  strip  of 
gi^ound  in  front  was  indeed  wrested  from  the  enemy, 
but  the  narrow  space  allowed  of  no  deployment  against 
the  wide  front  of  the  French. 

But  effectual  assistance  was  coming  from  the  right. 
General  von  Goeben  ordered  all  battalions  of  the  16th 
Division,  not  yet  engaged,  towards  Stiering,  where  the 
fortunes  of  the  day  were  sealed.  While  one  part  of 
these  troops  attacked  the  village,  the  others,  turning 


BATTLE   OF   SPICHEKEN.  25 

off  from  the  high  road,  entered  the  ravine  of  the  Spi- 
cheren  woods,  and  in  a  hand-to-hand  encounter  di'ove 
the  French  off  the  ridge  leading  to  the  Rotheberg  and 
repelled  them  in  the  direction  of  the  Forbach  Height. 

Even  as  late  as  seven  o'clock  did  Laveaucoupet's 
division,  supported  by  part  of  Bataille's,  come  out  to 
attack  and  invade  the  much-disputed  position  in  the 
Gifert  forest,  but  the  danger  threatening  the  French 
left  wing  from  the  Spicheren  wood  crippled  this  move. 
By  nightfall  the  French  were  in  full  retreat  over  the 
plateau. 

To  protect  his  night-quarters  General  von  Schwerin 
occupied  Stiering  at  about  nine  o'clock,  while  the 
French  call  to  retreat  was  sounding  from  the  heights. 
This  was  only  done,  at  many  points,  after  a  hand-to- 
hand  fight.  The  advanced  guard  of  the  13th  Division 
marched  out  to  Forbach  but  did  not  occupy  it,  having 
been  deceived  by  a  troop  of  di'agoons  in  possession. 

General  Frossard  had  in  any  case  given  up  the  idea 
of  retreating  via  the  seriously  threatened  Forbach  and 
St.  Avoid  route,  and  retired  with  his  three  divisions 
on  Oetingen.  The  darkness,  and  the  impossibility  of 
manoeuvring  large  bodies  of  cavalry  in  such  a  country, 
saved  him  from  further  pursuit. 

General  von  Steinmetz  ordered  the  re-organization 
of  the  German  forces  that  same  night.  Some  of  them 
had  marched  as  much  as  six  miles  (German)  in  the 
course  of  the  day ;  two  batteries,  arriving  from  Konigs- 
berg  by  rail,  had  immediately  set  out  for  the  battle- 
field; but  the  Germans,  notwithstanding,  had  at  no 
time  attained  the  numerical  strength  of  the  enemy  in 
this  engagement,  which  had  been  begun  with  insuffi- 
cent  forces.  Only  thirteen  batteries  could  be  brought 
into  action  in  the  limited  space,  and  the  cavalry  was 
excluded  from  all  participation.    It  was  only  natui'al, 


26  THE   FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

under  the  circumstances,  that  the  losses  in  attack  were 
greater  than  those  of  the  defence.  The  Prussians  lost 
4871,  the  French  4078  men.  A  matter  of  gi*ave  signifi- 
cance was  the  fact  that  a  considerable  number  of  un- 
wounded  French  prisoners  were  taken  in  this  action. 

In  strong  contrast  to  the  good  fellowship  and  help- 
fulness of  the  Prussian  generals,  and  the  eagerness  of 
their  troops,  was  the  strange  vacillation  of  the  divis- 
ions behind  General  Frossard's  line ;  only  three,  indeed, 
were  sent  forward  to  his  support,  and  only  two  came 
up  when  the  fight  was  already  ended. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  the  battle  of  Spicheren 
should  never  have  taken  place  where  it  did,  as  it  frus- 
trated plans  on  a  larger  scale.  It  certainly  had  not 
been  anticipated,  but,  generally  speaking,  a  tactical 
victory  rarely  fails  to  coincide  with  a  strategic  policy. 
Success  in  battle  has  always  been  thankfully  accepted, 
and  turned  to  account.  The  battle  of  Spicheren  pre- 
vented the  Second  French  Corps  from  retiring  un- 
harmed; it  brought  the  G-ermans  in  touch  with  the 
enemy's  main  force,  and  it  gave  the  superior  com- 
mand  a  basis  for  fresh  plans  of  action. 

THE   GERMAN   ARMY  WHEELS   TO   THE   RIGHT. 

Marshal  MacMahon,  in  his  retreat,  had  taken  a  route 
which  entirely  severed  his  connection  with  Marshal 
Bazaine. 

As  he  was  not  pursued  he  could  have  used  the  rail- 
way on  the  LuneviUe  Metz  line  to  effect  his  union  with 
the  French  main  army ;  for  on  the  9th  it  was  still  open, 
but  rumor  had  it  that  the  Prussians  were  already  in 
Pont-a-Mousson,  and  the  state  of  his  troops  prevented 
the  Marshal  from  risking  another  engagement. 

His  First  Corps,  therefore,  turned  southwards,  and 
marched  on   Neuchateau,  whence   Chalons  could  be 


THE  WHEEL  TO   THE  EIGHT.  27 

reached  by  railway.  The  Fifth  Corps  was  being  shifted 
to  and  fro  by  contradictory  orders  from  the  Emperor's 
head-quarters.  First  it  was  to  proceed  to  Nancy,  then 
to  go  in  an  opposite  direction  towards  Langres.  On 
arriving  at  Charmes  it  was  ordered  to  Toul,  but  at 
Chaumont  another  order  sent  the  corps  to  Chalons 
with  the  rest.  General  Trochu  had  drawn  up  the 
newly-formed  Twelfth  Corps  at  that  point,  and  be- 
hind this  line  the  Seventh  Corps  managed  to  get  away 
from  Alsace  and  reach  Rheims  by  rail  via  Bar-sur- 
Aube  and  Paris. 

Thus  by  August  22nd  a  reserve  army  was  formed, 
consisting  of  four  corps  and  two  cavalry  divisions, 
under  the  command  of  Marshal  MacMahon,  who,  being 
twenty-five  miles  away,  was,  however,  unable  to  render 
immediate  assistance  to  Marshal  Bazaine,  who  stood 
,  directly  in  the  line  of  the  advancing  enemy. 

When  the  news  of  the  double  defeat  of  August  6th 
reached  the  Imperial  head-quarters,  the  first  impression 
there  was  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  retreat  on 
Chalons  with  Bazaine's  army,  and  the  Sixth  Corps, 
sections  of  which  were  already  on  the  road  to  Metz, 
were  ordered  to  retrace  their  steps.  But  this  decision 
was  presently  changed.  The  Emperor  had  not  merely 
to  consider  the  foreign  enemy,  but  public  opinion  in 
his  own  country.  The  sacrifice  of  entire  provinces  at 
the  very  beginning  of  a  war  which  had  been  undertaken 
with  such  high  anticipations,  would  have  provoked  the 
unbounded  indignation  of  the  French  people.  There 
were  still  200,000  men  who  could  be  brought  together 
on  the  western  bank  of  the  Moselle,  with  a  strong 
fortress  to  support  them,  and  though,  even  then,  the 
enemy  would  have  the  superiority  in  numbers,  his 
army  was  posted  along  a  line  of  twelve  miles.  His 
troops  had  yet  to  cross  the  Moselle,  and  this  would 


28  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

necessitate  a  disjunction  which  might  weaken  them  at 
that  decisive  point. 

The  generals  of  the  Third  Grerman  Army  did  not 
know  of  the  disorderly  condition  of  the  defeated  enemy, 
nor  even  the  direction  of  its  retreat.  It  was  supposed 
that  the  French  would  rally  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Vosges  for  renewed  resistance ;  and  as  it  was  impossible 
to  cross  the  mountains,  except  as  a  narrow  front,  the 
German  advance  was  very  cautious,  and  by  short  day 
marches  only.  Though  the  distance  between  Reichs- 
hofen  and  the  Saar  is  only  six  miles  in  a  straight  line, 
that  river  was  only  reached  in  five  days. 

Nothing  was  seen  of  the  enemy,  except  in  the  small 
but  inaccessible  villages  which  close  in  the  mountain 
roads.  Bitsch  was  avoided  by  a  fatiguing  circuit, 
Lichtenberg  was  captured  by  surprise,  Liitzelstein  had 
been  abandoned  by  its  garrison,  Pfalzburg  was  being 
besieged  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  Marsal  capitulated 
after  a  short  resistance. 

The  German  left  wing,  having  no  enemy  before  it, 
could  be  brought  into  closer  connection  with  the  centre, 
and  in  order  to  get  the  three  armies  on  a  same  front, 
they  were  ordered  to  wheel  to  the  right.  The  advance 
of  the  First  and  Second  Armies  had,  however,  to  be  de- 
layed, as  the  Third  did  not  reach  the  Saar  until  August 
12th.  The  whole  movement  was  thus  arranged.  The 
Third  Army  was  to  proceed  by  Saarunion  and  Dieuze, 
and  then  southward ;  the  Second  via  St.  Avoid  and 
Nomeny  and  southward;  the  First  was  to  take  the 
road  by  Saarlouis  and  Les  Etangs,  that  is  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Metz. 

The  cavalry  divisions,  which  were  reconnoitring  far 
to  the  front,  reported  the  enemy  as  retreating  all  along 
the  line.  They  fought  close  up  to  Metz,  and  on  both 
sides  of  the  Moselle,  forcing  the  sections  of  Canro- 


THE  WHEEL   TO   THE   EIGHT.  29 

bert's  corps,  which  had  again  been  ordered  to  proceed 
from  Chalons,  to  retire. 

All  these  observations  indicated  that  a  large  army 
was  encamped  beyond  Metz.  From  this  it  might 
equally  be  inferred  that  the  enemy  intended  a  further 
retreat,  or  that  an  attack  was  to  be  made,  by  the  whole 
French  force,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Grerman  army, 
while  the  crossing  of  the  Moselle  still  inevitably  divided 
it  from  the  left  wing. 

The  Army  head-quarters  restricted  itself,  in  the  main, 
to  issuing  general  instructions,  the  execution  of  which 
was  left  to  the  commanders  on  the  scene  of  war ;  but  in 
this  instance  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  regulate  the 
movements  of  each  separate  corps  by  direct  orders. 
On  August  11th  the  head-quarters  of  his  Majesty  were 
therefore  transferred  to  St.  Avoid,  in  the  front  lines, 
and  between  the  First  and  Second  Armies,  so  as  to 
allow  of  immediate  action  with  either  of  these  bodies 
at  any  moment.  The  three  corps  of  the  First  Army 
advanced  towards  the  Nied,  a  German  stream,  on 
August  12th,  only  to  find  that  the  French  had  evacu- 
ated that  position.  Three  corps  of  the  Second  Army 
marched  forward  to  Faulquemont  and  Morhange  on 
a  same  front,  while  two  others  retired  a  short  distance. 

On  the  next  day  the  Second  Army  reached  the  Seille 
and  occupied  Pont-a-Mousson  without  encountering 
the  enemy. 

The  extraordinary  inactivity  of  the  French  made  it 
seem  probable  that  they  might  not  make  a  stand,  even 
at  Metz,  a  notion  corroborated  by  the  reports  of  the 
German  cavahy,  which  was  pursuing  its  observations 
as  far  as  Toul  and  the  road  to  Verdun ;  but  there  was 
still  a  possibility  that  the  enemy  meant  to  throw  him- 
self, with  200  battalions,  on  the  Fu'st  Ai-my,  now  in 
his  immediate  proximity.     The  two  corps  forming  the 


30  THE   FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

right  wing  of  the  Second  Army  were  therefore  ordered 
to  halt  for  the  present,  a  httle  way  to  the  south  of 
Metz,  so  that  they  might  be  ready  to  attack  the  French 
flank  in  case  of  necessity.  If  the  enemy  chose  to  turn 
upon  these  corps,  then  that  order  was  to  hold  good  for 
the  Fu'st  Army. 

Meanwhile  the  other  corps  of  the  Second  Army  pur- 
sued their  route  southwards  to  the  Moselle;  if  the 
enemy  should  attack  them  with  superior  forces,  after 
they  had  crossed  the  river,  their  orders  were,  in  case 
of  need,  to  fall  back  on  the  Third  Army. 

So  much  caution  was  not  deemed  essential  by  all  of 
the  leaders ;  the  French  were  abeady  in  full  retreat, 
they  must  not  be  allowed  to  escape  without  further 
check,  and  the  Grerman  Army  ought  forthwith  to  strike 
a  decided  blow.  The  French  had,  indeed,  already 
resolved  on  a  further  retreat ;  but,  when  the  Seventh 
Corps  became  aware  of  their  retrograde  movement, 
during  the  afternoon,  a  fight  began  on  the  German 
side  of  the  Moselle,  which,  by  the  voluntary  interven- 
tion of  the  nearest  divisions,  developed  into  a  battle  in 
the  course  of  the  evening. 

BATTLE   OF  COLOMBEY-NGUIJiLY. 

(August  14th.) 

The  Commandant  of  Metz  had  declared  his  inability 
to  hold  that  fortress  a  fortnight,  if  left  to  his  own 
resources ;  and  the  intrenched  position  on  the  Nied, 
taken  up  for  the  protection  of  the  city,  had  been  found 
disadvantageously  situated,  so  the  French  commander 
hoped  to  take  up  a  more  favorable  position  at  Verdun. 

Strategic  necessity  outweighed  even  political  regard 
for  public  opinion,  and  the  Emperor,  although  he  had 
transferred  the  command-in-chief  to  Marshal  Bazaine, 


BATTLE   OF   COLOMBEY-NOUILLY.  31 

remained  with  the  army,  for  it  would  have  been  im- 
possible for  him  to  return  to  Paris  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. 

Very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  14th  August  be- 
gan the  removal  of  the  extensive  baggage  train  through 
the  streets  of  the  city,  and  towards  noon  the  Second, 
Fourth,  and  Sixth  Corps  set  out,  while  the  Third  Corps 
remained  in  its  position  behind  the  deep  vaUey  of  the 
Colombey  stream,  to  cover  the  retreat. 

When,  at  four  o'clock,  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
became  known,  General  von  der  Goltz  threw  the  front 
columns  of  the  Seventh  Corps  across  his  path,  and 
seized  Colombey  and  the  Chateau  d'Aubigny,  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  French.  But,  upon  hearing  the  first 
sound  of  cannon,  the  French  columns  immediately 
turned  about,  fully  equipped  for  battle,  and  eager, 
after  their  previous  defeats,  to  change  their  fortunes 
by  a  determined  struggle.  Castagny's  division  at  once 
marched,  with  greatly  superior  force,  upon  the  small 
detachment  holding  the  isolated  position  of  Colombey, 
which  only  held  its  o\nti  by  a  determined  effort. 

Meanwhile  the  advanced  guard  of  the  First  Army 
Corps  came  by  both  highways  from  Saarbriicken  and 
Saarlouis ;  and  their  batteries,  being  ahead,  at  once  took 
part  in  the  engagement.  The  infantry  following, 
ascended  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  plateau  of  Bellecroix, 
by  way  of  Lauvallier,  and  also  drove  the  enemy  out  of 
the  woods  at  the  east  of  Mey.  But  at  this  point  the 
stand  made  by  the  French  Third  Corps  brought  about 
a  lull. 

The  13th,  1st,  and  2nd  Divisions  had  meanwhile  fol- 
lowed up  their  advanced  guard,  the  last  two  having 
been  kept  in  readiness  by  General  von  Manteuffel  ever 
since  his  outposts  had  reported  that  the  enemy  was 
moving.    General  von  Zastrow,  too,  arrived  on  the 


32  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

field,  and  undertook  the  command  of  the  left.  Very 
soon  sixty  field-pieces  came  into  action  against  the 
enemy.  General  von  Osten-Sacken  succeeded  in  car- 
rying the  25th  Brigade  through  the  hollow  of  Coincy, 
and  led  them  up  the  slope  of  the  plateau.  The  copse 
of  fir-trees  on  the  road  to  Bellecroix  was  taken  by 
storm,  surrounded  on  three  sides,  again  lost  in  a  bloody 
conflict,  and  then  recaptured.  Soon  afterwards  two 
batteries  succeeded  in  establishing  themselves  on  the 
western  side  of  Planchette  and  driving  the  French 
back  to  Borny ;  still  the  most  violent  conflict  was  rag- 
ing on  both  sides. 

But  now  the  German  right  was  in  danger  of  being 
out-flanked.  General  Ladmirault,  upon  hearing  that 
Grenier's  division  had  been  driven  out  of  Mey,  im- 
mediately set  out  to  its  relief  with  his  other  two 
divisions,  regained  possession  of  the  village,  and 
advanced  on  the  road  to  Bouzonville.  General  von 
Manteuffel  had  meanwhile  taken  the  necessary  precau- 
tions to  remain  master,  at  all  hazards,  of  that  part  of 
the  Vallieres  stream  which  covered  the  right  flank. 
The  1st  Brigade  was  drawn  up  behind  Noisseville,  as  a 
reserve  for  general  emergency,  the  4th,  and  part  of  the 
artiUery  of  the  First  Corps,  were  sent  to  face  General 
Ladmirault  at  Poix,  on  the  Bouzonvilte  road,  while  the 
remaining  batteries  were  to  enfilade  him  in  his  advance 
from  their  positions  on  the  southern  slopes  to  the  east 
of  Nouilly.  On  the  left  Gliimer's  division  had  all  this 
time  held  their  ground  at  Colombey,  but  now,  at  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  brigade  under  Woyna  came 
to  their  assistance,  and  took  possession  of  the  woods 
to  the  west.  A  very  welcome  reinforcement  by  the 
Second  Army,  retained  at  the  Seille,  now  arrived. 

The  18tli  Infantry  Division,  after  a  heavy  march, 
had  bivouacked  near  Buchy  in  the  afternoon,  but  when 


BATTLE   OF  COLOMBEY-NOUILLY.  33 

General  von  Wrangel  was  informed  that  firing  was 
audible  in  the  direction  where  the  First  Army  was 
known  to  be,  he  at  once  set  his  troops  in  motion 
towards  that  point.  He  drove  the  enemy  out  of 
Peltre,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Von  Woyna's  brigade, 
occupied  Grigy,  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  the  French 
position  at  Borny. 

The  2nd  Division,  on  the  right  wing,  had  also  pushed 
on  the  line  of  battle  towards  Mey,  by  way  of  Nouilly 
and  the  adjacent  vineyards ;  Mey  and  the  neighboring 
woods  were  taken  from  the  enemy  before  nightfall. 
The  French  had  not  proceeded  further  than  Villers 
I'Orme,  and  from  thence  retreated,  all  along  their  line, 
in  the  direction  of  Grigy.  The  Prussians,  as  they 
retired,  were  only  disturbed  by  heavy  firing  from  the 
forts,  especially  from  that  of  St.  Julien,  which  kept  it 
up  till  after  dark. 

The  Germans  lost  by  the  engagement  of  August  14th 
5000  men,  among  them  200  officers ;  the  French  lost  only 
3600  men,  their  Third  Corps  being  the  heaviest  sufferer. 
The  vicinity  of  a  great  fortress  of  course  prevented  the 
reaping  of  the  fruits  of  victory  by  immediate  pursuit. 

It  was  for  this  reason,  indeed,  that  the  Fu*st  Army 
had  not  been  prepared  to  fight  on  that  day,  though  the 
possibility  of  a  battle  had  been  anticipated.  Although 
the  Second  Army  had  only  been  able  to  send  one  divis- 
ion to  the  aid  of  the  Fii'st  at  that  late  hour,  its  assault 
on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  had  not  failed  of  its 
effect. 

The  manner  in  which  the  battle  was  begun  debarred 
it  from  being  directed  by  one  chief. 

The  advanced  guard  of  the  foui*  divisions  were  the 

troops  principally  engaged.    The  battle  was  checkered 

by  many  critical  moments ;  some  small  detachments, 

sometimes  out  of  reach  of  immediate  support,  boldly 

3 


34  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

attacked  a  superior  foe ;  and  the  result  might  have  been 
serious  if  the  enemy  had  made  more  decisive  use  of 
their  compact  formation.  It  must,  however,  be  ad- 
mitted that  their  Third  Corps  received  no  support 
from  the  Gruards  standing  close  in  theu'  rear ;  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  all  the  Prussian  commanders,  who 
were  within  reach,  were  again  distinguished  by  that 
esprit  de  corps  and  mutual  helpfulness  which  had  ani- 
mated them  in  the  previous  engagements. 

A  large  share  of  the  success  of  the  day  must  be 
attributed  to  the  artillery.  Hurrying  along  in  front 
of  the  advanced  guard,  the  artillery  aided  them  very 
effectively  in  driving  the  French  from  their  position 
before  Metz,  and  driving  them  back  under  cover  of  its 
forts,  even  before  the  main  body  had  time  to  come  up. 

But  for  this  protection  the  Grermans  would  have  had 
some  trophies  to  show  for  their  victory  at  Colombey- 
Nouilly,  but  the  Commander-in-chief  was  very  well 
satisfied  with  the  results  obtained.  The  retreat  of 
the  enemy  had  been  intercepted,  and  a  day  had  been 
gained  to  effect  the  crossing  of  the  Second  and  Third 
Armies  over  the  Moselle. 

(August  15th.)  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  15th  the 
cavalry  had  ridden  forth  to  the  outworks  of  Metz,  but 
saw  nothing  of  the  enemy  on  this  side  of  the  fortress. 
A  few  shells  thrown  into  the  camp  of  Longueville 
scared  the  Imperial  head-quarters  away  from  that 
point. 

King  William  had  ridden  over  to  the  First  Army, 
and  immense  clouds  of  dust  were  observed  rising  on 
the  other  side  of  the  fortress^  it  could  no  longer  be 
doubted  that  the  French  were  in  retreat,  and  that  the 
Second  Army  was  now  free  to  cross  the  MosoUe  with 
train  and  baggage. 

The  First  Corps  of  the  First  Army  had  to  remain 


BATTLE   OF  VIONVILLE — MARS-LA-TOUR.  35 

south  of  Metz  at  Courcelles,  to  protect  the  railway 
lines,  the  other  two  were  withdrawn  on  the  left  towards 
the  Seille ;  they  were  to  cross  the  river  higher  up,  so 
as  to  avoid  a  separation  of  the  forces  by  the  fortress. 

The  French  had  started  again  on  the  march,  inter- 
rupted yesterday,  but  proceeded  no  further  than  about 
a  mile  from  Metz  on  August  15th.  Their  cavalry  only 
went  a  little  further  ahead,  by  the  two  roads  to  Ver- 
dun. 

The  Third  Corps  of  the  German  Second  Army  trav- 
ersed the  Moselle  at  Noveant,  where  the  bridge  was 
found  intact,  and  by  a  flying  bridge  of  boats ;  its  artil- 
lery, however,  was  forced  to  make  a  detour  by  Pont-a- 
Mousson. 

It  was  not  until  late  at  night  that  the  troops  were 
all  across  and  encamped  close  to  the  left  bank.  One 
division  of  the  Tenth  Corps  was  left  at  Pont-a-Mousson 
and  the  others  advanced  to  Thiaucourt.  The  cavalry 
went  even  further  towards  the  Metz-Verdun  road, 
and  encountered  that  of  the  French  near  Mars-la-Tour. 
Several  small  engagements  took  place,  but  when,  early 
in  the  afternoon,  twenty-four  Prussian  squadrons  had 
assembled,  the  French  thought  it  wise  to  retreat  on 
Vionville.  The  Guards  and  the  Fourth  Corps  had 
crossed  at  Dieulouard  and  Marbache,  higher  up  the 
river. 

The  Third  Army  was  drawn  up  in  the  line  of  Nancy 
and  Bayou.  On  this  day  an  attempt  to  seize  the  for- 
tress of  Diedenhofen  by  surprise,  proved  a  failure. 

BATTLE   OF   VIONVILLE — MARS-LA-TOUR. 

(August  16th.) 

The  generals  of  the  Second  Army,  like  the  rest,  were 
of  opinion  that  there  were  no  more  serious  engage- 


36  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAK. 

ments  to  be  anticipated  on  the  Moselle,  and  therefore 
two  corps,  the  Third  and  the  Tenth,  were  ordered  to 
proceed  northwards  on  the  road  to  Verdun,  via  Gorze 
and  Thiaucourt,  on  August  16,  while  the  others  were 
hastened  westwards  towards  the  Meuse. 

The  French  retreat  from  Metz  was,  however,  not 
effected  on  that  day.  Its  heavy  baggage  blocked  every 
road,  and  in  the  forenoon  three  divisions  still  remained 
behind  in  the  Moselle  valley.  The  Emperor  alone  had 
departed  at  an  early  hour  on  the  road  by  Etain,  which 
was  comparatively  safe.  He  was  escorted  by  two 
brigades  of  cavahy.  As  the  right  wing  of  the  army 
could  not  yet  follow,  the  start  was  postponed  until  the 
afternoon,  and  the  left  wing,  who  were  ready,  sent  back 
again  into  their  bivouacs.  But  they  were  disturbed 
by  Prussian  shell  as  early  as  nine  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing. 

Major  Korber  had  advanced  with  four  batteries  close 
up  to  Vionville,  under  cover  of  the  cavahy,  and  the 
French  dragoons,  surprised  by  their  fire,  fled  in  con- 
fusion through  their  own  infantry-camp.  These,  how- 
ever, at  once  seized  their  arms  and  formed  into  line, 
while  their  artillery  opened  a  heavy  fire.  Unsupported 
at  first  by  infantry,  the  Prussian  gUAS  withdrew ;  but 
matters  soon  became  serious. 

General  von  Alvensleben,  fearing  to  lose  sight  of 
the  enemy,  had  started  again  with  the  Third  Corps 
after  a  short  night's  rest.  The  6th  Division  was  march- 
ing on  the  left  flank,  by  Onville ;  the  5th,  on  the  right, 
proceeded  through  the  long  forest  valley,  on  the  way 
to  Gorza.  This  valley  was  found  unoccupied  by  the 
enemy,  who  indeed  had  taken  very  few  precautions. 

The  advanced  guard  encountered  the  French  di- 
vision under  Berge  on  the  open  plateau  south  of  Fla- 
vigny,  and  General  von  Stiilpnagel   soon  discovered 


BATTLE   OF  VIONVILLE — MAES-LA-TOUE.  37 

that  lie  had  to  do  with  an  enemy  whom  it  would  take 
all  his  strength  to  beat.  At  ten  o'clock  the  10th  Bri- 
gade marched  to  the  attack  and  opened  fire  on  the 
enemy  with  twenty-four  guns. 

Both  sides  now  assumed  the  offensive.  The  Prus- 
sians, on  the  right,  fought  their  way  with  varying  for- 
tunes through  the  wood,  often  in  hand-to-hand  encount- 
er, and,  towards  eleven  o'clock,  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  projecting  spur  of  the  wood  of  St.  Arnould  oppo- 
site Flavigny.  Their  left  wing,  on  the  contrary,  was 
repulsed ;  even  the  artillery  at  that  point  came  near  to 
being  overthrown.  The  52nd  Regiment  finally  re- 
gained the  lost  ground,  paying  heavily  for  its  valor. 
The  1st  Battalion  lost  every  one  of  its  officers,  the  col- 
ors passed  from  hand  to  hand  as  its  bearers  were  suc- 
cessively shot  down,  and  the  commander  of  the  brigade, 
General  von  Doring,  feU  mortally  wounded.  General 
von  Stiilpnagel  rode  in  the  line  of  fire,  encouraging 
the  men,  while  General  von  Schwerin  collected  the 
remnant  of  his  troops  bereft  of  their  leaders,  and  held 
the  height  of  Flavigny,  whence  the  French  finally 
retired  on  the  General  having  been  reinforced  by  a 
section  of  the  Tenth  Corps  from  Noveaut. 

On  the  supposition  that  the  French  had  already 
begun  their  retreat,  the  6th  Division  was  sent  forward 
to  Etain  by  way  of  Mars-la-Tour,  to  obstruct,  if  pos- 
sible, the  northern  road  to  Verdun.  When  they 
reached  the  height  of  TronviUe,  whence  they  could  see 
how  things  really  stood,  they  wheeled  to  the  right  in 
the  direction  of  Vionville  and  Flavigny.  Their  artil- 
lery, in  advance,  formed  a  formidable  line  of  fire,  and 
thus  prepared  the  attack ;  by  half-past  eleven  the  11th 
Brigade  had  taken  possession  of  VionviUe  in  spite  of 
heavy  losses.  From  thence,  and  from  the  south,  in 
conjunction  with   the  10th  Brigade,  an  attack  was 


38  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

directed  on  the  town,  now  in  flames.  The  different 
divisions  were  much  mixed,  but  by  taking  advantage 
of  every  rise  in  the  ground  for  cover,  the  regimental 
officers  got  theii*  men  steadily  forward,  in  spite  of 
heavy  fire  from  the  French  infantry  and  guns.  Fla- 
vigny  was  taken  by  assault,  and  one  cannon  and  a 
number  of  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  brave 
Brandenburgers. 

Vionville,  Flavigny  and  the  northern  end  of  the 
forest  of  St.  Arnould  were  now  the  points  of  support 
of  the  Prussian  forces  facing  to  the  east ;  their  line  was 
nearly  a  mile  long,  and  the  entire  infantry  and  artil- 
lery were  in  one  Une  and  engaged  in  hot  fight.  The 
5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  and  part  of  the  37th 
Brigade  were  engaged  in  an  independent  fight  near 
Tronville. 

The  position  of  the  French  was  one  of  great  advan- 
tage. Their  left  flank  was  protected  by  the  fortress 
of  Metz,  the  right  by  formidable  batteries  along  the 
old  Roman  road,  and  a  strong  force  of  cavalry ;  they 
might  safely  await  an  attack  on  their  centre. 

Of  coui'se,  the  march  towards  Verdun,  even  under 
cover  of  a  strong  rear-guard,  had  to  be  abandoned.  If 
the  Marshal  had  been  resolved  to  pi;oceed,  he  would 
have  had  to  engage  and  get  rid  of  the  enemy  in  front 
of  him. 

It  is  difficult  to  decide,  from  a  purely  military  stand- 
point, why  this  alternative  was  not  taken.  There  was 
hardly  a  doubt  that  only  part,  and  probably  only  a 
small  part,  of  the  German  armies  could  as  yet  have 
crossed  the  Moselle,  and  when  in  the  course  of  the  day 
the  divisions  that  had  remained  at  Metz  arrived,  the 
French  were  decidedly  the  stronger.  But  it  seems 
that  the  Marshal's  first  object  was  not  to  be  forced 
■  away  from  Metz ;  almost  his  entire  concern  was  for 


BATTLE   OF  VIONVILLE— MAKS-LA-TOUE.  39 

the  left  wing.  By  constantly  reinforcing  this  flank,  he 
massed  the  Gruards  and  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps  in  front 
of  the  Bois  des  Ognons,  from  whence  no  attack  was 
made.  We  are  tempted  to  fancy  that  political  reasons 
alone  induced  Bazaine,  thus  early  in  the  game,  to 
attach  himself  to  Metz. 

Meanwhile  the  Prussians  slowly  but  surely  made 
their  way  beyond  Flavigny  and  Vionville,  and,  assisted 
by  a  heavy  fire  from  the  artillery,  compelled  the  right 
wing  of  the  Second  French  Corps  to  retire  on  Rezon- 
ville,  a  movement  which  turned  into  a  flight  when  the 
French  Generals  Bataille  and  Valaze  had  been  killed. 

To  regain  the  lost  ground  the  French  Cuirassier 
Guards  turned  resolutely  on  the  pursuers,  but  their 
attack  was  cut  short  by  the  rapid  fire  of  two  com- 
panies of  the  52nd  Regiment,  drawn  up  in  line,  who 
did  not  fire  till  within  250  paces  of  the  enemy.  The 
cavalry  parting  to  the  right  and  left  rushed  into  the 
fire  of  more  infantry  behind ;  243  horses  were  left  on 
the  field,  and  only  the  remains  of  the  regiment  escaped 
the  pursuit  of  two  hussar  regiments  from  Flavigny. 
A  French  battery  in  front  of  Rezonville  had  hardly 
time  to  discharge  a  few  shots  before  it  was  surrounded. 
The  Prussians  could  not,  indeed,  carry  off  the  guns, 
having  no  horses  to  spare;  but  the  Commander-in- 
chief  of  the  French  army,  who  himself  placed  the  guns 
in  position,  was  for  several  minutes  in  imminent  dan- 
ger of  being  taken  prisoner. 

The  6th  Division  of  Prussian  cavalry  had  also  been 
ordered  to  the  front ;  after  passing  through  the  lines 
of  artillery  and  forming  line  as  well  as  the  limited 
space  permitted,  they  found  themselves  face  to  face 
with  fresh  and  well-ordered  troops.  Marshal  Bazaine 
had  taken  the  precaution  of  substituting  the  Grenadier 
Guards  Division  for  the  defeated  companies  of  the 


40  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Second  Corps,  having  at  last  brought  them  up  from 
his  disengaged  left  wing,  but  not  without  filling  the 
vacancy  by  a  division  of  the  Thii-d  Corps.  Thus  the 
Prussian  cavalry,  on  nearing,  was  received  with  such 
overwhelming  fire  from  musketry  and  artillery  that  it 
pulled  up  short,  and  then  slowly  retired,  its  retreat 
being  covered  by  two  squadrons  of  Uhlans,  who 
repeatedly  attacked  the  advancing  enemy.  The  heavy- 
horse  did  no  actual  fighting,  but  the  artillery  had 
gained  time  and  opportunity  to  advance  on  a  line 
from  the  skirt  of  the  woods  to  Flavigny. 

It  was  now  two  o'clock.  So  far  General  von  Alven- 
sleben  had  deceived  the  enemy  with  regard  to  the 
slender  number  of  his  troops  by  incessant  assaults. 
But  the  battle  was  now  at  a  standstill,  the  battalions 
visibly  thinned,  their  strength  reduced  by  four  hours  of 
hard  fighting,  and  the  infantry  had  almost  exhausted 
its  supply  of  ammunition.  There  was  not  a  battalion, 
not  a  battery  left  in  reserve  all  along  the  exposed  line. 
There  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  maintain  and 
defend  the  positions  so  hardly  won. 

The  left  wing  was  in  especial  danger,  being  under 
the  fire  of  the  heavy  artillery  posted  on  the  Roman 
road.  Their  greatly  superior  numbers  permitted  the 
French  to  extend  their  right  wing,  threatening  thus  to 
encircle  the  Prussians. 

Marshal  Canrobert,  in  the  French  centre,  had  dis- 
cerned the  right  moment  to  press  forward  on  VionviUe 
with  all  his  forces.  At  this  critical  instant  the  Ger- 
mans had  only  a  small  portion  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision available  to  check  him.  Two  brigades  had  been 
dispatched  to  cover  the  German  left,  and  of  the  12th 
Brigade,  which  remained  in  the  rear  of  VionviUe,  two 
squadrons  had  been  sent  to  the  woods  of  Tronville. 
The  two  regiments,  the  Magdeburg  Cuirassiers  and 


BATTLE   OF  VIONYILLE — MAKS-LA-TOUK.  41 

Altmarkische  Lancers,  ordered  to  face-  Canrobei-t's 
forces,  were  therefore  only  three  squadi-ons,  that  is 
800  horses. 

General  von  Bredow  first  crossed  the  valley  below 
Vionville  in  column,  and  then  wheeling  to  the  right  he 
traversed  the  eastern  slope,  after  having  drawn  up 
both  regiments  on  the  same  front.  Being  received 
with  heavy  infantry  and  artillery  fii-e,  he  made  a  de- 
termined attack  on  the  enemy's  lines,  riding  down  the 
foremost,  breaking  through  their  fire  and  securing  the 
guns  and  the  drivers.  The  second  line  of  the  French 
again  could  not  withstand  this  onslaught,  and  even 
their  remoter  batteries  prepared  to  limber  up. 

But  the  triumph  and  excitement  of  success  carried 
the  small  body  of  horse  too  far,  and  after  an  advance 
of  3000  paces  they  found  themselves  surrounded  by 
the  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  which  attacked  them  from 
all  sides.  There  was  not  space  enough  for  a  second 
charge,  and  so,  after  several  encounters  with  the  French 
cavalry,  the  brigade  was  forced  to  cut  its  way  back 
through  the  French  infantry,  who  followed  them  up 
with  numerous  volleys.  Only  one-half  of  the  men 
reached  Flavigny  alive,  where  they  were  re-organized 
into  two  squadi'ons,  having  succeeded  by  their  devoted 
bravery  in  stopping  the  French  from  further  attack 
on  Vionville. 

At  three  o'clock  four  of  the  German  divisions  were 
advancing  towards  the  Tronville  woods.  Barby's 
cavalry  brigade,  placed  to  keep  watch  on  the  western 
side,  had  to  retire  before  the  enemy's  fire,  and  the  in- 
fantry occupying  the  forest  also  had  to  yield  to  superior 
strength ;  the  batteries  which  were  drawn  up  between 
Vionville  and  the  wood  were  attacked  in  their  unpro- 
tected rear  at  the  opening  of  the  forest,  and  were  like- 
wise forced  to  retire.    But  it  took  the  French  a  full 


42  THE   FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

hour  to  conquer  the  obstinate  resistance  of  the  four 
Prussian  battahons. 

At  the  subsequent  roll-call,  near  Tronville,  it  was  as- 
certained that  the  24th  Regiment  had  lost  1000  men 
and  52  officers,  while  every  officer  of  the  2nd  Battalion 
of  the  20th  Regiment  was  killed.  Half  the  37th 
Brigade,  who  had  backed  up  their  comrades  volunta- 
rily since  noon,  took  possession  of  Tronville  and  pre- 
pared it  for  an  obstinate  defence.  It  was  not  till  near 
three  that  the  Third  Corps,  which  had  been  fighting 
for  seven  hours  almost  single-handed,  received  any 
efficient  assistance. 

While  the  Tenth  Corps  was  on  the  route  to  Thiau- 
court,  its  advanced  guard  heard  heavy  firing  from  the 
direction  of  Vionville,  and  the  General  in  command, 
von  Voigts-Rhetz,  immediately  set  out  for  the  battle- 
field. Having  personally  ascertained  how  matters 
stood,  he  gave  the  necessary  orders  to  the  troops  in 
rear. 

Here  again  the  artillery  opened  the  attack.  Its  fire 
stopped  the  advance  of  the  enemy  on  both  sides  of 
the  Tronville  woods,  especially  when  the  batteries  of 
the  Third  Corps  simultaneously  reopened  fire.  Half 
an  hour  later  the  first  infantry  of  von  "^oyna's  brigade 
appeared  on  the  field,  drove  the  enemy  back  into  the 
wood,  and  finally,  assisted  by  the  Diringshofen's  bri- 
gade, took  possession  of  the  northern  outskirts.  The 
right  wing  of  the  Third  Corps  had  also  been  rein- 
forced. 

The  32nd  Brigade  of  the  Eighth  Corps,  on  being 
called  upon  to  assist  the  5th  Division,  immediately  ad- 
vanced from  the  Moselle  via  Arry,  though  fatigued  by 
a  long  march.  The  lltli  Regiment  joined  the  brigade, 
and  three  batteries  were  sent  ahead  to  commence  opera- 
tions ;  this  force  emerged  at  five  o'clock  from  the  forest 


BATTLE  OF  VIONVILLE — MAES-LA-TOUE.  43 

of  St.  Arnould.  They  at  once  made  an  assault  on  the 
heights  of  Maison  Blanche,  but,  though  renewing  their 
attack  three  times,  failed  to  take  up  that  position  in 
the  teeth  of  Marshal  Bazaine,  who  had  greatly  strength- 
ened his  lines  in  front  of  Rezonville.  Then  the  French, 
in  their  turn,  assumed  the  offensive ;  but  they  too  were 
unable  to  establish  themselves  on  the  hill,  which  was 
fully  exposed  to  the  well-du'ected  fire  of  the  Prussian 
artillery,  and  they  again  retraced  their  steps.  Minor 
struggles  for  this  position  were  renewed  on  both  sides, 
but  were  always  frustrated  either  by  the  German  or 
the  French  artillery ;  and  the  fight  on  the  right  had 
become  more  or  less  stationary. 

The  fact  that  on  the  left  two  French  divisions  had 
retired,  abandoning  the  woods  of  Tronville  to  a  few 
newly-arrived  Prussian  battalions,  can  only  be  ex- 
plained by  a  report  having  reached  Bazaine's  head- 
quarters that  the  enemy  was  harrying  the  right  fiank 
of  the  French  near  Hannonville. 

The  enemy  referred  to  was  Wedell's  brigade,  which, 
having  started  for  Etain  according  to  orders,  on  reach- 
ing St.  Hilaire  at  noon,  received  instructions  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  field  of  battle. 

General  von  Schwartzkoppen  selected  the  highway 
to  Mars-la-Tour,  with  a  view  to  falling  on  the  enemy 
either  in  the  rear  or  in  flank.  The  French  in  the 
interim  had  extended  their  reinforced  right  wing  to 
the  valley,  west  of  Bruville,  where  three  divisions  of 
cavahy  were  drawn  up. 

Thus,  when  General  von  Wedell's  brigade,  no  more 
than  five  battalions  strong,  advanced  to  the  attack  from 
both  sides  past  TronviUe,  which  the  French  themselves 
had  fired,  he  found  himself  in  front  of  the  extensive 
line  of  the  4th  French  Brigade. 

The  two  Westphalian  regiments  advanced  steadily 


44  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

under  the  storm  of  shell  and  fire  of  mitrailleuses,  when 
they  suddenly  reached  the  edge  of  a  deep  ravine.  This, 
however,  they  soon  traversed,  but  when  they  had 
scaled  the  opposite  bank  they  were  met  by  a  murderous 
shower  of  bullets  from  the  infantry,  which  were  every- 
where close  upon  them.  After  almost  every  one  of  the 
officers  and  generals  had  been  killed,  the  remnant  of 
the  battalions  fell  back  into  the  ravine ;  300  men  were 
taken  prisoners,  being  unable  to  ascend  the  steep 
southern  slope  after  the  fatigue  of  a  six-mile  march. 
Those  who  escaped  mustered  at  Tronville  around  the 
bullet-riddled  colors  which  Colonel  von  Cranach,  the 
only  officer  who  still  had  a  horse  under  him,  brought 
back  in  his  own  hand. 

Seventy-two  officers  and  2542  men  were  missing,  out 
of  95  officers  and  4546  men — more  than  half.  The 
French  pressed  after  the  defeated  enemy,  but  were 
checked  on  the  right  by  the  dauntless  attack  of  the 
1st  Dragoon  Gluards,  though  that  regiment  was  re- 
duced by  250  horses  and  nearly  all  its  officers  gone ; 
and  on  the  left  by  the  4th  Squadron  of  the  2nd 
Dragoon  Gruards,  who  faced  three  times  their  number 
of  Chasseurs  d'Afrique. 

But  there  now  appeared  on  the  op^n  ridge  of  Ville 
sur  Yron  a  large  force  of  cavahy.  These  were  Le- 
gi-and's  division  and  the  Guard  Brigade  de  France  in 
four  compact  masses,  overlapping  each  other  to  the 
right. 

The  Grermans  had  only  16  squadrons  left,  who  now 
joined  Barby's  brigade ;  they  were  drawn  up  in  two 
bodies  to  the  left  of  Mars-la-Tour.  A  little  in  advance 
of  them  stood  the  13th  Dragoons,  to  receive  the  charge 
of  the  squadron  of  the  Guards. 

The  dragoons  charged  the  French  first  line — the 
hussar  brigade,  which  had  ridden  through  between 


BATTLE   OF  VIONVILLE — MAKS-LA-TOUR.  45 

the  intervals  of  the  Prussian  regiments ;  but  soon  after- 
wards General  von  Barby  appeared  with  the  remainder 
of  his  forces  on  the  height  of  Ville  sur  Yron,  and  at 
haK-past  six  o'clock  the  bodies  of  cavahy  came  into 
collision. 

A  mighty  cloud  of  dust  concealed  the  ensuing  hand- 
to-hand  encounter  of  5000  mounted  men,  swaying  to 
and  fro,  fortune  gi*adually  deciding  for  the  Prussians. 
Greneral  Montaigu  was  taken  prisoner  severely 
wounded,  and  General  Legrand  fell  while  leading  his 
di'agoons  to  the  assistance  of  the  hussars. 

The  Brigade  de  France  allowed  the  enemy  to  ap- 
proach within  150  paces,  and  then  the  Lancer  Regiment 
rushed  upon  the  Hanoverian  Uhlans;  but  the  latter 
outflanked  them,  and  received  unforeseen  assistance 
from  the  5th  Squadron  of  the  2nd  Dragoon  Guards, 
who,  on  their  return  from  a  reconnaissance,  plunging 
over  fences  and  ditches,  fell  upon  the  French  in  flank, 
while  the  Westphalian  Cuirassiers  at  the  same  time 
broke  their  front.  The  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  tried  in 
vain  to  hinder  the  movements  of  the  Hanoverian 
Dragoons,  who  more  and  more  enclosed  them;  the 
clouds  of  dust  began  to  move  in  a  northerly  direction, 
and  the  entire  French  cavalry  drew  away  towards  the 
valley  of  Bruville,  where  they  had  still  five  regiments 
of  Clerembault's  cavalry.  The  General  ordered  one 
brigade  to  cross  the  valley,  but  the  fleeing  hussars  and 
some  misunderstood  signals  threw  them  into  confusion. 
They  were  borne  back,  and  not  until  the  infantry 
charged  upon  the  Prussian  pursuers  in  the  covered 
valley  did  the  latter  desist  from  the  pursuit. 

The  Prussian  regiments  quietly  reformed  and  then 
withdi-ew  at  a  walk  to  Mars-la-Toui-,  followed  at  a  gi^eat 
distance  by  part  of  the  Clerembault's  division. 

This,  the  greatest  cavalry  combat  of  the  war,  had 


46  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

the  effect  of  making  the  French  right  wing  give  up  all 
further  attempts  to  act  on  the  offensive.  The  Grermans 
moui-ned  the  loss  of  many  superior  officers,  who  always, 
at  the  head  of  thek  men,  had  set  them  a  splendid 
example. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  now  hastened  to  the 
field  of  battle.  The  day  was  nearly  at  an  end,  darkness 
approaching,  and  the  battle  won.  The  Prussians  in 
the  evening  stood  on  the  ground  which  in  the  morning 
had  been  occupied  by  the  French.  Though  General 
von  Alvensleben  had  in  the  first  instance  been  under 
the  impression  that  he  would  have  only  the  French 
rear-guard  to  deal  with,  he  did  not  hesitate  in  the 
attack  when  he  found  the  entire  army  before  him. 
With  his  single  corps  he  kept  up  the  fight  till  the  after- 
noon, and  drove  back  the  enemy  from  Flavigny  to 
Eezonville,  a  distance  of  more  than  half  a  mile.  This 
was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  achievements  of  the  war. 

Thanks  to  the  valuable  assistance  of  the  Tenth  Corps 
the  battle  could  be  carried  on  through  the  afternoon 
on  the  defensive,  but  only  by  most  decided  counter, 
attacks  from  the  cavalry,  and  the  unflinching  tenacity 
of  the  artillery. 

To  renew  a  challenge  to  the  enemy,^who  still  gi'eatly 
outnumbered  the  Grermans,  would  now  have  been  rash- 
ness, and  as  they  could  hope  for  no  further  assistance, 
might  have  jeopardized  the  success  so  dearly  paid  for. 

The  troops  were  exhausted,  most  of  their  ammunition 
spent,  the  horses  had  been  saddled  for  fifteen  hours, 
and  without  fodder.  A  part  of  the  batteries  could  only 
be  moved  at  a  slow  pace,  and  the  nearest  Prussian 
troops  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle,  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  were  a  day's  march  distant. 

Notwithstanding  aU  this,  an  order  from  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief,  issued  at   seven   o'clock,  decreed  a 


BATTLE  OF  VIONVILLE — MAHS-LA-TOUE.  47 

renewed  attack  by  all  troops  on  the  positions  occupied 
by  the  enemy.  The  Tenth  Corps  was  quite  incapable  of 
responding  to  this  demand,  but  part  of  the  artillery  and 
a  smaU  force  of  infantry  went  forward  on  the  right.  The 
batteries  succeeded  in  ascending  the  much-disputed 
plateau  south  of  Rezonville,  but  only  to  be  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  infantry  and  artillery  on  both  sides,  and 
fifty-four  guns  of  the  French  Guards  alone,  di-awn  up 
beyond  the  valley,  were  taking  them  in  flank.  The 
Prussian  batteries  were  compelled  to  retreat,  but  two 
brigades  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  were  still  pressing 
forward,  hardly  able  to  see  what  they  were  doing  in 
the  increasing  darkness.  They  too  came  within  range 
of  the  same  fire,  and  withdrew  with  great  loss. 

Fighting  did  not  entirely  cease  until  ten  o'clock, 
when  both  sides  had  lost  16,000  men.  Neither  could 
make  any  attempt  at  pursuit.  The  Grermans  reaped 
the  fruits  of  this  victory  only  in  its  results.  The 
troops,  worn  out  by  a  twelve  hours'  struggle,  encamped 
on  the  victorious  but  bloody  field,  immediately  opposite 
the  French  lines. 

Those  corps  of  the  Second  Army  that  had  not  taken 
part  in  the  battle  had  marched  on  towards  the  Meuse, 
the  advanced  guard  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on  the  left  wing 
being  directed  on  Toul.  This  fortress,  commanding  a 
railway  line  of  importance  for  the  further  progress  of 
the  German  army,  was  reported  to  be  but  insufficiently 
garrisoned,  and  it  was  resolved  to  take  it  by  surprise. 
But  the  fire  of  field  artillery  only  proved  futile.  Stone 
bastions  and  a  wide  moat  made  it  impregnable.  An 
attempt  to  batter  down  the  gates  by  shot  and  thus  gain 
an  entrance  proved  a  failure.  Finally  the  undertaking 
was  given  up,  and  not  without  some  loss  on  the  part 
of  the  Germans. 

At  the  Army  head-quarters  in  Pont-a-Mousson  it 


48  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

was  known  by  about  noon  that  the  Third  Corps  was 
engaged  in  a  serious  conflict,  and  that  the  Tenth  and 
Ninth  had  moved  up  to  its  assistance.  The  full  sig- 
nificance and  the  far-reaching  consequences  of  this 
information  were  recognized  at  once. 

The  French  evidently  had  been  stopped  in  their 
retreat,  but  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  they  would 
again  make  strenuous  efforts  to  effect  it. 

The  Twelfth  Corps  was  therefore  ordered  to  set  out 
for  Mars-la-Tour  as  early  as  three  o'clock  next  morn- 
ing, and  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Corps  were  to  stand 
in  readiness  at  Corny  and  Arry. 

The  bridge  over  the  river  was  to  be  constructed 
with  all  dispatch  dui'ing  the  night.  The  Commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Second  Army  at  Grorze  ordered  the 
Guards  to  go  at  once  to  Mars-la-Tour  and  take  up  a 
position  on  the  left  of  the  Twelfth  Corps. 

The  execution  of  these  orders  was  facilitated  by  the 
foresight  of  the  generals,  who  had  in  the  course  of  the 
day  received  news  of  the  battle  that  had  been  fought. 
Prince  George  of  Saxony  at  once  placed  his  division 
on  the  road  to  Thiaucourt,  and  the  Prince  of  Wiirtem- 
berg  collected  the  infantry  of  the  Guards  in  their 
northern  cantonments  to  be  in  readiness  for  an  early 
march. 

(August  17th.)  On  August  17th  at  daybreak,  the 
French  outposts  were  still  observed  occupying  the 
entire  Une  between  Bruville  and  Rezonville.  In  their 
rear  there  was  a  stir  and  much  signalling,  which  might 
indicate  an  intended  attack  or  preparations  for  retreat. 

The  King  arrived  from  Pont-a-Mousson  at  Flavigny 
as  early  as  six  o'clock.  The  reports  sent  in  to  head- 
quarters until  noon  by  the  reconnoitring  cavalry  were 
somewhat  contradictory ;  they  did  not  make  it  clear 
whether  the  French  were  concentrating  at  Metz,  or 


PBEPAEATIONS  FOR  FURTHER  ACTIOIT.  49 

retreating  by  the  two  still  open  roads  via  Etain,  and 
Brierg.  Hostile  movements  had  nowhere  been  ob- 
served. 

By  one  o'clock,  after  a  skirmish  on  the  way,  the  head 
of  the  Seventh  Corps  had  reached  the  northern  skirt  of 
the  Bois  des  Ognons,  opposite  which  the  French  subse- 
quently abandoned  G-ravelotte.  The  Eighth  Corps 
stood  ready  at  Gorze,  the  Third,  Ninth,  and  Tenth  had 
remained  in  their  positions,  the  Twelfth  and  the  Gruards 
were  marching  on.  By  the  next  day  the  Grermans 
could  count  on  having  seven  corps  and  three  cavalry 
divisions  at  their  disposal ;  for  the  present  no  attack 
was  to  be  made. 

In  preparing  for  the  forthcoming  battle  on  August 
18th,  two  possible  issues  were  to  be  anticipated.  To 
this  end,  the  left  wing  was  dispatched  in  a  northerly 
direction  past  Doncourt  towards  the  nearest  of  the 
routes  still  open  for  the  retreat  of  the  French.  If  the 
enemy  were  already  retiring  they  were  to  be  at  once 
attacked  and  detained;  the  right  wing  would  foUow 
to  support  the  left. 

In  case  the  enemy  was  encountered  at  Metz,  the  left 
wing  was  to  turn  eastwards  and  outflank  the  French 
on  the  north,  while  the  right  was  to  keep  them  engaged 
in  fighting  until  this  movement  was  accomplished. 
The  battle,  under  these  circumstances,  could  not  be 
decided  until  late  in  the  day,  owing  to  the  widely  turn- 
ing movement  of  a  portion  of  the  force.  A  peculiar 
feature  of  the  case  was  that  both  parties  had  to  fight 
with  changed  front  and  break  up  their  lines  of  com- 
munication. The  consequences  of  victory  or  defeat 
would  thus  be  greatly  enhanced  or  aggravated,  but 
the  French  had  the  advantage  of  a  larger  field  for 
action  and  of  reserves  behind  them. 

A  decision  was  arrived  at,  and  by  two  o'clock  orders 


50  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

were  issued  to  the  left  wing  at  Flavigny  to  advance  in 
echelon.  The  movements  of  each  corps  during  the  bat- 
tle were  to  depend  on  the  reports  brought  into  head- 
quarters.   The  King  then  returned  to  Pont-a-Mousson. 

As  early  as  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Saxon 
division  of  cavalry  had  come  up  to  the  west  of  Conflans, 
on  the  road  to  Etain,  and  reported  no  enemy  visible 
except  a  few  scouts.  Still,  this  only  proved  that  the 
French  had  not  begun  their  retreat  on  the  17th. 

The  Twelfth  Corps,  behind  and  to  the  left  of  its 
cavalry,  arrived  at  Mars-la-Tour  and  Puxieux  dur- 
ing the  day,  and  the  Guards  moved  on  to  Hannonville 
on  the  Yron  before  nightfall.  The  Second  Corps, 
which  ever  since  it  left  the  railway  had  followed  in 
the  wake  of  the  Second  Army,  reached  Pont-a-Mousson, 
and  was  ordered  to  proceed  by  Buxieres  at  four  in 
the  morning. 

BATTLE  OF  GRAVELOTTE — ST.   PRIVAT. 

(August  18th.) 

Marshal  Bazaine  had  not  thought  it  advisable  to 
proceed  to  Verdun  now  that  the  Germans  were  so  close 
on  the  flank  of  such  a  movement.  ..He  preferred  to 
assemble  his  forces  at  Metz,  in  a  position  which  he 
rightly  supposed  to  be  almost  impregnable. 

Such  a  position  was  afforded  by  the  range  of  hills, 
bordering  on  the  west  of  the  valley  of  Chatel.  That 
side  facing  the  enemy  sloped  away  like  a  glacis^  while 
the  short  and  steep  decline  behind  offered  protection 
for  the  reserves.*  The  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  and  Sixth 
Corps  were  placed  on  the  ridge  of  the  hills  between 
Roncourt  and  Rozerieulles,  a  distance  of  one  mile  and 
a  half  (German) ;  thus  there  were  eight  or  ten  men  to 
every  yard  of  ground. 


BATTLE   OF  GKAVELOTTE — ST.   PEIVAT.  51 

A  brigade  of  the  Fifth  Corps  stood  at  Ste.  Ruffine,  in 
the  valley  of  the  Moselle,  the  cavalry  in  the  rear  of  the 
two  wings. 

The  positions  of  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  were 
hastily  intrenched,  batteries  and  covered  ways  were 
established,  and  the  farm-honses  in  front  prepared  for 
defence.  To  approach  this  left  wing  from  the  west  it 
was  necessary  to  cross  the  deep  valley  of  the  Mance. 
The  Sixth  Corps,  on  the  other  hand,  had  no  engineering 
tools ;  and  it  is  indicative  of  the  general  ill  equipment 
of  the  French  that,  merely  to  convey  the  wounded  to 
the  rear,  in  spite  of  the  enormous  baggage-train,  pro- 
vision wagons  had  to  be  unloaded  and  their  contents 
bui'nt.  This  corps  was  therefore  unable  to  construct 
such  defences  on  the  side  overlooking  the  forest  of 
Jaumont  as  were  necessary  to  strengthen  the  right 
wing.  This  would  undoubtedly  have  been  the  place 
for  the  Guards,  but  in  liis  fear  of  an  attack  from  the 
south  Marshal  Bazaine  kept  them  in  reserve  at  Plappe- 
viUe. 

The  King  again  arrived  at  Flavigny  at  six  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  18th.  All  officers  in  command  were 
ordered  to  report  directly  to  head-quarters,  and  Staff- 
officers  of  Army  Head-quarters  were  dispatched  in  all 
directions  to  watch  the  progress  of  the  engagement. 

The  Seventh  Army  Corps,  forming  the  pivot  upon 
which  the  intended  wheel  to  the  right  was  to  be  effected, 
occupied  the  Bois  de  Vaux  and  Bois  des  Ognons ;  the 
Eighth,  under  the  personal  command  of  the  King,  halted 
at  Rezonville  ready  to  proceed  to  the  north  or  east,  as 
might  be  required.  The  Ninth  Corps  on  its  left  ad- 
vanced towards  the  Marcel,  while  the  Third  and  Tenth 
formed  the  second  line.  The  Guards  and  TweKth 
Corps  moved  in  a  northerly  direction. 

A  serious  delay  occurred  when  the  Twelfth  Corps  of 


52  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN   WAE. 

the  Second  Army,  which  was  stationed  on  the  right,  was 
commanded  to  form  the  left  wing,  by  the  crossing  of 
the  two  on  the  march.  The  Saxon  troops  did  not  get 
through  Mars-la-Tour  until  nine  o'clock,  and  till  then 
the  Guards  could  not  follow. 

The  advanced  guard  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  had  mean- 
while reached  Jarny,  and  proceeded  as  far  as  Briey 
without  encountering  the  enemy. 

Before  this  could  be  known,  the  authorities  at  head- 
quarters had  been  convinced  that  at  least  the  main 
forces  of  the  enemy  were  still  at  Metz ;  misapprehension, 
however,  prevailed  as  to  the  extension  of  their  lines, 
and  it  was  thought  the  French  front  did  not  reach 
beyond  Montigny.  The  Gleneral  in  command  of  the 
Second  Army  was  therefore  instructed  not  to  proceed 
farther  northward,  but  to  join  the  Ninth  Corps  in 
attacking  the  enemy's  right  wing,  and  move  in  the 
direction  of  Batilly  with  the  Guards  and  the  Twelfth 
Corps.  The  First  Army  was  not  to  attack  in  the  front 
until  the  Second  was  ready  to  strike. 

In  obedience  to  this  Prince  Frederick  Charles  ordered 
the  Ninth  Corps  to  march  on  to  Verneville,  and  in  case 
the  French  right  wing  should  be  found  there,  to  open 
battle  by  bringing  a  large  force  of  artillery  into  action. 
The  Guards  were  to  continue  their  advance  via  Don- 
court  to  reinforce  the  Ninth  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
Twelfth  were  to  remain  at  Jarny  for  the  present. 

A  little  later  fresh  reports  came  in  which  indicated 
that  the  Ninth  Corps,  if  proceeding  in  the  manner 
ordered,  would  come  upon  the  French  centre,  instead 
of  their  right  wing.  The  Prince  therefore  determined 
that  the  corps  should  postpone  the  attack  till  the 
Guards  had  done  so  at  Amanvillers.  At  the  same  time 
the  Twelfth  Corps  was  pushed  on  to  Ste.-Marie-aux- 
Cheues. 


BATTLE  OF  GEAVELOTTE — ST.  PKIVAT.  53 

But  while  these  orders  were  being  given,  the  first 
heavy  firing  was  heard  at  Verneville.  This  was  at 
twelve  o'clock. 

The  two  corps  on  the  left  had,  of  their  own  accord, 
taken  an  easterly  direction  without  waiting  for  orders, 
and  the  Third  Corps  moved  up  behind  the  Ninth  at  the 
farm  of  Caulre. 

General  von  Manstein,  in  command  of  the  Ninth,  had 
observed  from  near  Verneville  a  French  encampment 
at  Amanvillers,  apparently  in  a  state  of  quietude. 
From  that  point  of  view  the  great  masses  of  troops 
on  their  immediate  left  at  St.  Privat  were  not  visible. 
Mistaking  this  camp  for  the  right  wing,  he  determined 
to  act  on  his  first  orders  and  take  the  foe  by  surprise. 
Eight  of  his  batteries  at  once  opened  fire. 

But  it  did  not  take  the  French  troops  long  to  move 
into  the  position  assigned  to  them.  The  independent 
action  of  a  single  corps  naturally  exposed  it  not  only 
tO'  the  fire  of  the  troops  opposite,  but  to  an  attack  in 
flank. 

To  obtain  some  shelter  on  the  field,  the  Prussian 
batteries  had  taken  up  a  position  on  the  shoulder  of 
the  hill  below  Amanvillers  facing  the  south-east,  where 
they  were  exposed  from  the  north,  on  the  flank,  and 
even  in  the  rear,  to  the  fire  of  French  artillery,  as  well 
as  to  the  concentrated  fire  of  their  infantry. 

To  meet  this,  the  battalions  nearest  at  hand  were 
ordered  forward.  They  took  possession  of  the  eastern 
point  of  the  Bois  de  la  Cusse  on  the  left,  and  on  the 
right  seized  the  farm-houses  of  L'Envie  and  Chantrenne, 
forcing  their  way  into  the  Bois  des  Genivaux.  Thus 
the  line  of  battle  of  the  18th  Division  gained  a  front  of 
4000  paces. 

Its  losses  were  very  great,  for  the  French  with  their 
long-range  Chassepot  rifles  could  afford  to  keep  out 


54  THE   FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

of  range  of  the  needle-gun;  the  artillery  especially 
suffered  severely.  One  of  the  batteries  had  already 
lost  forty-five  gunners  when  it  was  attacked  by  French 
sharpshooters.  There  was  no  infantry  at  hand  to 
retaliate,  and  two  guns  were  lost.  By  two  o'clock  all 
the  batteries  were  almost  Jwrs-de-coinhat,  and  no  relief 
arrived  till  the  Hessian  division  reached  Habonville, 
and  brought  up  five  batteries  on  either  side  of  the  rail- 
way, thus  diverting  on  themselves  the  concentrated  fire 
of  the  enemy.  The  batteries  of  the  18th  Division, 
which  had  suffered  most,  could  now  be  withdi-awn  in 
succession,  but  even  in  their  retreat  they  had  to  defend 
themselves  against  their  pursuers  by  grapeshot. 

The  artillery  of  the  Third  Corps  and  the  Guards  were 
likewise  sent  to  the  assistance  of  the  Ninth,  and  those 
of  the  damaged  guns  that  were  still  fit  for  service  were 
at  once  brought  into  line.  Thus  a  front  of  130  guns 
was  drawn  up  before  Verneville  as  far  as  St.  Ail,  and 
its  fire  soon  told  upon  the  enemy.  Now,  when  the 
Third  Corps  was  approaching  Verneville  and  the  3rd 
Brigade  of  Guards  had  reached  Habonville,  there  was 
no  fear  that  the  French  would  break  through  the  line. 

The  main  force  of  the  Guards  had  arrived  at  St.  Ail 
as  early  as  two  o'clock.  General  von  Pape  at  once  saw 
that  by  wheeling  to  the  east  he  would  not  encounter 
the  right  wing  of  the  French,  which  was  to  be  out- 
flanked, but  would  expose  his  own  left  wing  to  the 
forces  occupying  Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes.  The  first 
thing  to  be  done  was  to  gain  possession  of  this  village 
— almost  a  town.  It  was  strongly  occupied  and  well 
flanked  by  the  main  position  of  the  French  army ;  but, 
in  obedience  to  superior  orders,  he  must  await  the 
arrival  of  a  co-operative  Saxon  contingent. 

The  advance  guard  of  this  corps  had  already  reached 
the  vicinity  of  Batilly,  but  was  yet  half  a  mile  distance 


BATTLE   OF  GEAVELOTTE — ST.   PKIVAT.  55 

from  Ste.  Marie,  so  its  batteries  could  not  be  placed  in 
position  west  of  the  town  until  three  o'clock.  But  as 
the  Guards  had  sent  most  of  their  own  artillery  to  the 
support  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  this  was  substantial  aid. 

Ten  batteries  now  opened  fire  upon  Ste.  Marie,  and 
by  the  time  it  was  beginning  to  tell  the  4-7th  Brigade 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps  came  up.  At  half -past  three  the 
Prussian  and  Saxon  battalions  stormed  the  town  from 
the  south  and  west  and  north,  amid  vociferous  cheers, 
and  without  further  returning  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 
The  French  were  driven  from  the  place,  and  a  few 
hundred  were  taken  prisoners. 

The  Saxons  tried  to  follow  them  up,  and  a  hvely 
infantry  engagement  ensued,  north  of  Ste.  Marie, 
which  masked  the  artillery.  As  soon  as  the  brigade 
had  been  ordered  to  retire,  the  batteries  re-opened  fire, 
and  the  repeated  efforts  of  the  French  to  regain  the 
lost  position  were  frustrated. 

Soon  afterwards  the  Ninth  Corps  succeeded  in  taking 
and  holding  the  farm  of  Champenois,  but  aU  further 
attempts,  by  isolated  battalions  or  companies,  to  force 
their  way  on  against  the  broad  and  compact  centre  of 
the  French  were,  on  the  face  of  it,  futile.  Thus,  by 
about  five  o'clock,  the  infantry  ceased  fire,  and  the 
artillery  only  fired  an  occasional  shot.  Fatigue  on  both 
sides  caused  an  almost  total  suspension  of  hostihties 
in  this  part  of  the  field. 

The  Commander-in-chief  decided  that  the  First  Ai*my 
should  not  engage  in  serious  assault  until  the  Second 
stood  close  to  the  enemy ;  but  when  the  day  was  half 
spent  and  brisk  firing  was  heard  about  noon  from 
Vion^dlle,  it  was  to  be  supposed  that  the  time  for  action 
had  arrived ;  still,  for  the  present  permission  was  only 
given  to  send  forward  the  artillery  in  preparation  for 
the  fight. 


56  THE   FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Sixteen  batteries  of  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Corps 
accordingly  drew  up  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  high- 
way running  through  Grravelotte.  Their  fire  was  in- 
effective, as  they  were  too  far  from  the  enemy; 
besides,  they  were  suffering  from  the  fire  of  the  French 
tirailleurs  who  had  established  themselves  in  the 
opposite  woods.  It  became  necessary  to  drive  them 
out,  so  here  again  there  was  a  sharp  skirmish.  The 
French  had  to  abandon  the  eastern  portion  of  the 
Mance  valley,  and  the  artillery,  now  increased  to  twenty 
batteries,  was  able  to  advance  to  the  western  ridge 
and  direct  its  fire  against  the  main  position  of  the 
enemy. 

The  battalions  of  the  29th  Brigade  followed  up  this 
advantage.  They  pressed  forward  into  the  southern 
part  of  the  Bois  des  Grenivaux  on  the  left,  but  were 
unable  to  effect  a  connection  with  the  Ninth  Corps, 
occupying  the  north  of  the  forest,  as  the  French  could 
not  be  driven  from  the  intervening  ground.  On  the 
right  various  detachments  took  possession  of  the 
quarries  and  gravel  pits  near  St.  Hubert. 

The  artillery  meanwhile  had  got  the  better  of  the 
French  guns ;  several  of  their  batteries  were  silenced, 
others  prevented  from  getting  into  position.  The 
French  fire  was  in  part  directed  on  the  farm  of  St. 
Hubert,  on  which  the  30th  Brigade  were  gi-adually  en- 
croaching. This  well-defended  structure  was  stormed 
at  three  o'clock  close  under  the  face  of  the  enemy's 
main  position,  and  in  spite  of  a  tremendous  fire.  The 
31st  Brigade  had  also  got  across  the  valley,  but  an 
attempt  to  reach  the  farms  of  Moscow  and  Leipzig, 
over  the  open  plain  enclosed  by  the  enemy  on  three 
sides,  proved  a  failure  and  resulted  in  great  loss.  The 
26th  Brigade  had  taken  possession  of  Jussy,  on  the 
extreme  right,  thus  maintaining  the  connection  with 


BATTLE   OF   GEAVELOTTE — ST.   PKIVAT.  57 

Metz,  but  found  it  impossible  to  cross  the  deep  valley 
of  EozerieuUes. 

The  advanced  detachments  of  the  French  had  been 
repulsed  on  all  sides,  the  farms  in  their  front  were 
burning,  their  artillery  appeared  to  be  silenced,  and, 
viewing  the  situation  from  Gravelotte,  there  remained 
nothing  but  pursuit.  General  von  Steinmetz  there- 
fore, at  four  o'clock,  ordered  fresh  forces  to  the  front 
for  a  renewed  attack. 

While  the  Seventh  Corps  occupied  the  border  of  the 
wood,  four  batteries,  backed  by  the  First  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion, made  their  way  through  the  narrow  ravine  ex- 
tending for  about  1500  paces  east  of  Gravelotte.  But 
as  soon  as  the  advanced  guard  of  the  long  column 
came  in  sight,  the  French  redoubled  their  rifle  and 
artillery  fire,  which  had  till  now  been  kept  under.  One 
battery  had  soon  lost  the  men  serving  four  of  its  guns, 
and  was  hardly  able  to  return  into  the  wood ;  a  second 
never  even  got  into  i^osition.  The  batteries  under 
Hasse  and  Gruiigge,  on  the  other  hand,  held  their  own 
at  St.  Hubert  in  spite  of  the  loss  of  seventy-five  horses 
and  of  the  firing  from  the  quarries  in  their  rear. 

The  foremost  regiment  of  cavalry  wheeled  to  the 
right  after  leaving  the  hollow  way,  and  gaUoped 
towards  Point-du-Jour,  but  the  enemy,  being  com- 
pletely under  cover,  offered  no  opportunity  for  an 
attack.  Evidently  this  was  no  field  for  utilizing  the 
cavahy,  so  the  regiments  retired  through  the  Mance 
valley  under  a  heavy  fire  from  all  sides. 

This  ill  success  of  the  Germans  encouraged  the 
French  to  advance  from  Point-du-Jour  with  swarms 
of  tirailleurs,  who  succeeded  in  diiving  the  Prussians 
back  from  the  open  ground  as  far  as  the  skirts  of  the 
wood.  The  bullets  of  the  Chassepots  even  reached 
the  hill  where  the  Commander-in-chief  was  watching 


58  THE  FEA2JC0-GEKMAN   WAK, 

the  battle,  and  Prince  Adalbert's  horse  was  shot  under 
him. 

Fresh  forces  were  now  at  hand  and  drove  the  enemy- 
back  to  his  main  position.  St.  Hubert  had  remained 
in  the  hands  of  the  Germans ;  and  thongh  the  survivors 
there  were  only  sufficient  to  serve  one  gun,  still  every 
attempt  to  cross  the  exposed  plateau  proved  a  failure. 
Thus  hostilities  ceased  at  this  point  also,  at  about  five 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  allowing  the  weary  troops  on 
both  sides  to  take  breath  and  reorganize. 

King  William  and  his  staff  rode  over  to  the  hill  on 
the  south  of  Malmaison  at  about  the  same  hour,  but 
could  see  nothing  of  the  situation  of  the  left  wing, 
which  was  more  than  a  mile  away.  The  French  ar- 
tillery had  ceased  firing  along  the  centre,  from  La  Folie 
to  Point-du- Jour ;  but  to  the  northwards  the  thunder 
of  artillery  was  louder  than  ever.  It  was  six  o'clock, 
the  day  was  nearly  at  an  end,  and  decided  action  must 
at  once  be  taken.  The  King  therefore  ordered  the  First 
Army  to  advance  once  more,  and  for  that  purpose 
placed  the  Second  Corps,  just  arrived  after  a  long 
march,  under  the  command  of  General  von  Steinmetz. 

Those  battalions  of  the  Seventh  Corps  which  could 
still  do  good  service,  except  five,  which  were  kept  in 
reserve,  were  again  sent  up  the  Mance  valley,  and  the 
battalions  from  the  Bois  de  Vaux  came  to  their  support 
towards  Point-du-Jour  and  the  quarries.  The  Second 
Corps  of  the  French  army  thus  attacked  was  now  rein- 
forced by  Guard  Voltigeur  Division.  All  the  reserves 
were  brought  to  the  front.  The  artillery  was  more 
rapidly  served,  and  a  destructive  musketry  fire  was 
directed  on  the  advancing  enemy.  Then  the  French 
on  their  side  made  an  attack.  A  strong  body  of  rifle- 
men dispersed  the  smaller  parties  who  were  lying  in 
the  open,  destitute  of  commanders,  and  drove  them 


BATTLE   OF  GEAVELOTTE — ST.   PEIVAT.  50 

back  to  the  wood.  There,  however,  their  advance  was 
checked,  and  there  was  still  another  army  corps  ready 
for  action. 

The  Second  Corps,  the  last  to  come  np  by  rail  to  the 
seat  of  war,  had  up  to  this  time  followed  in  the  wake 
of  the  army  by  forced  marches,  but  had  not  yet  fought 
in  any  engagement.  It  had  started  from  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  at  two  p.m.  and,  taking  the  road  by  Buxieres  and 
Rezonville,  arrived  south  of  Gravelotte  in  the  evening. 
The  Pomeranians  were  eager  to  get  at  the  enemy  with- 
out delay. 

It  would  have  been  better  if  the  Chief  of  the  Staff, 
who  was  personally  on  the  field  at  the  time,  had  not 
allowed  this  movement  at  so  late  an  hour.  A  body  of 
troops,  still  completely  intact,  might  have  been  of 
great  value  the  next  day ;  it  was  not  likely  this  evening 
to  effect  the  issue. 

Eushing  out  of  Gravelotte,  the  foremost  battalions 
of  the  Second  Corps  pushed  forward  to  the  quarries, 
and  up  to  within  a  few  hundred  paces  of  Point-du- 
Jour ;  but  those  following  were  soon  entangled  in  the 
turmoil  of  the  troops  under  fire  south  of  St.  Hubert, 
and  any  further  advance  towards  Moscow  was  arrested. 
Darkness  was  falling,  and  friend  became  indistinguish- 
able from  foe.  So  the  firing  was  stopped;  but  not 
until  ten  o'clock  did  it  entirely  cease. 

The  advance  of  the  Second  Corps  resulted  in  some 
good,  however,  for  these  fresh  troops  could  occupy  the 
fighting  line  for  the  night,  while  the  mixed  companies 
of  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Corps  were  enabled  to  re- 
form in  their  rear. 

The  whole  course  of  the  engagement  had  conclusively 
proved  that  the  position  of  the  French  left  wing,  made 
almost  impregnable  by  nature  and  art,  could  not  be 
shaken  even  by  the  most  devoted  bravery  and  the 


60  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

greatest  sacrifices.  Both  parties  were  now  facing  each 
other  in  threatening  proximity,  and  both  fully  able  to 
re-open  battle  next  morning.  The  success  of  the  day 
must  depend  on  events  at  the  other  end  of  the  French 
line. 

The  Prince  of  Wiii'temberg,  standing  at  Ail,  believed 
that  the  hour  had  come  for  an  attack  on  the  French 
right  at  about  a  quarter  past  five ;  but  that  wing  ex- 
tended much  further  north  than  the  line  of  his  Guards, 
further,  indeed,  than  the  French  Commander-in-chief 
himself  was  aware  of.  Though  the  Saxons  had  partici- 
pated in  the  capture  of  Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes,  the 
Crown  Prince  deemed  it  necessary  to  assemble  his 
corps  at  the  Bois  d'Auboue,  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
flank.  One  of  the  brigades  had  to  come  from  Jarny, 
and  one  from  Ste.  Marie ;  so,  as  the  corps  was  late  in 
getting  away  from  Mars-la-Tour,  it  was  not  expected 
to  be  on  the  field  for  some  hours  yet. 

The  4th  Brigade  of  Foot  Gruards,  in  obedience  to 
orders,  proceeded  in  the  direction  of  Jerusalem,  im- 
mediately south  of  St.  Privat.  As  soon  as  General 
von  Manstein,in  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  observed 
this,  he  ordered  the  3rd  Brigade  of  Guards,  which  had 
been  placed  at  his  orders,  to  advance  from  Habonville 
towards  Amanvillers. 

Between  these  two  brigades  marched  the  Hessians, 
but  it  was  not  till  half  an  hour  later  that  the  1st  Divi- 
sion of  Guards  joined  from  Ste.  Marie,  marching  on 
St.  Privat,  on  the  left  of  the  2Dd.  This  attack  was 
dii'ected  against  the  broad  front  of  the  French  Fourth 
and  Sixth  Corps.  Their  fortified  positions  at  St.  Privat 
and  Amanvillers  had  as  yet  hardly  felt  the  fire  of  the 
German  batteries,  which  had  found  sufiicient  employ- 
ment in  replying  to  the  enemy's  artillery  outside  the 
villages. 


BATTLE   OF   GKAVELOTTE — ST.   PRIVAT.  61 

Several  ranks  of  riflemen,  one  above  the  other,  were 
placed  in  front  of  the  French  main  position,  on  the 
hedges  and  fences  in  a  slope  up  the  ridge.  At  their 
back  towered  St.  Privat,  castle-like,  with  its  massive 
buildings,  which  were  crowded  by  soldiers  to  the  very- 
roof.  The  open  plain  in  front  was  thus  exposed  to  an 
overwhelming  shower  of  projectiles. 

The  losses  of  the  attacking  Guards  were,  in  fact, 
enormous.  In  the  course  of  half  an  hour  five  battal- 
ions lost  all,  the  others  the  greater  part  of  their 
officers,  especially  those  of  the  higher  grades.  Thou- 
sands of  dead  and  wounded  marked  the  track  of  the 
troops,  who,  in  spite  of  their  losses,  pressed  forward. 
The  ranks,  as  fast  as  they  were  thinned,  closed  up 
again,  and!  theii'  compact  formation  was  not  broken 
even  under  the  leadership  of  young  lieutenants  and 
ensigns.  As  they  got  nearer  to  the  enemy  the  needle- 
gun  did  good  service.  The  French  were  di'iven  from 
all  their  foremost  positions,  where,  for  the  most  part, 
they  did  not  await  the  final  struggle.  By  a  quarter- 
past  six  the  battalions  had  advanced  to  within  600  to 
800  paces  of  Amanvillers  and  St.  Privat.  The  troops, 
weary  from  long  combat,  halted  under  the  steeper 
slopes  offering  some,  though  small,  protection,  and  in 
the  trenches  just  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  Only  four 
battalions  now  remained  in  reserve  at  Ste.  Marie,  be- 
hind the  German  line,  which  now  extended  to  a  length 
of  4000  paces.  Every  charge  of  the  French  cavalry 
and  of  Cissy's  division  had  been  persistently  repelled 
with  the  aid  of  twelve  batteries  of  the  Guards,  which 
had  now  put  in  an  appearance,  but  the  German  troops, 
reduced,  as  they  were,  by  untold  losses,  had  to  face 
two  French  corps  for  thirty  minutes  longer  before 
reinforcements  came  to  their  aid. 

It  was  nearly  seven  o'clock  when,  to  the  left  of  the 


62  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Guards,  two  brigades  of  the  Saxon  infantry  arrived 
on  the  field ;  the  other  two  were  still  assembling  in  the 
forest  of  Auboue;  their  artillery,  however,  had  for 
some  time  kept  up  a  lively  fire  on  Roncourt. 

When  Bazaine,  at  three  o'clock,  received  word  that 
the  Germans  were  extending  the  line  to  enclose  his 
right  wing,  he  ordered  Picard's  division  of  the  Grena- 
dier Guards,  posted  at  Plappeville,  to  advance  to  the 
scene  of  action.  Though  the  distance  was  no  more 
than  a  mile  through  the  wooded  valley  on  the  right  of 
the  highway,  his  all-important  reinforcement  had  not 
yet  arrived  at  seven  o'clock,  and  Marshal  Canrobert, 
who  was  hardly  able,  by  the  most  strenuous  efforts, 
to  check  the  advance  of  the  Prussians,  decided  to  rally 
his  troops  closer  to  the  fortified  town  of  St.  Privat. 
The  retreat  from  Roncourt  was  to  be  covered  by  a 
small  rear-guard,  as  the  border  of  the  Bois  de  Jaumont 
was  to  be  held. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  Saxons  found  less  resist- 
ance at  Roncourt  than  they  expected,  and  entered  the 
town  after  a  short  struggle,  together  with  the  compa- 
nies of  the  extreme  left  of  the  Guards ;  part  of  them  had 
previously  been  diverted  from  the  road  to  Roncourt 
to  assist  the  Guards,  and  marched  dir^ect  on  St.  Privat. 

There  terrible  havoc  was  worked  by  the  twenty-four 
batteries  of  the  two  German  corps.  Many  houses  were 
in  flames,  or  falling  in  ruins  under  the  shower  of  shell. 
But  the  French  were  determined  to  defend  this  point, 
where  the  fate  of  the  day  was  to  be  decided  to  the  last. 
The  batteries  belonging  to  their  right  wing  were  placed 
between  St.  Privat  and  the  Bois  de  Jaumont,  that  is, 
on  the  flank  of  the  advancing  Saxons.  Others  faced 
the  Prussians  from  the  south,  and  as  the  German 
columns  came  on  side  by  side  they  were  received  by  a 
shower  of  bullets  from  the  French  rifles. 


BATTLE   OF   GEAVELOTTE — ST.   PKIVAT.  63 

All  these  obstacles  were  defied  in  the  onward  rush, 
though  again  under  heavy  losses,  some  stopping  here 
and  there  to  fire  a  volley,  others  again  never  firing  a 
shot.  By  sundown  they  stood  within  300  paces  of  St. 
Privat.  Some  detachments  of  the  Tenth  Corps,  who 
were  on  the  road  to  St.  Ail,  now  joined  them,  and  the 
final  onset  was  made  from  every  side  at  once.  The 
French  still  defended  the  burning  houses  and  the 
church  with  gi-eat  obstinacy,  till,  finding  themselves 
completely  surrounded,  they  surrendered  at  about 
eight  o'clock.  More  than  2000  men  were  taken  prison- 
ers, and  the  wounded  were  rescued  from  the  burning 
houses. 

The  defeated  remnant  of  the  Fourth  French  Corps 
retii^ed  towards  the  valley  of  the  Moselle,  their  retreat 
being  covered  by  the  brigade  occupying  the  Bois  de 
Jaumont  and  by  the  cavahy. 

Only  at  that  period  did  the  Grenadier  Guards  put 
in  an  appearance,  drawing  up  the  artillery  reserves 
east  of  Amanvillers.  The  German  batteries  at  once 
took  up  the  fight,  which  lasted  till  late  in  the  night, 
and  Amanvillers  also  was  left  burning. 

Here  the  retirement  of  the  Fourth  French  Corps  had 
already  commenced,  screened  by  repeated  severe  on» 
slaughts ;  the  right  wing  of  the  Guards  and  the  left  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  had  a  hvely  hand-to-hand  encounter 
with  the  enemy.  Still  the  town  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  French  for  the  night.  Their  Third  Corps  main- 
tained their  position  at  Moscow  until  three  o'clock,  and 
the  Second  until  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  though 
engaged  in  constant  frays  with  the  outposts  of  the 
Pomeranian  Division,  who  eventually  took  possession 
of  the  plateaus  of  Moscow  and  Point-du-Jour. 

This  success  of  the  18th  August  had  only  been  made 
possible  by  the  preceding  battles  of  the  14:th  and  16th. 


64  THE  PEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

The  French  estimate  their  losses  at  13,000  men.  In 
October  173,000  were  still  in  Metz,  which  proves  that 
more  than  180,000  French  engaged  in  the  battle  of  the 
18th.  The  seven  German  corps  facing  them  were 
exactly  178,818  strong.  Thus  the  French  had  been 
diiven  out  of  a  position  of  almost  unrivalled  natural 
advantages  by  a  numerically  inferior  force.  It  is  seK- 
evident  that  the  loss  of  the  aggressors  must  have  been 
much  greater  than  that  of  the  defence ;  it  amounted 
to  20,584  men,  among  them  899  officers. 

Though  the  war  establishment  provides  one  officer 
to  every  forty  men,  in  this  battle  one  officer  had  been 
killed  to  every  twenty- three ;  a  splendid  testimony  to 
the  example  set  by  the  officers  to  their  brave  men,  but 
a  loss  which  could  not  be  made  good  during  the  course 
of  the  war.  During  the  first  fortnight  of  August,  in 
six  battles  the  Germans  had  lost  50,000  men.  It  was 
impossible  at  once  to  find  substitutes,  but  new  com- 
panies were  formed  of  time-expired  soldiers. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  that  same  evening  was  to 
move  on  the  foremost  baggage  train,  and  the  ambu- 
lance corps  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle ;  ammu- 
nition was  also  served  out  aU  round.  In  Rezonville, 
which  was  crowded  with  the  wounded,  a  little  garret 
for  the  King  and  quarters  for  the  Staff  had  with  much 
difficulty  been  secured.  The  officers  were  engaged 
throughout  the  night  in  studying  the  requirements 
which  the  new  situation  created  by  the  victory  per- 
emptorily demanded.  AU  these  orders  were  placed 
before  his  Majesty  for  approval  by  the  morning  of  the 
19th. 

NEW   DISTRIBUTION   OF   THE   AEMY. 

The  siege  of  Metz  had  formed  no  part  of  the  original 
plan  of  campaign ;  it  had  been  intended  to  station  a 


REDISTEIBUTION   OF  THE   FOECES.  65 

corps  of  observation  in  the  vicinity  of  this  fortress, 
while  the  main  army  should  advance  on  Paris;  the 
reserve  division,  consisting  of  eighteen  battalions,  six- 
teen squadrons,  and  thirty-six  guns,  detailed  for  that 
duty,  was  now  near  at  hand. 

Under  existing  circumstances,  however,  the  town 
must  be  invested,  and  this  necessitated  a  complete  re- 
distribution of  the  army. 

A  special  army  was  formed  for  that  purpose  under 
the  command  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  consisting 
of  the  First,  Seventh,  and  Eighth  Corps  of  the  former 
First  Army,  the  Second,  Third,  Ninth,  and  Tenth 
Corps  of  the  Second  Army,  the  reserve  division  and 
the  1st  and  3rd  Cavahy  Divisions,  in  all  150,000  men. 

The  Ninth  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  of  The  Gruards, 
and  the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  were  placed 
under  the  command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony, 
and  called  "  The  Army  of  the  Meuse  " ;  it  was  138,000 
strong.  This  and  the  Third  Army,  amounting  to 
223,000  men,  were  directed  to  advance  against  the 
Trench  reforming  at  Chalons^ 

The  besieging  force  was  still  weaker  than  the  block- 
aded enemy.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  the  French 
would  renew  their  efforts  to  force  their  way  westward. 
Prince  Frederick  Charles'  main  forces  were  therefore 
to  remain  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle. 

All  these  orders  were  signed  by  the  King  and  dis- 
patched to  the  officers  in  command  by  eleven  o'clock. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  now  directed  the  Tenth 
Corps  to  occupy  the  woodland  districts  of  the  Lower 
Moselle  as  far  as  St.  Privat,  while  the  Second  was  to 
take  up  its  position  on  the  high  ridge  between  that 
point  and  Moscow.  The  Seventh  and  Eighth  Corps 
joined  them  on  the  right,  the  first-named  encamp- 
ing on  both  sides  of  the  IFpper  Moselle.  The  First 
5 


66  THE  FEANCO-GERMAK  WAE. 

Corps  stood  near  Pouilly,  to  the  left  and  right  of  the 
Seille,  especially  commissioned  to  protect  the  great 
magazines,  which  were  to  be  established  at  Remilly 
and  Pont-a-Monsson.  The  3rd  Reserve  Division  pro- 
ceeded to  the  vicinity  of  Retonfay,  north-east  of  Metz. 
The  Ninth  and  Third  Corps  encamped  at  Ste.  Marie  and 
Verneville  in  reserve.  All  these  troops  immediately 
began  to  throw  up  earthworks  and  dig  trenches,  while 
bridges  were  thrown  over  the  Moselle  above  and  below 
the  fortress. 

The  corps  belonging  to  the  Army  of  the  Mense  were 
also  set  in  motion,  the  Twelfth  assembling  at  Conflans 
and  the  Guards  at  Mars-la-Tour ;  the  Fourth  Corps, 
which  had  not  been  ordered  to  Metz,  had  already 
reached  Commercy. 

The  Third  Army,  after  crossing  the  mountains  and 
leaving  a  Bavarian  brigade  to  blockade  Toul,  had 
advanced  in  three  columns.  Its  foremost  corps  had 
ah'eady  reached  the  Meuse,  but  were  obliged  to  encamp 
there  for  two  days,  to  cross  with  the  rest  of  the  Meuse 
army  near  that  point.  Its  cavalry  meanwhile  patroUed 
the  territory  as  far  as  Chalons  and  Vitry,  and  there, 
for  the  first  time  since  Worth,  renewed  acquaintance 
with  the  enemy.  The  French  encountered  were  only 
outposts  on  the  Marne  railway  linCj^'who  retired  as 
soon  as  the  transport  service  was  finished. 

THE   AEMY   OF   CHIlONS. 

Meanwhile  a  French  army  had  formed  at  Chalons, 
consisting  of  166  battalions,  100  squadrons,  and  380 
guns,  belonging  to  the  First,  Fifth,  Seventh,  and 
Twelfth  Corps. 

The  division  originally  stationed  on  the  Spanish 
frontier  formed  its  nucleus,  to  which  were  added  four 
regiments  of  marine  infantry  and  two  divisions  of 


THE  POSITION   OF  THE  FBENCH.  67  . 

cavalry,  tlius  constituting  a  very  superior  force.  Gen- 
eral Trochu,  who  had  been  made  Governor  of  Paris, 
had  taken  with  him  eighteen  battalions  of  the  Garde 
Mohile^  they  having  behaved  in  such  a  refractory 
manner  that  it  would  have  been  rash  to  confront  them 
with  the  enemy. 

The  Emperor  had  arrived  in  Chalons  and  placed 
Marshal  MacMahon  in  command  of  the  newly-formed 
army.  At  the  Imperial  head-quarters  it  was  supposed, 
and  with  good  reason,  that  Marshal  Bazaine  was  re- 
treating from  Metz.  The  army  of  Chalons  could  easily 
unite  with  that  of  Bazaine  by  proceeding  to  Verdun, 
only  a  distance  of  a  few  days'  marches,  and  the  com- 
bined armies  might  indeed  have  held  their  own 
against  the  victorious  Germans.  MacMahon,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  to  provide  for  the  defence  of  Paris, 
and  that  capital,  no  less  than  his  own  right  flank,  was 
threatened  by  the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Prussia's  army  to  the  Meuse. 

To  enable  MacMahon  to  decide  whether  he  should 
advance  or  again  retire,  it  was  necessary  that  the 
direction  taken  by  Marshal  Bazaine  should  be  known. 

On  the  18th  Bazaine  had  sent  word  that  he  had 
maintained  his  position  in  a  battle  near  Rezonville, 
but  that  the  troops,  before  marching  further,  must 
have  food  and  ammunition.  From  this  it  seemed  only 
too  probable  that  the  communications  of  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine  were  already  threatened,  and  MacMahon 
determined  to  march  on  Rheims,  whence  he  could 
either  reach  Paris,  though  by  a  somewhat  roundabout 
way,  or  turn  back  and  effect  a  junction  with  the  other 
army. 

But  when  it  became  known  that  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia's  army  had  not  even  been  near  Metz,  and 
that  Prussian  cavahy  had  akeady  appeared  before 


68  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

Vitry,  the  Marshal  recognized  the  danger  of  such  an 
undertaking.  He  therefore  determined  to  march  on 
Paris,  and  very  wisely  refused  to  obey  the  order  of  the 
Empress  and  the  Ministerial  Council  when  they  desired 
him  to  take  the  other  course.  Outside  Paris  he  could 
risk  a  battle  with  advantage,  since  the  fortifications, 
even  in  the  event  of  defeat,  guaranteed  a  safe  retreat 
and  made  j^ursuit  impossible. 

Additional  reports  from  Metz  did  not  help  to  clear 
up  the  situation  there.  Even  on  the  18th  "  they  had 
held  their  ground,"  the  narrative  ran,  "  the  right  wing 
alone  had  changed  front ;  the  troops  required  two  to 
three  days'  rest,"  but  the  Marshal "  was  still  determined 
to  press  forward  in  a  northerly  direction,"  and  fight 
his  way  to  Chalons,  via  Montmedy  and  Ste.  Menehould, 
"  i/""  this  road  was  not  too  strongly  held  by  the  enemy. 
In  that  case  he  would  march  on  Sedan,  and  even  by 
Mezieres  on  Chalons. 

But  Bazaine  might  already  have  begun  this  move- 
ment, so  MacMahon,  who  would  not  desert  his  com- 
rades, abandoned  the  idea  of  marching  directly  on 
Paris,  and,  on  the  23rd,  took  the  road  to  Stenay. 

This  sudden  decision  left  no  time  for  the  dispositions 
necessary  for  such  an  undertaking.  4-t  the  end  of  the 
first  day's  march  the  troops  arrived,  late  in  the  evening, 
on  the  banks  of  the  Suippe  Eiver  in  a  pouring  rain. 
They  lacked  every  necessary,  and  two  corps  were  en- 
tirely without  food.  The  Marshal  was  therefore  forced 
to  move  further  northward  to  Rethel,  where  large 
victualling  magazines  had  been  established,  and  whence 
stores  could  be  sent  after  them  by  rail.  Even  on  the 
third  day's  march  the  army  had  made  little  progress 
eastward.  The  left  wing  was  left  at  Rethel,  the  right 
got  as  far  as  the  Aisne,  near  Vouziers.  On  August 
26th  the  main  force  was  still  standing  between  Attigny 


THE  AEMY  IN  THE  EAST.  69 

and  Le  Chene,  on  the  Ardennes  canal,  while  the  Seventh 
Corps  and  a  regiment  of  hussars  were  posted  in  front 
of  Vonziers  to  cover  the  right  flank„ 

While  the  French  army  was  thus  making  a  wide 
detour  to  the  east,  the  Grerman  forces,  which  had  been 
put  in  motion  at  the  same  time,  were  marching  in  a 
straight  line  westward. 

According  to  orders  issued  from  head-quarters  at 
Pont-a-Mousson,  the  advance  on  the  enemy,  who  was 
supposed  to  be  at  Chalons,  was  to  be  effected  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  give  the  Third  Army,  marching  on  the 
left  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  a  day's  start,  so  as  to 
attack  the  French  wherever  they  might  make  a  stand, 
both  in  front  and  on  the  right  flank,  and  thus  force 
them  off  the  Paris  route  to  the  northward.  The  two 
armies  were  to  converge  as  they  advanced,  and  to  reach 
the  line  of  Ste.  Menehould  and  Vitry  on  the  26th. 

On  the  first  day's  march,  the  troops  being  still  twelve 
miles  apart,  they  reached  the  Meuse ;  on  the  second 
day,  the  24th,  they  were  in  a  Hue  formed  by  St.  Dizier, 
Bar  le  Due,  and  Verdun.  The  attempt  to  take  Verdun 
and  Toul  on  their  route  proved  futile. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division,  which  had  greatly  ex- 
tended its  reconnoitring  expeditions,  brought  in  im- 
portant news  even  on  that  early  date.  The  Rhenish 
dragoons  had  discovered  that  Chalons  and  the  camp 
at  Mourmelon  were  deserted,  and,  though  the  stores 
in  camp  had  been  burnt,  they  found  plenty  of  loot.  A 
letter,  written  by  a  French  officer,  had  been  intercepted, 
which  intimated  that  MacMahon  purposed  to  relieve 
Metz;  and  another  stated  that  MacMahon  was  en- 
trenched at  Rheims  with  150,000  men ;  this  was  cor- 
roborated by  the  Paris  newspapers. 

On  the  25th  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  formed  a  line 
reaching  from  Sommeille  to  Dombasle,  while  the  fore- 


70  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

most  columns  of  the  Third  Army  were  already  on  the 
route  to  St.  Menehould  and  Vitry,  one  day  ahead  of 
the  prescribed  order.  The  small  fortress  of  Vitry, 
having  been  previously  vacated  by  a  battalion  of 
Mobiles,  surrendered  to  the  4th  Cavahy  Division.  This 
battalion,  of  1000  men,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  6th 
Cavahy  Division  riding  towards  Dampierre  as  they 
were  marching  to  Ste.  Menehould  to  take  the  railway 
to  Paris. 

The  5th  Cavalry  Division  reached  Ste.  Menehould, 
and  the  12th  followed  as  far  as  Clermont,  patrolling 
the  neighborhood  up  to  Varennes,  within  two  miles  of 
the  French  outposts  at  Grand  Pre,  but  without  learn- 
ing anything  about  the  operations  of  the  French  army. 

Reconnoitring  to  any  gi'eat  distance  on  the  right  of 
the  army  was  made  difficult  by  the  forest  of  Argonnes, 
which  it  would  have  been  rash  for  the  cavalry  to 
traverse  unaided  by  infantry.  The  inhabitants  of  that 
district  also  became  troublesome.  The  Government 
had  provided  them  with  arms,  and  organized  a  general 
rising.  The  Germans,  who  up  to  that  period  had  made 
war  on  the  Emperor  alone,  were  now  forced  to  use 
their  arms  against  the  people.  The  Franc-tireurs, 
though  not  affecting  the  operations  on  a  large  scale, 
were  a  source  of  much  annoyance  to  sm^ll  expeditions ; 
and  as  it  naturally  harassed  the  soldiers  to  feel  that 
they  were  not  safe  by  day  or  night,  the  character  of 
the  war  became  more  embittered,  and  increased  the 
sufferings  of  the  people. 

A  Paris  telegram,  sent  via  London,  arrived  this  day 
at  head-quarters  at  Bar  le  Due.  It  stated  that  Mac- 
Mahon  was  encamped  at  Eheims  and  anxious  to  effect 
a  junction  with  Bazaine. 

It  is  always  a  serious  matter  to  abandon,  without 
the  most  pressing  necessity,  a  once  settled  and  well- 


THE   GEEMAN  ADVANCE.  71 

devised  plan  for  a  new  and  unprepared  scheme.  It 
would  have  been  unjustifiable  to  entirely  change  the 
line  of  march  on  the  ground  of  rumors  that  might, 
after  all,  prove  unfounded.  Endless  difficulties  must 
result  from  such  a  course ;  the  arrangements  for  bring- 
ing up  baggage  and  reserves  would  have  to  be  cancelled, 
and  the  confidence  of  the  troops  in  their  commanders 
was  liable  to  be  shaken  if  they  were  called  upon  to 
perform  fruitless  marches.  The  orders  issued  at  eleven 
o'clock  next  day,  therefore,  directed  only  a  slight  devia- 
tion from  the  route  laid  down  towards  Rheims  instead 
of  Chalons.  The  cavalry,  on  the  right  wing,  however, 
was  ordered  to  advance  to  Buzancy  and  Vouziers, 
where  a  thorough  insight  into  the  situation  might  be 
obtained. 

In  war,  probabilities  alone  have  often  to  be  reckoned 
with;  and  the  probability,  as  a  rule,  is  that  the  enemy 
will  do  the  riulit  tlnng.  It  could  not  be  thought  prob- 
able that  the  French  army  would  leave  Paris  unpro- 
tected and  march  by  the  Belgian  frontier  to  Metz. 
Such  a  move  seemed  strange  and  somewhat  foolhardy ; 
stiU  it  was  possible.  The  Chief  of  the  Staff,  recogniz- 
ing this  fact,  worked  out  a  scheme  of  marches  that 
same  day,  by  which  the  three  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  together  with  the  two  nearest  Bavarian  corps, 
could  be  brought  together  in  the  vicinity  of  DanviUers, 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  within  three  days. 

These  forces,  with  the  two  reserve  corps  left  at  Metz, 
which  could  be  brought  into  action,  would  constitute 
a  force  of  150,000  men,  who  might  give  battle  there, 
or  compel  the  enemy  to  do  so  a  little  further  on  at 
Louguyon.  Even  without  this  reserve  the  advance  of 
the  French  could  be  checked  before  they  could  cross 
the  Meuse,  while  some  other  corps  of  the  Third  Army 
was  brought  up. 


72  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

This  plan  of  action  was  soon  to  be  carried  out. 
Fresh  news  arrived  that  same  afternoon.  The  news- 
papers let  out  the  secret  by  publishing  vehement 
speeches  delivered  in  the  National  Assembly  to  the 
effect  "  that  the  French  General,  leaving  his  comrade 
in  the  lurch,  was  bringing  the  curses  of  the  country 
upon  his  head." 

It  would  be  a  disgi-ace,  they  said,  to  the  French 
nation  to  leave  the  brave  Bazaine  unsuccored;  from 
all  this,  and  considering  the  effect  of  phrases  on  the 
French,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  military  considera- 
tions would  give  way  to  political.  A  telegram  from 
London,  quoting  the  Paris  Temps^  reported  that  Mac- 
Mahon  had  suddenly  resolved  to  hasten  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Bazaine,  though  an  abandonment  of  the  road 
to  Paris  placed  the  country  in  danger. 

The  King,  before  night,  approved  of  the  march  to 
the  right,  and  the  necessary  orders  to  the  commanders 
of  the  corps  were  dispatched  that  night. 

On  the  26th  his  Majesty  moved  his  head-quarters  to 
Clermont.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  had  set  out 
for  Varennes  early  in  the  morning  with  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  while  he  ordered  the  Gruards  to  Dombasle,  and 
the  Fourth  Corps  to  Fleury. 

The  cavalry,  sent  forward  in  every  direction,  found 
that  the  enemy  had  evacuated  the  Suippe  Valley  and 
had  not  yet  entered  that  of  the  Meuse ;  that  Buzancy 
and  Grrand  Pre  were  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  and 
that  their  Seventh  Corps  were  encamped  in  consider- 
able force  on  the  heights  of  Vouziers. 

A  small  detachment  of  cavalry  proceeded  to  that 
point  for  observation,  and  theii*  mere  appearance 
occasioned  an  almost  unaccountable  excitement. 

General  Douay,  quartered  at  Vouziers,  received  the 
most  exaggerated  reports,  and  must  have  thought  that 


MACMAHON'S   MOVEMENTS.  73 

a  general  attack  by  the  G-erman  army  was  imminent. 
The  Seventh  Corps  was  kept  under  arms  the  entire 
night,  though  it  was  raining  in  torrents,  and  the  Mar- 
shal resolved  to  advance  towards  Vouziers  and  Buzancy 
with  all  his  forces  next  morning.  Thus  the  march  to 
the  east  was  brought  to  an  end  as  early  as  the  27th, 
but  it  was  soon  discovered  that  these  rumors  were 
unfounded. 

The  German  generals  were  not  less  interested  in 
gaining  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  move- 
ments than  the  French  staff  was  in  knowing  those  of 
the  Germans.  If  the  enemy  had  handled  their  cavalry 
well  on  their  right  flank,  a  surprise  like  that  above 
mentioned  would  have  been  impossible,  but  the  1st 
French  Cavalry  Division  was  placed  on  the  left,  where 
there  was  no  danger  whatever,  and  the  2nd  were  in 
their  rear. 

It  seemed  as  though  they  had  paid  less  attention  to 
repelling  an  attack  than  to  evading  one,  and  reaching 
Montmedy,  the  point  of  rendezvous  with  Bazaine, 
unobserved. 

At  this  period,  when  the  advance  of  the  G^ermans 
from  the  south  could  no  longer  be  doubted,  it  would 
have  been  best  for  the  French  to  tui-n  against  them 
and  strike  a  decisive  blow,  or  at  least  to  clear  them 
out  of  the  way  of  their  own  line  of  march.  If  they 
had  failed  in  this,  they  would  at  any  rate  have  learned 
that  their  undertaking  was  impracticable  and  its  con- 
tinuation sure  to  lead  to  a  catastrophe. 

It  must,  however,  be  admitted  that  the  German 
cavalry  formed  an  almost  impenetrable  screen.  The 
Marshal  could  not  know  that  the  Germans  were  eche- 
loned from  Vitry  to  Varennes  (a  distance  of  eight 
miles),  and  were  not  at  all  in  a  position  to  attack  him 
on  the  spot. 


74  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAH. 

(August  27tli.)  On  this  day,  as  soon  as  the  Marshal 
had  discovered  his  error,  he  continued  his  march,  with 
part  of  his  troops  at  least.  The  Seventh  and  Fifth 
Corps  were  directed  to  cover  the  movement  at  Vouziers 
and  Buzancy,  the  Twelfth  advanced  to  Le  Chene  and 
the  1st  Cavalry  Division  to  Beaumont,  probably  to 
ascertain  when  Marshal  Bazaine  would  arrive.  The 
First  Corps  and  the  2nd  Cavahy  Division  remained 
by  the  Aisne. 

The  Saxons,  the  foremost  of  the  German  corps,  had 
received  explicit  orders  to  proceed  to  Dun  on  that  day, 
and  occupy  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  as  far  as 
Stenay  in  order  to  secure  a  crossing.  They  reached 
Stenay  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  sent  an 
advanced  post  across  the  river. 

The  cavalry  hung  on  to  the  heels  of  the  enemy  and 
followed  all  their  movements,  often  engaging  in  small 
skirmishes.  The  departure  of  the  Fifth  French  Corps 
from  Buzancy  for  Le  Chene  was  at  once  discovered, 
and  so  was  the  advance  to  Beaumont ;  the  Saxon  cav- 
alry division  was  in  consequence  sent  on  that  evening 
to  Nouart.  The  Bavarian  Corps  reached  the  Clermont- 
Verdun  road,  the  5th  Ste.  Menehould ;  the  other  corps 
of  the  Third  Army  followed  by  forced  marches  north- 
wards. "" 

It  now  seemed  certain  that  it  would  be  possible  to 
meet  the  enemy  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Word 
was  sent  to  the  army  before  Metz,  that  the  two  corps 
asked  for  were  no  longer  required,  but  they  had  mean- 
while set  out. 

The  latest  dispositions  made  by  Marshal  MacMahon 
indicated  that  he  was  making  a  last  effort  to  proceed 
on  the  pre-arranged  lines.  He  was  moving  in  echelon 
on  the  northernmost  road  to  Metz,  but  had  left  a  strong 
reserve  corps  on  the  Aisne  to  check  a  possible  attack. 


OBDERED  TO  EELIEVE  BAZAINE.  75 

Wlien  lie  now  learned  that  nothing  had  been  seen  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine  at  Montmedy,  but  that  it  was  still 
at  Metz,  he  resolved  on  retreat,  and,  after  giving  orders 
to  that  effect  for  next  morning,  reported  his  intentions 
to  Paris. 

From  thence,  during  the  night,  came  the  most  urgent 
remonstrances.  The  Minister  of  War  telegraphed,  "If 
you  leave  Bazaine  in  the  lurch,  revolution  will  break 
out,"  and  the  Ministerial  Council  issued  a  peremptory 
order  to  relieve  Metz.  The  troops  in  front  of  him, 
they  said,  were  only  part  of  the  investing  army ;  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  was  still  several  days'  march 
in  the  rear,  and  Greneral  Vinoy  had  already  started 
from  Rheims  with  the  newly-formed  Thirteenth  Corps 
to  protect  Paris. 

The  Marshal  silenced  his  military  convictions  and 
issued  new  orders,  but  the  troops  had  started  betimes. 
The  change  of  route  gave  rise  to  mucli  confusion ;  the 
roads  were  bad,  and  quarters  for  the  night  were  not 
reached  until  darkness  had  long  set  in ;  the  men  were 
weary,  wet  to  the  skin,  and  depressed  in  spirits. 

(August  28th.)  Hardly  two  miles'  progress  had  been 
made  east.  The  Twelfth  Corps  stood  at  La  Besace, 
the  First  was  on  the  way  to  Le  Chene,  the  Seventh 
had  halted  at  Boult  aux  Bois,  its  commander  having 
been  misinformed  that  two  Prussian  corps  were  occu- 
pying Buzancy,  a  little  further  on.  On  the  strength 
of  this  report  the  Fifth  Corps  advanced  on  that  town, 
by  way  of  Bar,  but  went  on  to  Bois-des-Dames  in  the 
afternoon.  These  movements  were  not  interfered 
with.  The  G-erman  cavalry  had  express  orders  to  re- 
strict itseK  to  reconnoitring,  and,  while  following  the 
French  as  closely  as  possible,  not  in  any  way  to  check 
or  press  them.  In  consequence  of  these  orders,  the 
Saxon  cavalry  evacuated  Nouart  on  the  approach  of 


76  THE   FKANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

the  enemy.  The  Grermans  were  not  yet  prepared  for 
action  till  the  Third  Army  had  arrived ;  and  the  rear 
of  that  force,  formed  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  had  only 
just  reached  Ste.  Menehould. 

(Ang:ust  29th.)  It  was  therefore  decided  that  a  non- 
offensive  attitude  should  be  preserved.  Even  on  the 
29th  a  decisive  move  was  deferred  until  the  30th. 

The  Marshal,  in  his  head-quarters  at  Stonne,  had 
been  informed  that  the  Germans  occupied  Dun,  and 
that  the  bridges  over  the  Meuse  had  been  destroyed. 
The  French  had  no  pontoon-train,  and  there  were  no 
means  of  crossing  the  river  excepting  lower  down,  at 
Mouzon  and  Villers.  His  Twelfth  Corps  and  the  1st 
Cavahy  Division  succeeded  in  effecting  their  passage 
at  these  points ;  the  First  Corps  and  the  2d  Cavalry 
Division  proceeded  to  Roncourt. 

The  Seventh  Corps,  delayed  in  its  progi'ess  by  skir- 
mishing on  its  right  flank,  did  not  reach  its  quarters 
at  La  Besace,  but  bivouacked  at  Oches.  The  Fifth 
Corps  was  to  proceed  to  Beaumont,  but  the  staff  officer 
carrying  the  order  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussian 
cavalry,  together  with  his  escort.  General  de  Failly 
therefore  marched  to  Stenay,  according  to  his  original 
instructions. 

Up  to  this  time  the  cavalry  of  the  Saxon  corps 
alone  had  come  into  contact  with  the  enemy,  but  the 
Guards  now  relieved  it  at  Buzancy,  while  the  cavalry 
recrossed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse  at  Dun.  Their 
advanced  guard  at  once  took  possession  of  the  wooded 
spur  to  the  north-east  of  Nouart,  repelled  the  French 
cavahy,  and  pressed  ahead  to  Champy,  where  they 
encountered  a  strong  force.  This  was  Lespart's  divis- 
ion. The  purpose  of  the  reconnoissance  had  been 
attained,  and  the  advanced  guard  withdrew.  The 
French  having  meanwhile  received  fresh  orders  from 


BATTLE   OF  BEAUMONT.  77 

MacMahon,  marched  off  at  the  same  time  in  a  northerly 
direction. 

Four  corps  of  the  Third  G-erman  Army  were  now 
within  two  miles  of  the  rear  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse. 
The  5th  Cavalry  Division  stood  at  Attigny  across  the 
enemy's  lines  of  communication ;  the  6th  was  following 
on  the  heels  of  the  French,  and,  besides  other  exploits, 
had  taken  Boucq  with  a  dismounted  party.  The  Royal 
head-quarters  were  now  established  at  Grand  Pre,  and 
upon  receipt  of  the  various  reports  it  was  decided  to 
attack  the  French  on  the  following  day,  before  they 
could  cross  the  Meuse.  The  Army  of  the  Meuse  was 
to  press  forward  towards  Beaumont,  the  Third  to  take 
the  route  between  that  place  and  Le  Chene.  To  insure 
the  simultaneous  arrival  of  both  bodies,  the  right  wing 
was  not  to  move  until  ten  o'clock,  while  the  left  began 
the  march  before  six  o'clock.  Only  those  sections  of  the 
train  absolutely  necessary  for  battle  were  to  follow. 

BATTLE   OF   BEAUMONT. 

(August  30th.) 

On  the  30th  of  August,  at  ten  o'clock,  the  King  pro- 
ceeded to  Sommauthe  rid  Buzancy. 

Both  Bavarian  corps  were  marching  by  the  same 
route,  the  Fifth  Corps  advanced  in  the  centre  towards 
Oches,  the  Eleventh  and  the  Wiirtemberg  division 
were  on  the  way  to  Le  Chene,  the  Sixth  to  Vouziers. 
The  Fourth  Corps  on  the  right  was  advancing  by 
Belval,  and  the  Twelfth  followed  the  course  of  the 
Meuse,  with  the  Guards  as  a  reserve  in  the  rear. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  issued  orders  that  his  entire 
army  was  to  concentrate  this  day  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Meuse,  only  the  baggage  and  ambulance  were 
to  remain. 


78  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAJST  WAE. 

This  First  Corps  and  the  2nd  Cavahy  Division  had 
left  Roncourt  at  the  early  hour  of  seven ;  they  crossed 
at  Reniilly,  pontoon  bridges  had  been  thrown  over  for 
the  infantry. 

The  Seventh  Corps  at  Oches  struck  camp  still  earlier, 
at  four  o'clock,  but  as  its  commander  insisted  on  tak- 
ing the  entire  train,  even  empty  wagons,  it  formed  a 
column  of  two  miles  in  length,  and  seven  of  its  battal- 
ions were  forced  to  march  off  the  road  to  protect  them. 
The  rear-guard,  consisting  of  one  brigade,  was  unable 
to  start  before  ten  o'clock.  This  long  procession  soon 
came  into  contact  with  the  Prussian  cavalry  and  the  ar- 
tillery following,  who  by  their  fire  forced  the  brigade  to 
retire.  Not  till  one  o'clock  could  the  march  to  La  Besace 
be  resumed,  and  as  heavy  firing  was  constantly  heard 
from  Beaumont,  General  Douay  conceived  it  right  to 
abandon  the  road  to  Mouzon  and  take  that  to  Remilly. 

The  Fifth  Corps,  as  had  been  foreseen,  was  destined 
to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  other  two.  These  troops 
had  reached  the  vicinity  of  Beaumont  only  at  four 
A.M.,  and  were  thoroughly  exhausted  by  the  fighting 
and  night  march. 

General  de  Fa  illy  therefore  determined  to  give  his 
men  time  to  cook  a  meal  before  proceeding.  Pre- 
cautionary measures  seem  to  have  been  altogether 
neglected,  though  he  must  have  known  that  the  enemy 
was  near  at  hand,  and  at  half -past  one,  while  the  officers 
and  m.en  were  at  dinner,  the  Prussian  shell  dropped 
into  the  lines  of  the  incautious  enemy. 

The  two  corps  on  the  German  right  had  to  move 
upon  four  quite  separate  columns  through  the  woods, 
and  over  roads  made  heavy  by  rain.  The  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony  therefore  ordered  that  neither  of  the 
columns  should  attempt  to  attack  before  the  support- 
ing column  was  ready  to  assist. 


BATTLE   OF  BEAUMONT.  79 

The  Fourtli  Corps  had  got  off  very  early,  and  after 
a  short  rest  proceeded  on  its  way  at  ten  o'clock. 
When  at  noon  the  advanced  gnard  of  the  8th  Division 
left  the  forest,  they  discovered,  from  their  elevated 
position,  the  camp  of  the  enemy  about  800  paces  away, 
employed  as  above  described.  Greneral  von  Scholer 
would  not  lose  such  an  opportunity ;  at  all  events  the 
presence  of  his  force  could  not  long  be  concealed,  so 
he  made  it  known  by  the  fire  of  guns. 

He  was  soon  made  aware  that  he  had  attacked  an 
enemy  of  superior  strength.  The  French  immediately 
took  up  arms  and  sent  swarms  of  riflemen  to  the  front, 
who,  with  their  long-ranged  Chassepots,  did  great  ex- 
ecution, especially  among  the  artillery.  The  main  body 
of  the  8th  Division  had  meanwhile  come  up,  and  ere 
long  the  7th  Division  appeared  on  the  right.  The 
French  attacked  these  too  with  great  impetuosity,  and 
could  only  be  repulsed  with  the  bayonet.  Presently, 
however,  the  foremost  battalions  of  both  divisions 
made  their  way  into  the  French  camp  in  front  of 
Beaumont,  into  the  town  itself,  and  finally  into  a 
second  camp  north  of  that  place.  Seven  guns,  of 
which  the  teams  were  missing,  and  which  continued 
firing  up  to  the  last  moment,  a  number  of  gunners, 
wagons  a,nd  horses,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  assailants. 

Whilst  thus,  at  two  o'clock,  the  infantry  were  for  a 
time  in  action,  fourteen  batteries  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
drawn  up  on  the  heights  north  of  Beaumont,  were  en- 
gaged in  a  duel  with  the  French  artillery.  The  Saxon 
artillery  soon  came  up  on  the  right,  and  the  Bavarian 
on  the  left.  This  formidable  artillery  line,  constantly 
advancing  in  echelon,  presently  silenced  the  mitrail- 
leuses, and  at  three  o'clock  the  remaining  French  bat- 
teries also  went  out  of  action. 

The  Second  Bavarian  Corps  had  advanced  on  La 


80  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

Thibaudine,  on  the  left  of  the  Prussian  Fourth,  when 
it  was  suddenly  attacked  by  a  strong  body  of  French 
coming  from  the  west. 

These  belonged  to  Conseil  Dumesnil's  division  of 
the  Seventh  French  Corps,  and  were "  still  proceeding 
to  Mouzon,  according  to  their  original  marching 
orders.  They  were  no  less  surprised  than  the  Bava- 
rians, who  attacked  them  in  front  and  flank.  They 
gave  up  all  hope  of  cutting  their  way  through,  and  at 
about  four  o'clock  beat  a  hasty  retreat  northwards, 
leaving  two  guns  behind. 

The  Bavarians  had  in  the  meantime  taken  possession 
of  the  Farm  of  Thibaudine,  and  the  Prussians  of  Har- 
noterie.  The  wooded  hills  prevented  a  clear  view  of 
the  surrounding  country ;  the  enemy  had  completely 
disappeared. 

General  de  Failly  was  making  strenuous  efforts  to 
collect  his  scattered  forces  at  Mouzon,  under  cover  of 
his  rear-guard  stationed  at  La  Sartelle ;  and  Greneral 
Lebrun,  of  the  Twelfth  French  Corps,  sent  an  infantry 
and  a  cavalry  brigade  and  three  batteries  back  across 
the  Meuse  to  his  assistance. 

The  8th  Division,  headed  by  the  13th  Brigade, 
worked  wearily  through  the  dense  forest  of  Grivodeau, 
on  its  way  to  operate  against  this  ne^  defensive  posi- 
tion. This  was  at  five  o'clock.  On  emerging  from  the 
wood  the  battalions,  who  had  fallen  into  some  confu- 
sion, were  received  by  a  heavy  fire  at  short  range. 
The  riflemen  made  several  fruitless  attempts  to  ad- 
vance, and  the  dense  underwood  prevented  a  closer 
formation  of  troops  in  rear.  By  the  time  the  Saxon 
Corps  had  succeeded,  by  gi'eat  exertions,  in  extricating 
itself  from  the  forest  and  swamp  by  the  Wamme,  and 
finally  reaching  Letanne,  the  impracticability  of  further 
progi'ess  in  the  Meuse  valley  became  apparent,  since 


BATTLE  OF  BEAUMONT.  81 

French  batteries,  in  impregnable  positions,  commanded 
the  low  ground  beyond  the  river.  The  troops  there- 
fore ascended  the  plateau,  and  followed  the  8th  Divis- 
ion through  the  Grivodeau  woods,  increasing  the  force 
on  the  northern  border,  where,  however,  the  develop- 
ment of  a  broader  front  was  impossible.  At  about 
six  o'clock  the  infantry  engagement  ceased  for  a  time 
at  this  point. 

The  14th  Brigade  had  come  into  line  on  the  left  of 
the  13th,  followed  by  the  8th  Division,  in  two  columns. 

The  93rd  Eegiment  had  stormed  the  hill  to  the 
north-east  of  Yoncq,  and  pursued  the  enemy  to  the 
foot  of  Mont-de-Brune.  The  Anhalters  captured  four 
mitraiUeuses  and  eight  guns,  some  of  them  with  their 
entire  teams. 

When,  at  half -past  five,  the  artillery  were  in  position, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  27th  Regiment  was  approach- 
ing, General  Zychlinski  advanced  to  the  main  attack. 

The  French  occupied  the  entirely  isolated  hill-top 
with  a  strong  body  of  troops ;  their  batteries  faced  the 
Bois  de  Givodeau  on  the  east,  whence  an  assault  was 
imminent,  but  when  the  93rd  and  the  2nd  Battalion  of 
the  27th  advanced  on  them  from  the  south  they  changed 
front  towards  their  aggressors,  and  opened  upon  them 
a  heavy  fire.  The  Fusilier  battalion  was  at  the  same 
time  approaching  from  the  west.  Regardless  of  their 
losses,  the  assailants  eagerly  scaled  the  hiU-sides,  with 
the  brigadiers  and  colonels  at  their  head.  Six  French 
guns  were  seized  while  in  action,  in  spite  of  a  brave 
resistance  from  the  gunners  and  their  escorts,  the 
enemy  was  pursued  as  far  as  the  Roman  road,  and 
four  more  guns,  completely  horsed  and  equipped,  which 
had  been  abandoned  by  the  French,  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  victorious  troops. 

The  three  battalions  hurried  on  towards  Mouzon, 
6 


82  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

without  waiting  for  the  14th  Brigade,  who  were  fol- 
lowing in  rear,  but  they  suddenly  found  themselves 
threatened  by  a  cavalry  charge. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  recognized  the  fact  that  the 
best  thing  he  could  do  was  to  effect  as  orderly  a  retreat 
as  possible  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse ;  the  rein- 
forcements sent  across  had  akeady  been  recalled. 
The  5th  Cuirassier  Regiment  alone  remained.  When  a 
little  to  the  north  of  the  Faubourg  de  Mouzon,  they 
came  within  range  of  the  shot  of  the  advancing  Prus- 
sians, and  fearlessly  faced  the  enemy. 

The  10th  company  of  the  27th  Regiment  received 
the  first  onslaught.  The  men,  without  rushing  for- 
ward, waited  for  the  signal  of  their  leader,  Captain 
Helmuth,  and  when  the  enemy  was  within  short  range, 
fired  a  volley.  Eleven  officers  and  100  men  fell,  includ- 
ing their  brave  commander,  who  was  killed  fifteen  yards 
in  front  of  his  men.  The  survivors  rushed  back  to  the 
Meuse,  and,  as  all  the  pontoon  bridges  had  been  re- 
moved, they  tried  to  gain  the  opposite  side  by  swim- 
ming. 

The  French  were  still  in  front  of  Mouzon  in  consid- 
erable numbers,  and  the  batteries  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
now  arrived  one  by  one,  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  on 
them.  Two  Bavarian  batteries  took "^  the  bridge  at 
Villers,  lower  down  the  river,  and  stopped  the  way. 
Then  the  suburb  was  taken,  after  a  fierce  encounter  in 
and  about  the  houses,  and  here  too  the  bridge  was 
occupied.  The  enemy,  deprived  of  every  means  of 
retreat,  received  the  8th  Division,  emerging  from  the 
valley  of  the  Yoncq,  with  a  hot  fire,  but  were  gradually 
driven  back  to  the  river.  The  French  sections  in  front 
of  the  Bois  de  Grivodeau,  too,  were  hopelessly  commit- 
ted, and  when  the  7th  Division  and  Twelfth  Corps 
charged  upon  them,  were  dispersed,  in  spite  of  an 


BATTLE   OF  BEAUMONT.  83 

obstinate  resistance.  When  darkness  set  in  the  French 
gave  up  the  fight  on  this  side  of  the  Meuse.  Many  of 
the  stragglers  were  taken  prisoners,  others  hid  them- 
selves in  the  copses  and  farm-houses,  or  tried  to  escape 
by  swimming  the  river. 

In  this  battle,  as  in  the  preceding  ones,  the  loss  of 
the  assailants  far  exceeded  that  of  the  defenders.  The 
Army  of  the  Meuse  lost  3500  men,  the  Fourth  Corps 
being  the  principal  sufferer.  The  French  estimated 
their  loss  at  1800  killed;  but  3000  prisoners,  mostly 
wounded,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  with  51 
guns,  33  ammunition  and  other  wagons,  and  a  mili- 
tary chest,  containing  150,000  francs.  And,  what  was 
worse,  this  battle  had  forced  them  on  to  most  unfavor- 
able ground. 

While  the  Fourth  Corps  had  fought  the  battle  of  the 
day  almost  single-handed,  the  Saxon  cavalry  had  made 
good  progress  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  and 
reconnoitred  towards  Mouzon  and  Carignan.  The 
Guards  had  reached  Beaumont,  and  General  von  der 
Tann,  with  the  First  Bavarian  Corps,  was  at  Roncouft, 
marching  by  way  of  La  Besace,  with  some  slight  skir- 
mishing on  the  way.  The  Second  Corps  concentrated 
at  Sommauthe,  the  Fifth  at  Stonne,  the  Eleventh  at 
La  Besace.  Thus  seven  corps  now  stood  in  close  com- 
munication between  the  Meuse  and  the  Bar. 

The  King  rode  back  to  Buzancy  after  the  battle,  as 
all  villages  in  the  vicinity  had  been  turned  into  hos- 
pitals. Here,  as  previously  at  Clermont,  was  felt  the 
great  inconvenience  of  inadequate  lodging  for  hundreds 
of  iUustrious  personages  and  their  suites,  when,  for 
once  in  a  way,  and  for  military  reasons,  head-quarters 
were  established  in  a  small  village,  instead  of  in  a  large 
town. 

Quarters  for  those  officers  whose  duty  it  was  to 


84  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

prepare  the  necessary  orders  for  the  morrow,  were 
only  found  late  at  night,  and  with  considerable  diffi- 
culty. 

The  orders,  worked  out  during  the  night,  were  that 
two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  should  cross  over 
to  the  right  bank  on  the  31st,  to  prevent  the  further 
progress  of  the  French  to  Metz  via  Montmedy,  should 
such  a  movement  be  undertaken.  Two  corps  of  the 
besieging  army  were  posted  at  Etain  and  Briey.  The 
Third  Army  was  to  continue  northwards. 

As  circumstances  now  stood,  it  already  seemed  pos- 
sible that  the  Army  of  Chalons  might  be  compelled  to 
retire  to  neutral  territory,  and  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment was  therefore  asked,  through  diplomatic  chan- 
nels, to  look  to  their  disarmament  should  this  come  to 
pass.  The  German  troops  had  orders  to  at  once  cross 
the  Belgian  frontier  should  the  enemy  refuse  to  disarm. 

While  the  Fifth  French  Corps  were  still  fighting  at 
Beaumont,  and  before  the  rest  of  the  army  had  crossed 
the  Meuse,  General  MacMahon  had  given  orders  that  it 
was  to  concentrate  on  Sedan. 

He  did  not  intend  to  offer  battle  there,  but  it  was 
indispensable  to  give  his  troops  a  short  rest,  and  pro- 
vide them  with  food  and  ammunition.  Later  on  he 
meant  to  retreat  via  Mezieres,  whither  General  Vinoy 
was  just  then  proceeding  with  the  newly-formed 
Thirteenth  Corps.  The  First  Corps,  which  had  arrived 
at  Carignan  early  in  the  afternoon,  detached  two  of  its 
divisions  to  Douzy  in  the  evening  to  check  any  further 
advance  of  the  Germans. 

Though  pursuit  immediately  after  the  battle  was 
prevented  by  the  intervening  river,  the  retreat  of  the 
French  soon  assumed  the  character  of  a  rout.  The 
troops  were  worn  out  with  their  efforts  by  day  and 
night,  in  continuous  rain,  and  with  but  scanty  sup- 


EETKEAT   ON   SEDAN.  85 

plies  of  food.  The  marching  to  and  fro,  to  no  visible 
purpose,  had  undermined  their  confidence  in  their  lead- 
ers, and  a  series  of  defeats  had  shaken  their  self-reli- 
ance. 

Thousands  of  fugitives,  crying  for  bread,  crowded 
round  the  wagons  as  they  made  their  way  to  the  little 
fortress  which  had  so  unexpectedly  become  the  central 
goal  of  a  vast  army. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon  arrived  there  from  Carignan 
late  in  the  evening ;  the  Seventh  Corps  reached  Floing 
during  the  night  of  the  31st,  but  the  Twelfth  Corps 
did  not  arrive  at  Bazeilles  until  the  following  day. 
The  Fifth  Corps  mustered  at  the  eastern  suburb  of 
Sedan  in  a  shocking  condition,  followed  in  the  after- 
noon by  the  First,  which  drew  up  behind  the  Grivonne 
Valley  after  many  rear-guard  actions  with  the  G-erman 
cavalry.  It  was  impossible  to  proceed  to  Mezieres 
that  day ;  but  the  Twelfth  Corps  had  that  same  even- 
ing to  face  the  Germans  at  Bazeilles,  where  the  sound 
of  firing  announced  their  arrival.  Even  the  order  to 
destroy  the  bridges  there  and  at  Donchery  was  neg- 
lected, owing  to  the  worn-out  condition  of  the  men. 

(August  31st.)  The  Gruards  and  the  12th  Cavahy 
Division,  which  formed  part  of  the  Ai-my  of  the 
Meuse,  had  crossed  that  river  at  Pouilly,  by  a  pontoon 
bridge  constructed  at  Letanne,  and  then  scoured  the 
country  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Chiers.  Following 
close  upon  the  rear  of  the  French  and  harassing  them 
till  they  reached  their  new  position,  they  succeeded  in 
taking  many  of  the  stragglers.  The  Gruards  crossed 
the  Chiers  at  Carignan  and  halted  at  Sachy;  the 
Twelfth  fell  back  on  the  Meuse  near  Douzy,  while  its 
advanced  guard  pushed  on  past  Francheval.  The 
Fourth  Corps  remained  at  Mouzon. 

The  4th  Cavahy  Division  of  the  Third  Army  took 


86  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAIL. 

the  direct  route  to  Sedan,  drove  back  the  French  out- 
posts from  Wadelincourt  and  Frenois,  and  from 
thence  took  possession  of  the  railroad  under  the  fire 
of  their  artillery.  The  6th  Cavalry  Division,  on  the 
left,  reached  Poix,  on  the  way  to  Mezieres. 

When  the  First  Bavarian  Corps  reached  Remilly 
before  noon,  it  came  under  the  heavy  fire  from  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river,  and  at  once  brought  up  its 
batteries  in  position  on  the  near  slope  of  the  valley. 
A  furious  cannonade  ensued,  in  which  finally  sixty 
guns  engaged  on  the  side  of  the  Bavarians.  The 
French  now  only  tried  to  blow  up  the  railway  bridge 
south  of  Bazeilles,  but  the  well-directed  shots  of  the 
4th  Jager  battalion  di-ove  off  the  men,  the  Jagers  threw 
the  powder-barrels  into  the  river,  and  at  midday  crossed 
the  bridge.  The  battalion  entered  Bazeilles  in  the  face 
of  a  shower  of  bullets  and  occupied  the  northern 
quarter  of  the  straggling  little  town. 

Thus  the  Twelfth  French  Corps  was  forced  to  draw 
up  between  Balan  and  La  Moncelle,  where,  after  being 
reinforced  by  batteries  from  the  First  Corps,  it  faced, 
with  an  expenditure  of  considerable  forces,  the  bold 
little  troop  of  Germans. 

General  von  der  Tann  did  not  think  it  expedient, 
however,  to  engage,  on  that  day  and'^at  that  point, 
in  serious  conflict  with  an  enemy  in  a  concentrated 
position,  and,  seeing  that  there  was  no  chance  of  being 
reinforced,  he  withdrew  from  Bazeilles  at  about  half- 
past  three,  without  being  pursued. 

Meanwhile  two  pontoon  bridges  had  been  laid,  with- 
out interference  from  the  French,  at  Allicourt.  These 
and  the  bridge  south  of  Bazeilles  were  barricaded  for 
the  night,  while  eighty-four  guns  secured  the  passage. 

The  Eleventh  Corps  marched  towards  Donchery,  to 
the  left  of  the  Bavarians,  followed  by  the  Fifth.     The 


THE   GEKMAN  ADVANCE.  87 

advanced  guard  found  the  village  unoccupied,  and 
spread  itself  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  Tvi^o  more 
bridges  were  thrown  across  below  Sedan  before  three 
o'clock,  whilst  the  railway  bridge  above,  which  was 
unprotected,  was  destroyed. 

The  Wiirtemberg  and  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  on 
the  extreme  left,  came  in  contact  with  the  Thirteenth 
French  Corps,  which  had  just  arrived  at  Mezieres. 

The  King  removed  his  head-quarters  to  Vendresse. 

In  spite  of  long  and  sometimes  forced  marches  in 
bad  weather,  with  little  by  way  of  supplies  beyond 
what  could  be  requisitioned,  the  Army  of  the  Meuse 
on  the  east,  and  the  Third  Army  on  the  south,  were 
now  close  in  front  of  the  combined  forces  of  the  French. 

Marshal  MacMahon  must  have  known  that  the  only 
chance  of  safety  for  his  army,  or  even  part  of  it,  was 
to  continue  immediately  the  retrograde  movement  on 
that  day,  September  1st.  Of  course  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia,  who  held  the  key  to  every  passage  over  the 
Meuse,  would  have  fallen  on  the  flank  of  the  retiring 
army,  and  would  have  pursued  it  to  the  frontier,  a 
distance  of  little  more  than  a  mile.  That  the  attempt 
was  not  risked  is  probably  owing  to  the  state  of  the 
worn-out  troops.  They  were  as  yet  incapable  of  a 
retreat  in  close  order;  they  could  only  fight  where 
they  stood. 

The  Grermans,  on  their  side,  still  believed  that  the 
enemy  would  make  for  Mezieres.  The  Army  of  the 
Meuse  was  instructed  to  attack  them  in  their  position 
and  detain  them  there ;  the  Third  Army  to  press  ahead 
on  the  right  side  of  the  river,  leaving  only  one  corps 
on  the  left  bank. 

The  rear  of  the  French  was  protected  by  the  fortress 
of  Sedan.  The  Meuse  and  the  valleys  of  the  Givonne 
and  the  Floing  offered  formidable  obstructions,  but 


88  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

this  line  of  defence  must  be  obstinately  held.  The 
Calvary  of  Illy  was  one  of  their  most  important  points, 
strengthened  as  it  was  by  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne  in  its 
rear,  whence  a  ridge  extends  to  Bazeilles  and  offers 
protection  in  its  numerous  dips  and  shoulders.  The 
road  ran  past  Illy,  should  it  become  necessary  to  enter 
neutral  territory.  Bazeilles,  on  the  other  hand,  which, 
as  regards  situation,  formed  a  strong  point  of  appui 
for  the  line  facing  the  Grivonne,  stands  on  a  promon- 
tory, which,  after  the  loss  of  the  bridges  across  the 
Meuse,  was  open  to  attack  on  two  sides. 

BATTLE   OF   SEDAN. 

(September  1st.) 

In  order  to  co-operate  with  the  Army  of  the  Meuse 
and  hem  in  the  French  in  their  position,  General  von 
der  Tann  sent  his  first  brigade  over  the  pontoon 
bridges  towards  Bazeilles  by  four  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing in  a  thick  mist.  The  troops  attacked  the  town, 
but  found  the  streets  barricaded,  while  they  were  fired 
on  from  every  house.  The  company  at  the  head 
pressed  forward  to  the  north  gate,  suffering  great 
losses,  but  the  others  were  driven  out  of  the  western 
part  of  BazeiUes,  while  engaged  in  street  fighting,  on 
the  arrival  of  the  2nd  Brigade  of  the  French  Twelfth 
Corps.  However,  they  kept  possession  of  the  build- 
ings at  the  southern  end  of  the  town  and  from  thence 
issued  to  repeated  assaults.  As  fresh  troops  were 
constantly  coming  up  on  both  sides,  and  the  French 
even  were  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of  the  First  and  one 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  murderous  combat  lasted  for 
many  hours  with  wavering  success ;  the  fight  for  the 
Villa  Beurmann,  situated  near  the  end  of  the  high 
street  and  commanding  its  whole  length,  was  especially 


BATTLE   OF   SEDAN.  89 

fierce.  The  citizens  took  active  part  iu  the  struggle, 
and  they  too  had  to  be  shot  down. 

The  strong  array  of  guns  drawn  up  on  the  left  ridge 
of  the  valley  of  the  Meuse  could  not  be  brought  to  bear 
on  the  crowded  streets  of  Bazeilles,  now  blazing  in 
several  places,  but  when,  at  eight  o'clock,  the  8th 
Prussian  Division  had  arrived  at  Eemilly,  General  von 
der  Tann  ordered  his  last  brigade  into  action.  The 
walled  park  of  Monvillers  was  stormed  and  an  entrance 
gained  to  Villa  Beuraiann.  The  artillery  crossed  the 
bridges  at  about  nine  o'clock,  and  the  8th  Division  were 
required  to  give  their  aid  in  a  struggle  begun  by  the 
Bavarians  at  La  Moncelle,  to  the  south  of  Bazeilles. 

Prince  George  of  Saxony  had  dispatched  an  ad- 
vanced guard  of  seven  battalions  from  Douzy  in  that 
direction  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.  They  di'ove 
the  French  from  La  Moncelle,  pressed  ahead  to  Pla- 
tinerie  and  the  bridge  situated  there,  and,  in  spite  of  a 
hot  and  steady  fire,  took  possession  of  the  houses  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Givonne,  which  they  immediately 
occupied  for  defensive  purposes.  Communication  with 
the  Bavarians  was  now  established  and  the  battery  of 
the  advanced  guard  drawn  up  on  the  eastern  slope ;  but 
the  brave  assailants  could  not  be  immediately  rein- 
forced by  infantry. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  been  struck  by  a  splinter 
from  a  shell  at  La  Moncelle  at  6  a.m.  He  nominated 
General  Ducrot  as  his  successor  in  command,  passing 
over  the  claims  of  two  senior  leaders.  When  General 
Ducrot  received  the  news  at  seven  o'clock,  he  issued 
orders  for  concentrating  the  army  at  Illy,  and  for  an 
immediate  retreat  upon  Mezieres.  Of  his  own  corps 
he  dispatched  Lartigue's  division  to  cover  the  passage 
at  Daigny ;  Lacretelle  and  Bassoigne  were  ordered  to 
assume  the  offensive  against  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons, 


90  THE   FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

SO  as  to  gain  time  for  the  rest  of  the  troops  to  retire. 
The  divisions  forming  the  second  hne  immediately 
began  to  move  towards  the  north. 

The  Minister  of  War  had  appointed  General  von 
Wimpffen,  recently  back  from  Algiers,  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Fifth  Corps,  vice  General  de  Failly,  and 
had  also  empowered  him  to  assume  the  chief  command 
in  case  the  Marshal  should  be  disabled. 

General  von  Wimpffen  knew  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince  to  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  Donchery,  he  re- 
garded the  retreat  to  Mezieres  as  an  impossibility,  and 
was  bent  on  the  diametrically  opposite  course  of  forc- 
ing his  way  to  Carignan,  not  doubting  that  he  could 
rout  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons,  and  so  effect  a  junc- 
tion with  Marshal  Bazaine.  When  he  heard  of  the 
orders  just  issued  by  General  Ducrot,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  observed  that  an  assault  upon  the  Germans  in 
La  Moncelle  seemed  to  turn  in  his  favor,  he  deter- 
mined, in  an  evil  hour,  to  exercise  his  authority. 

General  Ducrot  submitted  without  any  remon- 
strance ;  he  was  perhaps  not  averse  to  being  relieved 
of  so  heavy  a  responsibihty.  The  divisions  of  the 
second  line  who  were  about  to  start  were  ordered  back ; 
and  the  weak  advance  of  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons 
were  soon  hard  pressed  by  the  first  lihe,  who  at  once 
attacked  them. 

By  seven  in  the  morning  one  regiment  of  the  Saxon 
advanced  guard  had  marched  to  the  taking  of  La 
Moncelle ;  the  other  had  been  busy  with  the  threatening 
advance  of  Lartigue's  division  on  the  right.  Here  the 
firing  soon  became  very  hot.  The  regiment  had 
marched  without  knapsacks,  and  neglected  previously 
to  take  out  their  cartridges.  Thus  they  soon  ran 
short  of  ammunition,  and  tl^e  repeated  and  violent  on- 
slaught of  the  Zouaves,  directed  principally  against 


BATTLE  OF   SEDAN.  91 

the  unprotected  right,  had  to  be  repulsed  with  the 
bayonet. 

On  the  left  a  strong  artillery  .line  had  gradually 
been  formed,  and  by  half -past  eight  o'clock  amounted 
to  twelve  batteries.  But  Lacretelle's  division  was  now 
approaching  on  the  Givonne  lowlands,  and  dense 
swarms  of  tirailleurs  forced  the  Grerman  batteries  to 
retire  at  about  nine  o'clock.  The  gunners  withdrew 
to  some  distance,  but  then  turned  about  and  re-opened 
fire  on  the  French,  and  after  driving  them  back  into 
the  valley  returned  to  their  original  position. 

The  4th  Bavarian  Brigade  had  meanwhile  reached 
La  Moncelle,  and  the  46th  Saxon  Brigade  was  coming 
up,  so  the  small  progress  made  by  Bassoigne's  division 
was  checked. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Saxon  contingent,  which  had 
been  hardly  pressed,  now  received  much-needed  sup- 
port from  the  24th  Division,  and  they  at  once  assumed 
the  offensive.  The  French  were  driven  back  upon 
Daigny,  and  lost  five  guns  in  the  struggle.  Then  join- 
ing the  Bavarians,  who  were  pushing  on  through  the 
valley  to  the  northward,  after  a  sharp  fight,  Daigny, 
the  bridge  and  farmstead  of  La  Eapaille  were  taken. 

It  was  now  about  ten  o'clock,  and  the  Guards  had 
arrived  at  the  Upper  Givonne.  They  had  started  be- 
fore it  was  light,  marching  in  two  columns,  when  the 
sound  of  heavj"  firing  reached  them  from  Bazeilles  and 
caused  them  to  quicken  their  step.  In  order  to  render 
assistance  by  the  shortest  road,  the  left  column  would 
have  to  cross  two  deep  ravines  and  the  pathless  wood 
of  Chevallier,  so  they  chose  the  longer  route  by  ViUers- 
Cernay,  which  the  head  of  the  right  column  had  passed 
in  ample  time  to  take  part  in  the  contest  between  the 
Saxons  and  Lartigue's  division,  and  to  capture  two 
French  guns. 


S2  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN   WAB. 

The  divisions  ordered  back  by  General  Ducrot  had 
ah'eady  resumed  their  position  at  the  western  slope, 
and  the  14th  Battery  of  the  Guards  now  opened  fire 
upon  them  from  the  east. 

At  the  same  hour  (ten  o'clock)  the  Fourth  Corps  and 
the  7th  Division  had  arrived  at  Lamecourt,  and  the 
8th  at  Remilly,  both  situated  below  BazeiUes ;  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  the  8th  stood  at  the  Remilly  railway 
station. 

The  first  attempt  of  the  French  to  break  through  to 
Carignan  eastwards  had  proved  a  failure,  and  their  re- 
treat to  Mezieres  on  the  west  had  also  been  cut  off,  for 
the  Fifth  and  Eleventh  Corps  of  the  Third  Army,  to- 
gether with  the  Wiirtemberg  division,  had  received 
orders  to  move  northward  by  that  route.  These 
troops  had  struck  camp  before  daybreak,  and  at  six 
o'clock  had  crossed  the  Meuse  at  Donchery,  and  by 
the  three  pontoon  bridges  further  down  the  river. 
The  advanced  patrols  found  the  road  to  Mezieres  clear 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  heavy  shelling,  heard  from  the 
direction  of  Bazeilles,  made  it  appear  probable  that 
the  French  had  accepted  battle  in  their  position  at 
Sedan.  The  Crown  Prince,  therefore,  ordered  the  two 
corps,  that  had  arrived  at  Brigne,  to  march  to  the 
right  on  St.  Menges ;  the  Wiirtembergers  were  to  re- 
main to  keep  watch  over  Mezieres.  General  von 
Kirchbach  then  pointed  out  Fleigneux  to  his  advanced 
guard  as  the  next  objective,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of 
the  French  into  Belgium,  and  maintain  a  connection 
with  the  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse. 

The  narrow  roadway  between  the  hills  and  the  river 
leading  to  St.  Albert,  about  2000  paces  distant,  was 
neither  held  nor  watched  by  the  French.  It  was  not 
till  the  advanced  guard  reached  St.  Menges  that  they 
encountered  a  French  detachment,  which  soon  with- 


BATTLE   OF   SEDAN.  93 

drew.  The  Germans  then  deployed  in  the  direction 
of  Illy,  two  companies  on  the  right  taking  possession 
of  Floing,  where  they  kept  up  a  gallant  defence  for 
two  hours  without  assistance  against  repeated  attacks. 

The  first  Prussian  batteries  that  arrived  had  to  exert 
themselves  to  the  utmost  to  hold  out  against  the  larger 
force  of  French  artillery  drawn  up  at  Illy.  At  first 
they  were  only  protected  by  cavalry  and  a  few  com- 
panies of  infantry,  and  as  this  cavalry  managed  to 
issue  from  the  defile  of  St.  Albert,  it  found  itself  the 
misleading  object  of  attack,  for  the  Margueritte  Cav- 
alry Division  halted  on  the  lUy  plateau.  General 
Galliffet,  commander  of  the  division,  at  nine  o'clock 
formed  his  three  regiments  of  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  and 
two  squadrons  of  Lancers  into  three  divisions,  and 
gave  the  order  to  charge.  Two  companies  of  the  87th 
Eegiment  were  the  first  in  the  line ;  they  allowed  the 
cavalry  to  approach  within  sixty  paces,  and  then  fired 
a  volley  which  failed  to  stop  them.  The  1st  Division 
rode  on  a  little  further,  then  wheeled  outward  to  both 
flanks,  and  came  upon  the  fire  of  the  supports  estab- 
lished in  the  copse.  The  Prussian  batteries,  too,  sent 
a  shower  of  shrapnel  into  their  midst,  when  they  finally 
retired  to  seek  protection  in  the  Bois  de  Garenne,  while 
a  trail  of  dead  and  wounded  marked  their  way. 

About  half  an  hour  later,  that  is  at  ten  o'clock,  and 
at  the  same  time  when  the  assaults  of  the  French  in 
Bazeilles  and  at  Daigny  were  being  repulsed,  fourteen 
batteries  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  were  erected  on  and 
beside  the  hill  range  south-east  of  St.  Menges ;  those  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  were  soon  added  to  this  artillery  park. 
Thus,  with  the  powerful  infantry  columns  advancing 
upon  Fleigneux,  the  investing  fine  di'awn  around 
Sedan  was  nearly  completed.  The  Bavarian  corps 
and  the  artillery  reserves  remaining  on  the  left  em- 


94  THE   FKANCO-GERMAN   WAR.  ' 

bankment  of  the  Meuse,  were  considered  strong  enough 
to  repel  any  attempt  of  the  French  to  break  through 
in  that  direction.  Five  corps  were  standing  on  the 
right  bank,  ready  for  concentric  attack. 

The  Bavarians  and  Saxons,  reinforced  by  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  issued  from  the 
burning  town  of  Bazeilles  and  from  Moncelle,  and 
di-ove  sections  of  the  French  Twelfth  Corps,  in  spite 
of  a  stubborn  resistance,  from  the  east  of  Balan  back 
to  Fond  de  Givonne. 

Having  thus  taken  possession  of  the  spur  of  Illy, 
while  awaiting  a  fresh  attack  of  the  French,  the  most 
necessary  step  now  was  to  reform  the  troops,  which 
were  in  much  confusion. 

As  soon  as  this  was  done  the  5th  Bavarian  Brigade 
advanced  on  Balan.  The  troops  found  but  a  feeble 
resistance  in  the  village  itself ;  but  it  was  only  after  a 
hard  fight  that  they  were  allowed  to  occupy  the  park 
of  the  Castle,  situated  at  the  extreme  end.  From 
thence,  soon  after  midday,  the  foremost  battaUon  got 
close  to  the  walls  of  the  fortress,  and  exchanged  shots 
with  the  garrison.  The  French  were  now  trying  to 
take  up  a  position  at  Fond  de  Givonne,  and  a  steady 
fire  was  opened  on  both  sides.  At  ^  one  o'clock  the 
French  had  e\adently  received  reinforcements,  and 
when,  after  the  artillery  and  mitrailleuses  had  done 
some  preliminary  work,  they  assumed  the  offensive, 
the  5th  Bavarian  Brigade  was  driven  back  for  some 
little  distance,  but  assisted  by  the  6th,  regained  its  old 
position  after  an  hour's  hard  fighting.  Meanwhile  the 
Saxon  corps  had  spread  itself  in  the  northern  part  of 
the  valley  towards  Givonne.  There  the  foremost  com- 
panies of  the  Guards  were  already  established,  as  also 
in  Haybes.  The  Prussian  artillery  forced  the  French 
batteries  to  change  their  positions  more  than  once, 


BATTLE   OF   SEDAN.  95 

and  several  of  them  had  ah'eady  gone  out  of  action. 
To  gain  an  opening  here,  the  French  repeatedly  tried 
to  send  ahead  large  bodies  of  tirailleurs,  and  ten  guns 
were  got  into  Givonne,  after  it  had  been  occupied,  but 
these  were  taken  before  they  could  unhmber.  The 
Prussian  shells  also  fell  with  some  effect  among  the 
French  troops  massed  in  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne, 
though  fired  from  a  long  range. 

After  the  Franctireurs  de  Paris  had  been  diiven  out 
of  Chapelle,  the  cavalry  of  the  Guard  advanced  through 
Givonne  and  up  the  valley,  and  at  noon  the  hussars 
had  succeeded  in  establishing  a  connection  with  the 
left  wing  of  the  Third  Army. 

The  47th  Brigade  of  that  body  had  left  Fleigneux  to 
ascend  the  upper  valley  of  the  Givonne,  and  the  retreat 
of  the  French  from  Illy  in  a  southern  direction  had 
ah'eady  begun.  The  87th  Regiment  seized  eight  guns 
that  were  being  worked,  and  captured  thirty  baggage 
wagons  with  their  teams  and  hundi'eds  of  cavalry 
horses  wandering  riderless.  The  cavahy  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  the  Fifth  Corps  captured  General 
Brahaut  and  his  staff,  besides  a  great  number  of  in- 
fantry and  150  pack  horses,  together  with  forty  am- 
munition and  transport  wagons. 

At  Floing  there  was  also  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  French  to  break  through ;  but  the  originally  very 
insufficient  infantry  posts  at  that  point  had  gradually 
been  strengthened,  and  the  French  were  di'iven  from 
the  locality  as  quickly  as  they  had  entered.  And  now 
the  fire  from  the  twenty-six  batteries  of  the  Army 
of  the  Meuse  was  joined  by  that  of  the  Guards'  bat- 
teries, which  took  up  their  position  at  the  eastern 
slope  of  the  Givonne  valley.  The  effect  was  over- 
whelming. The  French  batteries  were  destroyed  and 
many  ammunition  wagons  exploded. 


96  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

General  von  Wimpffen  at  first  thought  the  advance 
of  the  Germans  from  the  north  a  mere  feint,  but 
recognized  his  mistake  when  he  himself  proceeded  to 
the  spot  towards  noon.  He  therefore  ordered  the  two 
divisions  in  the  second  line,  which  was  behind  the 
Givonne  front  of  the  First  Corps,  to  return  to  the 
height  above  Illy  and  support  General  Douay, 

On  rejoining  the  Twelfth  Corps  he  found  it  in  fuU 
retreat  on  Sedan,  and  urgently  requested  General 
Douay  to  dispatch  assistance  in  the  direction  of 
Bazeilles.  Maussion's  brigade  proceeded  thither  at 
once,  followed  by  Dumont's,  as  their  position  in  the 
front  had  been  taken  by  Conseil  Dumesnil's  division. 
All  these  marches  and  counter-marches  were  executed 
in  the  space  south  of  the  Bois  de  Garenne  under  fire 
of  the  German  artillery  on  two  sides.  The  retreat  of 
the  cavalry  heightened  the  confusion,  and  several 
battalions  returned  to  the  doubtful  protection  of  the 
forest.  General  Douay,  it  is  true,  when  reinforced  by 
sections  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  retook  the  Calvaire,  but 
was  forced  to  abandon  it  by  two  o'clock ;  the  forest, 
at  the  back  of  the  Calvaire,  was  then  shelled  by  sixty 
guns  of  the  Guards. 

Liebert's  division  alone  had  up  to  now  maintained 
its  very  strong  position  on  the  hills  north  of  Casal. 
The  assembling  in  sufficient  strength  of  the  German 
Fifth  and  Eleventh  Corps  at  Floing,  could  only  be 
effected  very  gradually.  At  one  o'clock,  however,  part 
of  them  began  to  scale  the  hill  immediately  before 
them,  while  others  went  round  to  the  south  towards 
Gaulier  and  Casal,  and  more  marched  down  from 
Fleigneux.  These  troops  became  so  intermixed  that 
no  detailed  orders  could  be  given ;  a  fierce  contest  was 
carried  on  for  a  long  time  with  varying  fortunes.  The 
French  division,  attacked  on  both  flanks,  and  also 


BATTLE  OP  SEDAN.  97 

shelled,  at  last  gave  way,  and  the  reserves  of  the 
Seventh  Corps  having  ah-eady  been  called  off  to  other 
parts  of  the  battle-field,  the  French  cavalry  once  more 
devoted  themselves  to  the  rescue. 

General  Margueritte,  with  five  regiments  of  light 
horse,  and  two  of  lancers,  charged  out  of  the  Bois  de 
Garennes.  He  fell  among  the  first,  severely  wounded, 
and  General  Galliffet  took  his  place.  The  charge  was 
over  very  treacherous  ground,  and  even  before  they 
could  attack,  the  ranks  were  broken  by  the  heavy 
flanking  fire  of  the  Prussian  batteries.  Still,  with 
thinned  numbers  but  unflagging  determination,  the 
squadrons  charged  on  the  43rd  Infantry  Brigade  and 
its  reinforcements  hurrying  along  from  Fleigneux. 
Part  of  the  German  infantry  on  the  hill-side  were 
lying  under  cover,  others  were  fully  exposed  in  groups 
of  more  or  less  strength.  Their  foremost  lines  were 
broken  through  at  several  points,  and  a  detachment  of 
these  brave  troops  forced  their  way  past  eight  guns, 
through  a  hot  fire,  but  the  reserves  beyond  checked 
their  further  progress.  A  troop  of  cuirassiers,  issuing 
from  Gaulier,  fell  on  the  German  rear,  but  encounter- 
ing the  Prussian  hussars  in  the  Meuse  Valley  galloped 
off  northward.  Other  detachments  forced  their  way 
through  the  infantry  as  far  as  the  narrow  way  by  St. 
Albert,  where  the  battalions  holding  it  gave  them  a 
warm  reception;  others  again  enter  Floing  only  to 
succumb  to  the  5th  Jagers,  who  fell  on  them  front  and 
rear.  These  attacks  were  repeated  by  the  French 
again  and  again,  and  the  mm^derous  turmoil  lasted  for 
half  an  hour  with  steadily  diminishing  success  for  the 
French.  The  volleys  of  the  infantry  fired  at  short 
range  strewed  the  whole  field  with  dead  and  wounded. 
Many  fell  into  the  quarries  or  over  the  steep  preci- 
pices, a    few  may  have   escaped   by  swimming  the 


98  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAK. 

Meuse ;  and  scarcely  more  than  half  of  these  brave 
troops  were  left  to  return  to  the  protection  of  the  for- 
tress. 

But  this  magnificent  sacrifice  of  the  splendid  French 
cavalry  could  not  change  the  fate  of  the  day.  The 
Prussian  infantry  had  lost  but  few  in  cut-and-thrust 
encounters,  and  at  once  resumed  the  attack  against 
Liebert's  division.  But  in  this  onslaught  they  sus- 
tained heavy  losses ;  for  instance,  the  three  battalions 
of  the  6th  Regiment  had  to  be  commanded  by  lieuten- 
ants. Casal  was  stormed,  and  the  French,  after  a 
spirited  resistance,  withdrew  at  about  three  o'clock  to 
their  last  refuge,  the  Bois  de  Garennes. 

When,  between  one  and  two  o'clock,  the  fighting 
round  Bazeilles  at  first  took  a  favorable  turn  for  his 
army,  Greneral  von  Wimpffen  returned  to  his  original 
plan  of  overthrowing  the  Bavarians,  exhausted  by  a 
long  struggle,  and  making  his  way  to  Carignan  with 
the  First,  Fifth,  and  Twelfth  Corps ;  while  the  Seventh 
Corps  was  to  cover  their  rear.  But  the  orders  issued 
to  that  effect  never  reached  the  generals  in  command, 
or  arrived  so  late  that  circumstances  forbade  their 
being  carried  out. 

In  consequence  of  his  previous  orders,  Bassoigne's 
division  with  those  of  Coze  and  Grandchamp  had 
remained  idle.  Now,  at  about  three  in  the  afternoon, 
the  two  last  named  advanced  from  Fond-de-Givonne, 
over  the  eastern  ridge,  and  the  23rd  Saxon  Division, 
which  was  marching  in  the  valley  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Givonne,  found  itself  suddenly  attacked  by  the 
compact  French  battalions  and  batteries,  but  with  the 
aid  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Guards  and  the  artillery 
thundering  from  the  eastern  slope,  they  soon  repulsed 
the  French,  and  even  followed  them  up  back  to  Fond- 
de-Givonne.     The  energy  of  the  French  appears  to 


BATTLE   OF   SEDAN.  99 

have  been  exhausted,  for  they  allowed  themselves  to 
be  taken  prisoners  by  hundreds.  As  soon  as  the  hiUs 
on  the  west  of  the  Givonne  had  been  secured,  the  Grer- 
man  artillery  established  itself  there,  and  by  three 
o'clock  twenty-one  batteries  stood  in  line  between  Ba- 
zeilles  and  Haybes. 

Bois  de  Grarennes,  where  many  corps  of  all  arms  had 
found  refuge  and  were  wandering  about,  still  re- 
mained to  be  taken.  After  a  short  cannonade  the  1st 
Divisit>n  of  Guards  ascended  the  hills  from  Givonne, 
and  were  joined  by  the  Saxon  battalions,  the  left  wing 
of  the  Third  Army  at  the  same  time  pressing  forward 
from  Illy.  A  wild  turmoil  ensued,  some  of  the  French 
offered  violent  resistance,  others  surrendered  by  thou- 
sands at  a  time,  but  not  until  five  o'clock  were  the 
Germans  masters  of  the  fortress. 

Meanwhile  long  columns  of  French  could  be  seen 
pouring  down  on  Sedan  from  all  the  neighboring  hills. 
Irregular  bands  of  troops  were  massed  in  and  around 
the  walls  of  the  fortress,  and  shell  from  the  German 
batteries  on  both  sides  of  the  Meuse  were  constantly 
exploding  in  their  midst.  Columns  of  fire  soon  began 
to  rise  from  the  city,  and  the  Bavarians,  who  had  gone 
round  to  Torcy,  were  about  to  climb  the  palisades  at 
the  gate  when,  at  about  half -past  four,  flags  of  truce 
were  hoisted  on  the  towers. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon  had  refused  to  join  with 
General  von  Wimpffen  in  his  attempt  to  break  through 
the  German  lines ;  he  had,  on  the  contrary,  desired  him 
to  parley  with  the  enemy.  On  the  order  being  re- 
newed, the  French  suddenly  ceased  firing. 

General  Reille  now  made  his  appearance  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  King,  who  had  watched  the  action  since 
early  in  the  day  from  the  hill  south  of  Frenois.  He 
was  the  bearer  of  an  autograph  letter  from  the  Em- 


100  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

peror,  whose  presence  in  Sedan  had  till  now  been  un- 
known. He  placed  his  sword  in  the  hands  of  the 
King,  but  as  this  was  only  an  act  of  personal  submis- 
sion, the  answer  given  to  his  letter  demanded  that  an 
officer  should  be  dispatched  hither,  fully  empowered  to 
treat  with  Greneral  von  Moltke  as  to  the  surrender  of 
the  French  army. 

This  sorrowful  duty  was  imposed  on  Greneral  von 
Wimpif en,  who  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  des- 
perate straits  into  which  the  army  had  been  brought. 

The  negotiations  were  held  at  Donchery  during  the 
night  between  the  1st  and  2nd  of  September.  The 
Germans  were  forced  to  consider  that  they  must  not 
forego  the  advantage  gained  over  so  powerful  an  enemy 
as  France.  When  it  was  remembered  that  the  French 
had  regarded  the  victory  of  German  arms  over  other 
nationalities  in  the  light  of  an  insult,  any  act  of  un- 
timely generosity  might  lead  them  to  forget  their  own 
defeat.  The  only  course  to  pui'sue  was  to  insist  upon 
the  disarmament  and  detention  of  the  entire  army, 
but  the  officers  were  to  be  free  on  parole. 

General  von  Wimpifen  declared  it  impossible  to  ac- 
cept such  hard  conditions,  the  negotiations  were 
broken  off,  and  the  French  officers  returned  to  Sedan 
at  one  o'clock.  Before  their  departure  they  were  given 
to  understand  that  unless  these  terms  were  agreed  to 
by  nine  o'clock  next  morning,  the  bombardment  would 
be  renewed. 

Thus  the  capitulation  was  signed  by  General  von 
Wimpffen  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd,  further  resist- 
ance being  obviously  impossible. 

Marshal  MacMahon  had  been  very  fortunate  in  be- 
ing disabled  so  early  in  the  day,  or  he  would  have 
been  inevitably  compelled  to  sign  the  capitulation,  and 
though  he  had  only  carried  out  the  orders  forced  upon 


BATTLE  OF   SEDAN.  101 

him  by  the  Paris  authorities,  he  could  hardly  have 
sat  in  judgment,  as  he  afterwards  did,  on  the  comrade 
he  had  failed  to  relieve. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  the  Germans  want 
to  celebrate  the  2nd  of  September  when  nothing  re- 
markable happened  but  what  was  the  inevitable  result 
of  the  previous  day's  work ;  the  day  when  the  army 
really  crowned  itself  with  glory  was  the  1st  of  Sep- 
tember. 

This  splendid  victory  had  cost  the  Germans  460 
officers  and  8500  men.  The  French  losses  were  far 
greater;  17,000  were  killed,  the  work  principally  of 
the  strong  force  of  German  artillery.  Twenty-one 
thousand  Frenchmen  were  taken  prisoners  in  the 
course  of  the  action,  83,000  surrendered ;  104,000  in  aU. 

These,  for  the  present,  were  assembled  on  the  Pen- 
insula of  Iges,  formed  by  the  Meuse.  As  they  were 
absolutely  destitute  of  supplies,  the  Commandant  of 
Mezieres  allowed  them  the  use  of  the  railway  as  far 
as  Donchery. 

Two  corps  d'armee  were  to  effect  and  escort  the 
transport  of  the  prisoners,  who  were  taken  off  2000  at 
a  time  by  two  roads,  one  to  Etain,  and  the  other  by 
Clermont  to  Pont-a-Mousson,  where  they  were  taken 
in  charge  by  the  army  investing  Metz,  and  forwarded 
to  various  places  in  Germany. 

Three  thousand  men  had  been  disarmed  on  Belgian 
territory. 

The  trophies,  taken  at  Sedan,  consisted  of  three 
standards,  419  field-pieces,  and  139  guns,  66,000  stands 
of  arms,  over  1000  baggage  and  other  wagons,  and 
6000  horses  fit  for  service. 

With  the  surrender  of  this  army,  Imperialism  in 
France  was  extinct. 


II. 

ADVANCE  ON  PARIS  AND  CAPITULATION  OF 

METZ. 

While  one  half  of  the  German  army  was  thus  en- 
gaged in  victorious  progress,  the  other  half  remained 
a  fixture  before  Metz. 

The  foremost  hue  of  outposts  of  the  besieging  army 
was  over  six  miles  long.  Thus  an  attempt  of  the  col- 
lected forces  of  the  enemy  to  break  through  would 
have  met  with  but  slight  opposition  at  the  outset.  It 
was  all  the  more  expedient  to  fortify  the  isolated  G-er- 
man  positions.  These  works,  the  clearing  of  the  bat- 
tle-fields in  the  neighborhood,  the  close  watch  kept 
over  every  movement  of  the  enemy,  the  construction 
of  a  telegraph  line  connecting  the  various  staff  quar- 
ters, and  the  erecting  of  hutments,  kept  the  troops 
and  their  leaders  amply  occupied.  Besides  the  care 
of  the  wounded,  attention  had  to  be  paid  to  the  sick, 
whose  number  was  daily  increased  oy  the  rough 
weather  and  insufficient  shelter.  The  provisioning  of 
the  troops  was,  however,  made  easier  by  their  station- 
ary attitude,  and  the  troops  were  now  amply  supplied 
by  their  friends  at  home. 

The  first  days  of  the  siege  went  by  without  any  at- 
tempts to  break  out  on  the  part  of  the  French.  They 
too  were  busy  reorganizing,  collecting  ammunition  and 
supplies. 

On  the  20th  of  August,  Marshal  Bazaine  wrote  to 
Chalons :  "  I  wiU  give  due  notice  of  my  march  if  I  am 


THE   SOKTIE  FKOM   METZ.  103 

able  to  attempt  it."  On  the  23rd  he  reported  to  the 
Emperor :  "  If  the  news  of  the  extensive  reductions  in 
the  besieging  army  are  corroborated,  I  shall  begin  the 
march  by  way  of  the  fortresses  on  the  north  in  order 
to  risk  nothing." 

THE  SOETIE  FEOM  METZ. 

(August  26th.) 

On  the  26th  of  August,  when  the  army  of  Chalons 
was  still  fifteen  miles  distant  from  the  canal  of  the 
Ardennes,  and  their  advance  on  Metz  was  as  yet  un- 
known. Marshal  Bazaine  collected  his  main  forces  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle. 

This  movement  had  not  escaped  the  notice  of  the 
outposts,  and  the  field  telegraph  at  once  communicated 
the  information  to  head-quarters. 

To  support  the  3rd  Reserve  Division  at  Malroy,  ten 
battalions  of  the  Tenth  Corps  crossed  the  Meuse  to 
Argancy,  on  the  right  bank.  The  25th  Division  held 
itself  in  readiness  at  the  bridge  of  Hauconcourt,  and 
the  First  Corps  closed  up  towards  Servigny.  In  the 
event  of  the  escape  of  the  French  towards  the  north, 
the  Third,  Fourth,  and  parts  of  the  Ninth  Corps  were 
to  arrest  their  progi-ess  at  Diedenhofen. 

The  crossing  of  the  river  by  pontoon  bridges  from 
the  island  of  Chambiere  seriously  delayed  the  French ; 
their  Second,  Third,  and  Fourth  Corps  had,  however, 
formed  in  close  order  between  Mey  and  Grimont,  by 
about  noon.  Their  advanced  guard  succeeded  in 
throwing  back  the  German  outposts  to  the  south-east 
of  Metz  at  several  points,  but  instead  of  entering  upon 
a  general  attack.  Marshal  Bazaine  called  all  the  com- 
mandants of  the  corps  to  a  conference  at  Grimont. 
The  Commandant   of  Metz  then  explained  that  the 


104  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAK. 

heavy  ammunition  at  their  disposal  would  suffice  for 
one  battle  only,  that  when  it  was  exhausted  they  would 
be  imprisoned  between  the  German  armies  without 
the  means  of  defence ;  the  fortress,  he  continued,  was 
not  defensible  in  its  present  state,  and  could  not  stand 
a  siege  if  the  army  were  to  be  withdi-awn.  All  this 
might  have  been — nay,  must  have  been,  known  to  the 
Commandant  before  he  entered  upon  the  movement. 
It  was  especially  impressed  upon  the  generals,  "  That 
the  best  service  they  could  render  to  their  country 
was  to  preserve  the  army,  which  would  be  of  the 
greatest  importance  if  negotiations  for  peace  should 
be  entered  into."  The  generals  present  all  spoke 
against  the  continuation  of  the  march ;  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief, who  had  refrained  from  expressing 
any  opinion  in  the  matter,  gave  the  order  to  retire  at 
four  o'clock. 

The  whole  affair  of  the  26th  of  August  can  only  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  a  parade  manoeuvre.  Bazaine 
reported  to  the  Minister  of  War  that  the  scarcity  of 
artillery  ammunition  made  it  "  impossible "  to  break 
through  the  German  lines,  unless  the  enemy  were 
forced  to  retreat  by  attacks  in  the  rear,  from  outside. 
Information  as  to  the  "  voice  of  the  people  "  in  Paris 
was  urgently  requested.  "" 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Bazaine  was  influenced,  not 
only  by  military,  but  by  political  considerations ;  still 
the  question  remains,  Could  he  have  acted  differently 
in  the  prevailing  confusion!  From  the  correspond- 
ence referred  to  and  his  behavior  in  the  battles  before 
Metz,  he  was  evidently  strongly  opposed  to  quitting 
the  fortress.  Under  shelter  of  its  walls  he  could  main- 
tain a  considerable  army  in  good  order  till  the  right 
moment.  At  the  head  of  the  only  unimpaired  army 
in  France  he  might  find  himself  in  a  position  of  greater 


THE   SOKTIE  FROM  METZ.  105 

power  than  any  other  man  in  the  country.  This  army 
must,  of  course,  first  be  freed  from  the  bondage  in 
which  it  was  now  held.  Even  if  it  should  succeed  in 
breaking  through  the  lines,  it  would  be  greatly  weak- 
ened ;  and  it  was  not  inconceivable  that  the  Marshal, 
as  the  strongest  man  in  power,  might  be  able  to  offer 
a  price  which  should  induce  the  enemy  to  allow  him 
to  march  out.  For  if  at  last  peace  were  to  be  con- 
cluded, the  Germans  would  no  doubt  ask:  Who  in 
France  is  the  authority  with  whom  we  are  to  negotiate, 
now  that  the  Empire  is  overthrown,  and  which  is 
strong  enough  to  give  a  guarantee  that  its  pledges 
will  be  kept  I  That  the  Marshal,  if  his  plans  had  been 
carried  out,  would  have  acted  otherwise  than  in  the 
interest  of  France  is  neither  proved  nor  to  be  assumed. 

But  ere  long,  a  number  of  men  combined  in  Paris, 
who,  without  consulting  the  nation,  constituted  them- 
selves the  Government  of  the  country,  and  took  the 
direction  of  its  affairs  into  their  own  hands.  In  op- 
position to  this  party,  Marshal  Bazaine,  supported  by 
his  army,  could  come  forward  as  a  rival  or  a  foe ;  nay, 
and  this  was  his  crime  in  the  eyes  of  the  Paris  Gov- 
ernment, he  might  restore  the  authority  of  the  Emperor 
to  whom  he  had  sworn  allegiance.  Whether  he  could 
thus  have  spared  his  country  even  longer  misery  and 
greater  suffering  need  not  be  discussed.  But  that  he 
was  subsequently  accused  of  betraying  his  country 
arose,  no  doubt,  from  the  national  vanity  of  the 
French,  which  demanded  a  "  Traitor "  to  account  for 
defeat. 

Soon  after  this  demonstration — for  it  was  nothing 
more — of  the  besieged  army,  the  besieging  army  was, 
in  fact,  reduced,  for  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  were 
sent  to  Brisy  and  Conflans,  by  orders  from  head-quar- 
ters.    To  be  sure,  from  that  point  they  could  attack 


106  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

either  of  the  French  Marshals,  as  might  prove  requisite ; 
and  the  Thirteenth  Corps,  formed  of  the  17th  Division, 
hitherto  retained  to  defend  the  coast,  and  of  the  Land- 
wehr,  was  ah'eady  within  a  few  days'  march  of  Metz. 

Meanwhile  Marshal  Bazaine  seems  to  have  recog- 
nized the  fallacy  of  his  expectations  of  the  release  of 
his  army  by  negotiations  with  the  enemy;  he  now 
decided  to  make  his  way  out,  weapon  in  hand.  The 
troops  were  supplied  with  three  days'  rations,  and  the 
commissariat  with  arms  from  the  magazines  of  the 
fortress.  That  the  attempt  should  again  be  made  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  was  only  to  be  expected ; 
the  main  forces  of  the  enemy  being  intrenched  on  the 
left.  It  would  have  been  very  difficult  to  traverse  the 
mountainous  region,  cut  up  by  deep  passes,  and  they 
were  sure  to  encounter  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince 
on  the  march  to  Paris.  East  of  Metz,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  was  ample  space  for  the  full  development 
of  his  army.  Thence  to  the  south  there  was  open 
country,  offering  no  cover  to  the  enemy,  whose  lines 
were  weakest  on  that  side.  The  march  to  the  north 
and  along  the  Belgian  frontier  offered  more  danger  and 
greater  obstacles,  and  yet  the  Marshal  had  selected 
this  very  road.  The  Army  of  Chalons  was  also  march- 
ing in  that  direction ;  their  approach  Was  reported,  and 
on  the  31st  of  August,  when  Marshal  MacMahon's 
forces  reached  Stenay  under  such  disastrous  circum- 
stances, Bazaine's  army  issued  from  Metz. 

BATTLE   OF   NOISSEVILLE. 

(August  31st.) 

Of  the  forces  then  assembled  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  the  Third  Corps  was  to  cover  the  right 
flank  of  the  others  while  they  were  advancing;  one 


BATTLE   OF  NOISSEVILLE.  107 

division  was  ordered  to  surprise  the  enemy  in  the 
south-east,  the  other  three  divisions  were  to  march  on 
Noisseville.  Three  pontoon-bridges  were  constructed 
for  the  rest  of  the  army,  and  exits  prepared  towards 
the  heights  of  St.  Julien.  The  Fourth  and  Sixth 
Corps  were  to  cross  at  six  o'clock  and  take  up  a  posi- 
tion to  the  right  of  the  Third,  from  the  town  of  Mey, 
past  Grimont  to  the  Moselle ;  the  Second  Corps  and 
the  Guards  were  to  follow  and  form  a  second  line  in 
their  rear.  The  artillery  reserves  and  the  cavalry 
were  expected  to  reach  the  other  side  of  the  Moselle 
by  ten  o'clock ;  the  baggage  trains  were  collected  on 
the  Isle  of  Chambiere.  Thus  there  should  have  been, 
by  twelve  o'clock,  five  corps  ready  to  attack  the  Ger- 
mans along  a  mile  and  a  half,  from  Retonfay  to 
Argancy,  where  only  two  German  divisions  held  the 
line. 

As  early  as  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  Montaudon's 
division  issued  from  Fort  Queuleu,  and  proceeding 
eastward,  drove  the  German  outposts  back  on  Aubigny. 
But  this  sham  attack  did  not  deceive  the  Germans. 
The  stir  in  the  French  camp  had  been  observed  quite 
early,  and  when  the  mist  cleared  off  and  large  bodies 
of  French  troops  were  seen  moving  in  front  of  Fort 
St.  Julien,  an  attempt  to  break  through  to  the  north 
was  confidently  expected,  and  measures  were  immedi- 
ately taken  to  prevent  it. 

The  28th  Brigade  of  the  Seventh  Corps  was  dis- 
patched to  reinforce  Courcelles ;  thus  the  3rd  Brigade 
of  the  First  Corps  could  be  brought  nearer  to  Servigny. 
The  troops  of  the  Tenth  Corps,  which  could  be  spared 
from  the  line  of  defence  on  the  left  bank,  were  again 
set  moving  to  return  to  the  right,  and  the  Ninth  Corps 
made  ready  to  begin  the  intended  retreat.  The  Third 
Corps  and  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  were  recalled  from 


108  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

Brisy  and  sent  to  the  plateau  of  Privat ;  the  Second 
was  to  prepare  to  march  at  any  moment. 

The  attempt  of  the  French  on  this  occasion  proved 
even  less  successful  than  on  the  26th ;  the  routes  of 
the  Fourth  and  Sixth  Corps  met  at  the  bridges,  and 
they  only  reached  their  rendezvous  at  one  o'clock, 
though  it  was  but  half  a  mile  beyond ;  they  then  re- 
nounced the  idea  of  an  immediate  assault  and  set  about 
cooking  their  dinners.  A  few  skirmishes  at  Aubigny 
on  the  east  and  on  the  north  towards  Eupigny  came 
to  nothing.  The  Gruards  did  not  arrive  till  three 
o'clock ;  the  artillery  and  cavalry  were  still  absent. 

As  everything  had  now  quieted  down,  the  Germans 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  attack  had  been  in- 
tended for  the  following  day.  Not  to  waste  their 
strength,  a  pai't  of  the  reinforcements  had  already 
been  sent  back,  when,  at  about  four  o'clock,  the  French 
guns  suddenly  opened  a  heavy  fire. 

It  appears  that  the  Marshal  had  again  assembled  all 
the  generals  at  Grimont,  this  time  to  inform  them  of 
his  plan  of  attack.  It  was  evident  that  the  French 
could  not  advance  towards  the  north  before  they  had 
cut  their  way  through  by  an  attack  on  the  eastern 
side,  and  covered  their  right  flank ;  |or  even  if  they 
succeeded  in  breaking  through  the  German  lines  be- 
tween Malroy  and  Charly,  they  could  get  no  further 
so  long  as  the  Germans  were  at  Servigny,  and  as  their 
fire  swept  the  plain  by  the  Moselle,  which,  at  that 
point,  is  no  more  than  5000  paces  broad,  the  Marshal 
could  not  in  any  case  reckon  on  getting  through  with 
his  artillery  reserves,  which  did  not  arrive  on  the  field 
until  six  o'clock ;  or,  indeed,  with  the  baggage  trains 
he  had  left  on  the  Isle  of  Chambiere.  The  cavalry 
corps  was  still  defiling,  and  could  not  arrive  until  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening. 


BATTLE   OF  NOISSEVILLE.  109 

The  French  commander's  orders  were  based  on  these 
calculations. 

Marshal  Le  Boeuf  received  orders  to  advance  with 
the  Second  and  Third  Corps  on  both  sides  of  the  valley 
of  Ste.  Barbe,  and  outflank  the  1st  Prussian  Division 
at  Servigny,  from  the  south ;  while  the  Fourth  Corps 
attacked  them  in  front.  The  Sixth  Corps  was  to  at- 
tack the  Reserve  Division  at  Charly-Malroy.  Marshal 
Canrobert  was  to  command  these  two  corps,  the  Guards 
being  kept  as  reserves. 

Thus  Greneral  von  Manteuffel  had  first  to  oppose 
Marshals  Le  Boeuf  and  Canrobert  with  a  small  force 
against  a  very  superior  enemy.  This  might  be  done 
either  at  Ste,  Barbe,  a  position  that  was  difficult  to 
outflank,  in  the  line  of  Servigny — Poix — Failly,  which, 
though  more  exposed,  was  favorable  to  the  use  of 
artillery.  The  latter  was  selected  on  the  advice  of 
General  von  Bergmann,  in  command  of  the  artillery 
and  the  Landwehr  Brigade  brought  up  from  Antilly, 
where  its  place  was  taken  by  the  25th  Division.  Ten 
batteries  advanced  to  within  1000  paces  of  the  villages 
occupied  by  the  infantry.  Their  fire  was  so  superior 
to  that  of  the  French  that  the  enemy's  batteries  were 
soon  silenced.  The  French  attack  from  Rupigny,  sup- 
ported on  the  flank  by  three  batteries,  was  for  a  long 
time  repelled,  and  as  the  Prussians  had  not  yet  been 
driven  back  on  Ste.  Barbe,  the  Sixth  French  "Corps 
deferred  for  the  present  any  serious  attack  on  the 
Reserve  Division  at  Malroy-Charly ;  Marshal  Canrobert 
received  orders  to  advance,  for  the  time  being,  only 
against  the  village  of  Failly,  the  northern  stronghold 
of  the  Servigny  position. 

Tixier's  division  therefore  set  out  at  7.30  in  the 
evening  from  ViUers  L'Orme,  but  met  with  a  most 
obstinate  resistance  at  FaiUy.     The  East-Prussians, 


110  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAK. 

though  attacked  on  two  sides  and  pelted  with  bullets, 
maintained  their  position,  and  for  a  time  were  engaged 
in  a  hand-to-hand  encounter,  till  the  Landwehr  Brigade 
came  to  their  assistance  from  Bremy. 

South  of  Servigny  the  French  fared  far  better  than 
in  this  angle  between  two  bodies  of  the  enemy ;  their 
Second  and  Third  Corps,  at  that  point,  had  only  the 
3rd  Brigade  of  the  First  Prussian  Corps  to  deal  with 
as  it  advanced  from  Retonfay.  Montaudon's  and 
Metman's  divisions  had  pressed  on  as  far  as  Nouilly, 
in  the  valley  of  the  Vallieres;  Clinchant's  brigade 
stormed  the  brewery  in  the  teeth  of  a  heavy  fire,  and 
by  seven  o'clock  had  compelled  the  defence  of  Noisse- 
ville  to  retire.  Montoy  and  Flanville  were  also  taken 
possession  of,  and  the  advanced  guard  of  the  4th 
Brigade  thrown  back  on  Coincy  and  Chateau  Aubigny. 
The  batteries  of  the  1st  Division,  after  withstanding 
for  a  long  time  the  fire  of  a  strong  force  of  tirailleurs 
from  the  southern  valley,  were  forced,  at  about  seven 
o'clock,  to  retire  in  echelon  to  the  position  held  by  the 
infantry  at  Poix-Servigny,  keeping  oif  the  pursuing 
enemy  with  grape-shot. 

But  at  Poix-Servigny  they  now  found  the  Prussians 
had  made  a  stand,  although  outflanked  on  their  left. 
Potier's  brigade  ascended  the  northern  slope  of  the 
Vallieres  valley,  but  found  it  impossible  to  reach  Ser- 
vigny. A  moment  later  Cissey's  brigade  rushed  up 
from  the  west,  and  seized  the  cemetery  outside  the 
village.  The  French  Fourth  Corps  made  a  move 
against  the  centre  of  the  Prussian  position,  but  with- 
out success,  for  those  battalions  of  the  2ud  Brigade 
which  had  hitherto  been  kept  in  reserve  met  the  attack. 
The  attempt  to  break  through  between  Poix  and  Ser- 
vigny was  met  by  the  last  reserve  battalions  of  the 
2nd  Brigade  with  a  counter  attack,  in  which  all  the 


BATTLE   OF  NOISSEVILLE.  Ill 

troops  at  hand  at  once  joined.  Amid  beating  of  drums 
they  fell  on  the  French,  forced  them  out  of  the  cem- 
etery, and  drove  them  over  the  slope. 

To  reinforce  the  troops  thus  engaged,  the  3rd  Bri- 
gade had,  at  about  half -past  eight,  marched  on  Noisse- 
ville,  whence  they  drove  out  the  small  detachment 
they  found  in  possession,  but  they  subsequently 
yielded  to  superior  numbers,  and  withdrew  to  St. 
Marais. 

The  din  of  battle  had  now  ceased  on  all  sides,  and 
the  fight  seemed  to  be  ended.  The  infantry  of  the  1st 
Division  found  quarters  in  the  villages,  the  artillery 
had  bivouacked,  when  suddenly,  at  nine  o'clock,  a 
strong  body  of  French  were  seen  through  the  dark- 
ness marching  on  Servigny.  This  proved  to  be 
Aymard's  division ;  it  advanced  without  firing  a  shot, 
and  surprised  the  detachment  which  occupied  the 
place,  ejecting  them  after  a  fierce  hand-to-hand  fight. 
This  attack  remained  unobserved  for  some  time,  even 
by  the  troops  nearest  at  hand ;  but  they  then  rushed 
to  arms,  and,  pouring  in  from  all  sides,  drove  the 
French  back  beyond  the  churchyard,  which  was  now 
held  by  the  Germans. 

It  was  now  ten  o'clock.  The  1st  Division  had  kept 
its  ground  against  an  enemy  of  superior  strength ;  but 
the  French  had  found  their  way  across  the  unoccupied 
ground  between  the  3rd  and  4th  Brigades,  and  threat- 
ened the  German  flank  at  Servigny  from  their  position 
at  Noisseville. 

(September  1st.)  The  18th  Division,  by  a  night 
march,  crossed  from  the  left  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Moselle  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  reinforced 
the  two  wings  in  the  line  of  Malroy,  Charly,  and  Bois 
de  Failly,  sending  a  brigade  to  each.  The  25th  Di- 
vision could  now  retire  from  Antilly  to  Ste.  Barbe, 


112  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

where,  with  the  6th  Landwehr  Brigade,  it  formed  the 
reserve  of  the  Poix-Servigny  position. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  September  a  thick 
mist  still  shi'ouded  the  plain,  where  all  troops  stood 
ready  for  action. 

Marshal  Bazaine  again  pointed  out  to  his  generals 
that,  first  of  all,  Ste.  Barbe  was  to  be  taken,  that  place 
being  the  key  to  the  northern  route  they  intended 
to  pursue ;  and  he  added,  "  failing  this,  we  must 
stand  by  our  own  position."  He  evidently  meant, 
the  position  under  shelter  of  the  cannons  of  Metz, 
and  this  shows  great  lack  of  confidence  in  his  own 
success. 

The  3rd  Brigade  had  deployed  on  the  Saarlouis 
route  as  early  as  five  o'clock,  to  forestall  the  fui-ther 
progress  of  the  French  on  the  left  flank  of  the  1st 
Division.  Twenty  guns  swept  the  plain  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Montoy,  and  when  Noisseville  had  been  for 
some  time  under  the  fii-e  of  the  artillery  of  the  3rd 
(German)  Brigade,  at  seven  o'clock  the  43rd  Regiment 
stormed  the  village.  A  violent  fight  ensued  in  and 
about  the  houses ;  two  French  brigades  engaged  in  the 
combat,  and  after  a  long  struggle  the  regiment  was 
again  repelled.  The  battalions  of  4:he  3rd  Brigade 
arrived  just  as  the  fight  was  over,  but  the  attack  was 
not  renewed. 

When  the  plan  of  Marshal  Bazaine's  attempt  was 
made  evident,  the  28th  Brigade  started  from  Coui'celles 
at  six  in  the  morning  to  reinforce  the  First  Corps ;  its 
two  batteries  silenced  those  of  the  French  at  Montoy 
and  then  fired  on  Flanville.  The  enemy  soon  began 
to  abandon  the  burning  village,  into  which,  at  nine 
o'clock,  the  Ehinelanders  marched  from  the  south  and 
the  East-Prussians  from  the  north.  Marshal  Le  Boeuf 
ordered  Bastoul's  division  to  make  another  charge  on 


BATTLE   OF  NOISSEVILLE.  113 

Montoy,  but  the  deadly  fire  of  the  Prussian  artillery 
compelled  them  to  turn  back. 

The  3rd  Brigade  had  meanwhile  taken  up  a  position 
parallel  with  Retonfay,  where  it  was  joined  by  the 
28th.  The  3rd  Cavalry  Division  was  reinforced  by  the 
Hessian  Horse  Brigade,  and  these  troops,  with  the  artil 
lery,  which  was  made  up  to  114  guns,  formed  a  ram- 
part against  any  further  progress  of  the  Second  and 
Third  French  Corps. 

Everything  was  now  quiet  on  the  right  wing 
of  the  French  army;  but  the  Fourth  Corps  had 
been  enjoined  to  await  their  advance  before  renew- 
ing the  attack  on  the  artillery  defences  and  village 
intrenchments  of  the  French  line  from  Servigny  to 
Poix,  as  its  strength  had  been  tested  the  day  before. 
At  eleven  o'clock,  after  Noisseville  had  been  severely 
bombarded,  the  3rd  Prussian  Brigade,  supported  by 
the  Landwehr,  advanced  from  the  south  and  com- 
pelled the  French  to  withdraw  from  the  bm'ning  vil- 
lage. 

Marshal  Canrobert,  commanding  the  northern  attack, 
had  drawn  up  his  batteries  at  ChieuUes  by  half -past 
eight,  and  their  fire,  seconded  by  that  of  the  artiUery 
of  the  fortress,  drove  the  Grermans  from  Eupigny  for 
a  time ;  but  the  village  was  soon  retaken. 

Tixier's  division  made  two  fruitless  attempts  to 
seize  Failly,  when  the  36th  Brigade  of  the  18th  Di- 
vision, which  had  just  arrived,  combining  with  the 
Reserve  Division,  assumed  the  offensive,  and  at  ten 
o'clock  di-ove  the  French  back  over  the  Chieulles 
stream.  They  made  still  another  onslaught  on  Failly, 
but  a  sharp  flanking  fire  made  this  too  a  failure. 

Marshal  Le  Boeuf,  though  he  still  had  two  divisions 
at  his  disposal,  retreated  before  the  advance  of  the  3rd 
Brigade  on  his  right  flank ;  and  when  Marshal  Bazaine 
& 


114  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

heard  of  this  he  ordered  a  cessation  of  hostilities  at  all 
other  points  at  about  midday. 

The  137,000  French  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  who 
had  issued  from  Metz  on  August  31st,  had  been  re- 
pulsed by  36,000  Prussians.  For  the  first  time  in  this 
war  the  attack  had  been  opened  by  the  French,  while 
defence  feU  to  the  lot  of  the  Glermans.  That  the  Ger- 
mans lost  3400  men  against  3000  on  the  French  side, 
must  be  attributed  to  the  superior  quality  of  the 
Chassepot  rifle.  But  the  effects  of  the  Prussian  artil- 
lery proved  decisive,  and  enabled  Manteuffel  to  main- 
tain an  unshaken  resistance. 

The  Seventh  Corps  remained  on  the  right  of  the 
Meuse,  where  the  invading  line  was  now  strengthened 
by  the  arrival  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  with  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Mecklenburg. 

The  Second  and  Third  Corps  were  again  drawn  up 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  On  the  same  day  and  at 
the  same  hour,  when  the  destruction  of  one  French 
army  was  completed  at  Sedan,  the  other  returned  to 
almost  hopeless  interment  in  Metz.  Thus  the  issue  of 
the  war  had  already  been  decided  after  only  two 
months'  duration;  though  the  war  itself  was  far 
from  ended. 

THE   CHANGE   OF  ADMINISTKATION  IN  PAKIS. 

When,  in  the  night  of  the  4th  of  September,  the 
news  of  the  defeat  at  Sedan  and  the  Emperor's  sur- 
render became  known  in  Paris,  the  Legislative  Body 
met  for  a  series  of  sittings  in  rapid  succession  to  select 
an  Adminstrative  Committee.  Eiotous  mobs  cut  these 
deliberations  short  by  forcing  their  way  into  the  Cham- 
ber and  proclaiming  the  Eepublic  here  and  at  the 
Hotel  de  Ville,  amidst  the  acclamations  of  the  people. 
Though  the   troops  were  under  arms  in  their  bar- 


THE  PEOVISIONAL   GOVEENMENT.  115 

racks,  the  Government  till  now  in  power  offered  no 
resistance;  the  Empress  left  Paris;  General  Trochu 
and  several  members  of  the  Minority  in  the  Chamber 
combined  to  form  a  Government,  which  they  styled 
"The  Government  of  National  Defence  and  War." 
"War  to  the  bitter  end"  was  their  motto,  and  the 
entire  nation  was  called  to  arms.  Not  an  inch  of  ter- 
ritory, not  a  stone  of  the  fortresses  was  to  be  yielded 
up  to  the  enemy. 

A  Government,  devoid  of  legitimate  foundation, 
must  achieve  some  manifest  success,  and  could  not 
afford  to  allow  the  war  to  end  in  peace. 

Notwithstanding  all  previous  reverses,  France  was 
too  rich  in  resources  to  find  herself  defenceless  yet. 
General  Yinoy  was  still  in  the  field.  The  dispersed 
members  of  all  the  corps,  the  marine  troops,  and  the 
Gendarmerie  could  rally  around  him.  There  was,  too, 
the  "  Territorial  Militia,"  numbering  468,000  men,  an 
institution  due  to  Marshal  Niel,  whose  far-seeing  work 
of  reorganization  had  been  cut  short  only  too  soon. 
Then  the  Garde  Nationale  could  be  called  out,  as  well 
as  100,000  newly  levied  recruits.  France  was  thus 
able  to  send  a  million  men  to  the  front,  without  reck- 
oning Franctireurs  and  volunteer  corps. 

Four  hundred  thousand  Chassepots  and  2000  guns 
lying  in  store  would  arm  these  troops,  and  the  work- 
shops of  England,  as  a  neutral  power,  were  ready  to 
complete  their  outfit  as  a  matter  of  business. 

Such  means  of  war,  backed  by  the  active  patriotism 
of  the  nation,  might  offer  a  prolonged  resistance  if 
governed  by  a  powerful  will.  That  will  was  Gam- 
betta's. 

As  Minister  of  War,  by  the  French  system  of  govern- 
ment, he  was,  at  the  same  time.  Commander-in-chief, 
and  he  certainly  would  not  resign  the  command.    For 


116  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

a  victorious  G-eneral  at  the  bead  of  the  army,  under  a 
Republic,  would  at  once  have  become  Dictator  in  his 
stead. 

M.  de  Freycinet,  also  a  civilian,  served  under  G^am- 
betta  as  a  sort  of  Chief  of  the  Gleneral  Staff,  and  the 
energetic,  but  dilettante,  commandership  exercised  by 
these  gentlemen  cost  France  very  dear.  Grambetta's 
rare  energy  and  unrelenting  perseverance  availed, 
indeed,  to  induce  the  entire  population  to  take  up 
arms,  but  not  to  du'ect  these  masses  on  a  uniform 
plan. 

Without  giving  them  time  to  be  drilled  into  fitness 
for  the  field,  he  sent  them  out  with  ruthless  cruelty, 
insufficiently  prepared  to  carry  out  ill-digested  plans 
against  an  enemy  on  whose  firm  solidity  all  their 
courage  and  devotion  must  be  wi'ecked.  He  prolonged 
the  struggle  with  great  sacrifice  on  both  sides,  without 
turning  the  balance  in  favor  of  France. 

But  the  German  army  had  still  great  difficulties  to 
overcome. 

The  battles  it  had  won  had  cost  it  dear ;  the  loss  in 
officers  especially  was  irremediable.  Half  the  army 
was  detained  before  Metz  and  Strasburg.  The  trans- 
port and  guard  of  more  than  200,000  p^soners  required 
the  services  of  a  large  part  of  the  new  levies  in  Ger- 
many. The  frontier  fortresses  had  not  indeed  hindered 
the  invasion  of  the  German  army,  but  they  had  to  be 
invested  or  kept  under  observation  to  secure  commu- 
nications with  the  rear,  the  forwarding  and  victualling 
of  troops,  and  every  advance  into  the  enemy's  country 
demanded  increased  supplies  of  arms.  After  the  battle 
of  Sedan  only  150,000  were  available  for  further  oper- 
ations in  the  field.  There  could  be  no  doubt  that  they 
must  be  directed  against  Paris,  as  the  seat  of  the  new 
government  and  the  centre  of  gi-avity,  so  to  speak,  of 


GENEEAL  VINOY'S  RETEEAT.  117 

the  whole  country.  On  the  very  day  of  the  capitula- 
tion of  Sedan,  arrangements  were  made  for  the  advance. 
To  spare  the  troops,  the  movement  was  to  be  ex- 
ecuted on  the  widest  possible  front,  for  of  the  French 
corps,  only  the  Thirteenth  could  detain  them.  Still, 
Blanchard's  division  alone  of  that  corps  was  still  at 
Mezieres ;  the  other  two  had  but  just  begun  their 
march  when  they  received  orders  to  retui'n. 

GENEEAL   \TNOY'S   EETEEAT. 

Greneral  Vinoy's  first  anxiety  was — very  rightly — to 
reach  Paris  with  the  least  possible  loss.  This  was  not 
very  easy  to  accomplish,  for  the  Sixth  Corps  (Prus- 
sian), which  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle  of  Sedan, 
was  at  Attigny  in  such  a  jDOsition  that,  between  that 
place  and  Laon,  it  could  intercept  any  line  of  the 
French  retreat  by  reaching  the  spot  before,  or  as  soon 
as  the  enemy.  General  von  Tiimpling,  with  the  12th 
Division,  had  taken  possession  of  Rethel  by  the  even- 
ing of  September  1st,  thus  closing  the  high  road  to 
Paris.  Only  extraordinary  forced  marches  and  a  suc- 
cession of  happy  circumstances  could  save  from  de- 
struction Blanchard's  division,  which  had  already  spent 
aU  its  ammunition  in  small  conflicts. 

General  Vinoy  supplied  the  troops  with  several  days* 
rations,  enjoined  a  strict  observance  of  order  and  dis- 
cipline, and  during  the  night  of  September  2nd  began 
his  retreat  to  Rethel,  where  he  expected  to  find  Crea's 
division ;  this,  however,  availing  itself  of  the  part  of 
the  railway  which  was  stiU  undestroyed,  had  already 
gone  on  to  Soissons. 

It  was  still  quite  early  when  the  French  column 
came  into  collision  with  the  5th  and  presently  with 
the  6th  Prussian  Cavalry  Divisions,  without  being 
seriously  attacked.    It  was  not  till  about  ten  o'clock, 


118  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

and  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Rethel,  that  the  French 
General  learned  that  that  place  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Grermans,  and  decided  on  making  a  detour  by 
Novion-Porcien.  He  sent  his  rear  guard  against  the 
enemy's  horse  artillery,  but  seeing  hardly  anything 
but  cavalry  in  front,  they  soon  resumed  the  march. 
They  reached  Novion,  where  they  bivouacked,  at  about 
four  in  the  afternoon. 

Greneral  von  Hoffmann  had  taken  up  a  position  at 
Rethel,  awaiting  the  French,  of  whose  approach  he  had 
been  warned.  Having  ridden  out  in  person,  he  became 
aware  of  their  deviation  from  the  route,  and  at  four  in 
the  afternoon  marched  on  Ecly,  where  he  arrived  late 
in  the  evening.  Part  of  his  troops  reconnoitred  the 
country  round  Chateau  Porcien. 

General  Vinoy,  on  learning  that  this  road  too  was 
closed,  left  his  bivouacs  at  half -past  one  in  the  morn- 
ing, leaving  the  fires  burning,  and  set  out  for  a  second 
night's  march  in  pouring  rain  and  total  darkness. 

At  first  he  took  a  northerly  direction,  to  reach  Laon 
at  any  rate  by  the  cross-roads.  Knee-deep  in  mud  and 
often  alarmed,  but  without  coming  into  collision  with 
the  enemy,  he  arrived  at  Chateau  Porcien  at  half- 
past  seven  in  the  morning,  and  halted  sf or  a  couple  of 
hours.  The  state  of  the  roads  compelled  him  now  to 
proceed  in  a  southerly  direction,  and  when  the  head 
of  his  column  reached  Seraincourt,  the  sound  of  firing 
told  him  that  the  rear  had  been  attacked  by  the  Ger- 
mans. 

The  Prussian  cavalry  had,  early  in  the  day,  dis- 
covered the  French  line  of  march,  but  when  this 
important  information  reached  him,  General  von  Hoff- 
mann had  left  Ecly.  He  had  already  started  to  look 
for  the  enemy  at  Novion-Porcien,  where  he  was  nat- 
urally to  be  expected  after  his  first  night-march,  but 


GENERAL,   VINOY'S   RETREAT.  119 

at  half -past  nine  had  found  the  place  deserted.  Thus, 
during  the  forenoon,  the  German  and  French  division 
had  crossed  on  the  road  at  a  distance  of  about  a  mile 
apart.  The  thick  weather  had  prevented  them  seeing 
each  other.  General  Vinoy  got,  this  day,  as  far  as 
Montcornet,  in  what  condition  may  be  imagined.  The 
12th  Division  (German)  had  persevered  in  its  westward 
march,  but  had  only  come  up  with  the  rear  of  the  fast- 
retreating  enemy,  and  took  up  quarters  in  Chaumont- 
Porcien. 

This  march  of  the  enemy  ought  not  indeed  to  have 
remained  unobserved  and  unchecked  under  the  eye  of 
two  cavalry  divisions,  but  these  were,  it  must  be 
owned,  called  off  at  an  unfortunate  moment. 

It  was,  in  fact,  in  consequence  of  a  report  that  the 
French  forces  were  assembled  at  Rheims,  that  the 
Commander-in-chief  of  the  Third  Army  had  ordered 
the  immediate  return  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  the  two 
divisions  of  cavalry.  These  at  once  relinquished  the 
pursuit,  and  General  von  Tiimpling  ordered  his  two 
infantry  divisions  to  march  at  once  on  Rheims ;  the 
11th,  which  was  holding  Rethel,  set  out  forthwith. 
General  von  Hoffmann,  on  the  contrary,  followed  up 
the  French,  on  his  own  responsibility,  as  far  as  was 
possible  without  any  cavalry  to  overtake  them.  It 
was  not  till  the  following  day  that  the  12th  reached 
the  Suippe. 

(September  4th.)  General  Vinoy  made  his  way 
northward  again,  beyond  Marie,  where  he  received  the 
news  of  the  Emperor's  surrender  and  the  outbreak  of 
the  revolution  in  Paris.  It  was  now  of  the  greatest 
importance  that  he  should  arrive  there,  and  by  the 
13th  he  had  reached  the  capital  with  the  two  other 
divisions  of  his  corps  from  Laon  and  Soissons. 


120  THE  FE.'^JfCO-GERMAN  WAB. 

THE  THIRD  AEMY  AND  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  MEUSE  MAECH 

ON  PAEIS. 

While  all  this  was  going  on,  the  Germans,  on  the 
4th  September,  had  begun  their  advance  on  Paris. 
The  fii'st  thing  to  be  done  was  to  re-form  the  mass  of 
troops  assembled  in  the  cramped  space  by  Sedan.  The 
Third  Army,  of  which  the  Eleventh  and  the  First 
Bavarian  Corps  were  still  there,  had  to  make  two  long 
marches  to  the  front  in  order  that  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  could  occupy  their  old  lines  in  its  rear. 

The  news  of  the  great  concentration  of  troops  at 
Rheims  was  soon  proved  to  be  unfounded.  So  early 
as  on  the  4th,  companies  of  Prussian  horse  had  entered 
the  excited  and  hostile  city,  the  11th  Division  arrived 
that  afternoon,  and  on  the  following  day  the  German 
King's  head-quarters  were  established  in  the  town 
which  had  seen  so  many  French  kings  crowned. 

On  the  10th  of  September  the  Third  Army  had 
reached  a  line  from  Dormans  to  Sezanne,  and  the 
Sixth  Corps  had  pushed  forward  to  Chateau  Thierry. 
The  Army  of  the  Meuse,  after  faihng  in  an  attack  on 
Montmedy,  occupied  a  line  between  Rheims  and  Laon. 
Cavalry  sent  far  in  advance  protected^ this  exception- 
ally wide  marching  front.  They  everywhere  found 
the  inhabitants  in  a  very  hostile  frame  of  mind ;  the 
franctireurs  attacked  with  conspicuous  daring,  and 
could  only  be  ejected  from  several  villages  by  a  dis- 
mounted force.  The  roads  were  in  many  places  broken 
up  and  the  bridges  destroyed. 

At  the  approach  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Di\dsion,  Laon 
capitulated.  Some  small  detachments  of  troops  of  the 
line  were  taken  prisoners,  with  twenty-five  guns,  100 
stand  of  arms  and  stores  were  plundered,  and  2000 
Gardes  Mobiles  dismissed  to  their  homes  on  parole. 


THE   GEKMAN  ADV.iNCE.  121 

Friend  and  foe  were  still  collected  in  large  numbers 
in  the  courtyard  of  the  citadel  when  the  powder  maga- 
zine blew  up,  having  probably  been  intentionally  fired, 
and  did  great  damage,  both  there  and  in  the  town. 
The  Prussians  had  fifteen  officers  and  ninety-nine  men 
kiUed  and  wounded;  among  the  wounded  were  the 
General  of  Division  and  his  staff  officer.  The  French 
lost  300  men ;  the  commandant  of  the  fortress  was 
mortally  wounded. 

On  the  16th  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  stood  on  the 
Ourcq,  between  Nanteuil  and  Lezy,  the  5th  Cavahy 
Division  was  at  Dammartin,  the  6th  had  advanced 
beyond  Beaumont,  sending  patrols  as  far  as  St.  Denis. 
The  Third  Army  occupied  the  ground  from  Meaux  to 
Comte  Eobert.  Strong  pontoon  bridges  had  been 
thrown  over  the  Marne  at  Trilport  instead  of  those 
which  had  been  blown  up,  and  by  the  17th,  the  Fifth 
Corps  had  ah-eady  reached  the  Upper  Seine. 

To  secure  the  pontoon  works  at  Villeneuve-St.- 
Georges,  the  17th  Brigade  was  sent  down  the  right 
bank  of  the  Seine  towards  Paris,  and  at  Mont  Mesly 
was  met  by  Crea's  division,  ordered  out  by  General 
Vinoy  to  bring  in  or  destroy  a  large  store  of  supplies. 
The  fight  which  ensued  ended  in  the  French  being 
driven  back  under  shelter  of  the  guns  of  the  fort  at 
Charenton. 

The  Second  Bavarian  Corps  also  arrived  on  the  Seine 
on  this  day  and  bridged  it  over  at  Corbeil.  The  2nd 
Cavahy  Division  were  observing  Paris  from  Saday. 
The  King  removed  his  head-quarters  from  Chateau 
Thierry  to  Meaux.  The  complete  investment  of  Paris 
was  now  imminent. 

The  works  completed  by  Louis  Philippe  effectually 
protected  the  city  from  being  taken  by  storm.  The 
armament  consisted  of  2627  guns,  including  200  of 


122  THE   FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

the  heaviest  calibre  of  naval  ordnance.  Each  had  500 
rounds  of  shot,  and  there  were  3,000,000  kilogi'ammes 
of  powder  in  the  magazines.  In  numerical  strength, 
besides  the  Thirteenth  Corps  arrived  from  Mezieres,  a 
new  corps,  the  Fourteenth,  had  been  raised  in  Paris 
itself.  These  50,000  troops  of  the  hne,  with  14,000 
highly  efficient  and  trustworthy  marines  and  sailors, 
and  about  8000  gensd'armes,  customs  officers,  and 
chasseurs,  formed  the  kernel  of  the  defence.  There 
were  besides  115,000  Gardes  Mobiles  which  had  been 
called  into  the  capital  at  an  earlier  date.  The  National 
Guard  was  divided  into  130  battalions  which,  how- 
ever, being  defectively  equipped  and  ill-disciplined, 
could  only  be  employed  in  the  defence  of  the  inner 
circle  of  walls.  The  volunteers,  though  numerous, 
proved  for  the  most  part  useless. 

On  the  whole,  the  besieged  force  may  be  reckoned 
at  300,000,  twice  as  many  as  the  besiegers  as  yet  on 
the  spot,  who  had  only  about  60,000  men  available, 
with  5000  cavalry  and  124  field  batteries.  There  were 
five  floating  batteries  on  the  Seine  and  nine  section- 
built  gun-boats,  originally  intended  for  the  Rhine ;  on 
the  railway  line  a  few  guns  were  mounted  on  armor- 
plated  cars.  ^ 

Great  difficulties  attended  the  victualling  of  two  mill- 
ion human  beings  for  any  length  of  time ;  however, 
the  French  had  succeeded  in  bringing  3000  oxen,  6000 
pigs,  and  180,000  sheep  into  Paris,  with  considerable 
stores  of  other  provisions,  so  that  they  were  sure  of 
holding  out  for  six  weeks  at  least. 

The  commands  issued  from  the  head-quarters  at 
Meaux  were  that  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  should  invest 
the  capital  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine,  and  the 
Third  Army  on  the  left  bank.  As  a  general  rule,  the 
troops  were  to  remain  beyond  the  range  of  fire  from 


THE   GERMAN   ADVANCE.  123 

the  forts,  but,  short  of  that,  were  to  keep  as  close  as 
possible  so  as  to  reduce  the  line  of  blockade.  The 
connection  of  the  two  armies  was  to  be  secured  above 
Paris  by  several  bridges  across  the  river,  and  below 
the  city,  by  the  cavahy  occupying  Poissy.  The  Third 
Ai'my  were  to  scour  the  country  about  Orleans.  In 
case  of  any  attempt  to  relieve  the  capital,  it  was  to 
march  up  within  a  short  distance  and  then,  leaving 
the  blockade  to  the  weaker  forces,  to  use  all  its  strength 
to  defeat  the  enemy.  Without  some  relief  from  the 
outside,  the  mere  investment  of  the  city  must  reduce 
it  to  capitulate,  though  probably  not  for  some  weeks, 
or  even  months.  The  most  obvious  alternative  was  a 
bombardment. 

At  the  time  when  Paris  was  fortified,  it  was  incon- 
ceivable that  the  improvements  in  artillery  would 
double  or  treble  the  range  of  fire.  The  outworks, 
especially  to  the  south,  were  at  so  short  a  distance 
from  the  main  work  that  the  latter  could  easily  be 
reached  by  the  fire  of  heavy  batteries. 

The  Grermans  have  been  blamed  for  not  having 
recourse  at  an  earlier  date  to  this  form  of  attack ;  but 
this  shows  a  deficient  appreciation  of  the  difficulties  in 
the  way.  It  may  safely  be  asserted  that  an  attack  on 
a  large  fortified  place  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
country  must  always  be  impossible  so  long  as  the  in- 
vader is  not  master  of  the  railways  or  waterways,  to 
bring  in  endless  supplies  of  the  necessary  materiel.  Its 
mere  conveyance  by  ordinary  highways,  even  for  a 
short  distance,  is  a  gigantic  undertaking.  At  this 
period  the  Grerman  army  had  the  control  of  only  one 
railway  on  French  soil,  and  this  was  fully  occupied  in 
the  transport  of  supplies  for  the  forces  in  the  field ; 
food,  reinforcements,  and  arms  to  bring  in;  the 
wounded,  sick,  and  prisoners  to   carry  back.    Even 


124  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

this  ended  at  Toul ;  and  the  attempt  to  construct  a 
ceinture  line  outside  that  fortress  was  rendered  impos- 
sible by  the  nature  of  the  ground.  A  scarcely  inferior 
obstacle  was  the  complete  destruction  of  the  Nanteuil 
tunnel,  which  would  probably  take  many  weeks  to 
restore. 

Even  then,  for  the  further  transport  beyond  Nan- 
teuil of  300  heavy  guns,  with  500  rounds  of  shot,  4500 
large  wagons  would  be  needed,  such* as  were  not  in 
use  in  the  country  to  be  traversed,  and  10,000  horses. 
Thus  a  bombardment  was,  in  the  first  instance,  not  to 
be  thought  of,  and,  in  any  case,  the  object  of  it  would 
not  be  to  destroy  Paris,  but  to  exert  a  final  pressm^e  on 
the  inhabitants;  and  this  would  be  more  effectual 
when  a  long  blockade  had  shaken  the  resolution  of  the 
besieged  than  it  was  likely  to  be  at  the  beginning. 

(September  8th.)  In  obedience  to  the  supreme  com- 
mand, the  Generals  of  Division  began  the  march  on 
the  enemy's  capital.  By  the  18th  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  by  a  deviation  to  the  left,  had  brought  the 
Twelfth  Corps  as  far  as  Claye,  the  Guards  to  Mitry, 
and  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Dammartin,  one  march  from 
Paris. 

AU  the  villages  beyond  St.  Denis  were  occupied  by 
the  French.  It  seemed  as  though  the^lockade  on  the 
north  side  would  be  opposed,  and  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Saxony  took  measures  to  follow  up  and  support  the 
Fourth  Corps,  which  led  the  way,  on  the  following  day. 
The  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions,  hastening  on  to 
Pontoise,  were  reinforced  by  two  companies  of  Jagers 
and  a  pontoon  train,  and,  after  constructing  a  bridge, 
they  crossed  the  Oise. 

The  Fifth  Corps  of  the  Third  Army  passed  over  the 
Seine  at  Villeneuve-St.-Georges  and  advanced  to  Palai- 
seau  and  the   Upper   Bievre.     The  advanced  guard 


INVESTMENT   OF   PAHIS.  125 

came  into  collision  with  the  French  cavalry  brigade 
under  Bernis.  The  (German)  47th  Regiment  at  once 
proceeded  to  attack,  and  stormed  the  waUed  farm- 
steads of  Dame-Rose  and  Trivaux.  But  on  the  south- 
ern skirt  of  the  wood  of  Meudon  the  whole  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  was  drawn  up ;  on  its  left  stood  a 
division  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps.  The  regiment  retired 
on  Petit-Bicetre  without  being  pursued,  and  there  took 
up  a  defensive  position. 

The  2nd  Bavarian  Corps  marched  from  Corbeil  by 
Longjumeau  to  a  line  parallel  with  the  Fifth,  and  on 
the  right  the  Sixth  occupied  both  banks  of  the  Seine. 
These  corps,  too,  had  several  brushes  with  the  French. 

The  Wurtemberg  Division  at  Lagny  and  Gournay 
was  to  cross  the  Marne  forthwith,  and  so  establish 
communication  between  the  two  armies. 

INVESTMENT   OF   PAKIS. 

(September  19th.) 

On  the  19th  of  September  the  Fourth  Corps,  advanc- 
ing to  St.  Brice,  met  with  no  opposition ;  they  drove 
out  the  enemy's  troops  from  the  neighboring  villages 
under  cover  of  the  heavy  guns  of  St.  Denis,  and  ad- 
vanced on  the  Lower  Seine.  The  Guards  followed 
them  as  far  as  Dugny,  and  took  possession  of  the 
Moree,  which  was  dammed  up  at  its  confluence  with 
the  Marne,  and  afforded  good  protection  for  the  invest- 
ing lines  along  a  considerable  distance.  Fui'ther  to 
the  left  the  Twelfth  Corps  took  up  a  position  on  the 
Marne,  and  on  the  left  bank  of  that  stream  the  Wiir- 
temberg  Division  advanced  to  Champigny. 

On  this  day  the  Fifth  Corps  of  the  Third  Army 
advanced  to  Versailles  in  two  columns.  The  47th 
Regiment  was  again  told  off  to  cover  the  march  on 


126  THE  FBANOO-GEEMAN  WAK. 

the  French  front.  The  enemy  evidently  were  anxious 
to  remain  masters  of  the  important  heights  in  front  of 
the  fortifications  of  Paris,  and  it  was  still  early  in  the 
morning  when  two  divisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
(French)  marched  out  of  the  neighboring  wood  of 
Meudon  on  Petit-Bicetre  and  Villacoublay.  Sup- 
ported by  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  which  set  the 
farm -buildings  of  Petit-Bicetre  on  fire,  they  drove  back 
the  German  posts ;  but  at  Villacoublay  the  Fifth  pres- 
ently came  up  to  Abbaye  aux  Bois  to  support  the 
Second  Bavarian  Corps. 

The  left  flank  brigade  of  the  Bavarians  had  crossed 
the  columns  marching  on  Versailles  in  the  valley  of 
the  Bievi'e ;  but  the  sound  of  fighting  on  the  field  of 
battle  induced  General  von  Dietl  to  advance  with  his 
detachments,  which  had  come  up  singly,  on  both  sides 
of  the  high  road  to  Bicetre.  By  charging  at  the  same 
time  with  the  Prussians,  who  were  still  fighting  in  the 
Bois  de  Garenne,  they  succeeded  in  repulsing  the 
French  at  Pave-blanc.  Meanwhile  the  enemy,  by 
half -past  eight,  had  formed  a  front  of  fifty  guns,  and 
three  regiments  of  foot  advanced  to  renew  the  attack 
on  Petit-Bicetre  and  Bois  de  Garenne.  They  were 
received  with  a  destructive  musketry  fire,  and  not  even 
General  Ducrot's  personal  influence  could  persuade  the 
troops,  who  were  young  recruits,  to  go  forward.  The 
Zouaves  posted  at  the  farm  of  Trivaux  were  finally 
thrown  into  such  confusion  by  the  German  shell  that 
they  fled  wildly  back  on  Paris. 

The  General  had  to  give  up  the  attempt.  His  di- 
visions retired  in  evident  disorder  on  Clamart  and 
Fontenay,  under  cover  of  the  artillery  and  of  the 
cavalry,  which  had  steadily  stood  fire;  the  German 
foot  pursued  them.  The  Bavarians  stormed  Pave- 
blanc  under  a  heavy  fire  of  their  guns,  the  Prussians 


'  SIEGE  OF  PARIS.  127 

retook  Dame-Rose  after  a  short  struggle,  and  forced 
their  way  past  the  farm  of  Trivaux  into  the  wood  of 
Meudon.  The  French  still  held  the  heights  of  Plessis- 
Piquet,  which  were  to  them  of  such  vast  importance 
and  easy  of  defence,  as  well  as  the  bastion  at  Moulin- 
de-la-Tour,  where  nine  batteries  were  at  once  placed  in 
position,  and  their  fire  commanded  the  whole  of  the 
western  field  of  operations. 

The  main  body  of  the  Bavarians  had  meanwhile 
advanced  to  the  south,  and,  marching  on,  after  nine 
o'clock,  on  Fontenay  aux  Roses,  they  came  under  a 
hot  fire  from  the  hill,  as  well  as  a  flanking  fire  from  a 
fort  on  Hautes-Bruyeres.  Being  informed  of  the  situa- 
tion at  the  scene  of  conflict  on  the  plateau  of  Bicetre, 
General  von  Hartmann  at  once  sent  forward  a  detach- 
ment of  artillery  as  a  reinforcement,  and  gave  orders 
for  the  5th  Brigade  to  effect  communication  on  the 
left,  at  Malabry.  As  soon  as  this  brigade  had  deployed 
under  a  hot  fire  of  Chassepots  and  artillery  between 
Pave-blanc  and  Malabry,  Greneral  von  Walther  pro- 
ceeded to  attack  Plessis-Piquet.  After  making  a 
short  stand,  the  artillery  retired  round  the  park  wall, 
and  then  the  infantry  came  out  from  the  wood  of  Ver- 
rieres,  and,  after  a  brief  but  sharp  struggle,  took  pos- 
session of  the  southern  mill.  After  half  an  hour's  fir- 
ing, the  Bavarians  advanced  on  Hachette  by  rushes, 
and  broke  into  the  park  of  Plessis.  The  French  kept 
up  a  hot  fire  from  the  fort  of  Moulin  de  la  Tour  on  the 
spots  seized  by  the  Germans,  by  which  the  Bavarian 
field  batteries  suffered  severely ;  but  they  still  effect- 
ively supported  the  further  advance  of  the  infantry, 
who  now  got  close  in  under  the  earthworks.  However, 
the  defenders  were  already  on  the  point  of  retiring, 
and  when  the  Bavarians  got  up,  at  about  three  o'clock, 
they  found  the  place  deserted  and  guns  left  in  position. 


128  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

Caussade's  division  had  left  Clamart  to  marcli  on 
Paris ;  Maussion's  had  abandoned  the  hill  of  Bagneux, 
in  consequence,  it  was  said,  of  mistaken  orders,  and 
Hugues'  division  was  with  difficulty  brought  to  a  stand 
at  the  Fort  of  Montrouge. 

The  Bavarian  Corps  now  took  up  the  position  it  had 
won  on  the  plateau  of  Bicetre  to  the  right  of  the  Fifth 
Corps.  The  fight  had  cost  the  Bavarians  265  men  and 
the  Fifth  Corps  178 ;  the  French  lost  661  killed  and 
above  300  prisoners. 

The  condition  in  which  the  French  Fourteenth  Corps 
returned  to  Paris  caused  such  dismay  that  General 
Trochu  found  himself  obliged  to  withdraw  a  division 
of  the  Thirteenth  from  Vincennes  for  the  defence  of 
the  city  fortifications. 

It  was  subsequently  supposed  that  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  capture  one  of  the  forts  as  early  as  on 
this  day,  by  forcing  a  way  in  upon  the  heels  of  the 
enemy ;  and  so  very  appreciably  shortening  the  siege. 
But  the  forts  did  not  open  their  gates  to  shelter  fugi- 
tives, to  whom  those  of  the  capital  were  always  open. 
The  scaling  of  walls  eighteen  feet  high  can  never  be 
done  without  much  preparation.  Besides,  such  peri- 
lous attempts  cannot  be  made  to  order ;  they  can  only 
be  achieved  in  a  propitious  moment  by  those  who  are 
on  the  spot.  In  this  case  almost  certain  failure  would 
have  endangered  the  important  success  just  obtained. 

The  Fifth  Corps  had  meanwhile  proceeded  on  its 
Way  to  Versailles ;  a  few  National  Guards,  who  had 
collected  at  the  entrance  to  the  town,  were  driven  off 
and  disarmed  by  the  German  Hussars.  The  9tli  Di- 
vision held  the  eastern  road  out  of  the  town,  the  10th 
was  encamped  at  Rocquencourt,  and  strong  outposts 
were  placed  on  the  Bougival-Sevres  line.  The  18th 
Brigade,  which  remained  at  Villacoublay  to  support 


riEST  NEGOTIATIONS   FOR  PEACE.  129 

the  Bavarians  in  case  of  need,  was  only  moved  for- 
ward at  nightfall. 

The  3rd  Division  of  the  Bavarian  Corps  was  left 
on  the  heights  opposite  Plessis-Piquet,  its  outposts 
extending  towards  the  wood  of  Meudon,  where  the 
French  were  still  in  possession  of  the  chateau,  and  the 
sappers  at  once  converted  the  trenches  at  La  Toui'- 
du-Moulin  so  as  to  front  north.  The  12th  Division 
was  encamped  at  Tousenay,  and  to  the  rear  as  far  as 
Chatenay. 

The  main  body  of  the  Sixth  Corps  had  taken  up  a 
position  at  Orly,  its  outposts  extending  from  Choisy- 
le-Roi  past  Thiais  to  Chevilly.  Maud'huy's  division 
attempted  to  repulse  them  at  this  village,  but  without 
success.  A  brigade  of  the  same  corps  at  Limeil,  on 
the  right  bank,  was  engaged  in  skirmishing  with  the 
French  at  Creteil.  Within  touch,  further  to  the  right, 
the  Wiirtemberg  Division  occupied  the  banks  of  the 
Marne  from  Ormesson  to  Noisy-le-Grand,  and  behind 
that  place  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Goui'nay  assured 
communication  with  the  Saxon  Corps. 

Thus  on  the  19th  of  September  the  blockade  of 
Paris  was  complete  on  all  sides.  Six  army  corps  on  a 
line  of  eleven  miles  were  di'awn  up  immediately  in 
front  of  the  enemy's  capital,  in  some  places  within 
range  of  his  guns,  and  protected  in  rear  by  a  large 
force  of  cavalry. 

FIRST  NEGOTIATIONS   FOR   PEACE. 

In  full  expectation  of  a  battle  to  the  north  of  Paris, 
the  King  had  ridden  out  to  join  the  Gruards,  and  in  the 
evening  head-quarters  were  moved  to  Ferrieres. 

Here  Monsieur  Jules  Favre  made  his  appearance  to 
negotiate  for  peace  on  the  basis  of  "  not  a  foot  of  soil." 
He  believed  that,  after  so  many  victories  and  such 


130  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

heavy  losses,  the  Germans  would  be  satisfied  with  a 
sum  of  money.  It  need  not  be  said  that  such  pro- 
posals could  not  be  considered,  and  only  the  possibility 
of  granting  an  armistice  was  seriously  discussed. 

It  was  to  the  political  interest  even  of  Germany  to 
afford  the  French  the  opportunity  of  establishing  a 
government  by  their  own  free  and  legalized  election ; 
a  government  which  should  have  full  right  and  powers 
to  conclude  a  peace ;  for  the  self -constituted  Goveim- 
ment  at  that  time  ruling  in  Paris  was  the  offspring  of 
a  revolution,  and  might  at  any  moment  be  strangled 
by  a  revolution.  But,  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
every  pause  in  the  operations  of  war  was  a  disadvan- 
tage. It  would  give  the  French  time  to  push  forward 
their  preparations,  and  by  raising  for  a  time  the  siege 
of  Paris,  would  enable  the  capital  to  obtain  the  most 
necessary  supplies. 

The  armistice  could,  therefore,  only  be  granted  in 
consideration  of  an  equivalent.  To  secure  supplies  to 
the  invading  army,  Strasburg  and  Toul,  which  inter- 
cepted communications  by  railway,  must  be  given  up. 
The  siege  of  Metz  was  to  be  maintained;  but  with 
regard  to  Paris,  either  the  blockade  was  to  continue, 
or,  if  it  were  raised,  one  of  the  forts  which  commanded 
it  was  to  be  held  by  the  Germans.  The  Chamber  of 
Deputies  was  to  be  at  full  liberty  to  meet  at  Tours. 

These  conditions,  especially  the  surrender  of  the 
fortified  towns,  were  absolutely  rejected  by  the  French, 
and  the  negotiations  broken  off.  A  week  later  Toul 
and  Strasburg  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 

THE   TAKING   OF   TOUL. 

(September  23rd.) 

As  soon  as  the  German  coast  seemed  free  from  any 
danger  of  an  invasion  of  French  troops,  the  17th  Di- 


THE   TAKING  OF   TOUL.  131 

vision,  left  on  guard  there,  was  ordered  to  join  the 
forces  in  France.  It  arrived  before  Toul  on  Septem- 
ber 12th. 

This  place,  in  itself  impregnable,  but  commanded  by 
neighboring  heights,  had  till  now  been  invested  by 
part  of  the  troops  of  the  Third  Army,  and  shelled  by 
the  guns  seized  at  Marsal  and  with  field-guns,  but 
without  any  particular  effect.  The  infantry,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  established  a  footing  behind  the  rail- 
way embankment  and  in  the  suburbs  quite  close  to  the 
foot  of  the  glacis,  so  that  sorties  were  rendered  almost 
impossible.  In  view  of  these  circumstances  haK  the 
division  was  ere  long  sent  to  Chalons,  where  sixteen 
battalions  and  fifteen  squadrons  were  barely  sufficient 
to  deal  with  the  extremely  hostile  demeanor  of  the 
country  people,  to  keep  the  roads  open  and  keep  open 
communications  with  Germany.  Thus  only  seven 
battalions,  four  squadrons,  and  four  field-batteries 
were  left  outside  Toul. 

On  the  18th  there  arrived  from  Nancy  by  railway 
ten  guns  of  15  cm.  bore  and  sixteen  of  12  cm.  bore. 
It  was  decided  to  direct  the  attack  on  the  place,  on  its 
western  face,  which  was  enfiladed  from  Mont-St.- 
Michel,  and  to  breach  the  south-west  bastion ;  but  first 
an  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  reduce  the  place  by  the 
shorter  process  of  an  artillery  attack. 

On  the  night  of  the  23rd  platforms  for  the  siege 
artillery  were  constructed  by  the  infantry ;  three  on 
Mont-St.-Michel,  seven  on  the  heights  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Moselle,  and  one  on  the  right  bank.  Next 
morning  sixty-two  guns  opened  fire,  and  by  half -past 
three  the  white  flag  was  flying  from  the  Cathedral. 

The  place  surrendered  on  the  23rd,  on  the  same  con- 
ditions as  had  been  granted  to  Sedan.  A  hundred  and 
nine  officers  were  released  on  parole,  2240  rank  and  file 


132  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

were  taken  prisoners.  Six  companies  took  possession 
of  the  city  that  evening ;  on  the  whole,  it  had  suffered 
little. 

Twenty-one  hea\^  guns,  about  3000  stand  of  arms, 
and  large  stores  of  provisions  and  forage  were  seized. 

THE   SIEGE   OF   STRASBURG. 

(September  28th.) 

Immediately  after  the  victory  at  Worth,  the  reduc- 
tion of  Strasburg  became  a  primary  object  to  the  G-er- 
mans.  This  strong  position,  as  a  bridge-head  com- 
manding the  Ehine,  was  a  standing  threat  to  Southern 
Germany. 

When  Marshal  MacMahon  evacuated  Alsace,  only 
three  battalions  of  the  line  were  left  with  the  com- 
mandant of  Strasburg.  Stragglers  escaping  from 
various  regiments  engaged  at  Worth,  the  remnants  of 
some  four  battalions  and  relief  detachments,  and  of 
the  Garde  Mobile  and  National  Guards,  had,  however, 
increased  the  garrison  to  23,000  men.  There  was  a 
complete  absence  of  engineers,  but  130  marine  infantry 
formed  a  company  of  trustworthy  men ;  the  armament 
of  guns  was  also  ample. 

So  early  as  on  the  11th  of  August  ""the  Baden  con- 
tingent had  been  detailed  to  observe  Strasburg.  Not- 
withstanding their  small  number,  they  had  advanced 
unchecked  on  the  plain  known  as  Ruprechts  Au,  as 
far  as  the  Rhine  and  the  canal;  had  occupied  the 
village  of  Schiltigheim,  almost  within  rifle  range  of 
the  fortifications ;  and,  after  preparing  it  for  defence, 
pushed  forward  into  the  suburb  of  Konigshofen. 

In  the  course  of  eighteen  days  the  Landwehr  Guard 
arrived,  under  the  command  of  General  von  Werder, 
and    the    1st    Reserve    Division,    with    one    cavalry 


THE   SIEGE   OF   STEASBUKG.  133 

brigade,  46  battalions,  24  squadrons,  and  18  field-bat- 
teries ;  followed  by  a  siege-train  of  200  field-pieces  and 
88  mortars,  with  6000  foot  artillery  and  ten  companies 
of  sappers  and  miners ;  40,000  men  in  all. 

The  unloading  of  the  guns  brought  from  Magdebui'g, 
Coblentz,  and  Wesel  was  begun  on  August  18th  by  a 
detachment  of  the  Railway  Battalion,  at  the  station  of 
Vendenheim. 

The  engineers'  depot  was  established  at  Hausberge, 
a  gun-carriage  depot  at  Lampertsheim,  and  magazines 
were  constructed.  The  city  was  blockaded  on  all 
sides,  and  a  field  telegraph  kept  up  communication 
between  the  posts. 

To  attain  the  desired  end  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  an  attempt  was  made,  contrary  to  the  advice  of 
General  Schultz,  of  the  engineers,  though  with  con- 
sent from  head-quarters,  to  force  the  town  to  surrender 
by  means  of  a  bombardment.  The  request  to  remove 
the  women  and  children  had  to  be  refused. 

The  erection  of  the  batteries  for  bombardment  in 
the  dark,  wet  nights  was  attended  with  gi-eat  difficul- 
ties. Meanwhile  only  the  field-guns  could  fire  on  the 
fortress;  however,  the  batteries  whose  armament  of 
heavy  pieces  was  complete  were  able  to  open  fire  on 
the  night  of  the  24th-25th ;  and  part  of  the  town  was 
soon  in  flames.  Kehl,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 
was  also  set  on  fire  by  shell. 

The  Bishop  of  Strasburg  came  out  to  the  outposts 
at  Schiltigheim  to  crave  quarter  for  the  citizens. 
Much  as  the  injury  of  a  Grerman  town  was  to  be 
regretted,  as  the  Prelate  was  not  empowered  to  make 
terms,  the  firing  had  to  be  continued  through  the  night 
of  the  25th,  when  it  was  at  its  hottest.  At  the  same 
time,  it  was  fully  acknowledged  at  head-quarters  in 
Mundolsheim  that  the  end  would  not  be  attained  by 


134  THE  FBANCO-GEKMAN  WAB. 

these  means,  and  that  the  more  dehberate  method  of  a 
regular  siege  must  be  tried.  G-eneral  von  Mertens  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  engineering  operations, 
General  Decker  of  the  artillery. 

During  the  night  of  the  29th-30th  of  August  the  first 
parallel  was  opened  very  near  the  glacis,  and  thence 
extended  from  the  Rhine  and  Marne  canal,  past  the 
churchyard  of  St.  Helena,  to  the  Jewish  cemetery  at 
Konigshofen. 

The  number  of  batteries  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  was  soon  increased  to  21;  on  the  right  bank  to 
4 ;  so  that  124  guns  of  the  heaviest  calibre  were  ready 
in  intrenched  positions  to  begin  the  duel  with  the 
guns  of  the  fortress.  Further  preparations  for  attack 
were  directed  against  bastions  Nos.  11  and  12  on  the 
north-west  salient  of  the  fortress.  In  the  night  of 
August  31st  the  second  parallel  was  occupied  without 
opposition.  A  strong  sortie  of  fourteen  companies  of 
the  garrison  was  driven  back  at  daybreak  on  the  1st 
September  from  the  island  of  Waken,  and  from  Kron- 
burg  and  Konigshofen. 

The  forts  now  opened  a  sharp  fire,  sending  such  a 
storm  of  projectiles  down  on  the  siege  works  that  they 
had  to  be  abandoned,  till  at  about  nine  Q'clock  the  Ger- 
man artillery  had  silenced  the  French  guns.  A  second 
attack  followed  on  the  3rd  September,  which  was  not 
repulsed  before  it  had  reached  the  second  parallel. 

A  short  truce  was  granted  at  the  request  of  the  com- 
mandant, to  allow  of  the  burial  of  the  dead  lying  out- 
side the  trenches.  And  on  this  day  a  grand  feu-de-joie 
announced  to  the  besieged  the  fall  of  Sedan. 

Incessant  rain  had  filled  the  trenches  of  the  second 
parallel,  2400  paces  in  length,  ankle-deep  with  water, 
and  it  was  not  till  the  9th  that  they  were  completely 
repaired.    Five  batteries  from  the  first  parallel  were 


THE   SIEGE   OF   STEASBUEG.  135 

moved  to  the  front.  Special  batteries  had  to  be  con- 
structed for  the  attack  of  lunette  No.  44,  which  flanked 
all  the  siege  works.  These  soon  silenced  its  guns,  and 
it  was  abandoned  by  the  French. 

The  Germans  had  now  got  96  mounted  field-pieces 
and  38  mortars  in  full  fire,  at  a  very  short  range. 

Each  gun  fired  twenty  grape-shot  a  day  and  ten 
shrapnel  every  night.  The  large  Finkmatt  Barracks 
were  destroyed  by  fire,  and  the  Steinthor  Gate  was  so 
much  injured  that  it  had  to  be  buttressed  up  with 
sandbags.  The  garrison  withdrew  the  guns  behind 
the  parapet,  and  only  fired  their  mortars.  Neverthe- 
less, to  carry  on  the  siege  works  the  sap-rollers  had  to 
be  called  into  requisition. 

When  the  French  discovered  that  mining  galleries 
had  been  constructed  in  front  of  lunette  No.  53,  Cap- 
tain Ledebour  was  let  down  by  ropes  into  the  trenches, 
and  with  the  help  of  his  sappers  removed  the  charges 
of  powder. 

During  the  night  of  the  13th,  the  crest  of  the  glacis 
between  lunettes  52  and  53  was  reached.  The  crown- 
ing of  the  covered  way  was  begun,  by  means  of  double 
saps  with  traverses,  and  finished  in  four  days. 

The  attack  henceforth  was  exclusively  directed 
against  bastion  No.  11. 

To  divert  the  water  from  the  moat  the  sluices  by  the 
Judenthor  (gateway)  must  be  destroyed.  They  were 
invisible  from  any  part  of  the  scene  of  operations,  and 
the  work  could  only  be  very  inefiiciently  done  by  artil- 
lery at  a  distance  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  Detachments 
of  the  34th  Fusilier  Regiment,  therefore,  on  the  15th, 
marched  on  the  sluices  under  a  heavy  rifle  fire  from 
the  besieged,  and  destroyed  the  dam. 

The  island  of  Sporen  was  at  the  same  time  occupied 
by  the  Baden  Corps. 


136  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

When  the  mortar-batteries  had  for  the  most  part 
been  moved  up  to  the  second  parallel,  the  guns  were 
also  advanced  to  the  second  position,  and  the  rifle-pit 
detachments  did  such  execution  by  their  excellent 
practice  that  the  French  never  dared  show  themselves 
by  daylight. 

The  inner  wall  of  lunette  No.  53  could  only  be  hit 
by  indirect  fire ;  but  1000  shells  made  a  breach,  and  on 
the  19th  of  September  two  mines  were  fired  which 
blew  up  the  counterscarp  and  laid  it  level  with  the 
water-line.  The  Germans  immediately  began  laying  a 
fascine-made  dam  across  the  moat.  A  party  sent 
over  in  boats  found  the  work  abandoned.  The  gorge 
was  closed  under  heavy  fire  from  the  ramparts,  and 
the  parapet  turned  so  as  to  oppose  the  fortress. 

The  next  lunette.  No.  52,  was  merely  an  earthwork, 
and  the  attack  had  akeady  been  pushed  forward  as 
far  as  the  edge  of  the  moat,  but  blinded  saps  had  first 
to  be  thrown  up  and  covered  in  with  rails,  as  a  protec- 
tion against  the  heavy  fire  of  shell  from  bastion  No.  12. 

The  construction  of  a  dam  of  fascines  or  earth,  more 
than  sixty  paces  across,  and  in  water  more  than  breast- 
high,  would  have  taken  a  long  time ;  so  it  was  decided 
to  make  a  cask-bridge  of  beer-barrels,  of  which  a 
quantity  had  been  found  in  Schiltigheim.  This  work 
was  begun  at  dusk  on  the  21st,  under  no  better  pro- 
tection than  a  screen  of  boards  to  prevent  observation, 
and  it  was  finished  by  ten  o'clock.  Here  again  the 
defenders  had  not  expected  that  the  waU  would  be 
scaled,  and  this  lunette  too  was  immediately  prepared 
for  further  attack.  Both  lunettes  were  now  furnished 
with  batteries  of  mortars  and  guns  to  silence  the  fire 
from  the  ravelins  and  counter-guards  of  the  front  of 
attack,  against  which  five  dismounted  guns  and  coun- 
ter-batteries were  also  directed. 


THE   SIEGE   OF    STKASBUKG.  137 

During  the  night  of  the  22nd  the  Germans  advanced, 
partly  by  a  flying  sap  and  partly  by  the  sap-roller 
from  lunette  No.  52,  and  at  once  proceeded  to  take  up 
a  position  on  the  crest  of  the  glacis  in  front  of  counter- 
guard  No.  51.  A  breaching  fire  was  opened  against 
the  eastern  side  of  bastion  No.  11,  and  the  western  side 
of  bastion  No.  12,  and  the  splinters  of  stone  compelled 
the  French  to  abandon  the  counter-guards.  The  walls 
of  bastion  No.  11  feU  in  on  the  24th,  after  a  shelling  of 
600  rounds.  The  breach  in  the  earthwork  at  the  angle, 
which  remained  standing,  was  postponed  till  the  storm- 
ing of  the  place. 

In  bastion  No.  12  it  was  more  difficult  to  make  a 
breach,  because  of  the  limited  means  for  observing  the 
effect  of  the  fire.  It  was  not  till  the  26th  that  a  breach 
of  thirty-six  feet  wide  was  made,  after  firing  467  minie 
shells.  And  even  now,  to  really  storm  the  place,  the 
deep  moat  surrounding  the  bastion  must  be  crossed. 

News  of  the  fall  of  the  Empire  had  by  some  means 
reached  Strasburg,  but  G-eneral  Uhrich  would  not 
listen  to  the  prayers  of  the  citizens  that  he  would 
put  an  end  to  their  sufferings.  The  Eepublic  was 
proclaimed. 

The  siege  had  lasted  thirty  days,  but  the  place  was 
still  well  supplied  with  food  and  stores ;  the  garrison 
was  not  materially  weakened  by  the  loss  of  2500  men, 
but  their  heterogeneous  elements  prevented  any  action 
in  large  bodies  outside  the  walls.  From  the  first  the 
small  blockading  force  had  been  allowed  to  approach 
close  to  the  works;  and  the  one  moment  when  the 
artillery  of  a  fortress  has  the  advantage  over  the  enemy 
had  not  been  fully  utilized. 

The  German  artillery  had  proved  much  the  stronger, 
both  as  regards  materiel  and  in  its  advantageous 
employment.    Under  protection  of  its  fire  the  sappers 


138  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAB. 

and  infantry  carried  on  the  works  with  equal  conrage 
and  caution,  never  swerving  from  the  object  in  view. 
The  storming  of  the  inner  wall  was  now  imminent, 
and  no  relief  from  outside  could  be  hoped  for. 

On  the  27th  of  September,  in  the  afternoon,  the 
white  flag  was  seen  flying  from  the  Cathedral  tower ; 
firing  ceased  and  the  engineering  works  were  stopped. 

At  two  in  the  morning  the  capitulation  ^as  signed, 
on  the  same  conditions  as  at  Sedan.  Five  hundred 
officers  and  17,000  men  were  made  prisoners,  but  the 
officers,  if  they  chose,  were  free  on  parole.  The  Na- 
tional Guards  and  franctireurs  were  dismissed,  after 
laying  down  arms  and  pledging  themselves  to  fight  no 
more.  All  the  cash  in  the  bank,  1200  guns,  200,000 
small  arms,  and  considerable  stores  proved  valuable 
trophies. 

At  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  com- 
panies of  Prussian  and  Baden  troops  mounted  guard 
at  the  gates  (the  National,  the  Fischer,  and  the  Auster- 
litz  gates).  The  French  garrison  marched  out  at  the 
National  Gate,  General  Uhrich  at  their  head.  At  first 
the  march  was  conducted  in  good  order,  but  before 
long  numbers  of  drunken  men  broke  the  ranks  and 
refused  to  obey,  or  threw  down  their  arms.  The  pris- 
oners were  taken  first  to  Rastatt,  under  the  escort  of 
two  battalions  and  two  squadrons. 

The  old  German  town,  which  had  been  seized  by 
France  in  time  of  peace  nearly  200  years  before,  was 
now  restored  by  German  daring  to  German  rule. 

The  besiegers  had  lost  39  officers  and  894  men.  The 
city,  of  course,  had  suffered  considerably.  Four  hun- 
dred and  fifty  houses  were  utterly  destroyed,  10,000 
inhabitants  were  roofless,  nearly  2000  killed  and 
wounded.  The  museum  and  picture  gallery,  town 
hall,  theatre,  new  church,  gymnasium,  Commandant's 


PAEIS  IN  OCTOBER.  139 

residence,  and  a  public  library  of  200,000  volumes  had 
been  burnt. 

The  noble  Cathedral  showed  many  traces  of  shot, 
and  the  citadel  was  a  heap  of  ruins.  Under  the  wreck 
of  the  west  front  of  the  fortifications  lay  shattered 
guns. 

The  fall  of  Toul  and  of  Strasburg  made  a  not  unim- 
portant change  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  Consider- 
able forces  were  now  free  for  other  uses,  and  transport 
by  railway  could  be  effected  much  nearer  to  the  armies. 

The  materiel  which  was  no  longer  required  at  Stras- 
burg could  not  indeed  be  at  once  employed  for  the 
artillery  attack  on  Paris ;  it  needed  considerable  addi- 
tions, and  was  to  do  duty  meanwhile  in  the  reduction 
of  several  smaller  places. 

The  newly-opened  railway  line  was  used  at  once  to 
convey  the  Landwehr  Guards  Division  to  assist  in 
blockading  Paris.  A  new  army  corps,  the  Fourteenth, 
was  created  out  of  the  Baden  Division  with  a  brigade 
composed  of  the  30th  and  Sith  Prussian  Eegiments, 
and  one  cavalry  brigade ;  and  this,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Greneral  von  Werder,  marched  on  the  Upper 
Seine.  The  1st  Reserve  Division  remained  in  occupa- 
tion at  Strasburg. 

OPERATIONS   ROUND  PARIS   TO    18TH   OF   OCTOBER. 

The  Government,  in  the  now  closely-blockaded  capi- 
tal, could  not  make  themselves  heard  and  obeyed  in 
the  provinces.  They  therefore  decided  on  sending 
two  of  their  members  to  the  scene  of  dehberations  at 
Tours. 

Even  these  could  only  quit  Paris  in  a  balloon.  One 
of  these  delegates  was  Gambetta,  whose  restless  energy 
soon  made  itself  conspicuously  felt,  and  for  as  long  as 
the  war  lasted. 


140  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

Monsieur  Thiers,  meanwliile,  had  visited  every  Eu- 
ropean court  to  invite  some  intervention  in  favor 
of  France.  After  the  failure  of  the  attempt  of  Sep- 
tember 19th  the  feeling  in  Paris  was  against  any  great 
offensive  demonstrations ;  but  the  troops  of  the  line 
still  remained  outside  the  walls  under  protection  of 
the  forts.  The  divisions  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  were 
encamped  on  the  south  side  and  on  the  plains  of  Vin- 
cennes;  the  Fourteenth  were  at  Boulogne,  Neuilly, 
and  Clichy,  behind  the  Seine,  with  Mont  Valerien  in 
their  front.  This  fort  was  held  by  two  battalions  of 
the  line,  after  the  Gardes  Mobiles  had  fled,  on  the  20th, 
from  that  perfectly  impregnable  stronghold,  in  great 
disorder  back  into  Paris.  The  northern  front  of  the 
city  was  still  defended  by  the  G-ardes  Mobiles. 

On  the  German  side  the  posts  of  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  which  were  to  be  occupied  and  defended  under 
all  circumstances,  extended  from  Chatou,  along  the 
Seine,  to  the  heights  of  Montmorency,  and  from  the 
Moree  and  the  skirts  of  the  forest  of  Bondy  as  far  as 
the  Marne.  In  connection  with  these  were  the  lines 
of  the  Wiirtemberg  contingent  from  Noisy-le-Grand, 
across  the  Joinville  peninsula  to  Ormesson.  To  fill 
the  gap  from  thence  to  Villeneuve-St.-Georges  the 
Eleventh  Corps  arrived  from  Sedan  \>n  the  23rd,  and 
the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  occupied  Longjumeau  for 
security  against  Orleans.  The  Sixth  Corps  could  now 
be  transferred  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine,  where  the 
line  of  defence  extended  along  the  wooded  heights 
south  of  Paris  to  Bougival. 

The  head-quarters,  occupied  by  the  King  and  the 
Third  Ai'my,  were  at  Versailles ;  those  of  the  Army  of 
the  Meuse  were  transferred  to  Vert-Galant.  Numer- 
ous bridges  connected  the  various  portions  of  the 
forces,  telegraphs  and  signal  lights  insured  their  rapid 


PAKIS   IN   OCTOBEE.  141 

concentration,  and  every  movement  of  the  French  was 
watched  from  posts  of  observation. 

There  was  no  lack  of  quarters  for  the  men.  Every 
village  was  deserted;  but  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
supplies  was  all  the  greater.  The  fugitive  inhabitants 
had  di'iven  off  their  cattle  and  destroyed  their  stores ; 
only  the  wine-cellars  seemed  inexhaustible.  For  the 
first  few  days  all  the  food  needed  had  to  be  drawn  from 
the  commissariat  stores,  but  ere  long  the  cavalry  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  fresh  provisions.  High  prices  and 
good  discipline  made  traffic  safe.  Only  the  advanced 
companies  had  to  bivouac  or  build  huts,  many  within 
range  of  the  fort  guns,  some  even  within  that  of  the 
French  rifles.  Near  St.  Cloud,  for  instance,  no  one 
could  show  himseK  without  becoming  a  mark  for  the 
Chassepots  behind  the  shutters  of  the  houses  opposite. 
The  sentries  here  could  only  be  relieved  at  night,  and 
sometimes  had  to  remain  on  duty  two  or  three  days  at 
a  time.  The  posts  of  the  Bavarians  at  Mouhn-la-Tour 
were  also  much  exposed,  and  the  officers  on  their 
rounds  were  always  subjected  to  a  sharp  cannonade. 
Le  Bourget,  which  stood  within  the  line  of  inundation, 
was  especially  liable  to  a  surprise.  It  had  been  taken 
on  the  20th  by  a  battalion  of  Guards,  at  whose  ap- 
proach 400  Grardes  Mobiles  had  fled,  leaving  all  their 
baggage.  Only  one  company  was  left  there,  as  it 
was  close  under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  neighboring 
fort. 

Some  minor  sorties  from  St.  Denis  met  with  no  suc- 
cess ;  but  detachments  of  the  Sixth  Corps  (German) 
vainly  endeavored  to  take  up  positions  in  the  hamlet 
of  Villejuif  or  the  earthworks  on  Hautes-Bruyeres. 
They  made  their  way  in  several  times,  but  always  had 
to  retire  under  the  fire  of  the  neighboring  forts  of 
Bicetre  and  Ivry,  and  the  superior  numbers  of  Maud'- 


142  THE   FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

huy's  division.  The  French  then  placed  heavy  guns 
in  Bicetre. 

(September  30th.)  Early  on  this  day  a  cannonade 
of  an  hour  and  a  half  s  duration  from  the  southern 
forts  announced  a  sortie  in  that  direction.  By  six 
o'clock  two  brigades  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  (French) 
had  deployed  near  Thiais  and  Choisy-le-Roi.  Strong 
parties  of  tirailleurs  di'ove  in  the  outposts  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  and  forced  the  field-guns  between  those  two 
villages  to  retire ;  but  then  the  fire  of  the  infantry  in 
occupation  checked  any  further  attack  on  the  part  of 
the  French.  Further  to  the  west  a  third  brigade  got 
into  Chevilly  and  seized  the  buildings  of  a  manufac- 
tory on  the  road  to  Belle-Epine ;  still  their  determined 
attack  failed  to  get  possession  of  the  whole  village. 

The  11th  Division,  in  their  quarters  in  the  rear,  took 
alarm,  and  advanced  to  the  support  of  the  12th.  The 
factory  was  recovered  from  the  French,  and  the  Prus- 
sian batteries  now  opened  fire,  and  worked  such  havoc 
among  the  enemy  as  they  retired  on  Saussaye,  that 
under  the  further  attack  of  the  infantry  they  fled  in 
the  greatest  disorder  to  Hautes-Bruyeres  and  Villejuif . 
A  brigade  which  had  forced  its  way  into  L'Hay  was  in 
the  same  way  repulsed,  leaving  120  prisoners,  for  the 
most  part  unwounded.  In  the  farmstead  at  the  north 
end  of  Chevilly,  however,  the  French  still  held  their 
ground  with  great  obstinacy.  Not  till  they  were  com- 
pletely surrounded,  and  had  made  an  ineffectual 
attempt  to  force  a  way  out,  did  they  surrender,  to  the 
number  of  about  100. 

The  whole  attempt  was  defeated  by  about  nine 
o'clock,  and  Greneral  Vinoy  vainly  endeavored  to  incite 
the  diminished  battalions  at  Hautes-Bruyeres  to  return 
to  the  charge. 

These  few  morning  hours  had  cost  the  Sixth  Corps 


QUIETUDE   AT  VEKSAILLES.  143 

28  officers  and  413  men ;  and  the  French  several  times 
as  many. 

Two  simultaneous  feint  attacks  on  Sevres  and  on 
Mesly,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Seine,  came  to  noth- 
ing. The  German  outposts,  at  first  driven  in,  returned 
to  their  posts  by  about  nine  o'clock. 

After  thus  failing  to  force  an  exit  to  the  south  by 
this  sortie,  the  garrison  proceeded  to  secure  the  posi- 
tion they  held  by  outworks.  They  fortified  Villejuif 
and  extended  their  lines  from  Hautes-Bruyeres,  past 
Arcueil  to  the  Mill  of  Pichon,  so  that  the  Bavarian 
outposts  had  to  be  withdrawn  somewhat  nearer  to 
Bourg-la-Reine. 

But  throughout  the  first  half  of  the  month  of  Octo- 
ber the  garrison  of  Paris  restricted  itself,  for  the  most 
part,  to  daily  cannonades.  Gruns  of  the  heaviest  cali- 
bre were  directed  on  the  smallest  objects.  It  was 
waste  of  ammunition,  just  as  though  their  object  was 
to  get  rid  of  the  stores  they  had  by  them.  If  one  of 
the  gigantic  minie  shells  happened  to  fall  on  a  picket, 
the  destruction  was  of  course  terrific;  but  on  the 
whole  they  did  little  execution. 

Apart  from  the  noise,  to  which  they  soon  became 
accustomed,  at  Versailles,  whence  none  of  the  resi- 
dents had  fled,  it  might  have  been  a  time  of  perfect 
peace.  The  admirable  discipline  of  the  German  troops 
allowed  the  townsfolk  to  pursue  their  business  undis- 
turbed ;  the  hosts  were  well  paid  for  the  soldiers  quar- 
tered on  them,  and  the  country  people  could  cultivate 
their  fields  and  gardens  in  peace.  At  St.  Cloud  every 
room  was  kept  in  the  same  order  as  when  the  Imperial 
family  had  left  it,  till  the  sheUs  from  Mont-Valerien 
reduced  that  delightful  palace,  with  all  its  treasures  of 
art,  to  a  heap  of  charred  ruins.  It  was  the  French 
fire  too  which  wrecked  the  Chateau  of  Meudon,  the 


144  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

porcelain  factory  of  Sevres,  and  whole  villages  in  the 
neighborhood.  And,  without  any  necessity,  the 
French  themselves  felled  half  the  Bois  de  Boulogne. 

The  blockade  was  considerably  strengthened  between 
the  10th  and  16th  of  October,  when  the  17th  Division 
arrived  from  Toul  to  relieve  the  21st  at  Bonneuil,  and 
the  21st  took  up  a  position  between  the  Bavarian  and 
the  Fifth  Corps,  in  the  line  from  Meudon  to  Sevi'es, 
while  the  Landwehr  Guards  Division  came  to  occupy 
St.  Germain. 

These  movements  were  observed  from  Paris,  and,  to 
clear  up  the  situation,  General  Vinoy  advanced,  at 
nine  o'clock  on  the  18th,  with  about  25,000  men  and 
280  guns,  on  the  position  held  by  the  Bavarian  Corps. 

Four  battalions  of  Gardes  Mobiles,  protected  by  the 
fire  of  the  forts,  proceeded  to  attack  Bagneux,  and 
forced  their  way  over  the  battered-in  fortifications 
into  the  heart  of  the  place,  whence  the  German  defend- 
ers retired  to  Fontenay,  when,  at  eleven  o'clock,  the 
10th  Regiment  of  the  line  (French)  had  also  come  up. 
Reinforced  by  a  fresh  battalion,  and  supported  by  an 
effective  flanking  fire  from  Chatillon,  they  now  made 
so  firm  a  stand  that  the  enemy  could  make  no  further 
progress,  but  began  to  put  Bagneux  in  a  state  of  de- 
fence. Meanwhile  the  4th  Bavarian  Division  had 
formed  up,  and  by  about  1.30  General  von  Bothmer 
came  up  from  Sceaux  and  from  Fontenay,  on  both 
sides  at  once,  on  Bagneux.  They  climbed  over  the  bar- 
ricades erected  by  the  French,  who,  however,  still 
offered  an  obstinate  resistance  in  the  northern  part  of 
the  village. 

A  French  battalion  had  also  made  its  way  into 
Chatillon,  but  the  Bavarian  battalion  on  guard  there 
held  its  own  until  assistance  came,  and  the  enemy  was 
driven  out  of  the  place  after  a  sharp  conflict. 


SORTIE  OF  OCTOBER   18TH.  145 

A  third  brigade  seized  Clamart,  which  at  that  time 
was  not  included  in  the  Grerman  intrenched  Hnes ;  but 
they  failed  to  climb  the  slopes  leading  to  Moulin-de-la- 
Tour,  although  the  Germans  occupying  the  plateau 
there  were  under  fire  from  the  fort. 

General  Vinoy  had  convinced  himself  that  a  suffi- 
cient force  was  prepared  to  make  head  to  him  at  every 
point,  and  at  three  o'clock  he  decided  on  giving  up  the 
struggle.  The  French  detachments  gi'adually  disap- 
peared behind  the  forts,  and  had  all  vanished  by  dusk. 
The  Bavarians  returned  to  their  former  positions,  and 
the  force  at  Bagneux  was  strengthened  to  two  bat- 
talions. 

France  had  all  this  while  been  arming  with  zealous 
haste.  Armies  of  considerable  strength  were  being 
massed  at  Rouen  and  at  Evreux,  at  Besan^on,  and 
especially  beyond  the  Loire,  of  very  various  compo- 
sition, no  doubt,  and  with  a  serious  lack  of  profes- 
sional officers  to  drill  and  discipline  them.  Great  bat- 
tles were  therefore  to  be  avoided ;  the  enemy  was  to  be 
harassed  by  constant  small  engagements. 

Thus,  towards  the  end  of  September,  General  Dela- 
rue  had  already  advanced  from  Evreux  with  his  troop 
of  scouts  (Eclau'eurs  de  la  Seine)  close  on  St.  Germain. 
But  the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  supported  by  two  Ba- 
varian battalions,  drove  these,  too,  back  across  the 
hue  to  Dreux. 

The  woods  in  front  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
were  full  of  detachments  of  the  French,  who  were, 
however,  repulsed  without  much  difficulty  to  Ram- 
bouillet  and  Epernon. 

Matters  looked  more  serious  to  the  south  of  Paris, 
where  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  were  observing  the 
Loire. 

The  newly-formed  French  Fifteenth  Corps  had  as- 
10 


146  THE  FRANCb-GERMAN  WAR. 

sembled  at  Orleans,  in  three  divisions,  30,000  strong, 
and  they  occupied  the  whole  forest  belt  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Loire.  To  avert  the  danger  here  of  being 
outflanked,  the  First  Bavarian  Corps  and  the  22nd 
Division  of  the  Eleventh  had,  as  has  already  been 
mentioned,  started  to  march  on  Arpajon  and  Mont- 
chery  as  soon  as  they  were  released  from  Sedan ;  and 
on  the  6th  of  October  they  were  placed,  with  the  2nd 
Cavalry  Division,  under  the  command  of  Greneral  von 
der  Tann. 

THE   BATTLE   OF   ARTENAY. 

As  soon  as  General  von  der  Tann  had  received 
instructions  to  act  on  the  offensive  against  Orleans, 
he  marched,  on  the  9th  of  October,  to  the  vicinity  of 
St.  Peravy  without  meeting  any  serious  opposition, 
and  on  the  10th  advanced  on  Artenay.  The  4th  Cav- 
ahy  Division  covered  the  right  flank,  the  2nd  remained 
near  Pithiviers,  where  the  French  had  collected  in 
great  force. 

But  General  La  Motterouge  had  on  the  same  day 
advanced  to  Artenay  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
(French),  having  the  wood  in  his  rear  occupied  by 
Gardes  Mobiles,  so  the  advanced  guards  of  the  two 
armies  met  at  a  short  distance  to  the  north  of  the  goal 
of  their  march. 

While  the  Bavarian  light  horse,  on  the  right,  drove 
the  French  cavahy  before  them,  the  infantry  deployed 
across  the  road  close  to  Dambron.  The  22nd  Division 
(German)  marched  on  Dambron  with  a  cavalry  division 
on  each  flank.  Under  the  fire  of  the  Bavarian  bat- 
teries, the  French  had  turned  off  towards  Artenay, 
where  the  Germans  were  ready  to  receive  them.  At- 
tacked in  front  and  threatened  by  bodies  of  horse,  at 
about  two  o'clock,  leaving  their  tents  behind  them, 
they  began  a  retreat,  which   soon   degenerated  into 


THE  ENGAGEMENT  AT  OELEANS.  147 

flight.  The  cavahy  seized  four  field-guns,  and  took 
above  250  prisoners.  Six  hundred  more,  who  had 
reached  Croix-Briquet,  surrendered  there  to  the  Ba- 
varian infantry. 

The  German  troops  had  made  a  long  march ;  Gen- 
eral von  der  Tann  therefore  called  a  halt  in  and  around 
Artenay,  and  only  the  advanced  guard  went  on  to 
Chevilly,  to  proceed  to  Orleans  next  day. 

THE  ENGAGEMENT  AT  ORLEANS. 

(October  11th.) 

The  22nd  Division,  only  6000  strong,  set  out  on 
October  11th,  on  the  right  of  the  advancing  forces,  and 
drove  the  French  out  of  several  villages  partly  prepared 
for  defence ;  it  was  not  till  about  ten  o'clock  that  they 
met  with  any  serious  opposition,  from  an  intrenched 
position  at  Ormes. 

The  French  commander,  after  the  disaster  at  Ar- 
tenay, decided  on  a  retreat  behind  the  Loire,  and  to 
cover  it  he  placed  about  15,000  men  on  the  ground  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  which  possessed  many 
essentials  towards  a  good  defence. 

General  von  Wittich  first  marched  his  44th  Brigade 
against  the  French  position  at  Ormes,  and  then  opened 
fire  from  seven  batteries.  His  left  wing,  supported  by 
the  Bavarian  right,  made  their  way  but  slowly  over 
the  plain  to  the  east  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  vari- 
ous enclosures  and  buildings  had  to  be  stormed  and 
taken  as  they  advanced.  This  threatening  movement 
on  their  right  flank,  however,  shook  the  firmness  of 
the  French,  and,  after  some  hours'  hard  fighting,  they 
began  to  yield.  No  sooner  was  this  observed  by  the 
Germans  than  two  batteries  were  brought  up  to  within 
800  paces,  and  the  83rd  Regiment  stormed  the  place  at 


148  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN   WAH. 

two  in  the  afternoon,  but  with  much  loss.  Detach- 
ments of  the  43rd  Brigade  had  meanwhile  reached  the 
road  in  the  rear  of  Ormes,  and  took  800  prisoners. 
The  villages,  orchards,  and  vineyards  which  line  the 
road  to  Orleans  for  above  a  mile  on  either  side  were 
serious  obstacles  to  the  advance  of  the  Grermans,  and 
the  division  did  not  arrive  at  Petit-St.-Jean  till  three 
o'clock ;  there  they  stormed  the  most  advanced  build- 
ings. 

The  Bavarian  Corps,  which  had  met  with  a  stout 
resistance  at  Saran,  pushed  forward  to  Bel- Air,  but 
with  great  loss,  especially  among  the  artillery.  Here 
the  nature  of  the  gi'ound  did  not  allow  of  the  align- 
ment of  the  guns,  and  the  attack  came  to  a  standstill ; 
at  half -past  four  the  French  were  still  holding  their 
own  at  Les  Aides,  till  the  advance  of  the  4th  Bavarian 
Brigade  on  Murlins  threatened  to  cut  off  their  retreat. 
Then  they  again  made  a  stand  behind  the  railway  em- 
bankment, 1000  paces  in  front  of  the  town,  and  the 
station  and  gas  works  had  also  to  be  taken  by  storm. 

It  was  five  o'clock  when  General  von  der  Tann  led 
his  Reserve  Corps,  the  1st  Bavarian  Brigade,  to  a 
decisive  attempt  on  Grand-Ormes.  The  32nd  Prussian 
Regiment  crossed  the  embankment  on  the  left  flank  of 
the  French,  who  now  retired  to  the  suWrb  of  St.  Jean. 
The  1st  Bavarian  Regiment,  hurrying  up  in  its  rear, 
was  received  with  a  hot  fii-e  at  the  gate  of  the  town ; 
but  aU  the  officers  led  the  advance,  and  by  seven 
o'clock  they  had  reached  the  market-place. 

The  French  hurried  down  to  the  bridge  over  the 
Loire,  the  43rd  Prussian  and  the  1st  Bavarian  Bri- 
gades seized  the  principal  buildings  and  the  passages 
across  the  river ;  but  as  darkness  fell  they  gave  up  all 
further  advance  and  bivouacked  on  the  squares  in  the 
town. 


OCCUPATION   OP   ORLEANS.  149 

The  day  had  cost  the  Grermans  900  men,  the  3rd  Ba- 
varian Brigade  having  suffered  most.  But  their  hard- 
won  victory  had  gained  security  to  the  investing 
troops ;  and  5000  rifles,  ten  locomotives,  and  sixty  rail- 
way carriages  were  welcome  spoil. 

The  French  rear-guard  had  lost  in  small  skirmishes 
and  retreats  alone  1800  prisoners ;  but  it  had  covered 
the  retreat  of  the  main  body  of  the  Army  of  the 
South  for  a  whole  day  against  superior  forces,  with 
praiseworthy  determination.  In  an  open  field,  where 
the  skilful  wielding  of  compact  masses  is  indispen- 
sable, it  would  soon  have  been  defeated ;  but  in  street 
fighting,  under  shelter  of  the  houses,  unflinching  per- 
sonal courage  is  all  that  is  needed,  and  even  the  recruits 
of  the  newly  created  French  army  did  not  lack  that. 

On  the  following  day  the  1st  Bavarian  Division  took 
possession  of  the  suburb  of  St.  Marceau,  on  the  fur- 
ther side  of  the  Loire,  and  advanced  to  the  Loiret. 
The  2nd  Cavalry  Division  scoured  the  district  of  So- 
logne,  the  4th  on  the  right  bank  kept  a  lookout  to  the 
westward.  The  Fifteenth  Corps  (French)  had  con- 
tinued to  retire  to  Salbris  and  Pierrefitte,  beyond  the 
Sauldre. 

It  might  certainly  have  been  wished  that  they  could 
have  been  followed  up  to  Vierzon  and  Tours,  to  de- 
stroy the  vast  stores  of  arms  at  the  first-named  town 
and  disturb  the  Provisional  Grovernment  in  the  other. 
But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  though  the  French 
forces  had  been  discomfited  at  Artenay,  favored  by 
the  nature  of  the  locality,  they  had  escaped  total  rout 
by  retreat.  A  new  French  corps  d'armee,  the  Six- 
teenth, had  come  into  existence  at  Blois,  below  Orleans, 
and  at  Gien,  above  that  city ;  it  had  come  into  col- 
lision with  the  German  cavalry  by  the  wood  of  Marche- 
noir  and  before  Chateaudun,  and  the  inhabitants  and 


150  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

volunteers  appeared  so  full  of  confidence  that  it  was 
to  be  supposed  they  counted  on  fresh  support. 

So  the  invaders  were  compelled  to  confine  their 
operations  to  the  occupation  of  Orleans  and  the  line 
of  the  Loire ;  and  for  this  purpose  the  Bavarian  Corps, 
with  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division,  seemed  a  sufiicient 
force.  The  22nd  Infantry  and  the  4th  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion were  recalled  to  the  Third  Army,  but  on  their  re- 
turn march  they  were  to  disperse  the  volunteers  who 
had  made  their  appearance  at  Chateaudun  and  Char- 
tres. 

Greneral  von  der  Tann  had  the  bridges  over  the 
Loiret  and  the  Loire  prepared  for  the  march,  stages 
were  established  to  Longjumeau,  and  the  Bavarian 
Eailway  Corps  set  to  work  to  restore  the  line  to  Ville- 
neuve. 

THE   TAKING  OF   SOISSONS. 

(October  15th.) 

Soissons  still  hindered  the  free  use  of  the  railway 
from  Rheims,  which  had  been  re-opened  by  the  fall 
of  Toul.  This  fortress  had  been  battered  by  artillery 
without  success  when  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  marched 
past  it  on  the  way  to  Paris,  and  since  then  it  had  only 
been  kept  under  observation  till  October  6th,  when 
eight  Landwehr  battalions,  four  squadrons,  two  bat- 
teries, two  companies  of  pioneers,  and  four  of  fortress 
artillery  completed  the  blockade. 

Soissons,  with  its  walls  eight  metres  high,  was  quite 
impregnable,  and  damming  up  the  waters  of  the  Crise 
would  preserve  it  from  attack  on  the  south.  The 
south-west  front,  on  the  other  hand,  had  only  a  dry 
moat,  with  no  counterscrap  of  masonry ;  here,  too,  the 
town  was  commanded  by  Mont-Marion,  rising  to  a 
height  of  ninety  metres  at  a  distance  of  less  than  a 


TAKING  OF   SOISSONS.  151 

quarter  of  a  mile.  On  this  side,  therefore,  the  artillery 
was  preparing  to  attack  at  close  quarters,  when,  on 
the  11th  of  October,  26  Prussian  siege-guns  arrived 
from  Toul,  with  170  rounds  of  ammunition  and  10 
French  mortars ;  the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  took 
over  the  command. 

In  a  clear  moonlight  night  the  artillery  was  got  up, 
with  the  help  of  the  infantry,  on  to  the  heights  at  St. 
Grenevieve  and  BeUeu;  and  the  batteries  on  Mont- 
Marion  were  constructed  and  armed.  They  opened 
fire  simultaneously  at  six  in  the  morning  of  the  12th 
of  October. 

The  besieged  answered  with  great  spirit  but  small 
results,  and  the  accurate  fire  of  the  Prussian  artillery 
soon  reduced  the  French  front  to  silence. 

A  small  breach  was  visible  by  next  day,  and  the  fire 
from  the  fortress  was  evidently  much  enfeebled ;  but 
the  Commandant  decidedly  rejected  the  demand  that 
he  should  capitulate.  On  the  14th  he  increased  the 
number  of  guns  on  his  south  front,  so  that  the  bat- 
teries on  St.  Grenevieve  had  a  hard  struggle.  The 
French  also  labored  hard  to  restore  the  damaged  for- 
tifications, brought  more  guns  up  to  the  ramparts,  and 
filled  up  the  breach  with  abatis. 

But  on  the  15th  these  repairs  were  soon  demolished 
again  by  the  Prussian  artillery,  and  a  breach  forty 
paces  wide  was  made.  As  the  fortress  still  kept  up  a 
brisk  fire,  it  was  determined  to  bring  the  field-batteries 
within  900  paces  of  the  walls;  but  at  eight  in  the 
evening,  when  this  was  just  begun,  the  Commandant 
opened  negotiations  and  surrendered  the  place  on  the 
same  terms  as  Sedan.  The  garrison  marched  out  next 
morning,  for  the  most  part  drunk.  A  thousand  of 
Gardes  Mobiles  were  dismissed  on  parole,  3800  soldiers 
were  made  prisoners. 


152  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

The  attack  had  cost  120  men ;  128  guns  and  8000 
small  arms  were  seized  as  plunder,  besides  vast  stores 
of  provisions. 

THE   STORMING  OF   CHATEAUDUN. 

(October  18th.) 

In  obedience  to  instructions,  Greneral  von  Wittich 
marched  on  Chateaudun  in  the  afternoon  of  the  18th, 
with  the  22nd  Division.  The  French  troops  of  the  line 
had  already  been  ordered  to  retire  on  Blois,  but  about 
1800  National  Gruards  and  volunteers  remained,  under 
cover  of  barricades  and  waUs,  to  receive  the  enemy. 
The  infantry  attack  was  also  made  more  difficult  by 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  four  batteries  had  to 
keep  up  a  hot  fire  for  some  little  time. 

It  was  not  till  dusk  that  a  general  attack  was  at- 
tempted. The  defence  inside  the  town  made  a  desper- 
ate resistance.  House  by  house  had  to  be  seized, 
the  fighting  went  on  late  into  the  night,  and  a  large 
part  of  the  place  was  set  in  flames.  The  volunteers 
finally  retired,  leaving  150  prisoners  and  abandoning 
the  inhabitants  to  their  fate ;  and  these,  though  hav- 
ing taken  part  in  the  struggle,  werq^  let  off  with  a 
fine. 

At  noon  on  the  21st,  the  division  marched  on  Char- 
tres,  where  20,000  French  were  said  to  have  assembled. 
The  G-ardes  Mobiles  and  Marine  Infantry  advanced  to 
attack,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  seven  batteries. 
The  General  in  command  deployed  both  brigades  to 
the  south  of  the  city,  and  with  the  assistance  of  the 
cavalry,  who  had  been  joined  by  the  6th  Division, 
completely  surrounded  it.  The  fate  of  Chateaudun 
had  been  a  warning  to  the  municipal  authorities,  and 
at  three  o'clock  an  agreement  was  come  to,  by  which 


THE   STORMING  OF   CHATEAUDUN.  153 

the  troops  were  to  be  withdrawn,  the  National  Gruards 
to  lay  down  their  arms,  and  the  gates  to  be  thrown 
open. 

General  Wittich's  orders  were  to  remain  at  Chartres 
for  the  present,  while  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  was  to 
occupy  Maintenon,  and  so  cover  the  investing  army  to 
the  west  of  Paris. 

Operations  had  been  no  less  active  in  the  north. 
The  Saxon  Cavahy  Division,  supported  by  a  part  of 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  had  in  the  early  part  of  Octo- 
ber driven  the  franctireurs  and  Oardes  Mobiles  be- 
yond the  Oise  and  the  Epte  on  Amiens,  taking  some 
hundi'eds  of  prisoners.  But  fresh  swarms  were  con- 
stantly coming  on,  and  had  to  be  attacked  at  Breteuil, 
Montdidier,  and  Etrepagny,  so  that  no  less  than  eleven 
battalions,  twenty-four  squadi'ons,  and  four  batteries 
(Grerman)  were  by  degrees  employed  in  protecting  the 
besieging  force  on  this  side  of  the  capital.  But  by  the 
end  of  the  month  the  French  forces  were  so  regularly 
disciplined  and  in  such  numbers,  that  for  a  time  the 
Germans  could  only  hold  and  defend  the  Hne  of  the 
Epte. 

To  the  south-east  also,  in  the  forest-land  of  Fon- 
tainebleau,  the  volunteers  were  hostile,  particularly  to 
requisition  parties  of  cavalry;  and  at  Nangis  they 
thi'eatened  to  obstruct  the  transport  of  siege-guns.  A 
small  force  of  Wiirtembergers  seized  Montereau,  which, 
though  barricaded,  was  not  defended ;  the  inhabitants 
gave  up  their  arms,  and  the  victors  marched  on  No- 
gent.  This  town  was  held  by  a  large  body  of  Gardes 
Mobiles.  After  breaching  the  walls  of  the  churchyard, 
the  "Wiirtembergers,  in  the  face  of  a  hot  fire,  made  their 
way  into  the  place.  The  French  still  offered  a  stout 
resistance,  but  finally  retired  on  Troyes,  leaving  600 
dead  and  wounded. 


154  THE   FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

The  small  flying  column  rejoined  its  division,  hav- 
ing traversed  twenty-seven  miles  (German)  of  country 
in  six  days. 

SOETIE  TOWAEDS   MAIiMAISON. 

(October  21st.) 

The  French  capital  had  now  been  invested  for  more 
than  a  month,  and  it  seemed  not  impossible  that  after 
such  long  inactivity  it  would  be  reduced  to  surrender 
by  famine.  All  the  sorties  hitherto  attempted  had 
only  di'iven  the  enemy  out  of  the  closest  vicinity ;  a 
new  effort  was  to  have  a  grander  object  in  view.  It 
was  to  cross  the  Seine  below  Paris  at  Bezons  and  Car- 
riere,  and  to  effect  a  simultaneous  attack  on  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Fourth  Prussian  Corps  on  the  heights  of 
Ai'genteuil  from  the  south,  and  from  St.  Denis  on  the 
east.  The  advance  on  Eouen  was  to  pass  by  Pontoise 
thi'ough  a  district  not  yet  altogether  exhausted  of  sup- 
plies ;  the  Army  of  the  Loire  was  also  to  proceed  by 
railway  to  Rouen  by  Le  Mans,  thus  forming  a  com- 
bined army  of  250,000  men. 

The  Prussian  Fifth  Corps,  it  was  true,  commanded 
the  crossing  of  the  Seine  immediately  in  flank ;  out- 
posts had  several  times  been  seen  at  Rueil.  As  a  pre- 
liminary step.  General  Ducrot  undertook  to  repulse 
this  force  with  10,000  men  and  120  field-guns.  Thus 
an  intrenched  hne  from  Yalerien  and  Carrieres  would 
close  the  peninsula  on  the  south. 

Perhaps,  in  the  face  of  much-dreaded  public  opinion 
and  the  growing  restlessness  of  pohtical  parties  in 
Paris,  it  was  more  a  craving  to  be  doing  something 
than  any  serious  hope  which  gave  rise  to  such  far- 
reaching  schemes.  Considerable  difficulties  had  to  be 
met  in  attacking  the  enemy's  lines,  and  greater  must 


SOETIE  OF  OCTOBER  21ST.  155 

inevitably  arise  if  their  attack  should  succeed.  It  was 
vain  to  think  of  getting  through  with  miles  of  bag- 
gage-trains, which  were  indispensable  to  victual  an 
army.  Serious  embarrassment  would  ensue  when  the 
troops  had  consumed  the  three  days'  rations  they  could 
carry  with  them.  To  live  on  the  produce  of  the  soil 
the  army  must  be  dispersed ;  but  with  the  enemy  at 
its  heels  a  close  order  of  march  was  indispensable. 
And,  in  any  case,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  would  have 
been  gained  by  withdi^awing  from  Paris  the  forces 
which  had  been  assembled  for  its  defence.  Success 
could  only  have  been  hoped  for  if  an  army  from  with- 
out had  been  so  close  at  hand  as  to  be  within  immedi- 
ate touch  of  the  troops  marching  out. 

However,  on  the  21st  of  October,  after  Mont  Valerien 
had  all  the  morning  kept  up  an  ineffectual  fire,  Gren- 
eral  Ducrot  advanced  at  about  one  o'clock  to  attack 
the  position  of  the  Prussian  19th  Brigade  occupying 
the  line  of  Bougival — Jonchere — Fohlenkoppel.  Four- 
teen French  field-batteries  deployed  on  either  side  of 
the  Rueil  and  at  the  southern  foot  of  Valerien ;  the 
infantry  advanced  in  five  columns  in  the  rear  of  this 
artillery  front. 

On  the  German  side  only  two  batteries  could  at  first 
engage  in  the  unequal  duel,  and  one  of  these,  at  Villa 
Metternich,  had  very  soon  to  retire.  The  French  guns 
advanced  to  within  1400  paces  of  Bougival,  and  at 
thi'ee  o'clock  four  companies  of  Zouaves  rushed  out  of 
Rueil.  Being  received  with  a  hot  fire,  they  inclined  to 
the  left,  throwing  themselves  into  the  park  of  Malmai- 
son,  and  without  opposition  seized  the  Chateau  of 
Buzanval  and  the  eastern  slope  of  the  deep  ravine  of 
Cucufa.  And  here  one  of  their  batteries  was  brought 
into  the  fighting  line  to  support  them. 

While  the  main  body  of  the  9th  Division  (German) 


156  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

advanced  from  Versailles  on  Vaucresson,  the  lOth  de- 
ployed by  the  ravine  and  at  Villa  Metternich.  The 
infantry  fire  lasted  for  above  an  hour,  and  did  much 
havoc  among  the  French.  When  at  about  four  o'clock 
they  seemed  sufiiciently  shaken,  and  a  reinforcement 
of  the  Landwehr  Gruard  had  come  up  from  St.  Germain 
on  the  left,  the  German  left  wing  advanced  from 
Bougival  over  the  hill  of  Jonchere,  forced  a  way  into 
Malmaison  in  spite  of  violent  opposition,  and  followed 
the  retreating  Zouaves  as  far  as  Rueil.  The  right 
wing  at  the  same  time  turning  the  head  of  the  Cucufa 
ravine,  advanced  behind  the  eastern  ridge  and  di'ove 
out  the  enemy,  seized  the  battery  of  two  guns,  and 
occupied  the  Chateau  of  Buzanval. 

The  French  now  retired  on  all  sides,  firing  ceased 
by  six  o'clock,  and  the  10th  Division,  which  had  kept 
the  enemy's  advance  in  check  single-handed,  returned 
to  their  old  position. 

The  struggle  had  cost  the  Germans  400  men.  The 
French,  on  the  other  hand,  had  in  this  luckless  enter- 
prise left  500  dead  and  wounded,  and  120  prisoners. 

Soon  after  this  the  French  began  to  throw  up  earth- 
works within  800  paces  of  the  line  of  the  Guards  Corps ; 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  General  Bellemare, 
under  cover  of  the  darkness,  advanced  on  Le-Bourget 
with  a  force  of  several  battalions. 

The  companies  in  occupation,  taken  completely  by 
surprise,  could  only  retire  before  such  overwhelming 
numbers,  on  Pont-Iblon  and  Blanc-Mesnil.  The  French 
barricaded  themselves  into  the  place  and  prepared  it 
for  an  obstinate  defence.  A  German  battahon  made  a 
vain  attempt  that  evening  to  drive  them  out ;  it  was 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  They  were  equally  unsuc- 
cessful next  day  with  the  fire  of  thirty  field-guns  which 
went  up  by  Pont-Iblon.    Now,  however,  the  Crown 


BATTLE   OF  LE-BOUEGET.  157 

Prince  of  Saxony  issued  imperative  orders  to   the 
Guards  to  recapture  Le-Bourget  without  delay. 

STORMING  OF  LE-BOURGET. 

(October  30th.) 

Nine  battalions  of  the  2nd  Division  of  Guards  and 
five  batteries  were  therefore  assembled  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant-General  von  Budritzki  at  Dugny, 
Pont-Iblon  and  Blanc-Mesnil  for  a  general  attack  on 
the  place.  After  the  artillery  had  opened  the  attack, 
at  about  eight  in  the  morning,  from  the  banks  of  the 
Moree,  the  infantry  advanced.  The  country  lay  per- 
fectly open,  and  they  were  under  fire,  not  merely  from 
Le-Bourget,  but  from  the  heavy  guns  of  the  fort. 
Queen  Elizabeth's  Grenadiers,  at  the  head  of  the  centre 
column,  nevertheless  made  a  successful  assault  at  about 
nine  o'clock,  surmounting  the  barricade  at  the  northern 
entrance,  and  getting  into  the  village  through  a  breach 
promptly  made  by  the  sappers.  The  Emperor  Francis's 
Grenadier  Regiment  advanced  on  the  west  and  took 
possession  of  the  park.  A  hot  street-fight  ensued,  the 
French  firing  from  the  houses,  and  the  colonels  of  both 
regiments — Colonel  von  Zaluskowski  and  Count  Wal- 
dersee — both  fell.  The  farms  on  the  left  of  the  road, 
which  had  been  walled  in,  were  stormed  one  after  an- 
other, in  spite  of  a  determined  defence ;  the  windows 
of  the  church,  though  walled  up  to  a  considerable 
height,  were  scaled,  and  a  hand-to-hand  fight  continued 
inside  it.  The  guns  of  the  Guards  forced  a  way  into 
the  glass-works. 

At  half -past  nine  the  French  tried  to  bring  up  rein- 
forcements from  Aubervillers  and  Drancy;  but  the 
left  German  column  had  meanwhile  seized  the  railway 
embankment,   placed  a  detachment  of  the  Emperor 


158  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

Alexander's  Regiment  to  hold  it,  and  forced  a  way  into 
the  village  from  the  south.  Two  batteries  had  taken 
up  a  position  on  the  Mollette  and  their  fire  drove  back 
the  French,  and  even  compelled  them  to  evacuate 
Drancy. 

At  ten  o'clock  the  French  still  held  the  buildings  on 
the  north  of  the  Mollette.  They  were  now  attacked 
from  the  south.  The  4th  Company  of  the  Alexander 
Regiment  crossed  the  stream  and  found  their  way 
through  one  of  the  breaches  made  by  the  sappers  into 
the  yard  where  the  French  had  collected  their  forces. 
The  bayonet  and  clubbed  arms  had  to  be  used  against 
them,  and  here  their  colonel — Colonel  de  Baroche — was 
killed. 

Although  by  this  time — eleven  o'clock — the  three 
attacking  columns  had  met  in  the  heart  of  Le-Bourget, 
the  enemy  continued  the  struggle  in  houses  and  gar- 
dens with  embittered  desperation  till  the  afternoon, 
while  all  the  forts  on  the  north  front  of  Paris  shelled 
the  place.  It  was  not  till  half -past  one  that  the  attack- 
ing forces  could  retire  in  companies  to  their  respective 
quarters.  Two  battalions  remained  to  occupy  Le- 
Bourget. 

The  desperate  resistance  of  the  French  showed  how 
important  they  considered  this  post.  "The  victory  had 
cost  the  2nd  (German)  Division  of  Guards  500  men. 
The  enemy's  loss  is  not  known,  but  1200  prisoners 
were  taken. 

This  new  disaster  added  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Paris.  The  revolutionary  factions, 
which  at  all  times  lurk  in  the  French  capital,  came 
threatening  to  the  front. 

Highly-colored  reports  could  no  longer  conceal  re- 
peated failures ;  respect  for  the  Government  was  fast 
dying  out.    The  authorities  were  accused  of  incapacity, 


THE  STATE   OF  PAEIS.  159 

nay,  of  treason.  Noisy  crowds  demanded  to  be  sup- 
plied with  arms,  and  a  part  of  the  National  Guard  even 
joined  in  the  tumult.  The  Hotel  de  Ville  was  sur- 
rounded by  a  mob  shouting  Vive  la  Commune,  and 
though  other  troops  dispersed  these  gatherings,  the 
ringleaders,  though  well  known,  went  unpunished. 

On  the  31st  of  October  uproarious  masses  again 
paraded  the  streets.  As  General  Trochu  had  forbidden 
the  sentries  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville  to  use  their  arms,  the 
rebels  forced  their  way  in.  The  Ministers  were  their 
prisoners  till  the  evening,  when  a  few  battahons  who 
had  remained  staunch  liberated  them. 

Monsieur  Thiers,  who  had  returned  from  his  fruitless 
journey  to  the  European  Sovereigns,  thought  it  was 
time  to  re-open  negotiations  with  Versailles.  The 
King  was  still  perfectly  willing  to  grant  an  armistice, 
but  it  was  impossible  to  accede  to  the  conditions  de- 
manded by  the  French,  namely,  that  the  city  should 
receive  a  supply  of  food,  so  hostilities  had  to  take  their 
course. 

At  this  time,  towards  the  end  of  October,  the  situa- 
tion on  the  Moselle  had  assumed  an  aspect  which 
essentially  modified  that  of  the  whole  war. 

By  the  exchange  of  German  prisoners  for  those 
French  who  had  fought  at  Sedan,  the  news  of  the  sur- 
render of  Metz,  which  had  immediately  followed,  was 
generally  known.  But  Marshal  Bazaine  had  declared 
that  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  was  ready  to  defend  the 
country  against  the  invaders,  and  public  order  against 
evil  passions — a  clause  which  certainly  could  be  inter- 
preted in  more  ways  than  one. 

It  could  on'ly  have  been  a  satisfaction  to  the  Ger- 
mans, politically  speaking,  if  there  had  been  in  France 
a  supreme  authority,  besides  the  pretentious  and  feeble 
Government  in  Paris,  with  whom  to  agree  as  to  the 


160  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

termination  of  the  war.  Permission  was  therefore 
given  for  the  admission  to  Metz  of  a  representative  of 
the  exiled  Imperial  family.  As  the  Marshal  was  unable 
to  show  any  credentials  as  holding  such  an  office,  Gren- 
eral  Bourbaki  was  allowed  to  pass  through  the  Glerman 
lines  on  an  embassy  to  London,  where,  however,  the 
Empress  Eugenie  declined  to  intervene  in  the  already- 
disastrous  affairs  of  France.  The  General  then  placed 
his  services  at  the  disposal  of  the  National  Defence 
Government  at  Tours. 

Meanwhile,  the  army  which  had  been  imprisoned  in 
Metz  since  the  battle  of  Noisseville  remained  in  an  atti- 
tude of  expectation.  The  necessary  provisions  for 
70,000  inhabitants,  including  the  country-folk  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  the  city,  had  originally  been  enough  to 
last  three  months  and  a  half;  those  for  the  regular 
garrison  were  calculated  for  five  months,  but  for  the 
whole  Army  of  the  Rhine  they  had  supplies  for  only 
forty-one  days,  and  there  were  oats  for  twenty-five 
days  only. 

The  supplies  for  the  troops  could,  indeed,  be  recruited 
by  purchase  from  the  abundant  stores  of  the  citizens ; 
but  ere  long  smaller  rations  of  bread  were  served  out, 
and  horses  had  to  be  slaughtered  for  meat,  so  that  most 
of  the  cavalry  regiments  were  reduced  to  two  squad- 
rons. 

On  the  German  side,  victualling  197,326  men  and 
33,136  horses  was  a  matter  of  great  difficulty.  The 
outbreak  of  cattle-plague  in  Germany  restricted  the 
importation  of  live  beasts  to  those  procurable  from 
Holland  or  Belgium.  The  meat  supply  had  to  be  sup- 
plemented by  tinned  provisions ;  and  increased  rations 
of  oats  had  to  take  the  place  of  hay  and  straw. 

The  losses  of  the  army  had  hitherto  been  made  good 
from  the  reserves,  but  the  transport  of  the  prisoners 


SORTIES  FEOM   METZ.  161 

from  Sedan  alone  required  the  services  of  fourteen  bat- 
talions of  the  blockading  force.  Thus  it  had  not  yet 
been  possible  to  provide  sufiS.cient  accommodation  be- 
hind the  trenches.  The  raw,  rainy  weather  had  come 
on  early  in  the  season,  and  a  quarter  of  the  men  were 
still  roofless ;  so  that,  by  degrees,  the  sick  in  hospital 
reached  the  alarming  number  of  40,000. 

Although  fifty  heavy  guns  had  been  brought  up  from 
Germany,  they  were  ineffectual  against  such  a  fortress 
as  Metz,  since,  in  consequence  of  the  superior  calibre 
of  the  fort  guns,  they  could  only  be  fired  at  night,  with 
frequent  change  of  position.  There  was  nothing  for 
it  but  to  hope  for  the  best,  and  have  patience. 

For  four  weeks  already  had  the  besieged  been  con- 
suming their  stores.  To  replace  them  in  some  degree, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  revive  the  spirit  of  the  troops 
by  some  sort  of  action,  the  supreme  commander  decided 
on  fetching  in  all  the  provisions  to  be  found  in  the  vil- 
lages within  the  line  of  blockade,  under  cover  of  the  guns. 

At  noon  on  September  22nd,  Fort  St.  Juhen  opened 
a  heavy  fire  on  the  outposts  of  the  First  Corps  (Ger- 
man). Strong  detachments  of  infantry  next  advanced 
on  the  villages  to  the  east,  di'ove  in  the  pickets,  and 
returned  to  Metz  with  the  stores  they  had  seized.  But 
a  similar  attempt  on  the  villages  to  the  north  was  less 
successful.  Most  of  the  wagons  had  to  return  empty, 
under  the  fire  of  the  Prussian  batteries,  quickly  brought 
into  position  to  receive  them.  At  last,  on  the  27th,  a 
sortie  for  the  same  purpose  was  made  to  the  south- 
ward, which  led  to  a  series  of  small  conflicts,  and  the 
capture  of  a  company,  who  were  surrounded  in  Pelore 
by  a  much  stronger  force.  A  simultaneous  sally  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle  was  baffled  by  the  fire  of 
the  artillery  of  the  besieging  force  which  was  hurried 
to  the  spot. 
11 


162  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

Diedenhof  en,  on  the  north  of  Metz,  had  hitherto  only 
been  kept  under  observation  by  a  small  force,  which 
could  not  hinder  the  garrison  from  scouring  the  country 
as  far  as  the  neighboring  frontier,  taking  many  prison- 
ers, seizing  several  wagon-loads  of  supplies,  and  even 
diverting  a  whole  train  of  provision  trucks  into  the 
fortress  by  the  railway  from  Luxembourg,  which  they 
had  restored. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  Army  of  the  Ehine,  now  distant 
only  a  day's  march,  would  have  found  an  important 
base  in  Metz,  if  the  blockade  could  only  have  been 
broken  through.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  therefore 
took  good  care  to  strengthen  the  investing  lines  to  the 
north,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle.  On  October 
1st  the  Tenth  Corps  took  up  the  position  hitherto  held 
by  Rummer's  Eeserve  Division,  which  was  transferred 
to  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  The  First,  Seventh,  and 
Eighth  closed  up  to  the  right,  and  the  Second  occupied 
the  space  between  the  Seille  and  the  Moselle;  the 
troops  in  front  of  Diedenhofen  were  also  reinforced. 

The  Marshal  had,  in  fact,  once  more  determined  to 
fight  his  way  to  the  northward,  and  on  both  sides  of 
the  river.  New  bridges  were  constructed  behind  St. 
JuHen  and  from  the  Island  of  Chambiere,  the  nearest 
German  outposts  were  driven  off  to  the  west  and  north 
by  a  series  of  daily  skirmishes.  Under  cover  of  the 
fort  guns  the  French  estabHshed  themselves  firmly  in 
Lessy  and  Ladonchamps.  The  troops  who  were  to  be 
left  in  Metz  were  expressly  selected ;  the  others  tested 
as  to  their  marching  powers.  Light-signals  were  ar- 
ranged with  Diedenhofen,  and  all  measures  taken  for 
a  sortie  on  the  7th. 

Then  the  French  commander  suddenly  changed  his 
mind,  and  the  proposed  enterprise  collapsed  into  a 
foraging  party. 


SOKTIES   FROM  METZ.  163 

For  this,  indeed,  large  forces  were  set  in  motion ;  the 
Garde  Voltigeur  Division,  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  the 
Fourth  in  the  woods  of  Woippy.  The  movement  was 
also  to  be  supported  by  the  Third  Corps  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river. 

Four  hundred  wagons  were  in  readiness  to  carry  off 
the  stores  from  the  large  farms  lying  north  of  Ladon- 
champs. 

SOETIE   FROM   METZ   ON  BELLEVUE. 

(October  7th.) 

Although  the  start  from  Woippy,  planned  for  eleven 
o'clock,  was  not  effected  till  one,  the  Landwehr  com- 
panies on  outpost  were  driven  in  by  superior  numbers, 
and  as  they  defended  their  positions  till  their  ammuni- 
tion was  exhausted,  they  also  lost  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  prisoners.  But  the  artillery  of  the  Landwehr 
Division  prevented  the  removal  of  the  stores ;  the  5th 
Division  attacked  the  French  in  flank  and  drove  them 
back  on  Bellevue,  where  a  hot  fire  ensued  on  both 
sides. 

The  French  Third  Corps  had  advanced  by  the  right 
bank  of  the  Moselle  on  Malroy  and  Noisseville.  Here, 
too,  the  outpost  line  retired ;  but  in  their  rear  stood 
the  Tenth  and  the  First  Corps,  ready  for  action.  The 
two  commanders  at  once  perceived  that  this  attack 
was  only  a  feint.  Although  threatened  himself,  Gren- 
eral  von  Voigts-Rhetz  moved  his  brigade,  the  38th, 
across  the  Moselle  at  Argancy  by  half -past  two  to  sup- 
port the  Landwehr  Division,  and  as  General  von  Man- 
teuffel  sent  him  supports  to  Charly,  the  37th  Brigade 
followed. 

No  sooner  had  the  first  reinforcements  arrived  than 
General  von  Kummer  assumed  the  offensive,  seized 


164  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

the  farm  from  the  French  after  a  sharp  struggle,  just 
as  they  were  about  to  retire,  and  then,  supported  on 
the  right  by  a  detachment  of  the  5th  Division,  got  into 
Bellevue  by  about  six  in  the  evening.  Ladonchamps, 
however,  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  The 
19th  Division  and  the  Reserve  advanced  on  this  place 
late  in  the  evening.  The  Castle-yard,  surrounded  by 
a  moat,  was  carefully  intrenched,  and  strongly  de- 
fended by  infantry  and  guns.  The  darkness  precluded 
effective  artillery  action,  and  the  attack  failed ;  but  all 
the  other  points  previously  held  by  the  Germans  had 
been  re-occupied. 

The  day  had  cost  the  Prussians  1700  killed  and 
wounded,  besides  500  reported  missing.  The  French 
loss  was  given  out  to  be  no  more  than  1193. 

This  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  French  might  be 
regarded  as  tentative,  and  preliminary  only  to  a  real 
struggle  to  break  through ;  perhaps  it  was  so  intended. 
The  Grerman  troops  therefore  remained  in  the  positions 
they  had  occupied  at  the  end  of  the  day,  in  expectation 
of  renewed  fighting  on  the  morrow. 

The  forts  did  in  fact  re-open  fire  on  the  farm  build- 
ings early  on  the  8th,  while  the  German  batteries 
directed  theirs  on  Ladonchamps.  Strong  columns  also 
advanced  along  the  right  bank  of  th6  Moselle,  but  no- 
where attempted  a  serious  attack.  The  Prussian 
troops  therefore  presently  retired  to  their  quarters. 

The  artillery  duel  was  carried  on  for  the  next  few 
days,  but  with  diminished  energy.  Constant  rain  made 
all  field  operations  very  difficult  and  increased  the 
sufferings  of  the  men  on  both  sides.  In  Metz  the  lack 
of  victuals  was  becoming  very  painfully  felt.  Even 
on  the  8th  the  Commandant  had  announced  that  his 
stores  would  not  last  more  than  twelve  days.  A  council 
pf  war,  held  on  the  10th,  was,  however,  of  opinion  that 


SOKTIES   FROM  METZ.  165 

the  greatest  service  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  could  do 
to  the  country  was  to  hold  out  as  long  as  possible, 
since  they  thus  kept  a  large  part  of  the  enemy's  forces 
employed  outside  Metz. 

The  Marshal  now  sent  General  Boyer  to  negotiate  at 
Versailles,  but  he  was  to  demand  a  free  exit  for  the 
army  and  emphatically  refuse  the  terms  granted  to 
Sedan. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  Metz  was  perfectly  well  known 
to  the  Germans.  The  number  of  men  who  were  taken 
willing  prisoners  while  digging  potatoes  increased 
every  day.  They  reported  that  riots  had  broken  out 
in  the  city,  in  which  even  the  soldiers  had  taken  part, 
and  that  the  officers  in  command  had  been  compelled 
to  proclaim  the  Republic.  And  when  the  Empress 
had  declared  that  she  would  never  give  her  consent  to 
any  cession  of  French  territory,  no  further  political 
negotiations  were  possible  with  the  Generals  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine. 

On  the  20th  the  distribution  of  stores  came  to  an 
end  within  the  fortress,  and  the  troops  for  the  most 
part  subsisted  on  horse-flesh.  The  original  stock  of 
20,000  horses  was  reduced  by  a  thousand  a  day.  The 
want  of  bread  and  salt  was  severely  felt,  and  the  soaked, 
clayey  ground  made  living  in  camp  almost  unendura- 
ble. 

After  the  failure  of  the  deputation  to  Versailles, 
the  imperative  necessity  of  negotiating  with  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  besieging  army  was  recognized 
by  a  council  of  war  held  on  the  24th. 

The  first  interview  came  to  nothing,  as  the  Marshal 
stiU  stipulated  for  free  egress,  withdi'awing  if  required 
to  Algiers,  or  else  for  an  armistice  and  the  admission 
of  stores.  The  Germans  insisted  on  the  surrender  of 
the  fortress  and  the  march  out  of  the  garrison  as 


166  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

prisoners  of  war,  and  on  these  conditions  the  capitu- 
lation was  signed  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  of 
October. 

THE   CAPITULATION   OF  METZ. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th  the  Prussian  flags  were 
hoisted  on  the  great  outworks  of  Metz.  At  one  o'clock 
the  French  troops  marched  out  by  six  roads  in  perfect 
silence  and  good  marching  order.  At  each  gate  a 
Prussian  army  corps  stood  to  take  the  prisoners,  who 
were  immediately  placed  in  bivouacs  that  had  been 
prepared  for  them,  and  supplied  with  food.  The  offi- 
cers were  allowed  to  keep  their  swords  and  to  return 
to  Metz  for  the  time;  provisions  were  immediately 
sent  in. 

Marshal  Bazaine  set  out  for  Cassel. 

In  the  course  of  the  day  the  26th  Brigade  (German) 
took  up  quarters  in  Metz.  No  injury  had  been  done 
in  the  city,  but  the  state  of  the  camp  showed  what  the 
troops  had  suffered  during  a  siege  of  seventy- two  days. 

The  Germans  during  that  time  had  lost  240  officers 
and  5500  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 

Six  thousand  French  officers  and  167,000  men  were 
taken  prisoners,  besides  20,000  sick  who  could  not  be 
at  once  removed — about  200,000  in  all.  Fifty-six  Im- 
perial eagles,  622  field,  and  2876  fortress-guns,  72 
mitrailleuses,  and  260,000  small  arms  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Germans. 

The  prisoners  were  transferred  by  way  of  Treves 
and  Saarbriicken  under  the  escort  of  Landwehr  bat- 
talions, and  as  these  would  have  also  to  guard  them 
when  on  foreign  soil,  their  return  was  not  to  be  reck- 
oned on. 


III. 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EAST  AND  ON  THE  LOIRE. 

NEW  DISTEIBUTION   OF  THE  AEMY. 

The  capitulation  of  Metz,  which  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  had  brought  about  under  such  serious  diffi- 
culties, had  materially  improved  the  prospects  of  the 
war  for  Germany. 

At  head-quarters  at  Versailles,  even  before  the  catas- 
trophe, but  in  confident  anticipation  of  it,  decisions 
had  been  arrived  at  as  to  the  destination  of  the  forces 
it  would  release  for  service,  and  communicated  to  the 
Commander-in-chief. 

The  First,  Seventh,  and  Eighth  Corps,  with  the  3rd 
Cavalry  Division,  were  henceforth  to  constitute  the 
First  Army,  under  the  command  of  General  von  Man- 
teuffel.  Their  orders  were  to  advance  on  Compiegne 
and  secure  the  blockade  of  Paris  on  the  north.  But 
they  had  other  duties  to  fulfil ;  they  were  to  occupy 
Metz  and  lay  siege  to  Diedenhofen  and  Montmedy. 

The  Second,  Third,  Ninth,  and  Tenth  Corps,  with 
the  1st  Cavalry  Division,  were  to  constitute  the  Second 
Army  under  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  were  or- 
dered to  advance  on  the  Middle  Loire. 

opeeations  of  the  foueteenth  coeps  m  the 

SOUTH-EAST. 

(October.) 

Since  the  faU  of  Strasburg  the  newly-formed  Four- 
teenth Corps  had  been  employed  in  keepmg  up  com- 


168  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

munications  between  the  armies  before  Metz  and  the 
forces  detained  in  blockading  Paris. 

General  von  Werder  had  no  gi'eat  battle  to  look  for- 
ward to,  bnt  a  succession  of  small  engagements.  To 
prepare  each  of  his  four  brigades  for  independent  action 
under  such  circumstances,  he  detailed  cavalry  and 
artillery  to  each. 

In  this  formation  the  corps  crossed  the  Vosges 
Mountains,  by  the  two  roads  past  Schirmeck  and  Barr, 
driving  swarms  of  French  franctireurs  out  of  the  nar- 
row passes  without  great  loss  of  time.  But  on  emerg- 
ing from  the  highlands  they  at  once  met  with  serious 
opposition. 

General  Cambriels  had  been  at  Epinal  with  about 
30,000  men  ever  since  the  beginning  of  October,  and 
under  cover  of  this  force  several  battalions  of  National 
Guards  and  Gardes  Mobiles  had  been  formed  in  the 
south  of  France. 

On  the  6th,  General  von  Degenfeld,  with  the  ad- 
vanced guard  of  the  Baden  contingent,  marched  up  to 
St.  Die  by  both  banks  of  the  Meurthe.  The  column 
was  a  weak  one  and  beset  on  all  sides  by  far  superior 
forces,  yet  after  repeated  attacks  it  succeeded  in  taking 
the  villages  held  by  the  French. 

The  struggle,  which  lasted  seven  hburs,  ended  with 
the  eccentric  retreat  of  the  enemy  on  Rambervillers 
and  Bruyeres.  It  had  cost  the  Germans  400  and  the 
French  1400  men.  The  Baden  Division  bivouacked  on 
the  field,  and  then  found  that  the  French  had  aban- 
doned St.  Die. 

General  Cambriels  had,  in  fact,  collected  all  the  forces 
at  his  disposal  in  intrenched  positions  at  Bruyeres. 
The  Baden  Brigade  advanced  on  these  on  the  11th, 
drove  the  Guards  Mobiles  and  volunteers  out  of  the 
villages  in  front  of  it,  climbed  the  hills  on  each  side  of 


FIGHTING  ON   THE  MEUETHE.  169 

the  town,  and  forced  their  way  into  the  town  with 
inconsiderable  loss.  The  French  retired  to  the  south- 
ward, on  Remiremont. 

From  the  small  resistance  made  by  the  enemy, 
though  so  far  superior  in  numbers,  Greneral  von  Werder 
supposed  that  they  would  hardly  make  a  stand  before 
reaching  Besancjon,  so  he  immediately  ordered  a  cessa- 
tion of  pursuit,  though  somewhat  early  in  the  day,  and 
concentrated  his  forces  on  Epinal,  which  was  taken  by 
the  Germans  after  a  short  fight.  From  thence  depots 
were  established,  and  telegraph  lines  opened  to  Lune- 
ville  and  Nancy,  magazines  were  formed,  and  the  bag- 
gage trains,  which  had  followed  the  corps  from  Zabern 
by  Blamont  to  Baccarat,  were  brought  up.  The  rail- 
way by  the  bank  of  the  Moselle  remained  useless  for  a 
long  time,  in  consequence  of  its  demolition  by  the 
French. 

General  von  Werder  was  now  anxious  to  obey  the 
instructions  he  had  received  on  September  30th  to 
march  by  Neuf  chateau,  on  the  Upper  Seine,  but  a  tele- 
gram from  head-quarters  instructed  him  first  to  rout 
the  enemy  near  him  under  General  Cambriels. 

The  corps  accordingly  marched  forthwith  on  Vesoul, 
via  Conflans  and  Luxeuil,  and  learnt  that  the  French 
had  halted  at  the  Ognon,  taken  up  quarters  there,  and 
received  reinforcements. 

General  von  Werder  determined  to  attack  at  once. 
He  ordered  that  the  passages  over  the  river  should  be 
secured  on  the  22nd  of  October ;  further  decisions  were 
postponed  till  the  reports  should  be  brought  in. 

The  1st  Baden  Brigade  came  up  on  the  right  by  nine 
o'clock,  reaching  Marnay  and  Pin  without  having  en- 
countered the  French ;  they  secured  the  bridges,  and 
then  halted  according  to  orders. 

On  the  left  wing,  the  franctireurs  were  driven  out 


170  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

of  the  wood  by  the  3rd  Brigade,  which  also  stormed 
Perrouse,  and  at  about  half -past  two  seized  the  bridge 
over  the  Ognon  at  Voray. 

In  the  centre  the  van-guard  of  the  2nd  Brigade 
entered  Etuz  after  a  slight  skirmish,  but  had  to  retire 
at  eleven  o'clock  to  the  northern  bank,  before  the 
enemy's  flank  attack  from  out  of  the  woods.  After- 
wards, when  the  main  force  came  up  and  the  artillery 
opened  fire,  the  place  was  taken  for  the  second  time. 
But  a  prolonged  firing  ensued,  the  French  making  an 
obstinate  stand  in  front  of  the  passage  over  the  river 
at  Cussey. 

Before  this,  indeed,  orders  had  been  dispatched  to 
the  1st  Brigade  to  move  up  on  the  southern  bank  from 
Pin  in  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  But  they  only 
reached  the  ground  at  six  o'clock,  when  the  battle  was 
over.  When  two  batteries  had  swept  the  bridge  over 
the  Ognon  with  a  heavy  fire,  the  French  hastily  retired, 
pursued  by  the  Baden  men ;  they  were  again  driven 
out  of  their  positions  to  the  rear,  but  when  night  fell 
still  remained  in  possession  of  several  posts  in  front 
of  Besan(;on. 

The  Germans  had  lost  120  men,  the  French  150  and 
200  prisoners.  In  opposition  to  G-ambetta,  who  was 
himself  at  Besangon,  General  Cambriel-s  positively  re- 
fused to  renew  the  advance,  and  would  only  consent 
to  maintain  his  strong  position  under  the  walls  of  the 
fortress. 

Parties  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  on  the  right  reported 
the  presence  of  French  forces  at  Dole  and  Auxonne, 
the  van-guard  probably  of  an  Army  of  the  Vosges 
under  Garibaldi,  which  was  assembling  on  the  Doubs. 
General  von  Werder  disregarded  it,  and  on  the  26th 
moved  his  corps  to  Dampierre  and  Gray. 

Beyond  the  Saone  all  the  roads  were  broken  up,  the 


FIGHTING  ON   THE  MEUETHE.  171 

woods  choked  with  abatis,  and  the  whole  population 
in  arms.  But  the  franctireurs  and  Grardes  Mobiles 
were  dispersed  without  difficulty,  and  a  column  march- 
ing without  any  precautions  was  driven  back  on  the 
Vingeanne,  where  15  officers  and  430  men  laid  down 
their  arms. 

From  further  reports  and  the  information  of  the 
prisoners  it  was  known  that  Dijon  was  strongly  gar- 
risoned. In  expectation,  therefore,  of  an  attack  from 
that  side,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  (German)  assembled 
behind  the  Vingeanne,  whence,  early  on  October  30th, 
General  von  Beyer  marched  on  Dijon  with  the  1st  and 
3rd  Brigades. 

Filled  with  apprehension  by  recent  events,  the  Na- 
tional Guard  in  Dijon  had  already  laid  down  their 
arms,  the  Gardes  Mobiles  and  troops  of  the  line  had 
retreated  to  the  southwards ;  still  the  inhabitants  were 
assured  that  the  forces  would  be  brought  back  to 
defend  them.  About  8000  men  were  on  the  spot,  but 
they  insisted  on  their  General  pledging  himself  to  fight 
only  outside  the  walls. 

The  advanced  posts  on  the  Tille  were  driven  in  by 
the  advanced  guard  of  the  Baden  contingent ;  the  vil- 
lage of  St.  Apollinaire  and  the  neighboring  heights 
were  taken  with  a  rush  at  noon,  in  spite  of  a  hot  fire. 
Meanwhile  the  main  body  (German)  had  come  up,  and 
by  three  o'clock  six  batteries  had  opened  fire.  The 
vineyards  and  various  enclosures  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Dijon,  and  especially  the  park  to  the  south,  which 
was  strongly  barricaded,  gave  the  defence  a  great 
advantage.  Nevertheless,  the  Baden  infantry  moved 
steadily  forward  and  closed  in  on  the  northern  and 
eastern  suburbs  by  a  wide  encircling  movement. 

On  this  side  a  fierce  combat  ensued,  in  which  the 
populace  took  part.    House  after  house  had  to  be 


172  THE  FEANCO-GEBMAN   WAE. 

stormed,  but  the  attack  came  to  a  standstill  at  the 
deep  river-bed  of  the  Suzon,  which  borders  the  city 
itself  on  the  east.  It  was  four  o'clock,  and  the  struggle 
could  not  be  ended  before  dark.  General  von  Beyer 
therefore  broke  it  off ;  the  battahons  were  withdrawn, 
and  retired  to  quarters  in  the  adjacent  hamlets ;  only 
the  artillery  kept  up  its  fire. 

The  Germans  had  lost  about  150  and  the  French  100 
men ;  but  200  French  were  taken  prisoners. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  a  deputation  came  out  to 
beg  that  the  town  might  be  spared ;  they  undertook  to 
furnish  supplies  for  20,000  men,  and  to  guarantee  the 
neutrality  of  the  inhabitants. 

The  Baden  brigades  took  possession  of  Dijon  on  the 
31st. 

Meanwhile  fresh  instructions  had  reached  General 
von  Werder.  He  was  to  cover  the  left  flank  of  the 
Second  Army  advancing  to  the  Loire  to  protect  both 
Alsace  and  the  troops  besieging  Belfort,  where  two 
reserve  divisions  had  now  arrived.  The  Fourteenth 
Corps,  while  occupying  Dijon,  was  to  retire  to  Vesoul 
and  check  the  gathering  of  French  troops  round  Be- 
sangon  and  at  Langres.  Some  offensive  movement  on 
Chalons  and  Dole  was  also  insisted  on.^  The  difficulty 
of  General  von  Werder's  position  was  not  fully  appre- 
ciated at  Versailles.  At  Besan^on  alone  there  were 
45,000  French,  under  the  command  of  a  new  leader, 
General  Crouzat.  Garibaldi  had  collected  12,000  be- 
tween Dole  and  Auxonne ;  lower  down  the  Saone  valley 
a  fresh  corps  was  forming  of  18,000  men,  and  12,000 
National  Guards  and  Gardes  Mobiles  threatened  the 
flank  of  the  isolated  German  Corps  from  Langres. 

But  the  French,  instead  of  attacking  this  division 
with  overwhelming  numbers — spread  out  as  it  was 
over  a  distance  of  twelve  miles  (German)  from  Lure  to 


THE  FEONTIER  FORTS.  173 

Dijon  and  Grray — were  haunted  by  a  fear  that  the  Ger- 
mans, reinforced  from  Metz,  might  be  planning  an 
attack  on  Lyons.  Greneral  Cronzat,  leaving  a  strong 
garrison  in  Besan^on,  consequently  marched  on 
Chagny,  where,  on  November  12th,  he  was  reinforced 
by  50,000  men  from  the  south.  Graribaldi's  volunteers 
moved  up  to  Autun  to  protect  Bourges. 

General  von  Werder  meanwhile  had  occupied  Vesoul, 
and  the  town  was  fortified  on  the  southern  side. 

The  only  event  of  importance  which  remains  to  be 
mentioned,  in  October,  was  the  attack  on  the  French 
forts  in  the  rear  of  the  German  army. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  month  the  newly  constituted 
4th  Reserve  Division,  of  fifteen  battalions,  eight  squad- 
rons, thirty  guns,  and  a  company  of  sappers  and 
miners,  had  assembled  at  Baden,  and  crossed  the  Rhine 
at  Neuenburg. 

The  neighborhood  was  first  cleared  of  franctireurs, 
Mulhouse  was  occupied,  and,  by  the  desire  of  the 
municipal  authorities,  the  excited  inhabitants,  all  fac- 
tory hands,  were  disarmed. 

General  von  Schmeling  was  instructed  to  besiege 
Neu-Breisach  and  Schlettstadt,  and  at  once  sent  one  of 
his  brigades  to  invest  each  of  these  places.  On  October 
7th  the  East  Prussian  Landwehr  invested  Breisach,  and 
the  field  batteries  shelled  the  town,  but  without  effect. 
The  other  brigade,  after  dropping  some  necessary  de- 
tachments, reached  Schlettstadt  with  a  small  force, 
but  was  supported  by  troops  from  the  depots  along  the 
road,  so  that  8  battalions,  2  squadrons,  and  2  batteries 
invested  the  place.  At  the  same  time  12  companies  of 
fortress-artillery  and  4  companies  of  pioneers  arrived 
from  Strasburg  with  the  necessary  siege  materiel,  and 
a  park  of  fifty-six  heavy  guns  was  established  at  St. 
put ;  the  Engineers'  park  was  located  at  Kinzheim. 


174  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN   WAK. 

TAKING   OF   SCHLETTSTADT. 

(October  24tli.) 

At  the  beginning  of  the  blockade,  inundations  and 
marsh  land  rendered  Schlettstadt  unapproachable  on 
the  east  and  south,  and  partly  on  the  north.  The  place 
itseK  was  impregnable,  with  high  walls  and  a  wet  ditch, 
armed  with  120  guns  and  garrisoned  with  only  2000 
men,  for  the  most  part  Gardes  Mobiles.  They  lacked 
casemates,  and  on  the  west  front  the  vineyards  and 
hedgerows  favored  a  close  attack,  while  the  railway 
embankment  was  a  ready-made  parapet  for  the  first 
parallel. 

To  divert  the  attention  of  the  besieged  from  this 
front,  a  battery  was  constructed  on  the  20th  at  the 
Kappel  Mills  on  the  south-east,  from  which  fire  was 
opened  on  the  barracks  and  magazines,  and  on  the 
sluice  which  prevented  the  inundations. 

When,  by  the  evening  of  the  21st,  the  infantry  posts 
had  advanced  to  within  400  paces  of  the  glacis,  the 
construction  of  the  first  parallel  was  proceeded  with 
that  night,  behind  the  railway,  and  six  batteries  were 
placed  at  only  1000  metres  from  the  ramparts. 

The  garrison  fired  in  the  dark  on  the  entire  zone  of 
attack,  but  almost  without  effect.  By  the  morning 
the  trenches  were  two  feet  wide  and  three  and  a  half 
feet  deep,  and  20  heavy  guns  and  8  mortars  were  ready 
to  open  fire. 

A  hot  artillery  duel  now  began  with  the  fortress, 
which  replied  very  steadily.  The  battery  at  the  Mills 
did  very  perceptible  execution  by  its  reverse  fire  against 
the  west  front,  and  several  guns  and  embrasures  were 
severely  damaged.  The  town  was  fired  at  several 
points,  and  the  defenders'  fire  gradually  ceased. 

During   the    night,   which  was   very   stormy,   the 


TAKING  OF   SCHLETTSTADT.  175 

attacking  batteries  kept  up  their  fire,  the  parallel  was 
widened,  and  two  new  batteries  were  begun. 

But  at  daybreak  on  the  2'4th  the  white  flag  was  seen 
flying,  and  a  capitulation  forthwith  signed,  by  which 
the  town  surrendered  with  its  garrison  and  all  its  stores. 
The  Commandant  begged  the  Germans  to  take  posses- 
sion at  once,  as  the  greatest  disorder  reigned  within 
the  town.  The  public  buildings  were  being  plundered 
by  the  mob  and  drunken  soldiery,  and  a  powder  maga- 
zine was  on  the  point  of  being  blown  up.  The  German 
battahons  promptly  restored  order,  extinguished  the 
flames,  and  led  away  the  prisoners. 

Seven  thousand  stand  of  arms  fell  into  theii'  hands, 
besides  the  fort  artillery  and  a  large  quantity  of  stores. 
The  siege  had  only  cost  the  Germans  twenty  men. 

Schlettstadt  was  occupied  by  the  depot  troops,  and 
the  battalions  released  from  that  duty  retired  into 
South  Alsace,  three  of  them  strengthening  and  com- 
pleting the  blockade  of  Breisach. 

TAKING   OF   BEEISACH. 

(November  10th.) 

This  fortress,  lying  in  the  plain  and  of  very  sym- 
metrical construction,  was  surrounded  by  dry  ditches 
of  solid  masonry,  and  not  to  be  taken  by  a  surprise. 
The  garrison  of  about  5000  men  had  well-protected 
quarters  in  the  bomb-proof  casemates  of  the  ravelins. 
Fort  Mortier,  standing  near  the  Rhine,  and  constructed 
for  an  independent  defence,  effectually  commanded  the 
ground  whence  the  intended  attack  must  be  made  on 
the  north-west  front  of  the  fortress.  To  this  end  12 
heavy  guns  were  brought  up  from  Rastatt  to  Alt- 
Breisach,  where  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine  commands 
the  fort  at  effective  vicinity. 


176  THE  FEAXCO-GEEMAN  W-\E. 

It  was  not  till  the  end  of  October  that  the  siege-guns 
aiTived  at  Alt-Breisach  from  Sehlettstadt,  and  as  soon 
as  the  infantiy  had  advanced  closer  to  the  place,  and 
all  ^^reparations  were  complete,  fii-e  was  opened  on  the 
fortress  on  November  2nd  from  Wolfganzen,  Biesheim, 
and  Alt-Breisach,  m  all  24  hea^y  guns. 

By  thi-ee  o'clock  a  large  part  of  the  town  was  in 
flames,  and  detachments  of  infantiy  were  engaged 
hand-to-hand  with  the  Fi-ench  posts  at  the  foot  of  the 
glacis.  Fort  Mortier  had  suffered  severely;  still,  an 
attempt  to  storm  it  was  repulsed,  but  at  six  o'clock  it 
capitulated,  lying  almost  in  mins.  Only  one  gun  re- 
mained in  serviceable  condition. 

Two  mortar  batteries  were  erected  to  shell  the  main 
work,  the  defence  was  now  more  feeble,  and  on  No- 
vember 10th  Breisach  surrendered  on  the  same  terms 
as  Sehlettstadt,  but  the  garrison  was  allowed  to  march 
out  with  all  the  honors  of  war. 

The  fortress  was  almost  uninjui'ed,  but  the  town  was 
for  the  most  part  buimt  down  or  badly  damaged.  The 
GeiTQans  had  lost  only  70  men ;  108  guns,  6000  smaU 
arms,  and  large  quantities  of  stores  fell  into  their  hands. 
While  these  strongholds  in  Alsace-Lorraine  were 
thus  reduced  by  the  Germans,  Verdun  still  intercepte(^ 
the  line  of  railway  which  formed  thfe  shortest  line  of 
communication  with  Oermany. 

TAKING   OF   VEEDUN. 

(November  9th.) 

This  place  too  was  made  impregnable  by  high  waUs 
and  deep  moats ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  sur- 
rounded by  hiUs  which  commanded  and  defiladed  it,  and 
at  the  foot  of  these  hills  villages  and  ^dneyards  favored 
an  approach  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  outworks. 


TAKING  OF  VEEDUN.  177 

It  was  armed  with  140  gnns  and  abundantly  vict- 
ualled, and  the  gan-ison,  which  had  been  supplemented 
by  escaped  prisoners,  was  6000  sti-ong.  A  bombard- 
ment by  field-artillery  had  ah*eady  proved  perfectly 
ineif  ectual.  For  a  long  time  Verdun  was  only  under 
observation,  at  fii'st  by  cavalry,  and  aftei^wards  by  a 
small  mixed  force.  At  the  end  of  September  the  65th 
Eegiment  and  12  companies  of  the  Landwehr  were 
collected  under  G-eneral  von  Gayl  before  the  east  front. 
It  was  not  tin  October  7th  that  2  companies  of  forti-ess- 
artillery  came  up,  with  some  French  guns  of  position 
from  Toul  and  Sedan.  The  infantiy  now  advanced  to 
within  a  few  hundred  paces  of  the  west  and  north 
fronts  and  there  took  up  a  position.  Under  this  cover 
the  construction  of  the  batteries  was  begun  on  the 
evening  of  October  12th. 

The  soppy  state  of  the  ground  after  heavy  rain,  and 
the  rocky  subsoil,  very  thinly  covered,  made  the  work 
uncommonly  difficult,  yet  by  next  moiTiing  fifty-two 
guns  could  open  fii-e.  But  the  fortress  rephed  with 
such  effect  that  before  noon  two  G-emian  batteries  were 
silenced  on  the  C6te-de-Hayvaux  to  the  west. 

In  the  coui'se  of  this  thi-ee  days'  artillery  duel,  15 
Grerman  guns  were  placed  out  of  action,  the  aitillery 
lost  60  men,  and  the  infantry  40.  The  disabled  guns 
on  the  walls  were  constantly  replaced  by  fresh  ones. 

The  gai'rison,  who  were  far  stronger  than  the  be- 
siegers, now  assumed  the  offensive.  Dui'ing  the  stormy 
night  of  the  19th-20th,  the  pickets  on  the  hiU  of  Hay- 
vaux  were  overpowered,  and  all  the  guns  spiked.  On 
the  2Sth  a  stronger  sortie  was  made.  The  French 
swarmed  up  Mont-St.-Miehel  to  the  north,  destroyed 
the  breast-works  and  casemates  of  the  batteries,  from 
which,  however,  the  guns  had  been  run  back.  Another 
party  stormed  Hayvaux,  and  as  the  soaked  state  of 
12 


178  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

the  ground  prevented  the  guns  from  being  withdi-awn, 
they  were  all  totally  disabled.  The  villages  in  the 
neighborhood  were  also  occupied  by  the  French. 

It  was  now  self-evident  that  the  means  hitherto 
brought  to  bear  on  the  reduction  of  Verdun  were  quite 
inadequate.  But  on  the  surrender  of  Metz  the  First 
Army  was  able  to  send  up  reinforcements.  At  the  end 
of  the  month  5  battalions  and  2  companies  of  pioneers 
and  several  of  artillery  arrived,  bringing  with  them 
Grerman  materiel. 

The  siege-park  now  had  102  guns  and  abundant 
ammunition,  so  preparations  were  at  once  made  for  a 
regular  attack. 

But  for  this  the  garrison  did  not  wait.  After  an 
armistice  had  been  granted,  the  place  capitulated  on 
November  8th,  and  the  garrison,  with  exception  of  the 
local  National  Guards,  were  taken  prisoners.  The 
officers  were  dismissed  with  their  swords  on  parole, 
and  it  was  agreed  that  the  materiel  in  store  should  be 
restored  on  peace  being  concluded. 

THE    ADVANCE     OF    THE    FIRST    AND    SECOND     ARMIES     IN 

NOVEMBER. 

When  the  First  Army  had  been  ordered  to  reinforce 
the  siege  of  Mezieres  the  1st  Infantry  Division  ad- 
vanced on  that  place,  the  3rd  Brigade  was  sent  forward 
by  railway  to  Soissons,  and  on  November  15th  invested 
the  small  fortress  of  La-Fere.  The  rest  of  the  First 
Corps  reached  Rethel  on  the  same  day.  The  Eighth 
arrived  at  Rheims,  and  the  3rd  Cavahy  Division  at 
Tagnon,  between  the  two.  The  Seventh  Corps  was 
still  fully  engaged  in  guarding  the  prisoners  and  in 
investing  Diedenhofen  and  Montmedy. 

Of  the  Second  Army,  the  Ninth  Corps  and  1st  Cav- 
alry Division  had  reached  Troyes  by  the  10th,  the 


THE   ADVANCE   OF  THE  GERMANS.  179 

Third  had  got  to  Vendeuvi^e,  the  Tenth  to  Neuf  chateau 
and  Chaumont.  The  important  railway  junctions 
there  and  at  Bologne  were  occupied,  and  the  demohtion 
of  the  hue  to  Blesme  was  repaired,  so  as  to  open  new 
communications.  The  health  of  the  Grerman  forces 
had  improved  conspicuously  dui-ing  a  series  of  short 
marches  along  good  roads  with  abundant  supplies ;  but 
a  telegram  from  Versailles  now  ordered  a  hasty  ad- 
vance. 

The  Government  in  Paris  being  helpless,  the  Dele- 
gates at  Tours  were  displaying  increased  activity. 
Gambetta,  as  Minister  both  of  War  and  of  the  Interior, 
was  exercising  the  power  almost  of  a  Dictator,  and  the 
warlike  energy  of  this  remarkable  man  had  achieved 
the  feat  of  placing  600,000  soldiers  and  1400  guns  in 
the  field  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks. 

In  the  Arrondissements  the  National  Guards  were 
formed  into  companies  and  ba,ttalions;  then  in  each 
Department  formed  into  brigades;  and  finally  they 
were  amalgamated  with  the  troops  of  the  hne  and 
Gardes  Mobiles  into  stiU  larger  bodies. 

Thus,  in  the  course  of  October,  a  new  Seventeenth 
Corps  took  up  a  position  at  Blois,  another,  the  Eight- 
eenth, at  Gien,  and  a  third,  under  Admiral  Jaures,  at 
Nogent-le-Rotrou ;  then*  movements  being  protected 
by  General  d'AureUe  de  Paladines,  whose  troops  had 
recrossed  the  Loire.  A  large  force  was  in  Picardy 
under  General  Bourbaki,  another  at  Rouen  under 
Briand,  and  a  third  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine  under 
Fiereck. 

The  detachments  of  the  German  investing  army, 
which  were  pushed  forward  to  the  south,  west,  and 
north,  met  on  all  sides  strong  forces  of  the  enemy, 
which  they  had  indeed  repulsed  in  many  small  en- 
counters, but  could  not  follow  up  to  the  bases.    For 


180  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

this  the  arrival  of  the  army  released  from  the  siege  of 
Metz  was  needed,  and  this  was  not  to  be  looked  for 
before  some  time  in  November,  while  a  general  advance 
on  Paris  of  all  the  French  forces  in  the  month  of  Octo- 
ber looked  imminent. 

In  consideration  of  the  inferior  strength  of  General 
von  der  Tann's  division,  now  holding  Orleans,  at  the 
council  of  war  held  at  Tours  it  was  decided  to  seize 
that  important  place.  The  attack  was  to  be  chiefly 
delivered  from  the  west.  The  French  Fifteenth  Corps 
— two  divisions  and  one  cavalry  division — -therefore 
assembled  at  Mer,  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Lower 
Loire,  and  the  main  body  of  the  Sixteenth  behind  the 
forest  of  Marchenoir.  The  remainder  of  the  two  corps 
were  to  support  the  attack  by  Gien  on  the  Upper  Loire. 
Any  further  advance  was  not  projected,  at  any  rate 
for  the  present ;  on  the  contrary.  General  d'Aurelle's 
instructions  were  to  form  an  intrenched  camp  at  Or- 
leans for  200,000  men. 

General  von  der  Tann's  reconnoitring  parties  to  the 
westward  everywhere  met  detachments  of  the  French, 
which  were  indeed  driven  back  in  various  skirmishes 
on  the  woods  of  Marchenoir,  and  without  much  diffi- 
culty, but  which  betrayed  the  vicinity  of  large  forces. 
On  the  whole,  an  attack  on  the  investing  army  on  the 
south-west  of  Paris  seemed  the  likeliest  event,  since 
this  would  imperil  both  the  German  head-quarters  in 
Versailles  and  the  siege-park  at  Villacoublay ;  and  the 
German  reinforcements  from  the  east  would  be  longest 
in  reaching  the  scene  of  the  struggle. 

The  French  forces  to  the  west  of  Orleans  were  already 
extended  over  a  wide  stretch  of  country  from  Beau- 
gency  to  Chateaudun.  The  volunteers  grew  bolder 
every  day,  and  the  people  more  hostile. 

At  last,  to  get  some  more  accurate  information,  Count 


THE  AEMIES  ON  THE  LOIKE.  181 

Stolberg,  on  November  7th,  made  a  reconnoissance  in 
force.  Three  regiments  of  the  2nd  Cavahy  Division, 
two  batteries,  and  a  few  companies  of  Bavarian  in- 
fantry marched  by  Ouzouer  and  drove  the  enemy  out 
of  Marolles,  but  they  found  the  skirt  of  the  forest 
strongly  defended. 

General  Chanzy  had  his  immediately  available  troops 
sent  to  St.  Laurent-des-Bois.  A  sharp  fij'e  ensued, 
lasting  about  haK  an  hour,  which  proved  very  fatal  to 
the  Bavarian  infantry ;  and  then,  as  the  great  superi- 
ority of  the  French  was  evident,  the  Q-ermans  retired. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  both  the  French  corps  were 
already  in  full  retreat  on  Orleans.  On  the  8th  they 
held  the  wood,  with  their  right  wing  occupying  Messas 
and  Meung,  their  left  Ouzouer.  The  Fifteenth  Corps 
was  then  to  proceed  to  the  Mauve  and  the  Sixteenth 
to  Coulmiers.  Their  van-guards  were  at  Bardon  and 
Charsonville  respectively.  Both  the  French  cavalry 
divisions  were  marching  northward  on  Prenouvellon 
to  outflank  the  Bavarian  right  wing,  with  a  force  of 
ten  regiments,  six  batteries,  and  several  hundred  volun- 
teers, thus  cutting  off  its  retreat  on  Paris. 

To  meet  this  the  Bavarian  Cuirassiers  started  for  St. 
Peravy,  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division  for  Baccon,  and, 
further  south,  the  2nd  Bavarian  Infantry  Division 
advanced  from  Orleans  on  Huisseau  and  St.  Ay. 

But  an  attack  was  threatening  the  German  rear  from 
the  considerable  force  at  Gien.  It  was  the  last  moment 
in  which  they  could  hope  to  extricate  themselves  from 
so  critical  a  position ;  General  von  der  Tann  issued  the 
necessary  orders  that  same  evening.  However  desir- 
able it  might  be  to  keep  possession  of  Orleans,  he 
could  not  accept  battle  in  such  thickly  wooded  country, 
which  would  so  seriously  impede  the  efficiency  of  his 
relatively  strong  artillery  and  cavalry,  and  where  he 


182  THE  FBANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

might  easily  be  hemmed  in.  The  Greneral,  however, 
determined  to  meet  the  most  immediately  threatening 
hostile  force  in  the  open  ground  by  Coulmiers,  by 
which  he  would  be  nearer  to  the  22nd  Division  at 
Chartres,  and  could  call  on  it  for  support. 

Even  before  this  Greneral  von  Wittich  had  asked  and 
obtained  permission  to  retire  on  Orleans,  but  on  the 
9th  he  had  only  reached  Voves,  with  his  cavalry  at 
Orgeres ;  thus  he  could  not  take  any  direct  part  in  that 
day's  fighting. 

The  Second  Army  was  still  on  the  march  from  Metz, 
and  on  this  day  its  van  had  but  just  arrived  at  Troyes. 

ENGAGEMENT  AT  COULMTEES. 

(November  9th.) 

Left  thus  to  its  own  resources,  the  First  Bavarian 
Corps  struck  camp  in  the  night,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  9th  had  formed  on  a  narrow  front  on  the  skirt 
of  the  wood  between  Chateau  Montpipeau  and  Rosieres, 
with  the  village  of  Coulmiers  in  front.  The  Bavarian 
Cuirassiers  on  the  right  wing  protected  the  retreat  at 
St.  Sigismond,  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division  was  posted 
in  brigades  along  the  front,  with  detachments  well  in 
advance  and  infantry  posts  ready  in  support.  Only  a 
small  detachment  remained  in  Orleans  after  the  bridge 
over  the  Loiret  had  been  destroyed,  to  protect  the 
numerous  sick  and  wounded  in  the  field  hospitals,  and 
occupy  the  city,  at  any  rate,  till  the  fight  was  decided. 

The  first  reports  brought  in  that  morning  were  of 
the  advance  of  a  strong  column  of  French  from  Cra- 
vant,  on  Fontaines  and  Le-Bardou.  This  was  Rebil- 
lard's  brigade,  which,  as  it  seemed,  meant  to  turn  the 
Bavarian  flank  and  march  on  Orleans.  To  oppose  it 
on  the  bank  of  the  Mauve,  General  von  der  Tann,  at 


BATTLE   OF   COULMIEES.  183 

about  nine  o'clock,  sent  the  3rd  Brigade  in  a  southerly- 
direction  to  Prefort,  about  half  a  mile  distant,  and  as 
at  the  same  time  a  sharp  contest  had  begun  at  the 
outposts  near  Baccon,  the  1st  Brigade  marched  to  La 
Renardiere.  The  remainder  of  the  corps  were  left  in 
and  behind  Coulmiers.  The  General's  intention  was 
to  assume  the  offensive  at  this  point,  by  attacking 
the  French  left  flank  if,  as  seemed  probable,  the  enemy 
should  direct  his  chief  attack  on  the  passage  of  the 
Mauve.  To  this  end,  also,  the  cavalry  of  the  right 
German  wing  was  ordered  to  retire  on  Coulmiers. 

But  the  superior  strength  of  the  French  allowed  of 
their  reconnoitring  much  further  to  the  left.  While 
General  d'Aurelle  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps  detained 
the  Bavarians  to  the  south  of  the  road  from  Ouzouer 
to  Orleans,  General  Chanzy  advanced  with  Barry's 
division  against  their  centre  and  caused  Jaureguiber- 
ry's  to  attack  their  right;  and  the  strong  force  of 
cavalry  under  General  Reyan  took  the  road  to  Patay, 
thus  threatening  the  communications  with  Paris. 

This  movement  of  the  French  Sixteenth  Corps  com- 
pelled General  von  der  Tann,  at  the  very  beginning  of 
the  engagement,  to  dispatch  the  2nd  Brigade,  which 
had  been  his  reserve,  to  prolong  his  right  wing  to  the 
northwards  towards  Champs,  thus  obtaining  touch 
with  the  4th  Cavalry  Brigade.  The  Bavarian  Cuiras- 
siers, retiring  according  to  orders  from  St.  Peravy  to 
the  southward,  by  eleven  o'clock  came  up  with  Reyan's 
cavalry,  which,  however,  was  content  with  a  mere 
cannonade. 

Meanwhile  the  advanced  posts  of  the  Bavarians  had 
been  driven  in  by  the  enemy's  superior  numbers.  The 
1st  Jager  Battalion  in  Baccon  retreated  on  La-Riviere, 
after  hampering  the  advance  of  the  French  horse  bat- 
teries past  Champdry  for  some  httle  time.    It  was  here 


184  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

joined  by  the  2nd  Battalion ;  but  these  were  presently 
in  difficulties.  Peytavin's  division  had  closely  pursued 
them  past  Baccon,  brought  five  batteries  up  on  La- 
Riviere,  and  then  attacked  the  burning  village  from 
three  sides  at  once.  After  a  stout  resistance,  the 
Jagers  retired  in  good  order  on  Renardiere  to  join  the 
1st  Brigade,  where  General  Diett  had  taken  up  a  posi- 
tion for  defence. 

When,  after  abandoning  Baccon,  Barry's  division 
had  continued  its  march  past  Champdiy,  its  batteries 
deployed  opposite  Coulmiers  and  in  front  of  Saintry, 
preparing  for  the  attack  by  strong  ranks  of  tirailleurs. 

The  4th  Bavarian  Brigade  occupied  the  park,  extend- 
ing to  the  west ;  the  stone  bridge  further  in  front  was 
held  by  two  battalions,  two  others  were  sent  to  the 
right,  to  the  farmsteads  of  Ormeteau  and  Vaui'ichard, 
so  as  to  keep  up  some  sort  of  communication  with  the 
2nd  Brigade.  One  battery  to  the  south  and  foui'  to 
the  north  of  Coulmiers  were  protected  by  the  5th 
Cavalry  Brigade. 

Thus,  at  noon,  the  Bavarian  Corps  was  spread  out 
over  a  mile  of  ground,  from  Renardiere  to  the  front  of 
Gemigny,  with  only  three  brigades.  But  as  the  French 
right  wing  remained  inactive,  the  br|_gade  dispatched 
to  Prefort  was  ordered  back  to  Renardiere. 

When  the  French  Corps  had  taken  up  a  position 
opposite  the  thin  Bavarian  line,  they  attacked  in  ear- 
nest, at  about  one  o'clock. 

The  Jagers  had  indeed  repulsed  the  enemy's  first 
rush  on  Renardiere,  but  this  position  was  no  longer 
tenable  with  only  four  battalions  against  the  whole  of 
Peytavin's  division.  At  about  one  o'clock  General  von 
Diett  retired  unmolested,  under  cover  of  an  intermedi- 
ate position  between  two  detachments,  on  the  wood  of 
Montpipeau  and  occupied  its  border.    Here  he  was 


BATTLE  OF  COULMIEES.  185 

joined  by  the  3rd  Brigade,  which,  had  advanced  from 
Pref ort,  and  found  Renardiere  ah'eady  evacuated.  The 
French  had  pursued,  but  timidly,  and  now  found  them- 
selves under  fire  from  six  batteries  between  the  end  of 
the  wood  at  La-Planche  and  Coulmiers,  so  their  right 
wing  advanced  no  further. 

In  the  centre  Barry's  division,  at  about  this  time, 
had  driven  the  Bavarian  Jiigers  out  of  the  stone  quar- 
ries in  front  of  Coulmiers.  Not  till  three  o'clock  did  it 
advance  to  a  renewed  general  attack  on  the  4th  Brigade, 
which,  however,  was  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  the  German 
guns  and  the  repeated  charges  of  the  5th  Cavalry 
Brigade. 

Meanwhile,  d' Aries'  brigade  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
(French),  after  leaving  Renardiere,  arrived  to  the  south 
of  Coulmiers,  and  its  batteries  also  opened  fire  on  that 
place.  The  Bavarian  guns  were  compelled,  before  the 
rush  of  the  French  tirailleurs,  to  come  into  action  fui'- 
ther  in  the  rear,  while  the  infantry  drove  the  French 
out  of  the  park  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet. 

But  after  four  hours'  fighting  this  single  brigade 
could  scarcely  hold  out  against  three  French  brigades. 
Of  the  whole  corps  only  two  battalions  remained  intact 
as  a  reserve  at  Bonneville,  no  reinforcement  was  to  be 
looked  for  from  outside,  and  on  the  right  wing  the 
French  threatened  to  cut  the  communications  with 
Chartres  as  well  as  with  Paris.  At  four  in  the  after- 
noon, Greneral  von  der  Tann  gave  order  to  cease  firing 
and  retii'e  by  brigades  on  Artenay  from  the  left  wing. 

Fresh  troops  at  this  moment  forced  their  way  into 
the  park  of  Coulmiers.  Colonel  Count  von  Ysenburg 
held  the  eastern  outlets  from  the  village,  and  led  his 
troops  in  reciprocal  support  back  to  Gremigny  in  good 
order. 

It  now  proved  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the 


186  THE   FKANCO-GERIVIAN  WAE. 

2nd  Brigade  had  been  able  to  maintain  its  position  in 
front  of  this  village,  thus  covering  their  further  retreat. 

At  noon,  Greneral  von  Orff,  on  reaching  Champs  and 
Cheminiers,  had  found  them  occupied  by  Deplanque's 
brigade  (French).  First  he  silenced  their  artillery  with 
his  own,  then  he  deployed  his  four  battahons  for  action, 
with  the  4th  Cavalry  Brigade  on  the  right  wing. 

Eeyan's  cavahy  ere  long  came  up  between  these  two 
villages,  after  they  had  given  up  their  two  hours'  can- 
nonade on  the  Bavarian  Cuirassiers  and  had  been 
driven  out  of  St.  Sigismond  by  dismounted  hussars. 
But  this  body  of  horse  soon  got  away  from  the  fire  of 
Bavarian  guns  and  moved  off  to  the  westward,  it  was 
said  because  they  mistook  Lipowski's  volunteers, 
skirmishing  at  some  distance  to  the  north,  for  German 
supports.  And  when  the  Bavarian  horse  batteries 
opened  fire  on  Champs,  from  the  north-east,  the  French 
abandoned  the  place,  at  about  two  o'clock,  in  great 
disorder. 

General  von  Orff  now  brought  the  artillery  up  to 
within  500  paces  of  Cheminiers,  and  marched  the  in- 
fantry up  between  the  guns. 

Admiral  Jaureguiberry,  however,  by  arriving  in 
person,  succeeded  in  rallying  the  wavering  troops,  and 
this  attack  failed.  The  French  batteries  soon  com- 
pelled the  Bavarian  horse  batteries  to  retire. 

When,  at  about  three  o'clock,  Bourdillon's  brigade 
and  the  reserve  artihery  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps 
(French)  also  arrived  at  Champs,  and  news  was  brought 
of  the  state  of  affairs  at  Coulmiers,  General  von  Orff 
refrained  from  all  further  attack,  and  directed  all  his 
efforts  to  maintaining  his  position  as  stoutly  as  possible 
in  front  of  Gemigny.  Unshaken  by  the  fire  of  the 
numerous  French  batteries,  the  httle  brigade  repulsed 
their  repeated  attacks. 


BATTLE  OF  COULMlERS.  187 

Thus  the  4th  Brigade  was  enabled  to  retire  from 
Coulmiers  on  Gremigny  and  St.  Peravy,  and  the  1st,  to 
the  eastward,  on  Coinces  unmolested  by  the  enemy. 
The  2nd  Brigade  followed  to  Coinces,  while  the  3rd 
formed  the  rear-guard  as  far  as  St.  Sigismond,  where 
it  halted  and  bivouacked.  The  cavahy  covered  the 
retreat  on  all  sides. 

After  a  short  rest  the  retreat  of  the  main  body  was 
continued  during  the  night,  by  very  bad  roads.  Ar- 
tenay  was  reached  by  the  morning.  Orleans  was 
evacuated,  and  the  detachment  left  there  rejoined  its 
corps.  The  stores  were  conveyed  by  railway  back  to 
Toury;  but  one  ammunition  column,  150  prisoners, 
and  the  sick  who  could  not  be  moved,  feU  into  the 
hands  of  the  French. 

Out  of  20,000  men,  against  70,000  French,  the  Ger- 
mans had  lost  800  in  killed  and  wounded ;  the  enemy's 
loss  was  nearly  twice  as  gi-eat. 

From  Artenay,  on  November  10th,  the  2nd  Brigade 
was  entrusted  with  the  security  of  the  further  march 
on  Toury,  where  limited  quarters  might  be  occupied. 
Thither  too  came  the  22nd  Division  from  Chartres,  and 
took  up  a  position  at  Janville,  alongside  of  the  Bava- 
rian Corps.  General  von  der  Tann  had  extricated  him- 
self from  a  difficult  position  with  much  skill  and  good 
fortune.  There  was  no  pui'suit.  General  d'Aurelle 
restricted  himself  to  awaiting  further  reinforcements 
in  a  strong  position  before  Orleans. 

The  French  were  in  more  active  preparation,  how- 
ever, on  the  Upper  Loir  and  the  Eure. 

The  Second  Army  Corps  (German)  had  arrived 
before  Paris  on  the  5th ;  its  3rd  Division  was  included 
in  the  investing  line  between  the  Seine  and  Marne ;  the 
4th  moved  on  to  Longjumeau. 

As  soon  as  the  Landwehr  Guard  occupied  the  penin- 


188  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

sula  of  Argenteuil,  a  brigade  of  the  Fourtli  Corps  was 
available  for  service  on  the  north  side  of  the  capital. 
On  the  south,  the  17th  Division  at  Rambouillet,  the 
22nd  at  Chartres,  and  the  Bavarian  Corps,  which  had 
retired  on  Ablis,  with  the  4th  and  6th  Cavalry  Di- 
visions, were  formed  into  distinct  corps  of  the  Third 
Army  and  placed  under  the  command  of  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Mecklenburg,  with  orders  to  advance  first  on 
Dreux. 

THE   GEAND  DUKE'S   MOVEMENTS. 

On  the  17th  of  November  the  17th  Division  marched 
by  Maintenon.  On  the  left,  a  French  detachment  was 
driven  back  across  the  Blaise ;  and  when  a  few  com- 
panies of  marines,  who  attempted  to  block  the  high- 
road, had  been  disposed  of,  Oeneral  von  Tresckow 
marched  into  Dreux  that  evening.  The  struggle  had 
cost  the  Grermans  50  men,  the  French  150  and  50 
prisoners. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles,  whose  forces  had  now  been 
assembled  to  face  the  enemy  outside  Orleans,  expressed 
a  wish  that  the  Grand  Duke's  army  should  advance  on 
Tours  via  Le  Mans.  The  Grand  Duke,  therefore, 
marched  on  Nogent-le-Eotrou,  which,  being  the  central 
rendezvous  of  the  French  divisions,  ^would  probably 
be  the  scene  of  an  obstinate  resistance. 

After  several  skirmishes  the  Grand  Duke's  force 
reached  this  town,  but  when,  on  the  22nd,  he  prepared 
to  storm  it  from  three  sides,  it  was  found  that  the 
French  had  already  evacuated  it.  At  the  same  time 
orders  arrived  from  head-quarters,  instructing  him  to 
retire  at  once  on  Beaugency  to  join  the  right  wing  of 
the  Second  Army,  which  must  immediately  be  rein- 
forced in  view  of  the  superior  strength  of  the  French. 
"  The  forces  already  concentrating  before  Orleans  are 
to  postpone  all  hostilities  till  this  support  arrives. 


ADVAlfCE  ON  TOUES.  189 

The  small  opposition  offered  by  the  French  on  the  Enre 
and  Huisne  shows  that  no  serious  danger  threatens  on 
that  side ;  the  enemy  in  that  quarter  need  only  be  kept 
under  observation  by  cavahy."  Even  a  day's  rest  was 
prohibited,  and  the  march  was  to  be  conducted  with 
the  utmost  speed. 

On  the  23rd,  the  divisions  had  closed  up  on  their 
leading  troops,  when  the  Grand  Duke,  on  the  24th, 
moved  on  Chateaudun  and  Vendome ;  but  the  Bavarian 
Corps  only  got  as  far  as  Vibraye,  while  the  two  Prus- 
sian divisions  withdi'ew  from  the  country  about  La- 
Perche,  and  the  cavahy  found  the  whole  hne  of  the 
Loire  already  occupied. 

In  fact,  the  French  had  sent  up  a  brigade  of  the 
troops  massed  behind  the  woods  of  Marchenoir  by  rail- 
way to  Vendome,  expressly  to  protect  the  Government 
at  Tours,  while  General  de  Sonis  had  advanced  with 
the  rest  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  on  Brou.  Here,  on 
the  25th,  his  van  met  an  ammunition  column  and 
pontoon  train  of  the  Bavarian  Corps.  At  first  only 
the  10th  Cavalry  Brigade  could  attack  the  French,  but 
when,  soon  after,  2  companies  and  8  guns  had  occupied 
the  bridge  over  the  Loir  at  Yevres,  the  wagons  were 
got  through  Brou  in  safety,  and  the  enemy  could  not 
continue  its  march  till  the  cavalry  had  filed  off. 

The  Bavarian  Corps  had  meanwhile  advanced  on 
Mondoubleau  and  St.  Calais,  not,  to  be  sure,  the  short- 
est route  to  Beaugency,  but  still  straight  on  Tours. 
The  two  divisions  had  only  reached  Vibraye  and 
Authon. 

The  appearance  of  a  hostile  force  at  Brou  was  deemed 
of  sufficient  importance  to  justify  a  detour  by  that 
place,  postponing  for  the  present  the  advance  on  the 
Loire.  But  when  the  22nd  arrived  at  Brou,  on  the 
26th,  they  found  that  the  enemy  had  already  retired 


190  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

during  the  night.  The  Government  at  Tours  had 
ordered  the  whole  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  to  march 
on  Vendome  for  their  protection.  However,  when  the 
German  cavahy  had  made  their  appearance  at  Cloyes 
and  Freteval,  General  Sonis  had  supposed  he  could  not 
advance  any  further  along  the  Loir  and  made  a  detour 
by  Marchenoir.  But  two  night  marches  so  upset  the 
newly-recruited  troops,  that  swarms  of  stragglers 
wandered  about  the  neighborhood  all  day,  and  could 
only  with  difficulty  be  re-assembled  at  Beaugency. 

To  obtain  some  unity  of  plan  and  action,  the  Grand 
Duke  was  now,  by  command  from  head-quarters,  placed 
under  Prince  Frederick  Charles's  orders,  and  General 
von  Stosch  was  dispatched  to  undertake  the  duties  of 
Chief  of  the  Staff  to  the  army-section.  This,  by  the 
Prince's  orders,  was  to  march  on  Janville  with  all 
speed,  whither  some  troops  of  the  Ninth  Corps  would 
be  sent  to  meet  it,  by  way  of  Orgeres. 

The  Grand  Duke  therefore  marched,  on  the  27th, 
with  both  divisions,  on  Bonneval,  where  he  found  a 
squadron  of  the  2nd  Cavahy  Division.  The  Bavarian 
Corps  which,  after  finding  Brou  abandoned,  had 
marched  on  Courtalain,  proceeded  to  Chateaudun. 
Having  thus  accomplished  a  junction  with  the  Second 
Army,  the  exhausted  troops  were  allowed  a  day's  rest 
on  the  28th,  in  quarters  on  the  Loir. 

THE  POSITION  OF  THE  SECOND  AEMY  IN  THE  LATTEE  PAKT 
OF  NOVEMBEK. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  hastened  the  advance 
of  his  forces  as  much  as  possible,  but  they  had  met 
with  several  obstacles.  The  roads  were  broken  up. 
National  Guards  and  franctireurs  were  on  the  watch, 
and  even  the  country-people  had  taken  up  arms ;  how- 
ever, by  November  14th,  the  Ninth  Corps  with  the 


BETWEEN  P.iEIS  AND   ORLEANS.  191 

Cavalry  Division  had  reached  Fontainebleau  and  gone 
on  to  Angerville.  The  Third  Corps  was  following  on 
Pithiviers.  Of  the  Tenth,  the  40th  Brigade  was  left  at 
Chaumont,  to  maintain  communications  with  the  Four- 
teenth Corps ;  the  36th  reached  Montargis  and  Beaune- 
la-Rolande  on  the  21st ;  the  two  brigades  following  in 
rear  had  a  sharp  encounter  on  the  24th  at  Ladon  and 
Maizieres.  In  this,  170  French  were  taken  prisoners, 
who  belonged  to  a  corps  which,  as  General  von  Werder 
had  already  reported,  was  proceeding  under  General 
Crouzat's  command,  from  Chagny  to  Gien  by  railway. 
The  order  of  battle  was  found  on  an  officer  who  was 
taken  prisoner. 

That  while  the  Grand  Duke's  forces  were  marching 
up,  the  Second  Army,  but  now  fully  concentrated,  had 
been  very  near  considerable  forces  of  the  enemy,  was 
sufficiently  ascertained  by  several  reconnoissances. 

On  the  24th  some  troops  of  the  Ninth  Corps  were 
sent  forward  along  the  highroad.  A  few  shells 
prompted  the  French  to  evacuate  Artenay,  pursued  by 
the  cavalry  as  far  as  Croix-Briquet.  Early  in  the  same 
day  a  detachment  of  aU  arms  from  the  Third  Corps 
had  advanced  on  NeuviUe-aux-Bois.  Two  detachments 
of  the  38th  Brigade  had  marched  on  Bois-Commun  and 
Bellegarde,  but  all  such  attempts  were  met  by  very 
superior  numbers  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  ascertained  that  the  French  position  before 
Orleans  extended  for  eight  miles  (German),  from  the 
Conie  to  the  Loing ;  and  the  massing  of  troops,  espe- 
cially on  their  flank,  made  it  highly  probable  that  they 
purposed  advancing  by  Fontainebleau  on  the  rear  of 
the  besieging  army.  StiU,  this  was  not  so  evident  as 
to  justify  Prince  Frederick  Charles  in  leaving  the  great 
highways  from  Orleans  to  Paris  unguarded.  However, 
to  enable  him  to  lend  his  left  wing  timely  support 


192  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

in  ease  of  need,  he  di'afted  off  the  5th  Infantry  and 
1st  Cavahy  Divisions  to  Boynes,  to  be  near  the  Tenth 
Corps,  which  was  weak,  and  the  6th  Division  occu- 
pied Pithiviers  in  their  stead.  Their  quarters  at  Ba- 
zoches  were  assigned  to  the  Ninth  Corps.  Finally, 
the  Grand  Duke  was  commanded  to  reach  Toury  by 
the  29th,  with  the  head  of  his  column,  at  least.  These 
arrangements  were  all  carried  out  in  due  course. 

Immediately  after  the  success  at  Coulmiers  the 
Army  of  the  Loire  seems  only  to  have  thought  of 
defending  itself  against  a  counter-blow.  It  retu-ed  on 
Orleans,  threw  up  extensive  earthworks,  for  which 
marine  artillery  was  even  brought  up  from  Cherbourg, 
and  awaited  the  arrival  of  further  reinforcements. 
The  Twentieth  Corps,  aheady  spoken  of,  40,000  strong, 
joined  the  Fifteenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Seventeenth  at 
Gien,  with  one  division  of  the  Eighteenth  newly 
assembled  at  Nevers,  and  the  volunteers  under  Cathe- 
lineau  and  Lipowski. 

Thus  the  French  Army  round  Orleans  numbered 
200,000;  the  Germans  opposed  to  them  at  the  time 
only  45,000  infantry. 

Gambetta  ere  long  was  urgent  for  renewed  offensive 
operations.  As  General  d'Aurelle  raised  objections  to 
an  advance  by  Pithiviers  and  Malesherbes,  the  Dic- 
tator himself  took  matters  in  hand.  On  the  night  of 
the  23rd  he  telegraphed  orders  from  Tours  that  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  were  at  once  to  assemble  at  Chilleurs- 
aux-Bois  and  reach  Pithiviers  in  the  course  of  the  24th. 
The  Twentieth  were  to  march  on  Beaune-la-Rolande, 
and  then  both  were  to  advance  via  Fontainebleau  on 
Paris.  The  General  pointed  out  that,  according  to  his 
estimate,  80,000  Germans  must  be  encountered  in  an 
open  country,  and  that  it  would  be  wiser  to  await  their 
attack  in  an  intrenched  position.     No  help,  indeed, 


BATTLE  OF  BEAUNE-LA-KOLANDE.  193 

would  thus  be  afforded  to  the  besieged  capital,  and 
even  the  strengthening  of  the  right  wing  must  be 
postponed ;  while  it  was  the  advance  of  the  Eighteenth 
and  Twentieth  Corps  on  the  24th  which  led  to  the 
fight  already  mentioned  at  Ladon  and  Maizieres. 

In  consequence  of  information  received  from  Tours 
on  the  26th,  General  Crouzat  ordered  the  advance,  on 
the  28th,  of  the  two  corps  he  commanded — the  Eight- 
eenth on  Juranville  du-ect,  the  Twentieth  to  the  left 
by  Bois-Commun — for  a  general  attack  on  Beaune-la- 
Eolande.  The  Fifteenth  Corps  was  moved  up  for 
support  to  Chambon,  and  Cathelineau's  volunteers 
to  Courcelles. 

As  we  have  seen,  on  that  very  day  the  Grrand  Duke's 
forces  had  come  up  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Second 
German  Army.  On  the  left,  the  38th  Brigade  of  the 
Tenth  Corps  was  at  Beaune,  the  39th  at  Les-Cotelles ; 
the  37th,  with  the  corps  artillery,  had  advanced  to 
Marcilly. 

BATTLE   OF   BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE. 

(November  28th.) 

The  French  attack  on  November  28th  failed  in  its 
dual  delivery,  and  the  two  actions  had  little  influence 
on  each  other.  On  the  right,  the  head  of  the  Eight- 
eenth Corps  met  the  outposts  of  the  39th  Brigade  at 
an  early  hour,  close  to  Juranville  and  Lorcy.  After 
a  stout  resistance,  they  were  driven  in  by  about  nine 
o'clock  on  Les-Cotelles  and  beyond  the  railway  em- 
bankment at  Corbeilles,  where  they  took  possession  of 
the  park. 

The  French  could  now  deploy  on  the  open  country 

before  Juranville,  and  following  up  the  Germans  with 

strong  hues  of  tirailleurs   marching   straight   before 

them,  they  got  into  Corbeilles  and  drove  the  invaders 

13 


194  THE  PKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

out  to  the  north  aud  west.  In  front,  meanwhile,  a 
reinforcement  from  the  reserve  at  Marcilly  had  reached 
Les-Cotelles,  and  Colonel  von  Yalentini  had  on  his  side 
attacked  Juranville  with  the  56th  Regiment.  The 
artillery  could  give  no  assistance.  The  French  made 
an  obstinate  resistance,  and  not  till  noon  did  they 
begin  to  retreat,  though  the  fighting  still  continued 
round  some  solitary  houses.  But  when  strong  col- 
umns came  up  from  Maizieres  and  Corbeilles,  the  Ger- 
mans were  compelled  to  abandon  the  conquered  vil- 
lage, but  they  carried  off:  300  prisoners. 

By  two  o'clock  the  greater  portion  of  the  French 
Corps  deployed  by  Juranville  to  attack  the  position 
held  by  the  39th  Brigade,  who  had  retired  on  Long- 
Cour.  But  not  having  prepared  their  attack  by  artil- 
lery fire,  it  came  to  nothing  under  that  of  five  Prus- 
sian batteries. 

The  first  attack  on  Les-Cotelles  was  also  repulsed, 
but  being  repeated  an  hour  later,  the  Germans  had  to 
abandon  the  position,  and  fifty  men  were  taken  pris- 
oners. A  gun,  which  had  lost  seven  of  its  gunners, 
had  sunk  so  deep  in  the  muddy  ground  that  the  few 
men  left  could  not  drag  it  out. 

StiU,  the  Eighteenth  French  Corps  made  no  further 
way,  but  as  dusk  came  on,  was  satisfied  with  an  inef- 
fective cannonade,  and  finally  the  39th  Brigade  was 
able  to  maintain  its  position  abreast  of  Beaune. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  French  line  of  battle  the 
attack  had  also  from  the  first  been  of  a  general  charac- 
ter, the  2nd  Division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  having 
advanced  on  Beaune,  and  the  First  on  Batilly.  But 
it  was  near  noon  before  the  arrival  of  another  portion 
of  the  3rd  Division  in  reserve  enabled  them  to  drive  in 
the  German  advanced  posts  from  Bois-de-la-Leu  to  the 
cross-roads  north-west  of  Beaune.    The  38th  Brigade, 


BATTLE   OF  BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE.  195 

too,  soon  found  itseK  under  fire  from  the  enemy's  guns, 
now  following  it  up  from  Pierre-Percee  on  the  north. 

The  retreat  had  to  be  continued  along  the  Roman 
road,  by  which  a  gun,  of  which  the  men  and  horses 
had  for  the  most  part  perished,  fell  into  the  enemy's 
hands.  About  the  same  time  the  2nd  French  Division 
ascended  the  heights  to  the  east  of  Beaune,  and  further 
back  Colonel  von  Cranach  was  enabled,  first  to  get  in 
hand  the  57th  Regiment  near  La-Rue-Boussier,  their 
retreat  being  covered  by  the  batteries  that  were  hurry- 
ing up  from  Marcilly,  and  then  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  returning  to  the  charge.  These  entirely  ceased 
to  advance  any  further,  for  they  were  suddenly 
threatened  on  their  own  flank  by  the  1st  Division  of 
the  Prussian  cavalry  retiring  from  Boynes,  and  were 
under  fire  of  the  horse  batteries. 

Meanwhile  the  16th  Regiment  found  itself  com- 
pletely isolated  in  Beaune  and  shut  in  on  three  sides 
by  the  enemy. 

The  town,  which  was  surrounded  by  the  remains  of 
a  high  wall,  and  the  churchyard  were,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, prepared  for  defence.  The  French,  after  being 
driven  back  by  the  first  attack  of  heavy  fire,  began 
bombarding  the  town.  Their  shells  burst  through  the 
walls  of  the  churchyard  and  set  a  few  buildings  on  fire, 
but  even  then  every  attempt  at  storming  was  stead- 
fastly repulsed. 

In  the  meantime,  Greneral  von  Woyna  had  supplied 
his  batteries  with  fresh  ammunition,  and  while  occupy- 
ing Romainville  on  the  right,  he  took  up  a  position 
opposite  the  copse  of  Pierre-Percee,  so  that  by  three 
o'clock  he  was  able  to  lead  these  companies  up  to  the 
east  of  Beaune. 

About  this  time  assistance  came  with  the  arrival  of 
the  Third  Army  Corps.    While  the  6th  Division  were 


196  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

still  pressing  on  towards  Pithiviers,  the  5th  had  already 
that  morning  rallied  beyond  that  place.  The  first 
news  from  Beaune  had  sounded  so  far  from  alarming, 
that  the  corps  artillery  retired  to  their  quarters. 
Nevertheless,  in  consequence  of  the  increasing  boom- 
ing of  guns  and  a  later  announcement  of  a  serious 
encounter.  General  von  Alvensleben  gave  the  word  for 
the  corps  to  advance;  General  von  Stiilpnagel  had 
already  spontaneously  set  out  with  the  5th  Division. 
The  6th  followed,  and  dispatched  a  battalion  to  observe 
towards  Com'celles ;  but  Cathelineau's  body  of  volun- 
teers remained  inactive. 

Part  of  the  52nd  Regiment,  which  was  marching  at 
the  head  of  the  column,  turned  off  to  the  right,  and, 
supported  by  artillery,  opened  fire  about  4.30  on  Ar- 
conviUe  and  Batilly.  Another  part  penetrated  into 
Bois-de-la-Leu  and  the  copse  near  La  Pierre-Percee, 
where  they  recaptured  the  gun  they  had  lost  there 
before.  Four  batteries  took  up  their  position  on  the 
road  from  Pithiviers,  behind  Fosse-des-Pres,  and  fired 
on  the  French,  who  still  stood  firm  on  the  west  side  of 
Beaune ;  but  they  were  by  this  means  entirely  dis- 
persed and  pursued  by  the  12th  Regiment  as  far  as 
Mont.-Barrois. 

After  dark  the  Tenth  Corps  encamped  near  Long- 
Coui',  Beaune,  and  Batilly,  and  the  5th  Division  in 
their  rear;  the  6th  had  remained  at  Boynes,  where 
the  1st  Division  of  cavalry  also  found  accommoda- 
tion. 

General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  had  held  his  ground 
against  the  enemy  in  the  battle  of  Beaune-la-Rolande, 
with  11,000  men  against  60,000,  and  with  three  bri- 
gades against  six  divisions,  until  help  reached  him 
towards  evening.  This  action  cost  the  Germans  900 
and  the  French  1300  men  in  killed  and  wounded ;  but 


BATTLE  OF  BEAUNE-LA-ROLANDE.  197 

1800  unwounded  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Grermans. 

By  the  evening  the  French  Twentieth  Corps  had 
retreated  as  far  as  Bois-Commun  and  Bellegarde ;  the 
Eighteenth,  on  the  contrary,  had  taken  up  their  posi- 
tion near  Vernonille  and  Juranville,  in  fact,  directly  in 
front  of  the  Tenth  Grerman  Corps,  on  the  ground  they 
had  gained  from  them.  They  were  justified  in  expect- 
ing that  the  fighting  would  recommence  on  the  mor- 
row. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles,  therefore,  directed  the 
Tenth  and  Third  Corps  to  assemble  fully  prepared  on 
the  29th.  The  Ninth  received  orders  to  advance  with 
two  brigades  towards  Boynes  and  Bazoches,  and  the 
remaining  troops  were  to  follow  as  soon  as  the  Grand 
Duke's  contingent  should  have  reached  the  road  to 
Paris. 

In  the  course  of  the  day  his  advanced  guard,  the  4th 
Division  of  cavalry,  reached  Toury,  his  infantry 
arrived  at  Allaines  and  Orgeres.  The  6th  Division  of 
cavalry,  who  were  marching  on  the  right  flank,  met 
with  their  first  opposition  at  Tournoisis. 

Meanwhile  Greneral  Crouzat  had  been  warned  from 
Tours,  by  a  report  which  reached  him  on  the  evening 
of  the  28th,  to  prepare  to  meet  another  attack,  and  he 
thereupon  recalled  his  right  wing.  On  the  30th  both 
corps  made  a  move  to  the  left,  in  order  to  be  in  the 
proximity  of  the  Fifteenth.  For  the  purpose  of  dis- 
sembling this  lateral  movement,  some  companies  went 
in  a  northerly  direction  and  met  reconnoitring  parties 
of  the  German  Tenth  and  Third  Corps,  with  whom 
skirmishes  took  place  at  Maizieres,  St.  Loup,  and  Mont 
Barrois;  however,  soon  after,  an  advance  of  the  left 
wing  of  the  French  Army  was  observed. 

The  French  Government  at  Tours  had  received  news 


198  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

from  Paris  that  General  Ducrot  would  attempt,  on  the 
29th,  to  break  through  the  Grerman  investing  lines 
with  100,000  men  and  400  guns,  and  endeavor  to  con- 
nect with  the  Array  of  the  Loire  in  a  southerly  direc- 
tion. The  balloon  that  had  carried  this  dispatch  had 
descended  in  Norway,  from  whence  the  communica- 
tion had  been  forwarded.  It  was  concluded  from  this 
that  the  General  was  already  vigorously  engaged,  and 
that  help  must  be  no  longer  delayed.  By  Gambetta's 
desire,  M.  Freycinet  submitted  to  the  council  of  war, 
caUed  by  General  d'Aurelle,  a  plan  for  the  advance  of 
the  whole  army  on  Pithiviers.  In  the  event  of  a  refusal, 
he  had  with  him  a  decree  to  supplant  the  Commander- 
in-chief. 

It  was  decided  in  the  first  place  to  execute  a  wheel 
to  the  right  with  the  left  wing,  Chilleurs-aux-Bois 
forming  the  pivot  of  the  movement.  Having  by  this 
means  taken  up  a  position  facing  Pithiviers,  the  corps 
on  the  right  wing,  which  was  now  on  the  same  line, 
had  to  await  orders  to  advance.  The  Twenty-first 
Corps  were  to  be  led  towards  Vendome  as  a  protection 
to  the  left  flank. 

THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  LOIRE  TO  THE 
EELIEF  OF  PARIS.   ^ 

Consequently,  on  the  1st  of  December  the  Sixteenth 
Corps  moved  forward  in  the  direction  of  the  railway 
at  Orgeres ;  the  Seventeenth  followed  as  far  as  Patay 
and  St.  Peravy. 

Opposite  to  these,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Second 
German  Army,  the  17th  Division  of  the  Grand  Duke's 
Corps  had  arrived  at  Bazoches,  the  22nd  at  Toury,  and 
the  Bavarian  Corps  in  the  neighborhood  of  Orgeres. 
Thus  the  French  first  met  the  Bavarians.  Attacked 
in  front  by  a  far  superior  force,  and  threatened  by 


ATTEMPT   TO   EELIEVE   PARIS.  199 

Michel's  division  of  cavalry  in  the  flank,  the  1st  Bava- 
rian Brigade  were  forced  to  retreat  at  three  o'clock 
towards  Villepion.  The  2nd  Brigade,  which  approached 
from  Orgeres,  halted  to  the  west  of  Nonneville,  and 
the  4th  marched  up  between  Villepion  and  Faverolles, 
where  the  Bavarians,  in  spite  of  heavy  losses,  succeeded 
in  holding  their  own  for  a  long  time.  On  the  right 
wing,  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  with  four  guns  of  his 
battery  which  could  still  do  good  service,  brought  the 
enemy's  advance  to  a  standstill,  but  under  the  personal 
leadership  of  Admiral  Jaureguiberry  the  French  fought 
their  way  into  Villepion.  As  night  drew  on,  and  the 
want  of  ammunition  was  becoming  serious,  the  1st 
Bavarian  Brigade  went  to  Loigny ;  the  2nd,  however, 
got  back  to  Orgeres  by  five  o'clock,  where  the  third 
arrived  in  the  evening,  whilst  the  4th  joined  company 
at  Loigny. 

The  engagement  cost  both  sides  about  1000  men, 
and  only  the  foremost  of  the  Bavarian  divisions  had 
been  forced  back  for  a  short  distance. 

This  result,  and  the  news  from  Paris,  aroused  in 
Tours  fresh  hopes  of  victory.  As  will  be  seen  further 
on,  a  sortie  had  been  successfully  effected  out  of  Paris 
through  the  investing  hues,  and  the  village  of  Epinay 
had  been  held  for  a  short  time.  Thereupon  it  was 
concluded  that  this  was  the  village  of  the  same  name 
which  lay  to  the  south  near  Longjumeau,  and  that  as 
soon  as  the  Ai-my  of  Orleans  should  effect  a  junction 
with  that  from  Paris  there  would  be  scarcely  any  fur- 
ther obstacle.  Cathelineau's  Volunteer  Corps  was 
directed  at  once  to  guard  the  forest  of  Fontainebleau, 
and  the  ensuing  annihilation  of  the  Germans  was  an- 
nounced to  the  country. 

The  army  from  Orleans,  however,  had  barely  gained 
half  a  day's  march  in  the  direction  of  Paris,  and  the 


200  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

right  wheel  of  the  left  wing  had  to  be  continued.  The 
Sixteenth  Corps  was  to  try  and  reach  the  line  between 
Allaines  and  Tomy  by  the  2nd  of  December;  the 
Seventeenth  were  to  follow,  and  the  Fifteenth,  march- 
ing from  Chilleurs  past  Artenay,  were  to  join  the  right. 
The  Grand  Duke,  on  hearing  the  report  of  the  great 
force  with  which  the  enemy  was  approaching,  deter- 
mined to  march  to  meet  them  with  the  whole  con- 
tingent. The  requisite  orders  were  issued  at  eight 
o'clock  to  the  forces,  who  were  already  standing  pre- 
pared in  camp.  The  Bavarian  Corps  was  directed  to 
take  up  a  position  near  Loigny,  with  its  left  wing  at 
Chateau-Groury ;  the  17th  Division  to  march  directly 
from  Sautilly  to  Lumeau,  and  the  22nd  from  Tivernon 
to  Baigneaux.  The  cavahy  had  to  undertake  the 
protection  of  both  wings. 

THE   BATTLE   AT   LOIGNY — POUPEY. 

(December  2nd.) 

The  Bavarian  Corps  was  still  engaged  in  advancing 
from  Maladerie  when  the  French  ascended  the  heights 
to  the  west  of  Loigny.  The  1st  Division  therefore 
advanced  via  Villeprevost,  and  the  2;id  occupied  the 
line  between  Beauvilliers  and  Goury. 

General  Chanzy  had  set  out  from  Terminiers  at  eight 
o'clock,  with  the  2nd  and  3rd  Divisions,  for  Loigny  and 
Lumeau.  The  first  followed  in  reserve,  and  Michel's 
division  of  cavalry  covered  the  left  flank.  In  spite  of 
the  hot  fire  of  the  defenders,  the  2nd  Division  had  by 
nine  o'clock  advanced  close  upon  Beauvilliers,  but  then 
they  had  to  fall  back  before  the  onset  of  the  Bavarians, 
who  now,  on  their  side,  attacked  Loigny.  When, 
however,  at  10.30  the  whole  French  Corps  advanced 
deployed  on  a  large  front  from  Nonneville  to  Neuvil- 


BATTLE   OF  LOIGNY — POUPRY.  201 

liers,  they  had  to  retreat  with  great  losses.  They  niet, 
nevertheless,  with  a  warm  reception  at  Beauvilliers, 
where  the  firing  of  the  artillery  of  the  German  corps 
put  a  stop  to  the  enemy's  movements. 

The  battle  surged  backwards  and  forwards  until,  at 
11.30,  the  2nd  Bavarian  Brigade  joined  in  the  fray. 
The  4th  Division  of  cavalry  charged  the  left  wing  of 
the  French,  and  Michel's  division  fell  back  on  the 
Seventeenth  Corps.  This  caused  numerous  prisoners 
to  be  taken  by  the  German  troopers.  In  the  meantime 
the  Bavarian  infantry  had  marched  to  Ferme-Morale, 
but  found  themselves  under  such  destructive  fire  that 
they  were  forced  to  turn  back.  Thereupon  the  horse 
batteries  on  the  flank  enfiladed  the  enemy's  wing  with 
such  effect,  even  firing  the  farm,  that  General  von  Orff 
found  himself  able  to  take  possession  of  it. 

At  Beauvilliers,  meanwhile,  the  2nd  Division  had 
only  with  great  difficulty  resisted  the  vigorous  on- 
slaughts of  the  French,  whose  riflemen  had  already 
approached  so  close  that  the  batteries  were  compelled 
to  retire.  But  the  success  of  the  right  wing  soon 
spread  to  the  left.  Charging  from  Beauvilliers,  as  well 
as  from  Chateau-Goury,  the  Bavarians  drove  Jauregui- 
berry's  division  back  to  Loigny. 

Shortly  after  noon  the  firing  of  the  French  became 
again  remarkably  energetic,  especially  against  Chateau- 
Goury.  The  battalions  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Bava- 
rians were  forced  back  upon  the  park. 

During  these  events  the  two  Prussian  divisions  had 
continued  their  advance.  The  artillery  of  the  17th 
pressed  on  in  order  to  engage  the  enemy,  while  the 
infantry  reached  Lumeau  in  time  to  prevent  its  occu- 
pation by  the  opposing  forces.  Dense  masses  of  French 
infantry  fought  their  way  up  quite  close  to  the  place, 
but  they  were  finally  driven  back  by  a  well-directed 


202  THE   FKANCO-GEEMAN   WAK. 

fire  of  musketry  and  shell;  whereupon  the  division 
attacked  the  right  flank  of  the  French. 

The  22nd  Division  also  marched  past  Baigneaux 
towards  Anneux,  and  joined  in  the  pursuit  of  the  re- 
treating enemy.  A  number  of  prisoners  and  a  battery 
were  taken  from  the  French,  who,  after  a  vain  attempt 
to  make  another  firm  stand  near  Neuvilliers,  at  last 
fled  towards  Terminiers  in  utter  disorder. 

After  this  conclusion  of  the  fighting  at  Lumeau, 
Greneral  von  Tresckow  was  able  to  go  to  the  assistance 
of  the  left  wing  of  the  Bavarians,  which  was  hard 
pressed.  Under  cover  of  the  fire  of  eight  batteries,  the 
33rd  Brigade  moved  against  the  flank  of  the  French 
forces,  which  were  now  making  a  fierce  attack  on 
Chateau-Goury.  Being  thus  taken  by  surprise,  they 
retired  upon  Loigny.  Here,  too,  the  Mecklenburg 
battalions,  together  with  the  Bavarians,  cut  their  way 
through,  and  it  was  only  in  the  churchyard,  which  was 
situated  on  a  hill  at  the  west  end  of  the  village,  that 
an  obstinate  resistance  was  made  for  some  time  longer. 
The  French,  as  they  retired  on  Villepion,  suffered 
from  a  destructive  fire  from  eighty  guns  posted  close 
together  at  Loigny. 

At  2.30  General  von  der  Tann  caused  the  whole  of 
his  1st  Division,  after  they  had  been  provided  with 
fresh  ammunition,  to  advance  once  more ;  this  move- 
ment, however,  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  the  fire 
of  the  enemy. 

Michel's  division  also  moved  up  to  oppose  the  ad- 
vance of  the  cavalry  on  the  right  wing,  but  turned 
back  as  soon  as  it  came  within  range  of  the  horse  bat- 
teries. 

Where  his  right  wing  was  exposed.  General  Chanzy 
had  sent  a  few  battalions  to  take  up  a  forward  position 
near  Terre-noire.    Behiiid  them  a  brigade  of  the  Seveji- 


BATTLE   OF  LOIGNY — POUPRY.  203 

teenth  Corps  had  arrived  at  Faverolles,  and  to  the  right 
of  Villepion  the  Papal  Zouaves  advanced  against  Vil- 
lours. 

Greneral  von  Tresckow  now  sent  forward  his  last 
reserves.  Two  battalions  of  the  75th  Regiment  broke 
through  the  position  at  the  first  charge,  and  in  con- 
junction with  all  the  troops  engaged,  drove  back  the 
French  column  to  Villepion. 

The  approach  of  darkness  brought  the  fighting  here 
to  a  close. 

While  the  French  Sixteenth  Corps  had  been  fighting 
alone  with  great  persistence  all  day,  the  Fifteenth, 
according  to  orders,  had  advanced  past  Artenay,  on 
the  high-road  to  Paris.  There,  they  were  only  opposed 
by  the  3rd  Brigade  of  German  cavalry.  This  was 
attacked  by  midday,  near  Dambron,  by  the  French  3rd 
Division,  which  formed  the  left  flanking  column,  while 
the  other  two  divisions  kept  much  further  to  the  right. 

As  soon,  therefore,  as  this  information  from  the 
cavalry  reached  General  von  Wittich,  he  moved  off 
with  the  whole  of  the  22nd  Division  from  Anneux,  in 
the  direction  of  Poupry.  The  head  of  the  column 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  place  at  the  double,  and  in 
driving  back  the  enemy,  who  had  already  broken  in 
there  and  in  the  belts  of  forest  to  the  north.  Six  bat- 
teries then  came  into  position,  resting  to  the  south  on 
Morale.  The  French  deployed  between  Dambron  and 
Autroches,  and  carried  on  a  persistent  fire  while  the 
remaining  divisions  came  up.  After  an  encounter 
with  the  troops  from  Poupry,  they  attacked  with  their 
right  wing  the  smaU  copses  which  lay  near,  in  front  of 
the  forest-land  to  the  north,  placed  the  artillery  in  the 
gaps,  and  began  at  three  o'clock  an  attack  from  thence. 
This,  however,  came  to  grief  under  the  fire  of  grape- 
shot  of  the  defenders,  and  of  a  threatened  charge  by 


204  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN   WAE. 

the  3rd  Brigade  of  cavalry,  which  General  von  Colomb 
had  set  in  motion  in  the  open  country  to  the  west  of 
Dambron.  In  the  same  way  an  attack  on  Morale,  by 
the  left  wing  from  Autroches,  miscarried.  But,  at 
four  o'clock,  the  French  advanced  along  the  whole  line, 
preceded  by  a  swarm  of  tirailleurs.  They  were  repulsed 
at  Poupry,  and  likewise  at  Morale,  at  which  latter  place 
two  companies  of  sappers  joined  in  the  fight ;  on  the 
other  hand,  their  right  wing  broke  through  into  the 
forest,  and  compelled  the  Germans  to  retreat.  But  the 
Prussian  battahons,  who  were  in  reserve,  advanced 
from  Poupry,  and  drove  the  enemy  back  into  the 
scrub,  where  they  still  had  to  defend  themselves  against 
an  attack  by  the  cavalry. 

The  fighting  was  now  stopped  by  the  approach  of 
night.  The  22nd  Division  remained  under  arms  till 
eleven  o'clock  in  the  position  which  they  had  seized, 
and  then  went  back  to  Anneux.  The  3rd  Division  of 
cavalry  went  for  the  night  to  Baigneaux.  The  17th 
Division  remained  in  position  near  Lumeau,  having 
Loigny  to  their  front,  which  they  occupied  in  concert 
with  the  Bavarians,  who  extended  further  to  the  right 
as  far  as  Orgeres. 

The  day  had  cost  the  French  4000  killed  and 
wounded,  and  the  Germans  fully  as  many ;  but  2500 
unwounded  prisoners,  eight  guns,  one  mitrailleuse,  and 
a  standard  belonging  to  the  enemy  were  left  in  their 
possession. 

On  the  French  side,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  returned  to 
Artenay,  and  there  received  orders  to  occupy  the  posi- 
tion previously  taken  up  on  the  skirt  of  the  wood, 
with  a  division  to  be  stationed  there  for  its  defence. 

Thus  the  intended  advance  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
Army  of  Orleans  failed.  The  Sixteenth  Corps,  lacking 
the  support  of  the  Seventeenth,  had  indeed  lost  ground, 


BATTLE   OF  LOIGNY — POUPRY.  205 

but  kept  its  place  in  the  foremost  line  at  Villepion, 
FaveroUes,  and  Terminiers.  It  was  therefore  left  to 
G-eneral  Chanzy  to  make  one  more  attack  on  the  right 
wing  of  the  Germans  on  the  following  day. 

This  consisted  of  five  corps,  and  stood  close  in  front 
of  the  enemy ;  further  reinforcements  could  not  for  the 
present  be  given,  but  the  Commander-in-chief  thought 
that  the  moment  had  now  come  to  put  an  end  to  the 
incessant  danger  to  the  investing  lines  from  the  south. 

On  the  2nd,  at  midday,  the  order  came  from  head- 
quarters for  all  the  forces  to  attack  Orleans,  and  in  the 
course  of  that  day  Prince  Frederick  Charles  gave  the 
requisite  instructions  to  this  end. 

It  is  here  necessary  to  go  back  a  little  in  order  to  see 
how  circumstances  developed  events  during  November 
at  various  other  points. 


IV. 

FIGHTING   ROUND   PARIS. 

PAEIS   IN   NOVEMBER. 

The  report,  which  became  known  on  the  14th 
November,  of  the  happy  result  of  the  action  at  Coul- 
miers  on  the  9th,  had  raised  new  hopes  in  Paris.  No 
one  any  longer  doubted  that  the  enemy  would  find  it 
necessary  to  send  large  forces  in  that  direction,  which 
would  considerably  weaken  the  investing  hues,  particu- 
larly in  the  south. 

In  order  to  assist  the  hoped-for  rehef  by  independent 
action  when  the  time  came,  three  armies  were  formed 
out  of  the  garrison  of  Paris. 

The  first,  under  General  Clement  Thomas,  consisted 
of  226  battalions  of  the  National  Guard,  in  round 
numbers  130,000  men.  They  were  to  defend  the  city 
walls  and  maintain  peace  in  the  city.  The  second, 
under  General  Ducrot,  included  the  most  trusty 
elements,  particularly  the  troops  which  had  hitherto 
constituted  the  Thirteenth  and  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 
This  army  was  divided  into  three  corps  and  one  di- 
vision of  cavalry,  consisting  of  fully  100,000  men  and 
more  than  300  guns.  They  were  intended  for  active 
service  in  the  field,  and  for  making  sorties  on  the  in- 
vesting forces.  The  third  army,  under  General  Vinoy, 
70,000  strong,  consisted  of  six  regiments  of  the  Garde 
Mobile,  and  one  division  of  cavalry ;  and  Maud'huy's 
infantry  division  was  also  distributed  among  them. 
They  were  to  support  the  more  important  sorties  by 
making  feints  against  the  foremost  besieging  Unes. 


PREPAEATIONS   IN   PARIS.  207 

Besides  these,  80,000  of  the  Garde  Mobile  were  in  the 
forts,  and  35,000  men  at  St.  Denis  under  Admiral  de  la 
Ronciere. 

The  available  fighting  power  consequently  amounted 
to  above  400,000  men. 

The  garrison  exhibited  a  remarkable  activity  in 
small  night  engagements.  The  heavy  guns  in  the  place 
would  carry  as  far  as  Choisy-le-Roi,  and  even  to 
Beauregard,  near  Versailles.  They  worked  hard  in  the 
trenches  on  the  peninsula  of  Gennevilliers  and  con- 
structed a  military  bridge.  Several  things  showed 
that  the  French  intended  to  make  an  attempt  on  the 
west.  But  since,  as  long  as  the  Second  Army  was 
still  incomplete,  the  greatest  danger  threatened  the 
Germans  from  the  south,  their  Commander-in-chief,  as 
already  mentioned,  kept  the  Second  Corps  behind  the 
Yvette  from  Villeneuve  to  Saclay.  On  the  north  of 
Paris  the  corps  of  Guards  spread  themselves  out  to 
the  left  towards  Aulnay,  the  Twelfth  crossed  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Marne,  and  the  Wiirtemberg  Di- 
vision moved  to  the  position  left  vacant  by  the  Second 
Corps  between  the  Marne  and  the  Seine. 

On  November  18th  the  summons  came  to  Paris  from 
Tours  to  effect  a  prompt  connection  with  the  Army  of 
the  Loire,  somewhat  prematurely,  as  we  know,  since 
that  army  was  still  deliberating  about  merely  defensive 
measures. 

In  Paris,  arrangements  were,  indeed,  being  made  for 
a  great  sortie.  But  as  the  earlier  attacks  on  the  centre 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  had  shown  that  this  had  been  con- 
siderably strengthened  by  fortifications  at  Thiais  and 
Chevilly,  it  was  decided  to  reach  the  uplands  east  of 
Joinville  and  from  thence  to  turn  off  to  the  south. 
The  attention  of  the  Germans  was  to  be  diverted  by 
means  of  attacks  in  the  opposite  direction. 


208  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

On  the  18tli,  the  day  on  which  the  Army  of  Orleans 
had  vainly  endeavored  to  press  on  towards  Beaune-la- 
Eolande,  General  Ducrot  assembled  the  Second  Paris 
Army  in  the  neighborhood  of  Vincennes,  and  the  Third, 
with  Hugues's  division,  occupied  Mont-A^Ton  on  the 
following  day.  As,  however,  the  construction  of 
bridges  at  Champigny  and  Bry  was  not  yet  completed, 
battle  was  postponed  till  the  30th ;  but  it  was  left  to 
the  leaders  of  the  minor  engagements  to  carry  them 
into  effect  simultaneously  or  separately.  Accordingly, 
Maud'huy's  division  collected  during  the  night  of  the 
29th  behind  the  redoubt  at  Hautes-Bruyeres,  and 
marched  towards  L'Hay  before  daybreak. 

Warned  by  the  heavy  firing  from  the  southern  forts, 
General  von  Tlimpling  had  ordered  the  12th  Division 
to  get  under  arms  early  in  their  positions,  and  the  11th 
to  assemble  at  Fresnes. 

The  French,  favored  by  the  darkness,  made  their 
way  through  the  vineyards  into  L'Hay ;  yet  they  were 
successfully  driven  back  by  the  Germans  with  the 
bayonet  and  clubbed  arms. 

After  continuing  the  firing  for  some  time,  the  French 
renewed  their  onslaught  at  8.30,  but  without  success ; 
and  then  the  defenders,  reinforced  from  the  reserve, 
replied  with  a  vigorous  charge.  At"-  ten  o'clock  the 
enemy  retreated  to  Villejuif. 

Admiral  Pothuau  had  at  the  same  time  advanced 
up  the  Seine  with  the  Marine  Infantry  and  the  Na- 
tional Guard.  A  vedette  at  Gare-aux-Boeufs  was  sur- 
prised and  taken  prisoner,  Choisy-le-Roi  was  fired  upon 
by  field-guns,  artillery,  and  some  gun-boats,  which 
appeared  on  the  Seine.  Meanwhile,  as  the  Grenadiers 
of  the  10th  Regiment  (German)  were  on  the  point  of 
making  an  attack  on  their  side,  General  Vinoy  stopped 
the  fighting. 


SORTIES  FROM  PARIS.  209 

This  demonstration  cost  the  French  1000  men  and 
300  uninjured  prisoners;  the  Prussians,  who  were 
under  cover,  lost  only  140  men.  Still,  the  forts  kept 
up  fire  till  midday,  and  then  the  enemy  were  allowed 
a  short  truce,  in  order  to  carry  away  their  numerous 
wounded. 

Against  the  centre  of  the  Fifth  Corps  also  a  strong 
force  of  infantry  had  advanced  at  eight  o'clock,  upon 
Garches  and  Malmaison,  and  had  driven  in  part  of  the 
outposts.  But  they  soon  met  with  opposition  from 
the  battahons,  and  at  noon  retreated  into  Valerien. 

THE   ATTEMPT   TO   RELEASE   THE  ARMY   OF   PARIS. 

(30th  November  and  2nd  December.) 

On  the  30th  November  the  Second  Paris  Army 
opened  the  battle  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of  the 
capital. 

To  prevent  the  concentration  of  the  Germans  towards 
the  real  attack,  the  investing  lines  were  engaged  against 
sorties  at  almost  every  point. 

General  Ducrot  ordered  SusbieUe's  division  of  his 
Second  Corps  to  march  to  the  south.  These  had 
already  reached  Rosny  by  three  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
crossed  over  the  Marne  at  Creteil  by  a  flying  bridge, 
and  from  thence,  briskly  supported  by  the  neighboring 
forts,  opened  fire  on  the  Wiirtemberg  Division,  whose 
outposts  had  been  pushed  forward  as  far  as  Bonneuil 
and  Mesly. 

General  von  Obernitz  had  to  maintain  an  extended 
position,  his  1st  Division,  being  near  ViUiers,  on  the 
peninsula  of  Joinville,  his  2nd  at  Sucy-en-Brie,  and  his 
3rd  at  Brevannes.  The  division  had  been  placed  under 
the  General  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
who  had  received  orders  from  Versailles  to  increase 

14: 


210  THE   FRANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

his  strength  considerably  by  the  addition  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  or  even  of  some  troops  of  the  Corps  of  Guards. 

In  consequence  of  the  enemy's  enormous  numbers 
on  Mont-Avron,  the  Saxon  Corps  believed  themselves 
immediately  threatened  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Marne, 
and  requested  to  be  immediately  transferred  to  the  left ; 
but  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  gave  orders  that  the 
whole  of  the  24th  Division  should  assemble  there  on 
the  following  day. 

Thus,  for  the  present,  no  help  could  be  rendered  to 
the  Wiirtembergers  but  by  means  of  the  wing  of  the 
Second  Corps,  which  was  posted  at  Villeneuve,  instead 
of  the  7th  Brigade  of  infantry,  who  were  sent  near 
Brevannes  to  Valenton. 

The  fire  of  three  German  batteries,  on  their  way  to 
that  town,  first  brought  the  advance  of  the  French 
Division  to  a  stand.  The  attempt  of  the  Wiirtem- 
bergers to  take  Mont-Mesly  completely  failed  at  the 
outset ;  but  after  the  artillery  was  brought  into  play 
they  succeeded  in  taking  the  hill  by  twelve  o'clock,  and 
the  Prussian  battalions  made  their  way  into  Mesly. 
The  Wiirtemberg  troopers  attacked  the  enemy's  retreat- 
ing guns  with  great  success.  At  1.30  the  re-opening 
of  the  fire  from  the  forts  announced,  the  end  of  this 
sortie.  It  cost  the  Germans  350  men,  and  the  French 
1200. 

During  this  time  the  centre  of  the  Sixth  Corps  had 
not  even  been  disturbed.  General  Vinoy,  who  had  not 
been  informed  of  the  advance  of  Susbielle's  division, 
as  soon  as  its  retreat  was  noticed,  opened  a  rapid  fire 
on  Ivry  and  the  adjoining  works,  which  was  augmented 
by  gun-boats  on  the  Seine,  and  armor-plated  batteries 
on  the  railway.  Then  Admiral  Pothuau  advanced 
against  Choisy-le-Roi  and  Thiais.  He  once  more  set 
his  marines  to  diive  out  the  Prussian  outposts  from 


SORTIES   FROM  PARIS.  211 

Gare-aux-Boeufs.  But  the  further  advance  failed,  and 
General  Vinoy  recalled  his  troops,  after  which  the 
fighting  at  Mesly  ceased,  and  only  the  thunder  of 
artillery  continued  till  five  o'clock. 

After  a  preliminary  cannonade  from  Valerien  the 
Garde  Mobile  advanced  against  the  centre  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  as  early  as  seven  o'clock.  They  were,  however, 
repulsed  by  the  outposts,  and  supports  who  were  in 
readiness,  and  retired  at  eleven  o'clock. 

Further  towards  the  north  of  Paris  a  sharp  skirmish 
took  place.  At  midday  the  Fort  de  la  Briche,  sup- 
ported by  field-guns  and  a  floating  battery,  opened  a 
heavy  fire  on  the  low-lying  village  of  Epinay,  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Seine.  At  two  o'clock  Haurion's 
brigade  advanced,  two  companies  of  marines  pressed 
into  this  place  along  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  drove 
out  the  garrison,  which  consisted  of  only  one  com- 
pany* A  second  also  retii-ed  from  the  base  of  the  for- 
tifications in  a  northerly  direction  towards  Ormesson. 
At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  village,  with  a 
few  obstinately  defended  farms  on  the  further  side  of 
the  mill-race,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  French. 

Meanwhile  the  troops  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps 
had  assembled,  and  estabhshed  seven  batteries  on  the 
heights  above.  The  infantry  rushed  into  the  village 
from  all  sides  with  loud  cheers,  and  after  a  fierce 
street-fight  recovered  possession  of  the  lost  posts ;  and 
it  was  this  transitory  victory  that  was  to  raise  such 
great  hopes  in  Tours.  The  losses  on  both  sides 
amounted  to  300  men. 

These  were  all  mere  feints  to  facilitate  the  chief 
action;  and  whilst  the  investing  troops  were  thus 
engaged  and  attracted  to  various  points,  two  corps  of 
the  French  Second  Army  at  6.30  in  the  morning 
crossed  the  bridges  at  Joinville  and  Nogent  which  had 


212  THE  FEAJ^CO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

been  completed  during  the  night.  After  repulsing  the 
German  outposts  they  both  deployed,  and  completely 
covered  the  peninsula  between  Champigny  and  Bry. 
The  Third  Corps  had  taken  the  road  along  the  north 
bank  of  the  Marne,  towards  Neuilly,  to  cross  the  river 
there,  thus  at  the  same  time  threatening  the  position 
of  the  Saxon  Corps,  who  therefore  detained  the  47th 
Brigade  on  the  right  bank,  though  it  had  been  sent  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Wiirtembergers.  Consequently 
only  two  Grerman  brigades,  spread  over  three-quarters 
of  a  mile,  were  left  to  face  the  two  French  corps 
on  the  left  bank,  with  the  Saxon  48th  at  Noisy,  and 
the  Wiirtemberg  1st  between  Villiers  and  Chenne- 
vieres. 

At  ten  o'clock  Maussion's  division  advanced  towards 
the  Park  of  Villiers.  Supported  by  the  Saxon  divis- 
ions from  Noisy,  the  Wiirtembergers  repulsed  a  first 
attack,  but  in  following  it  up  met  with  heavy  losses. 
The  French  batteries  of  two  divisions  and  those  of  the 
Artillery  Reserve  formed  line  in  front  of  the  park. 
On  their  right  wing  Faron's  division,  which  had  met 
with  no  slight  losses,  occupied  Champigny,  and  was 
drawn  up  for  defence  in  front  of  this  position. 

General  Ducrot's  original  idea  had^  been  to  prolong 
the  engagement  on  the  peninsula  until  he  could  be 
joined  at  Noisy  by  his  Third  Corps.  But  as  news 
arrived  that  at  eleven  o'clock  they  were  still  beyond 
the  Marne,  he  ordered  a  general  attack  by  the  two 
other  corps  to  commence  at  once. 

On  the  left  their  advance  was  checked  for  a  consid- 
erable time  by  the  German  batteries  between  Noisy 
and  Villiers,  and  when  Colonel  von  Abendroth  ad- 
vanced with  six  companies  of  the  48th  Brigade  from 
both  those  places  to  attack  in  force,  the  French  retired 
to  the  vineyards  on  the  western  slope  of  the  plateau, 


SOETIES   FKOM   PAKIS.  213 

even  leaving  two  guns,  which,  however,  the  Saxons 
could  not  take  away  for  want  of  horses. 

In  the  centre  Berthaut's  division  tried  to  pass  south 
of  ViUiers,  but,  under  a  fire  from  five  batteries  sta- 
tioned there  and  at  Cornilly,  their  ranks  were  so  much 
thinned  that  they  fell  back  before  the  advance  of  a 
Saxon  battalion. 

On  the  right  wing,  the  guns  which  had  been  brought 
up  for  the  defence  of  Champigny  had  at  last  been 
compelled  by  the  Grerman  artillery  to  withdi*aw,  and 
had  again  sought  cover  further  north,  near  the  lime- 
kilns. A  division  of  infantry  had  advanced  along  the 
river  to  Maison-Blanche,  but  in  the  meantime  the  2nd 
Wiirtemberg  Brigade,  although  itself  attacked  at  Sucy, 
had  dispatched  two  companies  and  a  battery  to  Chen- 
nevieres  as  reinforcements.  Moving  forward  from 
the  Hunting-lodge,  the  Wiirtembergers  took  200  French 
prisoners  at  Maison-Blanche;  though,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  attempt  to  scale  the  heights  before  Cham- 
pigny with  the  companies  assembled  at  Cornilly  failed 
with  heavy  losses.  However,  on  the  renewal  of  the 
flank  attack  from  the  Hunting-lodge,  Faron's  division, 
which  had  already  been  seriously  shaken,  was  obliged 
to  retreat  to  Champigny. 

General  Ducrot  decided  to  be  content,  for  that  day, 
with  having  established  a  firm  footing  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Marne,  and  he  brought  up  sixteen  batteries  to  a 
position  in  his  front,  to  secure  the  ground  he  had 
gained.  On  the  following  day  the  attack  was  to  be 
renewed  by  all  three  corps. 

The  Germans,  on  their  part,  had  to  congratulate 
themselves  on  having  held  firm  against  superior  num- 
bers. And  so  in  the  afternoon  the  fighting  gradually 
died  away,  until  it  broke  out  again  in  the  north. 

The  French  Third  Corps,  marching   up   the  right 


214  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

bank  of  the  Marne,  had  left  a  strong  force  in  Neuilly, 
and  had  diiven  back  the  outpost  of  the  Saxon  23rd 
Brigade.  Under  cover  of  six  batteries  the  construc- 
tion of  two  miUtary  bridges  below  Neuilly  was  begun 
at  ten  o'clock,  and  finished  by  noon.  Just  at  this  time 
it  happened,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  French  on  the 
plateau  were  retiring,  so  the  passage  did  not  take  place 
until  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Bellemare's  divis- 
ion marched  along  the  valley  to  Bry,  where  they  joined 
the  left  wing  of  the  Third  Corps.  A  regiment  of 
Zouaves,  trying  to  ascend  the  heights  from  that  side, 
lost  half  its  men  and  all  its  officers.  Notwithstanding 
this,  Greneral  Ducrot  decided  to  bring  his  increased  rein- 
forcements to  the  renewal  of  the  attack  on  Villiers. 

Reinforced  by  four  battalions,  the  divisions  advanced 
in  this  direction,  although  the  artillery  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  battering  down  the  park  wall;  repeated 
onslaughts  of  infantry  were  repulsed,  and  finally  the 
French  retreated  into  the  valley.  Simultaneously 
with  this,  Berthaut's  division  failed  in  an  attack  on 
the  railway  and  Faron's  in  one  on  the  Hunting-lodge. 
Not  till  darkness  had  set  in  did  the  firing  cease  on 
both  sides. 

In  the  direction  in  which  the  French  Third  Corps 
had  been  fighting  in  the  morning,  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Saxony  had  collected  the  23rd  Division  near  Chelles ; 
but  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  true  plans  could  be 
known,  he  sent  off  a  detachment  of  the  47th  Brigade 
and  part  of  the  artillery  corps  to  the  threatened  posi- 
tion held  by  the  Wiirtembergers.  In  the  same  way 
General  von  Obernitz,  as  soon  as  the  fighting  at  Mesly 
was  over,  dispatched  three  battalions  to  the  Hunting- 
lodge.  At  night  orders  came  from  head-quarters  for 
the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  to  send  reinforcements  to 
the  position  where  the  investing  lines  were  in  danger 


ATTACKS  FKOM  WITHOUT.  215 

and  the  7tli  and  21st  Brigades  arrived  at  Sucy  on  the 
following  day,  the  1st  of  December. 

The  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  French  to  break 
through  without  help  from  outside  was  already  con- 
sidered as  fairly  hopeless,  and  it  was  only  the  fear  of 
popular  indignation  which  caused  the  Third  Army  to 
remain  any  longer  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Marne.  In- 
stead of  attacking,  the  French  began  to  intrench  them- 
selves, and  in  order  to  clear  the  battle-field  a  truce 
was  arranged.  The  thundering  of  the  artillery  of 
Mont-Avron  must  serve  for  the  present  to  keep  the 
Parisians  in  a  good  humor.  The  Germans  also  worked 
at  strengthening  their  positions,  but  suffering  from 
the  sudden  and  extreme  cold,  they  withdrew  at  least 
part  of  their  troops  to  quarters  further  to  the  rear. 

The  command  of  the  whole  of  the  German  Army 
between  the  Marne  and  the  Seine  was  handed  over  to 
General  von  Fransecky.  The  Commander-in-chief  of 
the  Army  of  the  Meuse  had  already  arranged  that 
Prince  George,  with  all  the  available  troops  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  should  take  Bry  and  Champigny  by 
surprise  in  the  early  morning. 

With  this  object,  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd  of 
December,  the  24th  Division  assembled  at  Noisy,  the 
1st  Wiirtemberg  Brigade  at  Villiers,  and  the  7th  Prus- 
sian at  the  Hunting-lodge. 

The  foremost  battalion  of  the  Saxon  Division  drove 
back  the  enemy's  outposts  by  an  unexpected  rush, 
took  100  prisoners,  and  after  carrying  a  barricade,  en- 
tered Bry.  Here  the  fighting  took  the  form  of  fierce 
action  round  the  houses,  in  which  the  2nd  Battalion 
of  the  107th  Eegiment  lost  nearly  all  its  ofiicers.  Nev- 
ertheless, they  held  their  ground,  in  spite  of  the  heavy 
fire  from  the  forts  in  the  northern  parts  of  the  village. 

The  Wiirtembergers   also   seized  Champigny,  but 


216  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

soon  met  with  fierce  resistance  from  the  enemy,  who 
were  sheltered  in  the  buildings.  Bois-de-la-Lande, 
previously  occupied,  had  to  be  abandoned,  and  Gen- 
eral Ducrot  himself  determined  to  attack.  The  strong 
lines  of  artillery  on  his  front  came  into  action  at  about 
nine  o'clock,  and  two  divisions  deployed  behind  them. 

Meanwhile,  the  battalion  of  fusiliers  of  Colberg's 
Regiment  marched  once  more  from  the  Hunting-lodge 
on  Bois-de-la-Lande,  and  took  possession  of  it  at  the 
first  onslaught.  The  French,  who  were  firing  steadily 
from  the  railway  embankments,  di'ove  back  the  Pom- 
eranians with  clubbed  rifles  and  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet.  A  brisk  fight  was  carried  on  at  the  same 
time  near  the  lime-pits,  where  at  noon  160  French  laid 
down  their  arms.  Whilst  the  6th  Wiirtemberger  and 
the  9th  Prussian  batteries  were  by  degrees  brought 
into  action  against  Champigny,  General  Hartmann 
succeeded  in  getting  as  far  as  the  Bry  road.  As,  how- 
ever, the  batteries  were  prevented  by  their  own  troops 
from  firing,  and  were  suffering,  too,  from  the  projec- 
tiles from  the  forts,  they  were  withdrawn  behind  the 
slope  of  the  valley  near  the  Hunting-lodge.  At  two 
o'clock  the  1st  Wiirtemberg  and  the  7th  Prussian  Bri- 
gades had  established  themselves  in  the  line  from  the 
churchyard  of  Champigny  to  Bois-de^a-Lande. 

Meanwhile,  the  French  divisions,  under  Bellemare 
and  Susbielle,  had  reached  the  battle-field  from  the 
right  bank  of  the  Marne.  The  two  (German)  battalions 
at  Bry,  having  already  lost  thirty-six  officers  and  638 
men,  were  compelled  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy  in 
very  superior  force  to  evacuate  the  village  and  retire 
on  Noisy,  but  not  without  taking  300  prisoners  with 
them.  The  remainder  of  the  Saxon  forces  held  Vil- 
liers,  where  the  batteries  still  available  also  took  up  a 
position. 


THE  FIGHT   AT  CHAMPIGNY.  217 

When,  at  two  o'clock,  the  French  were  leading  a 
strong  body  of  artillery  to  this  point,  four  batteries  of 
the  Second  Corps  rushed  out  of  the  hollow  near  the 
Hunting-lodge  at  full  gallop,  and  opened  fire  at  2000 
paces  on  their  flank.  In  scarcely  ten  minutes  the 
French  batteries  retired  and  the  Prussians  went  back 
to  their  sheltered  position.  Several  of  the  enemy's 
battalions  which,  at  about  three  o'clock,  attempted 
a  renewed  assault  on  Villiers,  were  repulsed  with  less 
difficulty,  and  at  five  o'clock  the  fighting  ceased.  Only 
the  French  kept  up  a  fire  of  field  and  fortress  artillery 
until  after  dark. 

General  Ducrot  had  received  information,  in  the 
course  of  the  day,  that  the  Army  of  the  Loire  was 
marching  on  Fontainebleau,  and  he  therefore  deter- 
mined to  maintain,  if  possible,  his  position  outside 
Paris. 

During  the  night  of  the  3rd  December,  provisions 
had  been  procured,  also  additional  teams  and  ammu- 
nition for  the  batteries;  but  the  advance  of  support 
from  without  was  by  no  means  confirmed. 

The  troops  were  completely  exhausted  by  the  disas- 
trous fighting  they  had  gone  through,  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief was  justified  in  dreading  a  repulse  on 
the  Marne  from  the  enemy's  invigorated  forces.  He 
therefore  ordered  a  retreat,  the  troops  being  informed 
that  the  attack  should  be  renewed  as  soon  as  they  were 
once  more  in  a  condition  to  fight. 

Soon  after  midnight  the  divisions  were  already 
drawn  up  behind  the  outposts,  and  the  baggage  trains 
were  sent  back  first.  At  noon  the  troops  were  able  to 
follow  over  the  bridges  at  Neuilly,  Bry,  and  Joinville. 
Only  one  brigade  remained  to  protect  the  passage. 

The  retreat  was  very  skilfully  covered  by  a  series  of 
smaU.  attacks  on  the  German  outposts.    The  French 


218  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAH. 

batteries  had  opened  fire  at  Le-Plant  an^  Bry  by  day 
break,  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy's  army  was 
completely  hidden  by  the  thick  mist. 

General  Fransecky  assembled  the  Saxon  and  the 
Wiirtemberg  Divisions  in  fighting  order  at  Villiers  and 
Coeuilly,  the  7th  Brigade  with  the  artillery  of  the 
Second  Corps  and  two  regiments  of  the  Sixth  at  Chen- 
nevieres,  intending  to  wait  for  the  expected  reinforce- 
ment of  the  4th,  which  was  to  come  from  the  Sixth 
Corps.  The  23rd  Division  received  orders  from  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  to  cross  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Marne,  whilst  the  corps  of  Gruards  had  in  the  mean-' 
time  extended  their  outposts  to  Chelles. 

Matters  remained  so  on  the  3rd,  with  the  exception 
of  petty  frays,  and  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the 
troops  returned  to  quarters.  But  early  on  the  4th,  as 
the  patrols  rode  out  towards  Bry  and  Champigny,  they 
found  these  places  vacated,  and  the  peninsula  of  Join- 
ville  deserted  by  the  enemy. 

The  French  Second  Army,  which  had  been  severely 
reduced  and  its  discipline  much  shaken,  turned  back 
to  Paris ;  by  their  own  statement  they  had  lost  12,000 
men.  The  G-ermans  had  lost  6200  men,  but  took  up 
the  position  again  that  they  had  previously  held  in  the 
investing  lines.  "" 

This  determined  attempt  on  the  part  of  General 
Ducrot  is  the  most  serious  effort  that  was  made  to 
break  out  of  Paris.  It  was  directed  towards  what  was 
at  the  moment  the  weakest  point  of  the  investment, 
but  only  met  with  good  results  at  the  commencement.* 

*  A  legend  was  subsequently  circulated  that  the  voice  of  one  General 
at  one  of  the  German  councils  of  war  had,  in  opposition  to  all  the  others, 
prevented  the  removal  of  the  chief  head-qiiarters  from  Versailles.  Apart 
from  the  fact  that  during  the  whole  course  of  the  invasion  no  council  of 
war  was  ever  held,  it  never  occurred  to  any  member  of  the  King's  mili- 
tjiry  suite  to  set  so  bad  an  example  to  the  army. 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  FIKST  GEEMAN  AEMY.  219 

THE  ADVANCE   OF  THE  FIKST  AEMY   IN   NOVEMBEK. 

The  newly-formed  army  in  the  north  of  France  had 
not  remained  inactive.  Rouen  and  Lille  were  their 
chief  centres.  In  front  of  Lille,  the  Somme  with  its 
fortified  passages  at  Ham,  Peronne,  Amiens,  and  Ab- 
beville afforded  a  field  equally  advantageous  for  attacks 
in  front  or  for  a  secure  retreat.  The  advance  of  the 
French  in  independent  columns  had,  indeed,  on  various 
occasions,  been  checked  by  detachments  of  the  Army 
of  the  Meuse,  and  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  rid 
themselves  permanently  of  that  incubus. 

We  have  already  seen  how,  after  the  fall  of  Metz, 
the  Second  Army  retked  towards  the  Loire,  and  the 
First  into  the  northern  departments  of  France. 

A  large  portion  of  the  First  Army  was  detained  as 
far  back  as  the  Moselle  by  the  transport  of  the  numer- 
ous prisoners  and  by  the  watch  kept  at  the  fortresses 
which  interrupted  the  communications  with  Germany. 
The  whole  of  the  Seventh  Corps  were  either  in  Metz 
or  before  Diedenhof  and  Montmedy.  Of  the  First 
Corps,  the  1st  Division  had  been  withdrawn  to  Rethel, 
the  4th  Brigade  had  been  carried  forward  by  railway 
beyond  Soissons  to  the  investment  of  La-Fere,  and  the 
3rd  Division  of  cavalry  had  been  sent  on  towards  the 
Forest  of  Argonnes.  The  remaining  five  brigades  fol- 
lowed with  the  artillery  on  the  7th  November. 

Marching  on  a  wide  front,  they  had  ah'eady  reached 
the  Oise,  between  Compiegne  and  Chauny,  on  the  20th. 
In  front  of  the  right  wing  the  cavalry,  supported  by  a 
battalion  of  Jagers,  came  across  the  Garde  Mobile  at 
Ham  and  Guiscard,  but  the  French  forces  retired  to 
Amiens  on  the  advance  of  the  infantry  columns.  It 
was  understood  that  15,000  men  were  there,  and  rein- 
forcements continually  joining  them. 


220  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

On  the  25tli  the  3rd  Brigade  reached  Le-Quesnel. 
Of  the  Seventh  Corps,  the  15th  Division  succeeded  in 
getting  beyond  Montdidier,  and  the  16th  as  far  as 
Breteuil,  whence  they  estabhshed  communication  with 
the  Saxon  forces  at  Clermont. 

On  the  26th  the  right  wing  started  for  Le-Quesnel, 
the  left  for  Moreuil  and  Essertaux.  The  cavalry  made 
incursions  across  the  Somme,  the  right  bank  of  which 
they  found  occupied  by  the  French.  The  enemy's 
attitude  showed  that  they  restricted  themselves  to  the 
defence  of  that  position.  General  von  Manteuffel 
thereupon  determined  to  attack,  without  waiting  for 
the  arrival  of  the  1st  Division,  which  had  been  inex- 
plicably delayed  on  the  way  by  railway  from  Rethel. 
But  he  wanted  first,  on  the  27th,  to  concentrate  his 
available  forces  on  a  smaller  front,  as  they  were  spread 
out  over  an  extent  of  four  miles.  But  the  battle  was 
unexpectedly  fought  on  that  same  day. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  AMIENS. 

(November  17th.) 

General  Farre,  with  his  17,500  men  divided  into  three 
brigades,  stood  on  one  side  of  Amiens,  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Somme,  at  Villers-Bret'bnneux,  and  at 
Longueau,  on  the  road  to  Peronne,  keeping  possession 
of  the  villages  and  the  copses  on  his  front.  Besides 
these  there  were  8000  Gardes  Mobiles  haK  a  mile  in 
front  of  the  town  in  intrenched  positions. 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  from  head-quar- 
ters, General  von  Goeben  had  arranged  that  the  15th 
Division  should  take  up  their  quarters  at  Fouencamps 
and  Sains  on  the  27th;  the  16th  at  Rumigny  and 
Plachy,  and  in  the  villages  fui-ther  back ;  the  Artillery 
Corps  at  Grattepanche.    The  Eighth  Corps  had  to  as- 


BATTLE  OF  AMIENS.  221 

semble  before  Amiens  between  the  Celle  and  the  Noye, 
standing  at  least  half  a  mile  from  the  First  Corps,  and 
divided  from  them  by  the  Noye  and  the  Avre.  General 
von  Bentheim,  on  the  other  side,  had  directed  his 
advanced  guard,  the  3rd  Brigade,  to  find  quarters  north 
of  the  Luce. 

At  an  early  hour  the  Germans  seized  the  fords  of 
the  stream  at  Demuin,  Hangard,  and  Domart.  At  ten 
o'clock  they  moved  forward  in  order  to  occupy  the 
quarters  intended  for  them,  and  as  the  enemy  were 
already  in  possession,  a  fight  began  which  gradually 
increased  in  magnitude. 

The  wooded  heights  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Luce 
were  taken  without  any  particular  resistance,  and 
maintained  in  spite  of  several  assaults  by  the  French. 
The  artillery  advanced  in  the  intervals.  On  the  left 
the  4th  Regiment  seized  the  village  of  Gentelles,  on 
the  right  the  44th  Regiment  rushed  up  to  within 
300  paces  of  the  left  wing  of  the  French  position,  and 
by  a  vigorous  onslaught  carried  by  storm  the  earth- 
works at  the  railway  cutting  east  of  Villers  Bretonneux. 
Soon  after  midday  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy  drew 
up  at  Bretonneux  and  in  Cachy,  directly  opposite  the 
3rd  Brigade,  which  was  extended  nearly  a  mile. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  Germans  the  16th  Division 
had  by  eleven  o'clock  already  reached  the  quarters 
assigned  to  them,  and  had  driven  the  enemy  out  of 
Hebecourt,  as  well  as  out  of  te  woods  north  of  this 
place  towards  Dury.  When  the  Eighth  Corps  was 
called  out  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Noye,  the  15th  Di- 
vision was  moved  from  Moreuil  along  the  left  bank  of 
the  Noye  by  way  of  Ailly  to  Dommartin,  and  the  ad- 
vanced guard  from  Hailles  marched  on  Fouencamps. 

Thus  it  happened  that  before  noon,  between  the  two 
corps,  the  roads  from  Noye  and  Montdidier  were  left 


222  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN   WAR. 

completely  exposed  on  the  German  side,  while  a  French 
brigade  was  standing  at  the  fork  of  the  road  at  Lon- 
gueau,  though,  in  fact,  it  remained  absolutely  inactive. 

This  interval  was  at  fii'st  screened  only  by  the 
numerous  retinue  and  the  staff  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief  ;  and  then  it  was  to  some  extent  filled  up  by  the 
battalions  constituting  the  escort  of  the  head-quarters. 
As,  however,  at  ten  o'clock  the  French  on  their  side 
commenced  an  attack  on  the  3rd  Brigade,  General  von 
Manteuffel  ordered  the  15th  Division  to  join  in  the  fight 
as  far  as  possible  on  the  right  wing. 

After  a  steady  defence,  the  companies  of  the  4th 
Regiment  were  driven  back  out  of  the  Wood  of  Han- 
gard  towards  the  slope  of  the  hill  in  front  of  Demuin, 
and  subsequently,  after  having  fired  away  all  their 
ammunition,  the  defenders  of  Gentelles  were  driven 
back  to  Domart. 

General  von  Strubberg,  instructed  from  the  ca.mp 
beyond  the  Luce,  had  sent  four  batteries  in  this  direc- 
tion, which  crossed  the  Avre,  but  came  under  such  a 
hea\"j^  fire  from  the  Wood  of  Gentelles  that  their  fur- 
ther advance  was  prevented,  and  they  had  to  change 
front  on  the  copse.  Behind  them,  however,  the  other 
detachments  of  the  30th  Brigade  pressed  forward  to 
St.  Nicolas  on  the  right  bank,  and  to  Boves  on  the  left, 
and  with  the  help  of  the  29th  Brigade  di'ove  out  the 
French  from  the  heap  of  ruins. 

Meanwhile  a  part  of  the  1st  German  Division,  who 
were  retiring,  had  come  up  behind  the  3rd  Brigade. 
The  position  of  the  artillery  was  considerably  strength- 
ened, the  guns  were  directed  against  the  earthworks 
south  of  Bretonneux.  As  further  support  the  Crown 
Prince's  Regiment  marched  out  and  the  French  were 
again  soon  driven  out  of  the  Bois-de-Hangard.  The 
East  Prussians,  who  were  following,  crouched  behind 


BATTLE  OF  AMIENS,  223 

the  earthworks,  several  detachments  of  the  4th  and 
44th  Regiments  gradually  collected  there  from  the 
neighboring  woods,  and  di'ove  the  enemy  from  this 
position.  Thirteen  batteries  now  silenced  the  French 
artiUery,  and,  after  they  had  fired  for  some  time  on 
Bretonneux,  the  place  was,  at  four  o'clock,  seized  by 
the  Prussians,  who  came  in  from  all  sides  with  di'ums 
beating.  The  French  in  the  town  only  opposed  them 
at  a  few  places ;  for  the  most  part  they  hurried  over 
the  Somme  at  Corbie  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  and 
with  the  loss  of  180  nnwounded  prisoners. 

When,  somewhat  later.  General  Lecointe  advanced 
with  the  reserve  brigade  on  Domart,  he  found  the  place 
already  in  possession  of  the  1st  Division,  so  turned 
back.  The  French  only  succeeded  in  holding  Cachy 
till  late  in  the  evening. 

The  troops  of  the  First  Corps  were  accommodated 
for  the  night  in  the  hamlets  to  the  south  of  the  Luce, 
the  outposts  remained  on  duty  on  the  north  bank,  and 
Bretonneux  also  was  occupied. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  battle-field  the  16th  Division 
had  advanced  on  Dury,  had  driven  the  French  out  of 
the  neighboring  churchyard,  but  had  been  forced  to 
retire  from  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  lines  of  intrench- 
ment,  which  were  extensive  and  strongly  defended. 
They  bivouacked  behind  Dury. 

It  was  night  before  General  von  Manteuffel  received 
news  of  the  enemy's  complete  defeat.  Early  in  the 
morning  of  the  28th  the  patrols  of  the  First  Army 
Corps  found  the  ground  clear  of  the  enemy  as  far  as 
the  Somme,  and  all  the  bridges  across  the  river  demol- 
ished. By  noon  General  von  Goeben  returned  to 
Amiens,  and  the  citadel  capitulated  two  days  later  with 
400  men  and  30  cannon. 

One  pecuharity  of  the  battle  of  the  27th  November 


224  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

is  the  small  extent  of  the  battle-field  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  the  troops'  engaged.  G-eneral  Farre, 
with  25,000  men  in  round  numbers,  covered  a  front  of 
three  miles  from  Pont-de-Metz  south  of  Amiens  to  the 
east  of  Villers  Bretonneux,  with  the  Somine  close  on 
his  rear.  As  the  Germans  attacked  on  about  the  same 
length  of  front,  there  was  a  break  in  their  centre.  The 
danger  caused  by  this  gap  was  not  taken  advantage 
of  during  the  morning  through  the  inactivity  of  the 
enemy,  and  it  was  then  nullified  by  the  occupation  of 
St.  Nicolas. 

The  superiority  of  numbers  was  on  the  side  of  the 
Germans,  for,  although  of  the  1st  Division  in  their 
rear,  only  the  Crown  Prince's  Regiment  could  take 
part  in  the  fighting,  they  were  30,000  strong. 

The  3rd  Brigade  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  battle, 
losing  630  men  and  34  officers,  out  of  a  total  of  1300. 
The  French  also  lost  1300  kiUed,  besides  1000  reported 
missingo  Part  of  the  National  Guard  threw  down  their 
arms  and  fled  for  their  homes.  The  main  body  of  the 
French  Corps  retired  on  Amiens. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  the  First  Army  was 
reinforced  by  the  4th  Brigade,  which  had  been  brought 
from  La-Fere. 

THE   TAKING   OF   LA-FERE. 

(November  27th.) 

This  little  fortress  had  become  quite  important,  since 
it  closed  the  line  of  railway  passing  through  Rheims, 
whether  to  Paris  or  to  Amiens.  Lying  in  low  open 
ground,  well  watered  by  the  Somme  and  its  tributaries, 
it  is  difficult  of  access;  otherwise,  the  fortifications 
were  restricted  to  a  wall  standing  apart,  with  small 
earthworks  lying  close  in  front  of  it,  and  it  was  entirely 


LA-FEKE  AND  DIEDENHOF.  225 

exposed  to  view  from  the  heights  situated  on  the  east 
at  a  distance  of  not  more  than  1500  metres. 

The  brigade  had  temporarily  invested  La-Fere  on 
the  15th  November,  and  when  the  siege-train  arrived 
from  Soissons  with  thirty-two  heavy  guns,  seven  bat- 
teries were  constructed  and  armed  dm-ing  the  night  of 
the  25th  on  the  heights  abeady  mentioned.  On  the 
following  morning  these  opened  fire,  and  on  the  27th 
the  place  capitulated ;  2300  Gardes  Mobiles  were  taken 
prisoners,  and  the  most  serviceable  of  the  113  guns 
were  carried  to  Amiens  to  arm  the  citadel.  The 
Seventh  Corps,  which  was  to  have  supported  the  Fu-st 
Army,  meanwhile  never  appeared  in  sight,  because 
they  still  had  further  work  to  do  on  the  Moselle ;  on 
the  13th  November  the  gi-eater  part  of  the  14th  Divis- 
ion had  only  reached  Diedenhof. 

THE  TAKING  OF  DIEDENHOF. 

(November  24th.) 

This  fortress,  being  shut  in  on  aU  sides  by  hills,  was 
entirely  without  bomb-proof  space ;  the  direct  approach 
from  the  south  was,  on  the  other  hand,  rendered  more 
difficult  by  inundations,  and  on  the  west  and  north  by 
marsh  lands.  General  von  Kameke  therefore  decided 
to  await  the  results  of  a  heavy  bombardment  before 
making  a  regular  attack.  Batteries  were  erected  on 
both  banks  of  the  Moselle,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
22nd  eighty-five  guns  opened  fire.  At  first  the  fortress 
answered  briskly.  In  the  following  night,  to  lay  the 
first  parallel,  the  infantry  advanced  to  within  600  paces 
on  the  west  front,  but,  in  consequence  of  pouring  rain 
and  the  condition  of  the  ground,  the  work  made  but 
small  progress.  However,  on  the  24th  at  midday  the 
Commandant  sent  in  negotiations  for  the  sui'render  of 
15 


226  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

the  place.  The  garrison,  4000  men  strong,  with  the 
exception  of  the  National  Guard  stationed  in  the  place, 
was  captured  and  sent  to  Germany.  One  hundred  and 
ninety-nine  guns,  besides  a  considerable  amount  of 
provisions,  arms,  and  ammunition,  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  victorious  troops. 

The  14th  Division  was  now  required  to  lay  siege  to 
the  forts  on  the  northern  frontier,  which  would  occupy 
it  for  some  time.  The  13th  Division  was,  by  orders 
from  head-quarters,  directed  to  commence  operations 
in  the  south  of  France. 

THE   INVESTMENT   OF  BELFOET   IN   NOVEMBEE. 

On  the  south-east  of  the  seat  of  war  Belfort  had 
become  the  centre  of  continuous  small  engagements 
between  French  scouts  and  the  rear  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  who,  under  General  von  Werder,  stood  near 
Vesoul. 

However,  when  the  divisions  which  up  till  then  had 
been  standing  before  Strasburg,  had  been  relieved  by 
a  new  contingent  from  Germany,  the  troops  that  were 
at  Neu-Breisach  were  available,  and  these  forces 
marched  in  the  direction  of  Upper  Alsace,  while  the 
1st  Reserve  Division  had  reached  Belfort  by  the  3rd 
November,  and  by  the  8th  had  effected  the  preliminary 
investment  of  that  place.  The  larger  half  of  the  4th 
Eeserve  Division  had  marched  to  combine  with  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  at  Vesoul,  a  detachment  under  Gen- 
eral von  Debschitz  occupied  Montbeliard,  and  the  67th 
Regiment  held  Mulhouse  and  Delle. 

If  we  glance  back  at  the  German  successes  during 
November  and  the  general  military  position  towards 
the  end  of  the  month,  we  see  the  grand  sortie  from 
Paris  repulsed  in  the  north,  the  danger  of  being 
hemmed   in   done  away  with  by  General  von  Man- 


BATTLE   OF   ORLEANS.  227 

teuffel's  victory  at  Amiens;  in  the  east,  Diedenhof, 
Breisach,  Verdun,  and  La-Fere  taken,  Montmedy  and 
Belf ort  surrounded ;  and  in  the  south  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  preparing  to  attack  the  French  army  at  Or- 
leans. 

BATTLE   or  OELEANS. 

(December  3rd  and  4th.) 

"When  the  telegraphic  order  was  received  by  the 
Second  Army,  soon  after  noon  on  the  2nd  of  December, 
the  Prince  on  the  same  day  assembled  the  Tenth  Corps 
at  Beaune-la-Rolande  and  Boynes,  the  Third  at  Pithi- 
viers,  and  the  Ninth  at  Bazoches-les-Gallerandes.  By 
evening  the  collected  forces  had  their  marching  orders. 

The  attack  was  expected  to  take  place  two  days  later. 
The  Third  Corps  was  first  to  advance  on  Loury  by 
way  of  Chilleurs-aux-Bois ;  the  Tenth  only  on  Chil- 
leurs ;  the  Ninth,  however,  were  to  attack  Artenay  at 
half -past  nine.  The  1st  Division  of  cavalry,  supported 
by  the  infantry  on  the  left  wing,  was  to  keep  a  lookout 
over  the  Yonne,  the  6  th  was  to  follow  the  right  wing. 
The  Grand  Duke,  to  whom  it  had  been  left  to  plan  his 
own  march  on  the  west  of  the  road  to  Paris,  ordered 
the  22nd  Division  to  assist  in  the  attack  on  Artenay, 
the  Bavarian  Corps  to  advance  on  Lumeau,  the  17th 
Division  to  remain  at  Anneux.  The  4th  Division  of 
cavalry  was  to  scour  the  country  on  the  left  flank. 

Already  by  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  3rd 
of  December  the  Third  Corps  met  eight  battalions  and 
six  batteries  of  the  French  at  Santeau.  The  12th 
Brigade  and  the  artillery  of  the  6th  Division,  who  had 
been  marched  up  in  the  rear  of  the  foremost  battalions 
in  the  column  of  route,  therefore  formed  line  at  La- 
Brosse.  After  a  few  rounds,  one  of  the  batteries  of 
the  left  wing  had  to  be  withdi-awn  from  the  battle, 


228  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

which  had  now  commenced ;  on  the  right,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  Artillery  Corps  came  up  by  degrees,  and  by 
noon  seventy-eight  Prussian  guns  were  in  full  action. 

The  French,  yielding  to  such  superior  strength, 
retired  on  Chilleurs ;  but,  after  the  Grerman  batteries 
had  advanced  within  2000  paces  of  that  place  and  their 
right  flank  had  been  threatened  by  an  assault  from  the 
Jager  battalions,  they  commenced  a  retreat  towards 
the  forest,  and  at  three  o'clock  part  of  the  5th  Division 
followed  them  up  by  the  path  which  led  to  the  south, 
and  the  6th  by  the  high-roads.  As  these  had  been 
obstructed  in  several  places,  it  was  six  o'clock  in  the 
evening  before  the  clearing  by  Loury  was  reached. 

On  the  right  brisk  musketry-fire  was  heard  in  the 
direction  of  Neuville,  and  an  announcement  also  arrived 
that  on  the  left  the  French  were  occupying  Nancray. 

In  consequence  of  this,  some  of  the  reserve  forces 
that  had  remained  at  Chilleurs  were  brought  up  as  a 
support,  one  regiment  was  fronted  towards  the  west,  a 
second  towards  the  east,  and,  under  cover  of  the  out- 
posts on  the  south,  the  remainder  of  the  troops  biv- 
ouacked and  went  into  quarters  at  Loury. 

The  Ninth  Corps  had  at  first  assembled  at  Chateau- 
Graillard,  on  the  road  to  Paris,  and  then  advanced  along 
the  high-road  and  against  Villereau  by  way  of  Dam- 
bron. 

At  Assas  they  met  the  French,  who  were  soon  driven 
back  by  the  guns,  and  vanished  towards  Artenay.  At 
about  ten  o'clock  an  obstinate  duel  was  opened  with 
the  batteries  of  the  2nd  Division  (French)  in  position 
at  this  place,  in  which  part  of  the  corps'  artillery  bore 
a  part,  seconded  presently  by  the  batteries  of  the  22nd 
Division,  which  had  come  up  to  Poupry.  General 
Martineau  slowly  retreated  in  echelon  before  the  over- 
whelming fire  of  90  guns,  the  artillery  leading  the  way, 


FIGHTING  ROUND  ORLEANS.  229 

on  La-Croix-Briquet  and  Ferme-d'Arblay.  By  twelve 
o'clock  the  Germans  were  in  possession  of  Artenay, 
and  after  half  an  hour's  rest  they  renewed  the  attack. 
It  was  a  long  and  obstinate  duel  of  artillery  and  in- 
fantry alike,  while  the  22nd  Division  pushed  hard  on 
the  French  left  flank.  At  two  o'clock  their  guns  were 
silenced,  the  left  wing  column  of  the  Ninth  German 
Corps  took  the  farm  of  Arblay,  and  the  centre  drove 
the  enemy  down  the  high-road,  fighting  persistently, 
past  La-Croix-Briquet  to  Andeglou,  where,  under  cover 
of  the  Marine  ordnance,  resistance  was  kept  up  till 
dark. 

General  Puttkamer  had  brought  up  five  batteries  to 
within  800  paces  of  Chevilly,  and  the  22nd  Division 
was  advancing  on  the  burning  village,  when  the  gen- 
eral in  command  gave  the  order  to  halt,  the  Grand 
Duke  doubting  the  wisdom  of  a  night  attack  on  an 
intrenched  position.  But  when,  soon  after,  a  patrol 
of  hussars  announced  that  it  was  already  evacuated, 
General  von  Wittich  ordered  his  men  to  take  posses- 
sion. 

The  troops  bivouacked,  under  a  heavy  snow-storm, 
in  and  to  the  rear  of  La-Croix-Briquet. 

At  the  first  advance  the  Ninth  Corps  had  sent  a 
detachment  of  four  battalions  of  Hessians  against  St. 
Lye  on  the  left.  They  had  met  the  enemy  at  La-Tour, 
and  had  driven  him  back  on  St.  Germain,  but  could 
not  drive  him  out  again. 

When  the  Tenth  Corps,  marching  round  by  Pithi- 
viers,  reached  Chilleurs  at  about  three  o'clock,  in  the 
rear  of  the  Third  Corps,  part  of  the  20th  Division  went 
on  in  the  direction  of  the  battle  at  Neuville,  which,  in 
the  evening,  became  audible  at  Loury.  Darkness  had 
already  come  on  and  precluded  the  use  of  artillery,  but 
the  infantry  broke  into  the  village  at  several  points. 


230  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

However,  they  found  the  streets  barricaded,  and  met 
with  obstinate  resistance,  so  the  attack  had  to  be  post- 
poned till  the  following  day. 

The  Fifteenth  French  Corps  had  alone  received  the 
onslaught  of  three  Prussian  corps.  Strong  contingents 
of  the  Army  of  the  Loire,  posted  to  the  right  and  left 
of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  made  but  feeble  efforts  through- 
out the  day  to  support  it.  General  Chanzy  alone,  at 
about  two  o'clock,  ordered  the  2nd  Division  of  the  Six- 
teenth Corps  to  advance  when  he  heard  firing  from 
Artenay,  though  he  had  that  morning  begun  his  retreat 
on  St.  Peravy  and  Boulay.  But  this  reinforcement 
met  the  Prussian  17th  Division,  which,  coming  up 
from  Anneux,  was  on  the  point  of  joining  in  the  fight 
at  Andeglou,  and  with  it  the  Bavarian  Corps  advancing 
from  Lumeau.  Their  strong  artillery,  in  position  at 
Chameul  and  Sougy,  soon  forced  the  French  to  retire. 
First  Douzy  and  then  Huetre  were  taken,  and  the 
chateau  of  Chevilly  occupied  by  the  17th  Division. 
Here,  too,  darkness  put  an  end  to  the  fighting.  The 
troops  of  the  right  wing  encamped  at  Provencheres, 
Chameul,  and  other  places  to  the  rear. 

Thus  the  German  Army  had  made  its  way  without 
much  fighting  to  within  two  miles  of  Orleans.  The 
French,  indeed,  had  maintained  their  ground  till  even- 
ing in  the  neighborhood  of  Neuville,  but  the  detach- 
ments stationed  there  were  ordered  to  retire  in  the 
course  of  the  night.  They  were  to  get  into  the  Pithi- 
viers  road  by  Rebrechien,  and  make  a  circuit  by  Orleans 
to  Chevilly.  But  they  thus  came  under  the  fire  of  the 
Third  German  Corps,  encamped  at  Loury,  and  fled  in 
disorder  back  into  the  wood,  whence  they  attempted 
to  reach  their  destination  in  detachments. 

It  was  only  to  be  expected  that  the  French  would 
stoutly  defend  their  intrenchments  at  Gidy  and  Cer- 


FIGHTING  ROUND   OELEANS.  231 

cottes,  on  the  following  day,  if  only  to  keep  open  their 
retreat  on  Orleans.  On  the  4th,  therefore.  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  ordered  the  Grand  Duke's  forces 
and  the  Ninth  Corps  to  attack  both  points  from  all 
sides.  The  Third  Corps  was  to  advance  from  Loury 
on  Orleans,  and  the  Tenth,  again  forming  the  reserve, 
was  to  follow  on  Chevilly. 

General  d'Aurelle  had  returned  in  the  evening  to 
Saran.  Here  he  saw  the  2nd  Division  of  the  Fifteenth 
flying  past  in  complete  rout,  and  heard  that  the  1st, 
too,  had  failed  to  make  a  stand  at  Chilleurs.  The 
corps  of  the  right  wing  were  altogether  shattered  by 
the  battle  of  Beaune,  and  those  of  the  left  no  less  by 
the  fight  at  Loigny.  The  French  General  saw  the 
danger  of  being  driven  on  the  Loire,  with  undisciphned 
hordes,  and  thus  blocking  the  only  passage  across  the 
river  at  Orleans.  He  decided  therefore  on  a  divergent 
retreat.  Only  the  Fifteenth  Corps  was  to  retire  by 
Orleans;  General  Crouzat  was  to  cross  the  Loire  at 
Gien,  General  Chanzy  at  Beaugency.  Then  their  re- 
union must  be  attempted  beyond  the  Sauldre.  The 
necessary  dispositions  were  made  during  the  night, 
and  communicated  to  the  Government.  From  the 
Green  Table  at  Tours,  indeed,  counter-orders  came 
next  morning,  to  maintain  the  position  at  Orleans, 
which  was,  in  fact,  already  given  up ;  but  the  General 
adhered  to  his  own  determination. 

On  December  4th  the  Third  Army  Corps  (German) 
marched  out  of  Loury  in  two  columns,  one  by  the  high- 
road and  one  by  Vennecy.  Both  reached  Boigny  by 
noon,  having  met  none  but  deserters. 

A  detachment  was  sent  on  to  Neuville  on  the  right, 
and  captured  seven  deserted  guns  and  stands  of  arms. 
To  the  left,  another  detachment  occupied  Chezy,  on 
the  Loire.     After  a  short  rest  the  main  columns  ad- 


232  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

vanced,  and  by  two  o'clock  the  6th  Division  reached 
Vaumainbert,  which  was  occupied  by  part  of  the 
French  Fifteenth  Corps.  Although  the  country  was 
not  open  enough  to  allow  of  the  employment  of  artil- 
lery, the  place  was  taken  by  the  Brandenburgers,  in 
spite  of  the  stout  resistance  of  the  French  Marine 
Infantry,  and  the  fire  of  the  batteries  on  the  heights 
to  the  north  of  St.  Loup  could  now  be  directed  on  that 
suburb  of  Orleans. 

The  5th  Division  had  meanwhile  come  up  behind 
the  6th  and  taken  part  in  the  fight. 

The  Twentieth  French  Corps,  which  was  still  at 
Chambon,  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  forest  opposite 
Beaune-la-Eolande,  had  received  orders  at  four  in  the 
morning,  from  Tours  direct,  to  march  on  Orleans. 
Contradictory  orders  had  previously  arrived  from  Gen- 
eral d'Aurelle,  but  nothing  further  had  been  heard. 
General  Crouzat  had,  as  a  precaution,  sent  his  train 
across  the  Loire  at  Jargeau,  and  then  marched  in  the 
direction  he  was  ordered  to  take.  When,  at  half -past 
two,  at  Pont-aux-Moines,  he  met  the  detachment  march- 
ing on  Chezy,  he  determined  to  fight  his  way  across ; 
but  as  General  von  Stiilpnagel  reinforced  his  two  bat- 
talions by  bringing  up  the  rest  of  his  division,  the 
French  gave  up  the  attempt  and  withdrew  to  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  crossing  again  at  Jargeau. 

On  the  German  side  the  attack  on  St.  Loup  was  un- 
successful ;  and  since  from  the  site  of  the  battle  he  got 
no  news  of  the  other  corps,  and  darkness  was  coming 
on.  General  von  Alvensleben  postponed  any  further 
attack  on  the  city  till  the  following  day. 

To  the  north  of  Orleans  the  Ninth  Army  Corps 
(German)  had  advanced  from  La-Croix-Briquet  on  the 
intrenched  position  at  Cercottes.  At  about  one  o'clock 
the  foremost  detachments  of  infantry  entered  the  place. 


FIGHTING  ROUND   OELEANS.  233 

The  2nd  Division  of  the  French  Fifteenth  Corps  was 
driven  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery  into  the  vineyards 
outside  the  town.  Here  the  infantry  alone  could  con- 
tinue the  struggle.  The  French  defended  every  tena- 
ble spot,  and  in  the  railway  station  just  outside  Orleans 
especially  held  their  own  with  great  persistency.  The 
station  and  the  deep  cutting  through  which  the  road 
ran  were  fortified  with  barricades  and  rifle-pits,  and 
armed  with  naval  guns.  It  was  not  till  nightfall,  at 
about  half -past  five,  that  they  abandoned  this  position, 
but  renewed  the  contest  a  little  further  back.  To 
avoid  street-fighting  in  the  dark.  General  von  Manstein 
put  a  stop  to  the  battle  at  about  seven  o'clock,  till 
next  day. 

The  advanced  guard  of  the  17th  Division  of  the 
Grand  Duke's  forces  had  found  Gidy  intrenched  and 
strongly  occupied.  But  at  the  approach  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  the  French  abandoned  the  position  at  about  11 
o'clock,  leaving  8  guns  behind  them.  The  German 
Division,  to  avoid  the  wood,  now  marched  to  the  west, 
on  Boulay,  whither  the  22nd  and  the  2nd  Cavalry 
Division  followed  as  a  reserve. 

They  here  found  the  Bavarian  Corps  and  the  4th 
Cavalry  Division  engaged  in  a  fight,  having  already 
driven  the  French  out  of  Bricy  and  Janvry.  When 
the  artillery  had  for  some  time  been  engaged,  General 
von  der  Tann  stormed  the  position,  at  about  twelve 
o'clock.  But  the  French  did  not  wait  for  this ;  they 
beat  a  hasty  retreat,  leaving  some  of  their  guns  in  the 
trenches.  The  2nd  Cavalry  Division  followed  in  pur- 
suit. 

The  4th  Hussars,  of  the  5th  Brigade,  galloping  past 
Montaigu,  charged  a  French  unlimbered  battery  and 
seized  all  the  guns ;  another  at  Ormes  was  brought  out 
of  action  by  a  horse  battery.     From  thence  a  strong 


234  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

body  of  French  horse  suddenly  appeared  on  the  left 
flank  of  the  4th  Brigade,  as  these  were  crossing  the 
road  to  Chateaudun.  But  Blucher's  hussars,  with  a 
sharp  swerve,  drove  the  enemy  through  the  village 
and  back  on  Ingre. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division  was  placed  to  watch  on 
the  Grand  Duke's  right  flank;  and  the  hussars  here 
charged  250  men  of  the  2nd  Life  Guards,  forming  the 
escort  of  a  baggage-train  on  the  road  to  Chateaudun, 
and  took  them  all  prisoners. 

While  the  Germans  were  thus  converging  on  Orleans 
from  the  north  and  east,  the  French  Seventeenth  Corps 
and  the  1st  Division  of  the  Sixteenth  were  still  in  the 
field  at  Patay  and  St.  Peravy.  General  Chanzy  had 
assembled  the  latter  at  Coinces,  and,  to  protect  himself 
against  their  threatened  attack  in  flank.  General  von 
der  Tann  drew  up  his  3rd  Infantry  Brigade,  with  the 
cuirassiers  and  artillery  reserve,  on  a  front  towards 
Bricy.  The  4th  Cavalry  Division  marched  on  Coinces, 
where  General  von  Bernhardi,  leaping  a  wide  ditch, 
with  four  squadrons  of  Ulilans,  di'ove  a  body  of  French 
horse  back  on  St.  Peravy,  without  their  stopping  to  do 
more  than  fire  one  volley.  Other  squadi'ons  of  the  9th 
Brigade  charged  the  French  tirailleurs,  and  pursued 
the  cavalry  till  they  had  fallen  back  o'n  a  strong  body 
of  infantry.  The  8th  Brigade  was  observing  Patay, 
and  after  that  place  had  come  under  the  fire  of  a  bat- 
tery and  been  abandoned.  General  Chanzy  gave  up  aU 
further  attack  and  retired  behind  the  wood  of  Montpi- 
peau. 

The  2nd  Cavalry  Division  now  made  for  the  Loire 
immediately  below  Orleans.  Its  artiUery  destroyed  a 
bridge  at  Chapelle  over  which  a  baggage-train  was 
passing,  and  compelled  the  troops  which  were  march- 
ing on  Clery,  along  the  further  bank,  to  fly  back  to 


FIGHTING  ROUND   ORLEANS.  235 

Orleans.  Two  military  railway-trains  from  thence 
were  not  to  be  stopped  by  the  firing,  but  one  from 
Tours,  in  which,  as  it  happened,  was  Glambetta  himself, 
returned  thither  with  all  speed. 

The  Bavarian  Corps,  meanwhile,  had  advanced  on 
the  high-road,  and  the  22nd  Division,  in  touch  with 
the  Ninth  Corps,  on  the  old  Chateaudun  road ;  the  17th 
Division  on  La-Borde  between  the  other  two.  This 
division  was  called  upon  at  about  3.30  to  take  the  vil- 
lage of  Heurdy,  which  was  stoutly  defended ;  and  when 
the  Bavarians  from  Ormes  had  turned  to  the  right  on 
Indre,  it  proceeded  by  the  high-road  towards  St.-Jean- 
de-la-RueUe.  Having  overcome  all  opposition  there, 
too,  the  head  of  the  division  reached  the  gates  of  Or- 
leans at  about  six  o'clock. 

General  von  Tresckow  there  negotiated  with  the 
military  authorities  the  formal  occupation  of  the  town. 
An  agreement  was  arrived  at  by  ten  o'clock,  and 
shortly  after  midnight  the  Grand  Duke  marched  in 
with  the  17th  Division,  followed  by  the  2nd  Bavarian 
Brigade. 

The  bridge  over  the  Loire  was  forthwith  secured, 
the  French  not  having  had  time  to  blow  it  up.  The 
rest  of  the  troops  found  quarters  to  the  west  and  north 
of  the  city. 

The  peremptory  orders  from  the  Government  to 
hold  Orleans  had  shaken  General  d'Aurelle's  original 
determination.  When  the  greater  part  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  (French)  arrived  there  in  the  forenoon,  he  wanted 
to  renew  the  attempt  at  resistance.  But  the  necessary 
orders  could  not  be  transmitted  to  the  corps  on  the 
right  wing,  nor  carried  out  by  those  on  the  left ;  and 
by  five  o'clock  the  General  in  command  was  convinced 
of  the  futility  of  any  further  conflict.  The  artillery  of 
the  Fifteenth  Corps  was  fii'st  transferred  to  La-Ferte- 


236  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

St.-Aubin;  the  infantry  followed.  The  Twentieth 
Corps,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at  Jargeau ;  the  Eighteenth 
had  recrossed  the  Loire  at  Sully ;  the  Sixteenth  and 
Seventeenth  moved  off  westward  in  the  direction  of 
Beaugency,  but  remained  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
river. 

The  battle,  which  had  lasted  two  days,  had  cost  the 
Germans  1700  men ;  the  French  lost  20,000,  of  whom 
1800  were  taken  prisoners.  Their  large  army,  lately 
massed  before  Orleans,  was  now  split  up  into  three 
separate  bodies. 

THE  GEEMANT  ADVANCE  ON  THE  SOUTH,  EAST,  AND  WEST. 

The  troops  were  too  much  exhausted  for  immediate 
pursuit  in  any  direction. 

It  was  decided  that  the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  rein- 
forced by  an  infantry  detachment  of  the  18th  Division, 
should  follow  up  the  enemy  to  the  southward  only, 
ascertain  his  whereabouts,  and  destroy  the  connection 
of  the  railways  from  Bourges,  Orleans,  and  Tours  at 
the  Vierzon  junction.  These  cavalry  troops  were  in 
quarters  to  the  north  of  the  city ;  the  French  Fifteenth 
had  a  long  start  of  them,  and  their  ^main  body  had 
reached  Salbris,  when,  two  days  after  the  battle,  on 
December  6th,  General  von  Schmidt  arrived  by  a  forced 
march  at  La-Ferte-St.-Aubin.  Here  he  found  a  detach- 
ment of  the  18th  Division,  which  had  already  driven 
the  French  rear-guard  back  on  La-Motte-Beuvron,  and 
was  now  ordered  to  retire  on  the  Loiret.  Only  two 
companies  of  the  36th  Eegiment  and  one  of  pioneers 
joined  the  advance,  and  followed  the  cavahy  partly  in 
baggage- wagons  and  on  gun-limbers. 

On  the  7th,  under  orders  from  Tours,  the  French 
left  the  high-road  and  executed  a  flank  movement  of 


GENERAL  GEEMAN  ADVANCE.  237 

four  miles  in  an  easterly  direction  to  Aubigny-Ville. 
The  cavalry,  supported  to  the  best  of  their  power  by 
their  artillery  and  the  small  infantry  force,  had  a  smart 
fight  with  the  French  rear-guard  at  Nouan-le-Fuzelier, 
and  again  in  the  evening  at  Salbris,  in  which  the 
French  finally  had  the  best  of  it.  The  neighborhood 
being  very  thinly  populated,  the  division  had  to  get 
back  in  the  dark  to  Nouan,  to  find  shelter  from  the 
bitter  winter  night. 

Long  before  daybreak  on  the  8th,  the  French  rear- 
guard had  left  Salbris  to  avoid  a  further  encounter 
with  the  enemy,  whose  strength  they  greatly  overesti- 
mated. 

After  some  slight  skirmishes  the  cavalry  division 
reached  Vierzon  that  evening.  The  telegraph  wires 
were  cut  and  the  railway  line  torn  up  in  several  places, 
70  goods'  vans  were  armor-plated,  the  direction  of  the 
enemy's  retreat  reported,  and  any  offensive  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  French  from  that  side  was  regarded 
as  most  improbable. 

The  division  had  fulfilled  its  task ;  it  was  now  ordered 
to  leave  one  brigade  as  a  corps  of  observation,  and  to 
advance  on  Blois  with  the  rest.  General  von  der 
Grroeben  maintained  his  positions  at  Vierzon  and  Sal- 
bris till  the  14th. 

The  winter  campaign  of  this  6th  Cavahy  Division 
was  exceptionally  fatiguing.  It  was  almost  impossible 
to  move  excepting  along  the  high-roads,  and  they  were 
frozen  so  hard  that  it  was  often  necessary  to  dismount 
and  lead  the  horses.  The  inhabitants  of  the  Sologne 
district  were  extremely  hostile,  the  advanced  troopers 
were  shot  down  in  every  village.  The  French  forces, 
on  the  other  hand,  made  but  a  feeble  resistance. 
Numerous  prisoners  and  large  quantities  of  abandoned 
materiel  bore  witness  to  a  hasty  retreat,  in  many  cases 


238  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

to  desperate  flight.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  mucli 
purposeless  inarching  and  counter-marching,  the  corps 
of  the  right  wing  had  by  December  13th  succeeded  in 
joining  the  Army  of  Orleans  at  Bourges. 

The  state  in  which  they  arrived  may  be  gathered 
from  the  telegraphic  Corresiwndence  Urgente  of  the 
Government  with  General  Bourbaki,  who,  when  Gen- 
eral d'Aurelle  was  deprived  of  the  command  in  chief, 
took  that  of  these  three  corps. 

Monsieur  Freycinet,  who  was  no  doubt  kept  well 
informed  by  the  country  peojole,  assured  General  Bour- 
baki that  only  a  weak  force  of  cavalry  stood  in  front 
of  him,  and  repeatedly  urged  his  advancing  on  Blois. 
The  General  replied  that  if  he  were  to  make  the  at- 
tempt, not  a  gun,  not  a  man  of  his  three  corps  would 
ever  be  seen  again.  His  intention  was  to  retreat  at 
once  from  Bourges  on  St.  Amand,  and  if  necessary 
yet  further  to  the  rear ;  the  only  danger  was  that  he 
might  be  attacked  before  he  could  accomplish  this,  and 
be  involved  in  disaster. 

The  Minister  of  War  himseK  went  to  Bourges,  but 
he  too  renounced  all  idea  of  an  offensive  movement 
when  he  saw  the  disorder  of  the  troops.  "C'e.s^  encore 
ce  que  fai  vu  deplus  tristeP  It  was  with  great  difficulty 
that  he  persuaded  the  corps  not  to  retreat  at  once,  but 
to  await  the  course  of  events,  under  cover  of  a  detach- 
ment pushed  forward  on  Vierzon. 

On  the  day  when  General  Schmidt  entered  Vierzon, 
the  Fifteenth  Corps  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  Hen- 
richemont,  at  about  an  equal  distance  with  himself 
from  Bourges.  The  Eighteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps 
were  at  Aubigny-Ville  and  Cernay,  from  two  to  three 
marches  away. 

It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that,  if  the  18th  Division 
had  followed  the  advance  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division, 


THE  GEAND  DUKE'S  BATTLE.  239 

the  Germans  might  have  taken  possession  of  Bourges 
and  of  the  vast  military  stores  there. 

To  the  east  of  Orleans  the  Third  Corps  had  marched 
up  the  river  on  Chateauneuf.  They  only  met  parties 
of  stragglers  till  the  7th,  when  two  divisions  of  the 
Eighteenth  French  Corps  attempted  to  cross  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Loire  at  Gien.  This  resulted  in  an 
engagement  between  the  advanced  guards  at  Nevoy, 
with  the  result  that  these  divisions  retreated  across  the 
bridge  in  the  course  of  the  night  and  continued  their 
march  on  Bourges. 

THE   GKAND   DUKE'S   BATTLE. 

(December  7th,  8th,  9th,  and  10th.) 

The  Grand  Duke's  forces  were  in  a  position  close  to 
the  retreating  left  wing  of  the  French.  In  contrast  to 
the  disorder  of  the  right  wing.  General  Chanzy,  cer- 
tainly the  most  capable  of  all  the  leaders  whose  duty 
it  became  to  fight  the  invaders  in  the  open  field,  had, 
in  a  great  measure,  restored  the  discipline  and  spirit 
of  his  troops.  They  were  not  only  able  to  make  a 
stand,  but  could  even  attack  the  enemy.  They  had, 
indeed,  been  considerably  reinforced  by  the  newly- 
formed  Twenty-first  Corps  and  by  Camo's  division. 
The  latter  formed  the  advanced  guard  at  Meung ;  be- 
hind it  were  the  Sixteenth  Corps  at  Beaugency,  the 
Seventeenth  at  Cravant,  and  the  Twenty-first  at  St. 
Laurent,  by  the  woods  of  Marchenoir. 

On  the  day  after  the  fight  the  Grand  Duke  gave  the 
troops  a  day's  rest;  only  the  cavahy  pursued  the 
French.  The  4th  Cavalry  Division  reached  Ouzouer ; 
the  2nd,  arriving  at  Meung,  met  a  strong  force  of  in- 
fantry. 


240  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAB. 

On  the  7th,  the  Grand  Duke's  forces  advanced  on  a 
very  wide  front.  The  17th  Division,  on  the  left  wing, 
marched  on  Meung,  where  its  artillery  opened  a  duel 
with  that  of  the  enemy.  Towards  four  o'clock,  a  Meck- 
lenbui'g  battalion  carried  Langlochere  by  storm,  but 
found  itseK  threatened  on  both  sides  by  the  approach 
of  the  enemy's  columns.  On  the  left  Foinard  was  ere 
long  taken  and  a  gun  seized,  while  on  the  right  the  1st 
Bavarian  Brigade  advanced  on  La  Bourie.  Here,  al- 
most at  the  same  moment,  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division 
came  up  by  by-roads  from  Renardiere,  having  driven 
the  enemy  out  of  Le-Bardon  by  the  fire  of  its  guns. 
The  Bavarians  now  marched  out  to  meet  the  mass  of 
French  approaching  from  Grrand-Chatre.  They  fought 
a  hard  battle  till  nightfall,  supported  by  the  horse  bat- 
teries, ending  in  the  retreat  of  the  French  on  Beau' 
mont. 

During  this  conflict  of  the  left  wing,  the  Grand 
Duke's  Army,  the  1st  Bavarian  Division,  had  marched 
a  considerable  distance  on  Baccon,  and  the  22nd  on 
Ouzouer ;  and  then,  finding  the  French  offered  a  deter- 
mined resistance,  the  Grand  Duke  decided  on  closing 
up  his  forces  to  the  left. 

(December  8th.)  To  this  end  the  22nd  Division 
advanced  to  the  south  of  Ouzouer  on  Villermain. 
After  repulsing  the  swarms  of  tirailleurs  which  attacked 
their  left  flank  under  cover  of  a  fog.  General  von  Wit- 
tich  directed  his  march  on  Cravant,  to  effect  a  junc- 
tion with  the  right  wing  of  Bavarians  who  were  ah'eady 
engaged  in  a  hot  struggle.  They  had  repulsed  the  en- 
emy's advance  from  Villechaumont,  and  had  advanced 
with  the  2nd  Division  along  the  road  from  Cravant  to 
Beaugency ;  when  all  three  French  divisions  charged 
afresh,  the  Bavarians  retreated  on  Beaumont.  Here 
they  found  support  from  the  former  and  17  batteries, 


THE  GEAND  DUKE'S  BATTLE.  241 

which  were  gi^adually  brought  into  the  fighting  hne. 
Their  fire  and  an  impetuous  attack  from  three  Bava- 
rian brigades  at  last  forced  the  enemy  to  fall  back,  and 
the  position  in  the  high-road  was  recovered. 

The  French  now,  on  their  side,  brought  up  a  strong 
body  of  artillery,  and  the  Seventeenth  Corps  prepared 
to  advance  on  Cravant.  But  the  22nd  German  Divis- 
ion had  already  arrived  there  at  about  one  o'clock, 
after  taking  Beauvert  and  Layes,  with  the  4th  Cav- 
alry Division  on  their  right  and  the  2nd  on  their  left. 
So  when,  at  about  three  o'clock,  the  dense  French 
columns  advanced  on  Cravant,  they  were  checked  by 
an  impetuous  attack  of  the  44th  Brigade,  which  had 
joined  the  Bavarians,  and  soon  driven  out  of  Layes, 
which  they  had  taken  on  their  way.  The  five  batteries 
nearest  to  Cravant  had  suffered  so  severely  meanwhile 
that  they  had  to  be  withdrawn. 

When  at  last,  at  about  four  o'clock,  the  Bavarian 
battalions  advanced  to  storm  the  height  in  front  of 
them,  they  were  met  by  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy,  and 
after  losing  the  greater  part  of  their  officers  were  com- 
pelled to  retreat  on  the  artillery  position  at  Beaumont. 
Finally,  however,  the  French  abandoned  Villechau- 
mont. 

On  the  left  wing  of  the  Grand  Duke's  forces  the  17th 
Division  had  pursued  the  retreating  French  beyond 
Vallees  and  Villeneuve,  and  then  at  about  half -past 
twelve  had  attacked  them  at  Messas.  The  defence 
was  obstinate,  and  it  was  not  till  dusk  that  they  suc- 
ceeded in  carrying  the  place.  The  artiUery  directed 
its  fire  on  dense  masses  assembled  by  Vernon,  the 
infantry  stormed  the  hill  of  Beaugency,  and  finally 
forced  then*  way  into  the  town,  where  a  French  bat- 
tery fell  into  their  hands.  Camo's  division  then  retired 
on  Tavers,  and  even  after  midnight  General  von 
16 


242  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Tresckow  attacked  Vernon,  whence  the  French,  taken 
quite  by  surprise,  fled  to  Bonvalet. 

The  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army 
(German)  had  intended  to  march  the  Third,  Tenth, 
and  Ninth  Corps  on  Bourges,  from  Gien,  Orleans,  and 
lastly  from  Blois.  But  the  Grand  Duke's  force  in  its 
advance  on  Blois  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Loire  had 
met  with  unexpected  resistance  and  a  two  days'  en- 
gagement. At  the  army  head-quarters  at  Versailles 
it  was  regarded  as  indispensable  that  the  Grand  Duke 
should  immediately  be  reinforced  by  at  least  one  divis- 
ion. Telegraphic  orders  to  that  effect  were  dispatched 
at  ten  in  the  morning  of  December  9th.  The  Ninth 
Corps,  which  was  already  on  the  march  along  the  left 
bank  and  had  no  enemy  in  front,  could  not  give  the 
required  support,  as  all  the  bridges  over  the  river  had 
been  blown  up.  The  Third  Corps  was  therefore  or- 
dered to  leave  only  a  detachment  at  Gien,  as  a  corps 
of  observation,  and  to  march  back  on  Orleans.  The 
Tenth  Corps  was  to  call  in  the  detachments  it  had 
posted  to  the  east  of  the  city  and  advance  on  Meung. 
Thus,  on  the  9th,  the  Grand  Duke  was  still  actually 
facing  eleven  French  divisions  with  four  divisions  of 
infantry,  quite  unsupported.  Early  next  morning 
General  Chanzy  proceeded  to  the  attack. 

(December  9th.)  The  two  Prussian  divisions  at 
Beauvert  and  Messas  stood  firmly  awaiting  the  French 
charge.  The  two  Bavarian  divisions,  having  sustained 
great  loss,  were  left  at  Cravant  as  a  reserve,  but  soon 
had  to  be  absorbed  in  the  fighting  line,  when  at  seven 
o'clock  strong  columns  of  the  French  were  seen  ad- 
vancing on  Le  Mee. 

Dense  bodies  of  tirailleurs  were  repulsed  both  there 
and  at  Vernon,  and  came  under  the  fire  of  the  devoted 
German  artillery,  which  silenced  the  French  guns  and 


THE   GEAND  DUKE'S  BATTLE.  243 

then  opened  fire  on  Villorceau.  In  spite  of  a  stout  de- 
fence, this  village  was  taken  by  about  half -past  ten  by 
the  Bavarian  infantry.  The  French  advance  on  Ville- 
chaumont  in  gi^eatly  superior  force  was  also  repulsed, 
with  the  assistance  of  three  battalions  and  two  batteries 
of  the  22nd  Division.  The  Thuringians  then  stormed 
Cernay,  where  200  French  laid  down  their  arms,  and 
one  of  their  batteries  lost  its  team  and  carriages. 

On  the  right  wing,  by  a  misunderstanding,  the  Ger- 
mans evacuated  Layes  and  Beauvert,  and  the  French 
marched  in.  However,  with  the  support  of  the  2nd 
Bavarian  Brigade,  the  enemy  was  again  driven  out 
of  both  places.  Further  to  the  north,  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  was  observing  the  movement  of  a  French 
detachment  marching  on  Villermain. 

The  French  made  renewed  efforts  by  midday,  ad- 
vancing again  on  Cravant  in  strong  columns ;  but  this 
movement  Greneral  Tresckow  r;>ttacked  in  flank,  from 
Messas.  He  left  only  a  weak  detachment  in  Beaugency 
and  secured  the  villages  on  the  left  on  the  way  to 
Tavers.  The  main  body  of  the  17th  Division  advanced 
on  Bonvalet,  reinforced  the  hardly-pressed  Bavarians 
in  Villorceau,  and  occupied  Villemarceau  in  front  of 
that  place.  Here  the  division  had  to  maintain  a  severe 
struggle,  at  about  three  o'clock,  with  the  strong  col- 
umns of  the  French  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps. 
The  infantry  rushing  on  the  enemy  with  cheers  suc- 
ceeded, however,  in  repulsing  him  and  holding  their 
ground  in  spite  of  a  hot  fire.  At  the  same  time  three 
Bavarian  battalions,  with  cavalry  and  artillery,  had 
marched  up  from  Cravant  and  had  driven  the  French 
out  of  Villejouan.  Further  to  the  right  a  battalion  of 
the  32nd  had  taken  possession  of  Ourcelle.  A  line 
from  thence  to  Tavers  marked  the  ground  so  labori- 
ously wrung  from  the  French, 


244  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAH. 

The  battle  ended  with  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  on 
Josnes  and  Dugny. 

On  this  day  the  Third  Corps  were  on  the  march  to 
Orleans.  The  Ninth  could  take  no  part  in  the  fight- 
ing but  by  the  fire  from  their  artillery  on  Meung  and 
Beaugency,  from  its  position  on  the  left  bank.  It 
was  not  till  near  Blois  that  they  met  some  French 
detachments.  Fifty  men  of  one  of  the  Hessian  bat- 
talions stormed  the  fortified  castle  of  Chambord  a  little 
way  from  the  river,  and  there  took  200  prisoners  and 
twelve  ammunition  wagons  with  their  teams. 

Of  the  Tenth  Corps  only  the  infantry  at  the  head 
had  reached  Meung,  but  it  had  sent  forward  a  regi- 
ment of  hussars  with  eight  batteries,  which  arrived  at 
Grand  Chatre  by  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

The  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army  now 
ordered  the  Bavarian  Corps  to  retire  on  Orleans,  to 
recruit  after  its  heavy  losses.  But  even  when  rein- 
forced by  the  Tenth  Corps,  the  Grrand  Duke  still  had 
to  meet  an  enemy  of  double  numerical  strength,  and 
instead  of  pursuing  he  had  rather  to  think  of  defend- 
ing his  position. 

(December  10th.)  Before  daybreak  G-eneral  Chanzy 
renewed  his  attack,  which  even  the  Bavarians  were 
presently  required  to  repel. 

At  seven  in  the  morning  the  French  Seventeenth 
Corps  rushed  in  dense  masses  on  Origny,  took  150 
prisoners,  and  forced  their  way  into  Villejouan.  This 
advance  was  met  by  the  43rd  Brigade  at  Cernay  on 
the  front,  and  by  the  4th  Bavarians  with  six  batteries 
at  Villechaumont ;  while  on  the  right  flank  G-eneral 
von  Tresckow  marched  on  Villorceau  and  Villemarceau. 
In  this  last  village  two  of  his  battalions,  supported  by 
four  batteries,  resisted  every  onslaught  of  the  French 
from  Origny  and  Toupenay.    At  noon  the  main  body 


THE   GEAND  DUKE'S   BATTLE.  245 

of  the  17tli  Division  advanced  to  repossess  themselves 
of  Villejouan.  Here  the  French  made  an  obstinate 
stand.  The  fighting,  with  great  loss  on  both  sides, 
was  continued  till  four  o'clock,  and  then  fresh  troops 
of  French  came  up  to  recover  the  position  the  Germans 
still  held  in  one  single  farmstead. 

All  the  artillery  of  the  Prussian  Division  had,  how- 
ever, deployed  to  the  south  of  ViUemarceau;  they 
were  joined  by  two  horse  batteries  of  the  Tenth  Corps, 
and  the  batteries  of  the  22nd  Division  also  opened  an 
effective  fire.  The  concentric  fire  of  all  these  guns 
put  an  end  to  any  further  attack  of  the  Seventeenth 
French  Corps. 

Beaugency  was  now  occupied  by  part  of  the  Tenth 
Corps.  During  the  past  few  days  the  German  left  wing 
had  had  a  firm  position  on  the  Loire  to  depend  upon, 
but  on  the  right  such  a  point  had  been  whoUy  lacking. 
The  French  had  nevertheless  made  no  attempt  to  take 
advantage  of  their  superiority  by  extending  their  front. 
Not  till  this  day  did  they  march  on  the  unprotected 
German  flank.  The  greater  part  of  the  Twenty-first 
Corps  was  deployed  opposite  to  it,  between  Poisly  and 
Mezieres,  and  at  half-past  ten  the  strong  columns 
advanced  on  Villermain.  The  Bavarians  were  com- 
pelled to  form  in  a  bow-line,  with  the  2nd  Brigade, 
from  Jouy  to  Coudray.  Seven  batteries  were  brought 
into  that  line,  and  on  its  right  wing  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  stood  in  readiness.  Before  two  o'clock  2  more 
horse  batteries  and  4  batteries  of  the  Tenth  Corps  ar- 
rived from  Cravant,  and  joined  them  there  with  three 
brigades  as  a  reserve.  The  fire  of  over  a  hundred  Ger- 
man guns  made  the  French  take  their  artillery  out  of 
action  at  about  three  o'clock,  and  separate  weak  attacks 
by  their  infantry  were  repulsed  without  difiiculty  by 
the  Germans,  who  awaited  them  in  resolute  defence. 


246  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

The  French  losses  in  this  four  days'  battle  are  un- 
known. The  Grand  Duke's  force  lost  3400  men,  of 
which  the  larger  half  belonged  to  the  two  Bavarian 
divisions. 

The  Grand  Duke  had  held  his  own  against  three 
corps  of  the  enemy,  till  the  first  supports  could  come 
up,  and  this  he  owed  to  the  bravery  of  his  troops, 
more  especially  of  the  artillery.  This  alone  lost  255 
men  and  356  horses.  The  guns  were  brought  into 
such  requisition  that  at  last  almost  all  the  steel  guns 
of  the  light  batteries  of  the  22nd  Division,  and  most  of 
the  Bavarian,  were  rendered  useless  by  the  burning 
out  of  their  breech  blocks. 

The  Third  Corps  had  on  this  day  just  arrived  at  St. 
Denis,  and  the  Ninth  at  Vienne,  opposite  Blois ;  but 
here  too  the  bridge  over  the  Loire  was  blown  up. 

On  the  French  side.  General  Chanzy  had  learnt  from 
the  telegi'aphic  correspondence  of  General  Bourbaki 
with  the  Government  at  Tours,  that  nothing  had  come 
of  Bourbaki's  attempt  to  divert  part  of  the  German 
forces  against  himself.  The  long  delay  led  him  to  fear 
an  attack  from  their  whole  force;  he  had  therefore 
decided  on  a  retreat,  which  resulted  in  the  removal  of 
the  Assembly  from  Tours  to  Bordeaux. 

At  the  Grand  Duke's  head-quarters  a  fresh  attack 
was  decided  on  for  December  11th.  The  villages  in 
front  had  been  left  strongly  occupied,  and  it  was  only 
at  noon  that  the  enemy's  retreat  became  known.  They 
were  at  once  pursued  on  the  left  by  the  Tenth  Corps, 
and  on  the  right,  south  of  the  woods  of  Marchenoir, 
by  the  Grand  Duke's  force.  On  the  north,  the  4th 
Cavalry  Division  was  engaged  in  scouting. 

A  thaw  had  followed  the  hard  frost,  making  the 
march  equally  difficult  for  both  armies.  The  Germans 
found  the  roads  blocked  with  abandoned  wagons  and 


THE   GKAND   DUKE'S   BATTLE.  247 

cast-away  arms;  the  bodies  of  men  and  horses  lay 
iinburied  in  the  fields,  and  in  the  villages  were  hun- 
dreds of  wounded  quite  uncared  for.  Several  thou- 
sands of  stragglers  were  captured. 

The  orders  from  the  army  head-quarters  at  Versailles 
were  for  a  pursuit,  which  should  render  the  enemy 
incapable  of  further  action  for  some  time  to  come; 
but  not  beyond  Tours.  The  Second  Ai-my  was  then 
to  muster  at  Orleans  and  the  Grand  Duke's  forces  at 
Chartres,  and  the  troops  were  to  have  the  rest  they 
needed.  From  the  first  point  constant  and  strict 
watch  could  be  kept  on  Greneral  Bourbaki's  army,  and 
to  this  end  a  connection  was  to  be  made  with  Gen- 
eral von  Zastrow,  who  was  to  go  to  Chatillon-sur- 
Seine  on  the  13th,  with  the  Seventh  Corps.  Still,  no 
operations  were  to  extend  beyond  Bourges  and  Nevers. 

The  Second  Army  was  accordingly  next  marched  on 
the  Loir,  and  by  the  13th  held  the  line  of  Oucques — 
Conan — Blois,  that  town  having  been  found  evacuated. 

On  the  14th,  the  17th  Division  marched  on  Moree, 
and  on  the  Loir  past  Freteval.  A  fight  ensued  at 
both  these  points.  Though  the  French  had  advanced 
so  far,  they  seemed  to  intend  making  a  firm  stand  on 
the  Loir,  where  they  had  occupied  Cloyes  and  Ven- 
dome  in  great  strength. 

To  attack  with  success,  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
began  by  collecting  all  his  forces.  The  Third  Corps, 
hurrying  after  the  army  by  forced  marches,  was  in  the 
first  instance  to  fill  the  interval  between  the  Grand 
Duke's  forces  and  the  Tenth  Corps,  which  was  with- 
drawn from  Blois  and  Herbault  on  Vendome. 

But  when,  on  the  15th,  the  Tenth  Corps  marched 
in  that  direction,  the  main  body  met  with  such  a  de- 
termined resistance  close  in  front  of  Vendome  that 
it  could   not  be  overcome  before  dark.    The  troops 


248  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

therefore  retired  to  quarters  in  the  rear  of  Ste.  Anne. 
A  left  flanking  detachment  had  found  St.  Amand  occu- 
pied by  a  strong  force,  and  had  halted  at  Gombergean. 
The  Third  Corps  had  advanced  in  the  course  of  the 
day  on  Coulommiers,  near  Vendome,  had  fought  the 
French  at  Bel-Essert,  and  di'iven  them  back  across  the 
Loir  and  established  communications.  The  Grand 
Duke,  in  obedience  to  orders,  acted  at  first  on  the 
defensive.  The  Ninth  Corps,  after  the  restoration  of 
the  bridge  at  Blois,  was  at  last  able  to  follow  the  army, 
leaving  a  brigade  in  occupation. 

A  greatly  superior  force  was  now  assembled  oppo- 
site the  enemy's  position,  and  a  general  attack  was 
decided  on ;  but  to  give  the  troops  a  much-needed  rest 
it  was  postponed  till  the  17th,  and  meanwhile,  on  the 
16th,  General  Chanzy  withdrew. 

It  had  certainly  been  his  intention  to  hold  the  Loir 
Valley  still  longer ;  but  his  generals  assured  him  that 
the  condition  of  the  troops  would  not  aUow  him  to 
prolong  the  struggle.  He  accordingly  gave  the  order 
for  the  retreat  of  the  army  at  daybreak  on  Le-Mans, 
by  Montoire,  St.  Calais,  and  Vibraye. 

Thus,  in  the  early  morning,  the  Tenth  Corps  found 
the  French  position  in  front  of  Vendome  abandoned, 
and  entered  the  city  without  opposition.  On  the 
French  left  wing  only,  where  marching  orders  had  not 
yet  arrived,  General  Jaures  made  an  attack  on  Frete- 
val,  but  in  the  evening  he  followed  the  other  corps. 

THE   INTEERUPTION   OF   SERIOUS    OFFENSIVE   OPERATIONS 
IN   DECEMBER. 

On  the  17th  of  December  general  orders  had  been 
issued  from  Versailles  to  the  Armies  both  to  the  north 
and  south  of  Paris. 

Now  that  General  von  Manteuffel  had  crossed  the 


THE   SITUATION   IN   DECEMBEE.  249 

Somme,  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  the  Loir,  the 
Germans  held  possession  of  almost  a  third  of  France. 
The  French  were  driven  back  on  every  side ;  and  in 
order  not  to  split  up  their  forces,  it  was  thought 
advisable  that  the  Germans  should  concentrate  into 
three  principal  divisions.  The  First  Army  was  there- 
fore to  assemble  at  Beauvais,  the  Grand  Duke's  forces 
at  Chartres,  the  Second  Army  near  Orleans ;  the  troops 
were  to  have  some  needful  rest,  and  their  efficiency 
to  be  restored  by  the  arrival  from  Germany  of  fresh 
reliefs  and  equipment.  If  the  French  made  any  new 
move,  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  approach  as  close  as 
possible,  and  then  be  driven  back  by  a  strong  attack. 

The  Second  Army  had  but  little  prospect  at  present 
of  overtaking  the  enemy  beyond  the  Loir;  and  the 
reports  from  the  Upper  Loire  now  necessitated  a 
sharper  lookout  in  that  direction.  News  came  from 
Gien  that  the  posts  established  at  Ouzouer  on  the 
Loire  had  been  driven  in ;  and  it  seemed  not  unlikely 
that  General  Bourbaki  would  take  the  opportunity  of 
advancing  by  Montargis  on  Paris,  or  at  least  on  Or- 
leans, which  at  this  moment  was  occupied  by  only  a 
part  of  the  First  Bavarian  Corps. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  got  rid  of  his  enemy, 
probably  for  some  little  time,  and  he  decided,  in  obedi- 
ence to  orders  from  Versailles,  to  remain  with  his 
forces  in  an  expectant  attitude  at  Orleans.  Only  the 
Tenth  Corps  was  to  be  left  to  keep  watch  on  the  Loir. 
To  secure  support  at  once,  for  the  Bavarian  Corps  in 
any  case,  the  Ninth  Corps,  on  its  arrival  from  Blois  at 
La-Chapelle-Vendomoise,  on  the  16th,  was  ordered  to 
march  on  Beaugency  that  day,  and  on  Orleans  on  the 
morrow.  It  covered  eleven  German  miles  in  twenty- 
four  hours,  in  very  bad  weather.  The  Third  Corps 
followed  it  up. 


250  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

However,  it  was  soon  known  that  the  enemy's  de- 
tachment which  had  been  at  Gien  did  not  form  part 
of  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  was  intrenching  itself  at 
Briare  for  its  own  safety.  So  the  Germans  retired  into 
comfortable  quarters,  the  First  Bavarian  Corps  at  Or- 
leans, the  Third  there  and  at  Beaugency,  the  Ninth  in 
the  plain  of  the  Loire  and  up  as  far  as  Chateauneuf, 
with  a  strong  post  at  Montargis. 

The  Bavarian  Corps  was  then  transferred  to 
Etampes,  to  recover  at  their  leisure,  to  recruit  their 
numbers,  and  make  good  their  clothing  and  equipment. 
Nor  were  the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg's  forces  in 
a  condition  to  pursue  General  Chanzy  beyond  the 
Loir.  Six  weeks  of  daily  marching  and  fighting  had 
tried  them  to  the  utmost.  The  dreadful  weather  and 
the  state  of  the  roads  had  reduced  their  clothing  and 
boots  to  a  miserable  state.  A  reconnoissance  beyond 
the  Loir  showed  that  the  French  could  only  be  over- 
taken by  long  and  rapid  marches.  So  the  Grand  Duke 
allowed  his  troops  a  long  rest,  from  the  18th,  in  the 
villages  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 

Of  the  Third  Army,  General  von  Rheinbaben,  on 
the  contrary,  had  the  three  brigades  of  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division  at  Courtalin,  Brou,  and  Chai'tres  reinforced 
by  5  battalions  of  Guard  Landwehr  and  4  batteries. 
A  letter  from  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  at  Ver- 
sailles had  pointed  out  that  this  cavalry  might  probably 
be  employed  with  great  success  in  attacking  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  enemy's  retreating  columns,  and  the 
Crown  Prince  had  already  given  orders  that  they 
should  advance  on  Brou  in  full  strength  on  the  15th. 
In  contradiction  to  these,  the  division  obeyed  an  order 
which  reached  them  on  the  16th  from  the  Grand 
Duke,  under  whose  command  they  had  not  been  placed, 
to  take  up  a  position  on  the  Yeres. 


THE   SITUATION   IN   DECEMBER.  251 

On  this  day  the  patrols  had  found  the  roads  open  to 
Montmirail  and  Mondoubleau,  but  there  was  a  body  of 
French  infantry  in  front  of  Cloyes,  which  retired  after 
a  short  fray.  On  the  left,  communications  were  estab- 
lished with  the  4th  Cavalry  Division.  On  the  17th, 
the  12th  Cavalry  Brigade  entered  Cloyes,  already 
evacuated  by  the  French ;  on  the  13th  they  advanced 
on  Arrou,  and  only  General  von  Bartz  marched  on 
Droue  with  a  force  of  all  arms,  where  he  surprised  the 
French  at  their  cooking,  and  carried  off  much  plunder. 

On  the  18th,  the  12th  Brigade  still  found  a  few  strag- 
glers there,  but  the  other  two  brigades  marched  a  little 
way  to  the  westward  on  La-Bazoche-Gouet  and  Ar- 
viUe,  whence  the  enemy  had  quite  disappeared.  To 
the  south  of  ArvUle  a  battalion  of  the  Guard  Land- 
wehr  drove  the  French  infantry  out  of  St.  Agil. 

With  this  the  pursuit  ended  on  the  19th.  The 
division  retired  on  Nogent-le-Rotrou  by  the  Grand 
Duke's  desire,  and  subsequently  undertook  the  obser- 
vation of  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine  at  Vernon  and 
Dreux. 

The  Grand  Duke's  forces  left  their  quarters  on  the 
Loir  on  the  21st.  The  22nd  Division  occupied  Nogent- 
le-Roi,  and  the  17th  Chartres,  till  the  24th  of  the  month. 
The  4th  Bavarian  Brigade  rejoined  its  own  corps  at 
Orleans. 

During  the  remainder  of  December  only  the  Tenth 
Corps  had  any  fighting,  having  been  detailed  to  keep 
watch  beyond  the  Loir  from  Blois  and  Vendome. 

Two  brigades  were  marched  on  Tours  on  the  20th. 
On  the  further  side  of  Monnaie  they  met  the  newly- 
formed  troops  of  General  Ferri-Pisani,  10,000  to  15,000 
strong,  and  which  were  advancing  from  Angers  on 
Tours. 

The  soaked  gi'ound  made  it  most  difficult  to  deploy 


252  THE  TEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

the  artillery  and  cavaliy.  The  cavalry,  indeed,  could 
do  no  more  than  pursue  the  retreating  French  in  deep 
columns  along  the  high-roads,  thereby  suffering  se- 
verely from  the  enemy's  fire,  delivered  at  very  short 
range. 

On  the  following  day  General  von  Woyna  advanced 
unopposed,  with  six  battalions,  on  the  bridge  at  Tours. 
A  light  battery  was  driven  up  on  the  bank  of  the 
river  and  dispersed  the  masses  firing  from  the  oppo- 
site shore,  but  it  would  have  cost  too  many  lives  to 
storm  the  city,  which,  since  the  removal  of  the  seat  of 
Government,  had  ceased  to  be  of  any  gi-eat  importance. 
The  detachment  was  recalled  to  Monnaie,  and  the  19th 
Division  went  into  quarters  at  Blois,  the  20th  at  Her- 
bault  and  Vendome. 

From  thence,  on  the  27th,  a  detachment  of  two  bat- 
talions, one  squadron,  and  two  guns  marched  past 
Montoire  on  Souge  on  the  Braye,  and  there  met  a 
greatly  superior  force.  General  Chanzy  had,  in  fact, 
marched  a  division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  on  Ven- 
dome to  draw  the  Prussians  away  from  Tours.  Be- 
hind St.  Quentin  tl;ie  weak  Prussian  detachment  found 
itself  hemmed  in  between  the  river  and  the  cliff,  en- 
closed on  every  side,  and  under  heavy  fire.  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel von  Boltenstern  succeeded,  however,  in 
cutting  his  way  through.  Without  firing  a  shot  the 
two  Hanoverian  battalions  rushed  on  the  dense  body 
of  tirailleurs  who  cut  off  their  retreat,  and  fought  their 
way  out  hand-to-hand.  Through  the  gap  thus  made 
the  guns  followed,  after  firing  a  round  of  gi'ape-shot, 
and  notwithstanding  losses  to  the  teams  they  were  got 
back  to  Montoire.  The  squadron  also  charged  through 
two  lines  of  riflemen  and  rejoined  the  infantry. 

As  a  result  of  this  incident  General  von  Kraatz, 
after  collecting  the  remainder  of  the   20th   Division 


FKENCH  ATTACK  ON  VENDOME.  253 

from  Herbault,  determined  to  enlighten  the  situation 
by  a  fresh  reconnoissance.  Four  battahons  were  to 
advance  from  Vendome,  and  the  1st  Cavah-y  Brigade 
from  Freteval  was  to  scout  towards  Epuisay.  On  this 
day,  however,  General  de  Jouffroy  was  marching  on 
Vendome  to  attack  it  with  two  divisions. 

When,  at  about  ten  o'clock,  the  reconnoitring  force 
from  Vendome  reached  the  Azay,  they  came  under  a 
hot  fire  from  the  opposite  slope  of  the  valley.  Soon 
after  this  six  French  battalions  attacked  them  in  fiank 
from  the  south,  and  repeated  notice  was  brought  in 
that  considerable  forces  of  the  enemy  were  marching 
on  Vendome  direct,  from  the  north  of  Azay  by  Epse- 
reuse.  General  von  Kraatz  perceived  that  he  would 
have  to  face  a  planned  attack  from  very  superior 
numbers,  and  determined  to  restrict  himself  to  the  local 
defence  of  Vendome.  Under  cover  of  a  battalion,  left 
to  maintain  its  position  at  Huchepie,  he  achieved  the 
retreat  of  the  detachment  in  perfect  order,  and  it  then 
took  up  a  position  on  the  railway  embankment  to  the 
west  of  the  city. 

Further  to  the  north  the  French  columns,  advancing 
past  Espereuse,  had  already  reached  Bel- Air.  A  bat- 
talion hastening  up  from  Vendome  occupied  the  cha- 
teau, but  being  outflanked  on  the  right  by  a  superior 
force  was  obliged  to  retire,  and  likewise  took  up  a  posi- 
tion behind  the  railway.  At  about  two  o'clock  the 
French  attacked  this  position  in  dense  masses  of  sharp- 
shooters, but  came  under  the  fire  of  six  batteries 
posted  on  the  heights  behind  Vendome,  which  di'ove 
back  their  right  wing.  A  column  advanced,  along  the 
left  bank  of  the  Loir  from  Varennes,  to  attack  this  line 
of  guns,  but  hastily  retreated  out  of  range  of  their  fire. 

The  attacks  on  the  railway  from  Bel- Air  and  Tuile- 
ries  were  a  more  serious  affair ;  eight  companies  placed 


254  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

there,  however,  repelled  them.  At  four  o'clock  the 
French  once  more  advanced  in  strength;  fortune 
wavered  for  some  time,  and  at  last,  as  darkness  fell, 
they  retired. 

The  1st  Cavalry  Brigade,  with  two  companies  and  a 
horse  battery,  had  marched  on  Danze.  Captain  Spitz, 
with  a  small  number  of  his  Westphalian  Fusihers,  fell 
on  two  batteries  which  had  been  drawn  up  there,  and 
captured  two  guns  and  three  limbers.  With  these  and 
fifty  prisoners  General  von  Liideritz  returned  to  Frete- 
val  by  about  one  o'clock,  after  pursuing  the  enemy  as 
far  as  Epuisay. 

The  French  attempt  on  Yendome  had  utterly  failed, 
and  they  now  retreated  to  a  greater  distance.  General 
von  Kraatz,  however,  was  ordered,  with  an  eye  to  a 
greater  enterprise  to  be. described  later,  to  remain  in  a 
state  of  preparation  on  the  Loir. 

THE  FOUKTEENTH   CORPS   IN   DECEMBER. 

In  the  south-eastern  scene  of  war  the  French  had  at 
last  decided  on  some  definite  action. 

Garibaldi's  Corps,  assembled  at  Autun,  advanced  on 
the  24th ;  the  detachments  marched  by  Sombernon  and 
St.  Seine,  with  various  skirmishes  ai^d  night  attacks, 
close  up  to  the  front.  Cremer's  division  advanced  on 
Gevrey  from  the  south.  But  as  soon  as  reinforcements 
had  reached  Dijon  from  Gray  and  Is-sur-Tille,  the 
enemy  was  driven  back,  and  now  General  von  Werder, 
on  his  part,  ordered  the  1st  Brigade  to  march  on  Autun. 
General  Keller  arrived  in  front  of  the  town  on  Decem- 
ber 1st,  driving  the  French  before  him.  Preparations 
had  been  made  to  attack  on  the  following  day,  when 
orders  came  for  a  rapid  retreat.  Fresh  detachments 
were  needed  at  Chatillon,  where  those  posted  to  pro- 
tect the  railway  had  been  surprised,  at  Gray,  against 


FIGHTING  IN  THE   SOUTH-EAST.  255 

sorties  by  the  garrison  of  Besan^on,  and  also  to  ob- 
serve Langi'es. 

The  Prussian  Brigade  marched  on  Langres  with  two 
cavalry  regiments  and  three  batteries,  and  on  the  16th 
they  met  the  French  not  far  from  Longeau,  in  number 
about  2000.  The  French  were  repulsed,  losing  200 
wounded,  fifty  prisoners,  two  guns,  and  two  ammuni- 
tion wagons.  General  von  der  Goltz  had,  in  a  day  or 
two,  surrounded  Langre«,  driven  the  Gardes  Mobiles 
posted  outside  into  the  fortress,  and  occupied  a 
position  on  the  north  for  the  protection  of  the  rail- 
ways. 

In  the  country  south  of  Dijon  fresh  massing  of  the 
French  troops  had  now  been  observed.  To  disperse 
these  General  von  Werder  advanced  on  the  18th  with 
two  Baden  brigades  on  Nuits.  In  Boncourt,  close  to 
the  town  on  the  east,  the  advanced  guard  met  with 
lively  opposition,  but  carried  the  place  by  noon.  The 
French,  assisted  by  their  batteries  drawn  up  on  the 
hills  west  of  Nuits,  offered  an  obstinate  defence  in  the 
deep  railway  cutting  and  by  the  Meuzin.  When  the 
main  body  of  the  brigade  came  up  at  two  o'clock  Gen- 
eral von  Gliimer  ordered  a  general  attack.  The  in- 
fantry now  rushed  across  the  open  plain,  with  great 
loss,  especially  in  superior  officers,  against  the  enemy, 
who  was  well  under  cover  and  who,  firing  at  short 
range,  was  not  driven  back  on  Nuits  till  four  o'clock, 
after  a  hand-to-hand  struggle.  At  five  o'clock  they 
abandoned  the  place  to  the  German  battalions. 

The  Germans  had  met  Cremer's  division,  10,000 
strong,  which  had  lost  1700  men,  among  them  650  un- 
wounded  prisoners.  The  Baden  divisions,  too,  had 
lost  900  men.  They  encamped  for  the  night  on  the 
market-place  of  the  town  and  in  the  villages  to  the 
eastward. 


256  THE  PRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Next  morning  the  French  were  found  to  have  re- 
treated still  further,  but  the  Germans  were  not  strong 
enough  for  pursuit.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  had  already 
been  obliged  to  spare  seven  battalions  for  the  invest- 
ment of  Belfort.  General  von  Werder  therefore  re- 
turned to  Dijon,  where  he  assembled  all  the  forces  still 
left  to  him  with  those  of  General  von  der  Goltz  from 
Langres,  waiting  to  see  whether  the  French  would 
renew  the  attack.  But  the  month  of  December  ended 
without  any  further  disturbance. 

THE   FIEST   AEMY  IN   DECEMBER. 

"While  the  Second  Army  was  fighting  on  the  Loire, 
General  von  Manteuffel,  after  the  siege  of  Amiens,  had 
marched  on  Rouen. 

General  Farre  was  indeed  at  Arras,  in  the  rear  of 
this  movement,  but  the  disorder  in  which  his  troops 
had  retired  after  that  battle  made  it  probable  that  he 
would  do  nothing,  at  any  rate  for  the  present.  The 
3rd  Brigade,  too,  was  left  in  Amiens  with  two  cavalry 
regiments  and  three  batteries,  to  occupy  the  place  and 
protect  the  important  line  of  railway  to  Laon. 

,  The  outlook  on  the  west  was  more  serious  than  on 
the  north,  for  there,  at  this  juncture,  French  forces 
threatened  to  interfere  with  the  investment  of  Paris. 
General  Briand  was  at  Rouen  with  20,000  men,  and 
had  advanced  his  leading  troops  as  far  forward  as  the 
Epte,  where,  at  Beauvais  and  Gisors,  he  met  the 
Dragoon  Guards  sent  in  from  the  Army  of  the  Meuse 
and  the  Saxon  Cavalry  Division.  The  detachment  of 
infantry  which  had  escorted  the  cavalry  had  lost  150 
men  and  a  gun,  in  a  night  attack. 

When  the  First  Army  reached  the  Epte,  on  Decem- 
ber 3rd,  the  two  cavalry  divisions  joined  the  march, 
and  the  French  retired  behind  the  Andelles.    The 


THE  AEMIES  IN   NORMANDY.  257 

Eighth  Corps  arrived  near  Rouen,  after  skirmishes  on 
the  road,  and  found  an  intrenched  position  abandoned 
at  Isneauville;  and  on  December  5th  General  von 
Goeben  entered  the  chief  city  of  Normandy.  The  29th 
Brigade  advanced  on  Pont-Audemer,  the  First  Corps 
crossed  the  Seine  higher  up,  at  Les-Andelys  and  Pont- 
de-l'Arche.  Vernon  and  Evreux  were  occupied,  num- 
bers of  Gardes  Mobiles  having  retreated  by  railway  to 
Liseux.  On  the  northern  bank  the  Dragoon  Guards 
reconnoitred  as  far  as  Bolbec,  and  the  Uhlans  found 
no  French  even  in  Dieppe. 

The  French  had  retired  to  Le-Havre,  and  a  consider- 
able force  had  been  conveyed,  in  ships  that  were  in 
readiness,  to  Honfleur,  on  the  other  bank  of  the  Seine. 
The  16th  Division  continued  its  march,  reaching  Bolbec 
and  Lillebonne  on  the  11th. 

The  orders  from  head-quarters  at  Versailles  had  been 
transmitted  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and,  in 
obedience  to  these.  General  Manteuffel  now  decided  on 
leaving  only  the  First  Corps  on  the  Lower  Scire,  and 
returning  with  the  Eighth  on  the  Somme,  where  the 
French  in  Arras  were  now  becoming  active. 

Besides  making  this  evident  by  various  small  en- 
counters, on  December  9th  they  had  attacked  a  com- 
pany detailed  to  protect  the  reconstruction  of  the  rail- 
way at  Ham,  surprising  it  at  night,  and  taking  most 
of  the  men  prisoners ;  and  on  the  11th  several  French 
battalions  advanced  as  far  as  La-Fere. 

To  check  their  fui'ther  progress,  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  sent  detachments  to  Soissons  and  Compiegne. 
General  Count  von  der  Groeben  took  up  a  position  at 
Roye  with  part  of  the  garrison  from  Amiens,  and  on 
the  16th  encountered  the  15th  Division  at  Montdidier, 
which  immediately  retired  on  the  Somme. 

Only  the  citadel  of  Amiens  was  now  held  by  the 
IT 


258  THE  PEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

Germans;  General  von  Manteuffel,  who  liad  not 
approved  of  the  evacuation  of  the  town,  ordered  its 
immediate  re-occupation.  The  inhabitants  had,  how- 
ever, remained  peaceable,  and  on  the  20th  the  16th 
Division,  which  had  given  up  the  attack  on  Le-Havre, 
arrived  via  Dieppe. 

A  reconnoissance  action  by  Querrieux  made  it  cer- 
tain that  great  numbers  of  French  were  drawn  up  on 
the  bank  of  the  Hallue,  and  General  von  Manteuffel 
now  concentrated  the  whole  corps  at  Amiens.  Rein- 
forcements might  shortly  be  expected,  for  the  3rd 
Eeserve  Division  was  on  the  march,  and  had  already 
reached  St.  Quentin.  The  First  Corps  was  also  ordered 
to  send  another  brigade  from  Rouen  to  Amiens  by 
railway,  and  the  General  in  command  determined  to 
attack  at  once  with  22,600  men,  his  only  available 
force. 

"General  Faidherbe  had  assembled  two  corps,  the 
Twenty-second  and  Twenty-third.  His  advance  on 
Ham  and  La-Fere,  intended  to  divert  the  Prussians 
from  attacking  Le-Havre,  had  succeeded.  He  next 
turned  on  Amiens,  and  had  advanced  to  within  two 
miles  (German).  He  now  stood,  with  43,000  men  and 
eighty-two  guns,  fronting  to  the  west  behind  the 
Hallue.  Two  divisions  held  the  left  bank  of  this 
stream,  for  1^  miles  from  its  confluence  at  Daours  up 
to  Contay,  and  two  beyond,  at  Corbie  and  Franvillers. 
The  Somme  secured  their  left  flank. 

On  December  23rd  General  von  Manteuffel,  with  the 
Eighth  Corps,  advanced  on  the  road  to  Albert.  The 
3rd  Brigade  of  the  First  Corps  formed  his  reserve.  He 
intended  to  keep  the  French  busy  with  the  15th  Divis- 
ion on  their  front  and  left  wing,  and  outflank  their 
right  with  the  16th  Division.  The  unexpected  exten- 
sion of  the  French  right  wing  prevented  this,  and  it 


BATTLE  ON   THE  HALLUE.  259 

became  a  front-to-front  battle  along  the  whole  line. 
The  commanding  height  of  the  eastern  bank  gave  the 
French  a  superior  artillery  position,  and  the  villages 
lying  at  the  foot  had  in  every  instance  to  be  stormed. 

The  French  had  withdi*awn  their  outposts  to  this 
line  when,  at  eleven  o'clock,  the  head  of  the  15th  Divis- 
ion reached  the  copse  at  Querrieux,  and  brought  up  a 
battery.  Two  battalions  of  the  29th  Brigade  took  the 
place  at  midday  at  the  first  onslaught,  crossed  the 
stream,  drove  the  French  on  the  further  bank  out  of 
Noyelles;  but  they  now  found  themselves  under  an 
artillery  and  infantry  fire  from  all  sides.  The  East 
Prussians  stormed  up  the  slope  at  about  four  o'clock, 
and  took  two  guns  which  were  being  served,  but  were 
forced  to  retire  to  the  village  before  the  advancing 
masses  of  the  French. 

Soon  after  midday,  too,  Fechencourt  was  carried  on 
the  left,  and  Bussy  on  the  right ;  and  the  enemy,  after 
a  feeble  resistance,  was  diiven  back  across  the  stream. 
Here,  on  the  other  hand,  the  German  artillery  could  at 
first  do  nothing  against  the  strong  and  well-posted 
batteries  of  the  French.  Vecquemont,  however,  was 
stormed,  though  stoutly  defended,  and  street-fighting 
lasted  till  the  afternoon. 

The  15th  Division,  against  the  intentions  of  their 
leader,  had  become  involved  in  the  fight  before  the 
16th,  operating  more  to  the  left,  could  afford  them  any 
assistance. 

It  was  not  till  four  o'clock  that  the  31st  Brigade  ar- 
rived at  Behencourt,  and,  crossing  the  river  by  flying 
bridges,  di'ove  the  French  back  into  the  village,  where 
they  still  offered  a  firm  resistance,  but  finally  had  to 
give  way.  The  32nd  Brigade,  on  the  extreme  left,  got 
across  the  Hallue  and  into  Bavelincourt. 

Thus  all  the  hamlets  on  the  river  were  in  the  hands 


260  THE   FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

of  the  Germans ;  but  the  short  December  day  was  clos- 
ing in,  and  further  progress  must  be  postponed  till  the 
morrow.  Even  in  the  dark  the  French  made  several 
attempts  to  regain  the  positions  they  had  lost,  particu- 
larly about  Contay,  where  they  overlapped  the  German 
position.  But  their  attacks  were  repulsed  both  there 
and  at  Noyelles.  They  succeeded  indeed  in  getting 
into  Vecquemont,  but  were  diiven  out  again,  and  then 
the  Prussians,  pursuing  them  across  the  stream,  also 
carried  Daours,  so  that  finally  the  Germans  held  every 
passage  of  the  Hallue. 

The  battle  was  over  by  six  o'clock.  The  troops  re- 
tired into  quarters  in  the  captured  villages,  placing 
outposts  near  every  egress. 

The  attack  had  cost  the  Germans  900  men;  the 
defence  had  cost  the  French  about  1000,  besides  1000 
unwounded  prisoners  taken  into  Amiens. 

At  daybreak  on  the  24th  the  French  opened  fire  on 
the  Hallue  cutting. 

Having  ascertained  that  their  numbers  were  almost 
double  those  of  the  Germans,  it  was  decided  this 
day  to  act  only  on  the  defensive,  awaiting  the  arri- 
val of  reinforcements  and  intrenching  themselves  in 
the  positions  gained.  The  army  reserve  was  pushed 
forward  on  Corbie  to  threaten  the  French  left  flank. 

But  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Faid- 
herbe  was  already  retiring.  His  insufiiciently-clothed 
troops  had  suffered  fearfully  through  the  bitter  winter's 
night,  and  were  much  shaken  by  the  unfavorable  issue 
of  the  fight.  He  therefore  led  them  back  under  shelter 
of  the  fortresses.  When,  on  the  25th,  the  two  Prussian 
divisions  and  the  cavalry  pursued  them  beyond  Albert, 
and  then  almost  as  far  as  Arras  and  up  to  Cambrai, 
they  found  no  compact  force  at  all,  and  only  captured 
some  hundreds  of  stragglers. 


TAKING  OF   MEZIERES.  261 

When  General  Manteuffel  had  disposed  of  the  enemy, 
he  sent  General  von  Mu'us  to  invest  Peronne,  while  he 
himself  returned  to  Rouen. 

By  drafting  off  six  battalions  as  a  reinforcement  to 
Amiens,  the  First  Army  Corps  was  left  with  only  two 
brigades.  The  French  had  10,000  men  on  the  right 
bank,  and  12,000  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Lower  Seine. 
And  these  forces  had  come  very  close  to  Rouen ;  on 
the  south  side  within  two  miles.  Meanwhile,  however, 
the  2nd  Brigade  had  again  been  sent  up  from  Amiens, 
and  on  its  arrival  the  hostile  force  was  once  more 
driven  back. 

THE   TAKING  OF  MEZIERES. 

On  the  northern  field  of  war,  before  the  end  of  the 
year,  the  siege  of  Mezieres  was  brought  to  an  end. 
After  the  battle  of  Sedan  the  Commandant  had  to  send 
out  provisions  from  the  stores  of  the  besieged  town 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  large  number  of  prisoners, 
and  it  was,  therefore,  for  the  present  exempted  from 
attack.  After  that  the  fortress  precluded  the  use  of 
the  railroad ;  still  it  was  only  kept  under  observation 
till  the  19th  of  December,  when,  after  the  disaster  of 
Montmedy,  the  14th  Division  fell  back  on  Mezieres. 

The  garrison  numbered  only  2000  men,  but  it  was 
effectually  seconded  without  by  volunteers,  who  were 
extremely  active  in  this  broken  and  wooded  country. 
The  town  was  not  completely  invested  till  the  25th. 

Mezieres  stands  on  a  spur  of  the  mountains,  sur- 
rounded on  three  sides  by  the  Moselle,  and  shut  in  by 
high  ground.  The  construction  of  the  fortress,  which 
was  strengthened  by  Vauban,  was  not  calculated  to 
resist  modern  artillery.  There  was  an  outer  rampart 
at  a  distance  of  from  2000  to  3000  metres  from  the 
inner  wall,  and   although   the  long   delay  had  been 


262  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

utilized  to  make  good  tlie  weak  points  by  throwing  up 
earthworks,  a  bombardment  could  not  fail  to  be  fatal 
to  the  defence. 

When  Verdun  had  surrendered,  heavy  artillery  had 
to  be  brought  by  rail  from  Clermont  to  a  position  close 
under  the  southern  front  of  the  fortress.  The  only 
hindrance  to  the  erection  of  the  batteries  was  the  state 
of  the  soil,  which  was  frozen  to  a  depth  of  twenty 
inches ;  but  at  a  quarter  past  eight  on  the  morning  of 
the  31st  of  December  eight  field-guns  opened  fire. 

At  first  the  fort  replied  vigorously,  but  by  the  after- 
noon its  artillery  was  silenced,  and  the  white  flag  was 
hoisted  next  morning. 

The  garrison  were  taken  prisoners ;  large  stores  and 
132  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  But  the 
chief  advantage  gained  was  the  opening  of  another  line 
of  railway  to  Paris. 

PAEIS  IN  DECEMBER. 

In  Paris  G-eneral  Ducrot  had  been  busily  employed 
in  making  good  the  losses  sustained  at  Villiers.  A 
part  of  the  greatly  reduced  First  Corps  must  be  kept 
in  reserve,  the  Second  Army  was  redistributed.  A 
sortie  by  the  peninsula  of  Gennevillers  and  the  heights 
of  Franconville  had  not  been  approved  by  the  Govern- 
ment. They  expected  confidently  to  see  the  Army  of 
Orleans  appear  ere  long  under  the  walls  of  the  capital, 
and  steps  were  being  taken  on  the  6th  of  December  to 
facilitate  a  junction,  when  a  letter  from  General  von 
Moltke  announced  the  defeat  of  General  d'Aurelle  and 
the  occupation  of  Orleans.  A  sortie  to  the  south 
would  thenceforth  be  aimless,  and  after  long  discussion 
it  was  at  last  decided  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
lines  on  the  north  by  a  great  collective  effort. 

The  little  stream  of  the  Moree  offered  some  protec- 


PAKIS   IN   DECEMBER.  263 

tion  on  that  side,  but  only  so  long  as  the  ice  would 
not  bear.  And  there  were  but  three  German  corps, 
amounting  to  81,200,  over  an  extent  of  forty-five 
kilometres  (twenty-seven  miles  English). 

Earthworks  were  constructed  in  preparation  between 
Bondy  and  Courneuve,  the  forts  to  the  north  were 
armed  with  heavier  guns,  and  a  battery  was  mounted 
on  Mont-Avron.  Ninety  rounds  of  ammunition  were 
served  out  to  each  man,  with  six  days'  rations :  and 
four  days'  fodder  for  the  horses.  They  were  forbidden 
to  carry  their  kit,  but  the  camp  bedding  was  to  be 
taken.  The  day  at  first  fixed  was  December  19th,  but 
it  was  postponed  till  the  21st. 

Thus,  during  great  part  of  the  month,  the  investing 
army  remained  almost  undisturbed  by  the  defenders. 
Regular  food,  warm  winter  clothing,  and  abundant 
supplies  through  the  unfailing  punctuality  of  the  mails, 
had  kept  the  troops  in  a  thoroughly  satisfactory 
condition. 

The  preparations  of  the  garrison  for  a  new  offensive 
did  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  besieging  forces. 
Deserters  brought  reports  of  an  imminent  sortie.  On 
the  20th  information  came  from  the  posts  of  observa- 
tion that  a  large  force  was  assembling  at  Merlan  and 
Noisy-le-Sec,  and  early  on  the  21st  the  2nd  Division  of 
foot-guards  were,  by  order  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  in  readiness  to  cross  the 
Moree.  Part  of  the  1st  Division  remained  in  reserve 
at  Gonesse ;  the  rest  were  to  be  relieved  by  the  7th, 
and  brought  into  action.  On  the  right  wing  the  Land- 
wehr  Division  of  Guards  occupied  the  country  between 
Chatou  and  Carrieres-St.-Denis ;  on  the  left  a  brigade  of 
the  Saxon  Corps  held  Seran.  The  4th  Infantry  Division 
of  the  Second  Corps  were  drawn  back  on  Malnoue 
to  support  the  Wiirtembergers  in  case  of  need,  as  they 


264  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

were  to  make  a  stand  against  the  French  at  Join- 
ville. 

To  divert  the  attention  of  the  Germans  from  the  true 
point  of  attack,  a  brisk  fire  was  to  be  opened  early  in 
the  day  from  St.  Valerien ;  a  considerable  force  was  to 
engage  the  right  wing  of  the  Gruards,  General  Vinoy 
was  to  lead  the  Third  Army  against  the  Saxons,  and 
Admiral  de  la  Eouciere  was  to  fall  upon  Le-Bourget. 
This  place,  which  was  a  standing  threat,  must  at  any 
rate  be  seized,  and  not  till  then  was  General  Ducrot  to 
cross  the  Moree,  near  Blancmesnil  and  Aulnay,  with 
the  Second  Paris  Army. 

THE  FIGHT  AT  LE-BOUEGET. 

(December  21st.) 

Le-Bourget  was  held  by  only  four  companies  of 
Queen  Elizabeth's  Regiment  (German)  and  one  bat- 
talion of  foot  guards.  When  the  mist  rose  at  about  a 
quarter  to  eight,  the  little  force  found  itself  under  fire 
from  the  forts  and  several  batteries,  as  well  as  from 
the  armor-clad  railway  carriages.  Within  half  an  hour 
strong  columns  of  the  French  were  marching  up  from 
east  and  west.  To  the  east  the  village  was  defended 
for  some  time  against  seven  French  iDattalions,  and  on 
the  other  side,  five  were  brought  to  a  standstill  close 
to  the  church  by  the  rapid  fire  of  the  Germans ;  but 
some  of  the  marine  fusiliers  made  their  way  into  the 
place  from  the  north.  Pressed  on  all  sides  by  superior 
numbers,  the  defence  was  concentrated  at  the  southern 
end  of  the  village.  The  party  holding  the  churchyard 
tried  to  force  their  way  through  to  this  point,  but  some 
of  them  were  taken  prisoners  in  the  attempt.  The 
French  advanced  step  by  step  under  great  loss,  and 
did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  possession  of  the  glass- 


FIGHTING  AT  LE-BOURGET.  265 

works.  Five  fresh  battalions  of  the  French  reserve 
marched  up  from  St.  Denis  to  the  gas-works,  and 
battered  down  the  garden-wall,  but  still  could  not 
break  the  steady  resistance  of  the  Germans. 

At  nine  o'clock  they  were  reinforced  by  one  company, 
and  at  ten  o'clock  by  seven  more,  who,  in  a  bloody 
hand-to-hand  struggle,  fought  their  way  to  the  church- 
yard and  gas-works.  By  eleven  the  last  of  the  assail- 
ants were  routed,  and  Le-Bourget,  in  the  expectation 
of  a  fresh  attack,  was  occupied  by  fifteen  companies. 
Two  batteries  of  field  artillery,  which  had  been  busy 
by  the  brook,  were  brought  up  to  defend  the  village. 

Meanwhile  General  Ducrot  had  waited  in  vain  for 
the  signal  which  should  have  announced  success  at 
Le-Bourget.  He  had  pushed  the  advanced  guard  of 
his  army  past  Bondy  and  Drancy,  when  he  was  warned 
by  the  disastrous  issue  of  the  struggle  on  his  left  to 
give  up  the  attack  on  the  line  by  the  Moree. 

The  triumphant  exploit  became  a  mere  cannonade, 
to  which  the  German  field-guns  replied  as  far  as  possi- 
ble.    By  noon  the  French  had  retired. 

They  had  lost,  by  their  own  account,  about  600  men. 
The  German  Guards  had  sacrificed  400,  but  they  car- 
ried off  360  prisoners.  In  the  evening  the  outposts 
resumed  their  old  positions. 

The  various  feints  of  the  Parisian  garrison  had  had 
no  result,  and  produced  no  alteration  in  the  plan  pur- 
sued by  the  German  Commander-in-chief.  Their  ad- 
vance from  St.  Denis  to  Etains  had  been  repulsed, 
and  two  gun-boats  on  the  Seine  were  driven  back  by 
the  fire  of  four  field  batteries  on  Orgemont.  The  tri- 
fling sortie  on  Chatou  was  scarcely  heeded.  General 
Vinoy  had  indeed  led  a  larger  force  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Marne,  but  that  was  not  till  the  afternoon 
when  the  fight  at  Le-Bourget  was  over.    The  Saxon 


266  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN   WAK. 

outposts  retired  to  the  intrenched  position  near  Le 
Chen  ay.  One  of  the  German  battahons  in  quarters 
there  drove  the  enemy  out  of  Maison-Blanche  that 
same  evening,  another  attacked  Ville-Evrart,  where 
fighting  went  on  till  midnight ;  they  lost  seventy  men, 
but  brought  in  600  prisoners.  Next  morning  the 
French  abandoned  Ville-Evrart,  under  the  fire  of  the 
German  artillery  posted  on  the  heights  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river. 

Paris  had  now  been  invested  for  three  months.  A 
bombardment — never  a  satisfactory  mode  of  action — 
could  have  no  decisive  effect  against  so  large  a  place ; 
and  the  Germans  were,  in  fact,  well  aware  that  nothing 
could  reduce  it  but  a  regular  siege.  But  the  engineer- 
ing siege- works  must  wait  till  the  artillery  were  in  a 
position  to  second  them. 

It  has  akeady  been  shown  that  the  fortress  artillery 
had  been  first  employed  against  those  forts  which  in- 
terrupted the  communications  in  the  rear  of  the  army. 
There  were  indeed  235  heavy  pieces  standing  ready 
for  action  at  Villacoublay ;  but  it  had  proved  impossi- 
ble as  yet  to  bring  up  the  necessary  ammunition  for 
an  attack  which,  when  once  begun,  must  on  no  account 
be  allowed  to  flag.  ^ 

By  the  end  of  November,  railway  communication 
had  been  opened  with  Chelles,  but  the  greater  part  of 
the  ammunition  had  meanwhile  been  deposited  at 
Lagny,  and  would  now  have  to  be  forwarded  by  the 
cross-road.  The  ordinary  country  carts  with  two 
wheels  proved  totally  unfit  for  the  transport  of  shell, 
and  only  2000  four-wheeled  carts  could  be  requisitioned 
for  many  miles  round.  Hence  960  more  were  brought 
from  Metz  with  horses  sent  from  Germany,  and  even 
the  teams  of  the  Third  Army  were  called  into  requisi- 
tion, though  they  were  almost  indispensable  just  then 


FIGHTING  AT  LE-BOURGET.  267 

as  remounts  towards  the  efficiency  of  the  army  on  the 
Loire.  Finally,  all  the  horses  of  the  pontoon  trains, 
of  the  field  bridging  troops,  and  the  columns  of  in- 
trenching tools  were  taken  for  the  transport  ser- 
vice. 

A  new  difficulty  arose  when  the  breaking-up  of  the 
ice  necessitated  the  removal  of  the  pontoon-bridges 
over  the  Seine. 

The  roads  were  so  bad  that  it  took  the  wagons  nine 
days  to  get  from  Nanteuil  to  Villacoublay  and  back. 
Many  broke  down  under  their  loads,  and  the  drivers 
constantly  took  to  flight.  And  at  this  juncture  the 
Chief  of  the  Staff  gave  the  artillery  another  task  to  be 
carried  out  forthwith. 

Though  the  besieged  had  not  hitherto  succeeded  in 
fighting  their  way  through  the  enemy's  lines,  they  now 
proposed  to  extend  their  operations  so  as  to  repel  the 
besiegers  till  the  circle  became  so  thin  that  it  could  be 
broken.  On  the  south  side  the  German  lines  already 
extended  beyond  Vitry  and  Villejuif  to  the  Seine ;  and 
on  the  north,  between  Drancy  and  the  Fort-de-1'Est, 
there  was  an  extensive  system  of  trenches  and  batteries 
reaching  to  Le-Bourget  over  a  distance  of  1000  metres, 
which  in  part  might  be  dignified  as  regular  siege-works. 
The  hard  frost  had  indeed  arrested  their  construction, 
but  they  were  armed  with  artillery  and  occupied  by 
the  Second  Army.  Hence  the  most  favorable  ^om^- 
cVappui  for  a  sortie  to  the  east,  as  well  as  to  the  north, 
was  the  commanding  eminence  of  Mont-Avron,  which, 
with  its  seventy  heavy  guns,  stood  out  in  the  Marne 
valley  like  the  point  of  a  wedge  between  the  northern 
and  southern  German  lines. 


268  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

THE  REDUCTION   OF  MONT-AVRON. 

(December  27th.) 

To  drive  the  French  from  this  position  fifty  heavy 
guns  from  Germany,  and  twenty-six  from  La-Fere 
were  brought  up  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Bartsch.  By  the  exertions  of  a  whole  battalion  as  a 
working  party,  two  groups  of  batteries  were  erected, 
in  spite  of  the  severe  frost,  on  the  western  slopes  of 
the  hills  behind  Raincy  and  Gagny,  and  on  the  left 
ridge  of  the  Marne  Valley  near  Noisy-le-Grrand,  thus 
threatening  Mont-Avi'on  on  each  side  at  a  distance  of 
from  2000  to  3000  metres. 

At  haK-past  eight  on  the  27th  of  December  these 
guns  opened  fire.  A  heavy  snow-storm  interfered 
with  accurate  aim,  and  prevented  any  observation  of 
the  execution  done.  Mont-Avron  with  the  forts  of 
Nogent  and  Rosny  replied  promptly  and  rapidly. 

The  German  batteries  had  lost  two  officers  and 
twenty-five  gunners,  several  gun-carriages  had  broken 
down  under  their  own  fire,  and  everything  pointed  to 
the  conclusion  that  no  result  would  be  obtained  on  that 
day.  But  the  firing  had  been  more  effectual  than  the 
men  supposed.  The  fine  weather  on  the  28th  allowed 
of  greater  precision;  the  Prussian  fire  proved  most 
telling,  making  fearful  havoc  of  the  strong  but  exposed 
French  infantry  garrison.  Mont-Avi*on  was  silenced 
and  the  forts  only  kept  up  a  feeble  fire.  General 
Trochu,  who  had  commanded  in  person,  ordered  the 
troops  to  abandon  Mont-Avron,  and  it  was  so  effect- 
ually disarmed  in  the  course  of  the  night  by  the  energy 
of  Colonel  Stoffel  that  only  one  disabled  gun  was  left 
on  its  fiank. 

On  the  29th  the  French  guns  were  silenced,  and  th© 


MONT-AVEON  ABANDONED.  269 

hill  was  deserted,  as  the  Germans  had  no  intention  of 
occupying  the  position.  Then*  batteries  were  now 
tui'ned  on  the  forts,  which  suffered  severely,  and  on 
the  earthworks  near  Bondy. 

Before  the  year  was  out  the  besiegers  succeeded  in 
storing  the  most  indispensable  ammunition  in  Villa- 
coublay.  The  siege  operations  were  entrusted  to 
General  Kameky,  the  artillery  was  under  the  command 
of  General  Prince  Hohenlohe.  The  batteries  had  long 
been  finished,  and  by  the  dawn  of  the  new  year  100 
guns  of  the  heaviest  calibre  were  ready  to  open  fii*e  on 
the  southern  fortifications. 


V. 

ACTIVE  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  PROVINCES. 

THE  AEMY  OF  THE  EAST   UNDER  GENERAL  BOURBAKI. 

Wnn^E  the  French  forces  were  engaged  in  constant 
fighting,  in  the  north,  on  the  Seine  and  the  Somme,  in 
the  south,  on  the  Loire  and  Saone,  General  Bourbaki's 
army  had  kept  out  of  sight.  Since  the  8th  of  Decem- 
ber, when  the  6th  Division  of  cavalry  had  reported  its 
presence  at  Vierzon,  aU  trace  of  it  had  been  lost.  It 
was,  of  course,  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  Ger- 
man Commander-in-chief  to  know  the  whereabouts  of 
so  large  an  army;  only  the  Second  German  Army 
could  learn  this,  and  on  the  22nd  received  instructions 
to  reconnoitre. 

To  this  end  General  von  Rantzau  set  out  from  Mon- 
targis  towards  Briare,  where  he  found  that  the  French 
had  abandoned  their  position;  in  the  course  of  the 
next  few  days  he  met  them,  and  was  defeated. 

The  Hessians  were  reinforced  to  a  strength  of  three 
battalions,  four  squadrons,  and  six  field-pieces,  but 
were  nevertheless  withdi-awn  to  Gien  on  the  1st  of 
January.  The  French  had  displayed  a  force  of  several 
thousand  Gardes  Mobiles,  twelve  guns,  and  a  body  of 
marine  infantry.  A  noticeable  fact  was  that  some  of 
the  prisoners  taken  belonged  to  the  Eighteenth  French 
Corps,  which  formed  part  of  the  Fu'st  Army  of  the 
Loire. 

A  regiment  of  the  6th  Division  of  cavahy,  sent  out 
to  reconnoitre  on  the  road  to  Sologne,  returned  with 


BOUEBAKI'S   MOVEMENTS.  271 

the  report  that  a  strong  force  of  the  French  were 
marching  in  column  on  Aubigny-Ville.  On  the  other 
hand,  two  diivers,  who  had  been  taken  prisoners,  de- 
clared that  the  troops  from  Bourges  were  already  being 
moved  by  railway,  and  the  newspapers  pointed  to  the 
same  conclusion ;  still,  too  much  weight  could  not  be 
attached  to  mere  rumor  as  against  a  circumstantial 
report.  At  Versailles  it  must  be  assumed  that  the 
First  Army  of  the  Loire  had  not  moved  from  Bourges, 
and  that  General  Bourbaki,  after  recuperating  his 
forces,  would  act  in  concert  with  General  Chanzy. 

These  two  armies  might  attack  the  Germans  at  Or- 
leans on  both  sides,  or  one  might  engage  and  detain 
them  there,  while  the  other  marched  to  relieve  the 
capital. 

This,  in  fact,  was  what  General  Chanzy  proposed. 
Since  the  21st  of  December  he  had  been  resting  in 
quarters  in  and  about  Le-Mans,  where  railways  from 
four  directions  facilitated  the  arrival  of  new  detach- 
ments. His  troops  had  no  doubt  great  difficulties  to 
contend  with.  For  lack  of  billets  for  so  large  a  force 
some  had  to  camp  out  under  tents  in  the  snow,  and 
suffered  severely  from  the  intense  cold.  The  hospitals 
were  full  of  wounded,  and  small-pox  broke  out.  On 
the  other  hand,  these  narrow  quarters  were  favorable 
to  the  redistribution  of  the  companies  and  the  restora- 
tion of  discipline.  The  news  from  Paris,  too,  urged 
the  General  to  prompt  action. 

General  Trochu  had  sent  word  that  Paris  could  not, 
unaided,  repel  the  enemy.  Even  if  a  sortie  should 
prove  successful,  the  necessary  provisions  could  not 
be  carried  through,  and  nothing  but  the  simultaneous 
arrival  of  an  army  from  without  could  secure  supplies. 
Now  General  Chanzy  was  quite  ready  to  march  on 
Paris,  but  it  was  indispensable  that  he  should  first 


272  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

know  exactly  what  Generals  Bourbaki  and  Faidherbe 
were  doing. 

Of  course,  the  concerted  action  of  the  three  gi'eat 
Army  Corps  could  only  be  planned  and  ordered  from 
head-quarters.  The  General  therefore  sent  an  officer 
of  his  Staff  on  the  23rd  December  to  Gambetta  at 
Lyons,  to  express  his  opinion  that  only  a  prompt  and 
combined  advance  could  prevent  the  surrender  of  Paris. 
But  the  Minister  believed  that  he  knew  better.  The 
first  news  of  a  quite  different  employment  of  Bour- 
baki's  army  only  reached  Chanzy  on  the  29th,  when 
Bourbaki  was  already  on  the  march.  Nor  did  Gam- 
betta's  reply  convey  either  distinct  orders  or  sufficient 
information.  "Vous  avez  decime  les  Mecklembour- 
geois,  les  Bavarois  n'existent  plus,  le  reste  de  I'armee 
est  deja  envahi  par  I'inquietude  et  la  lassitude.  Per- 
sistons  et  nous  renverrons  ces  hordes  hors  du  sol,  les 
mains  vides."  *  The  plan  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  to  be  that  "which  would  most  demoralize 
the  German  army."  f 

Under  such  obscure  instructions  from  head-quarters, 
General  Chanzy,  trusting  to  his  own  forces,  determined 
to  make  his  way  to  Paris  unaided ;  but  he  soon  found 
himself  in  serious  difficulties. 

The  Germans  had  no  time  to  lose  if  they  wished  to 
profit  by  their  position  between  the  two  hostile  armies, 
advantageous  so  long  as  those  armies  were  not  too 
close  upon  them.  The  simultaneous  attacks,  on  the 
31st  of  December,  at  Vendome  on  the  Loir,  and  at 
Briare  on  the  Loire,  seemed  to  indicate  that  they  were 
already  acting  on  a  concerted  plan. 

*  "  You  have  decimated  the  Mecklenburgers,  the  Bavarians  are  wiped 
out,  the  rest  of  the  army  is  a  prey  to  uneasiness  and  exhaustion.  Let  us 
4>efsevere,  and  we  shall  drive  these  hordes  off  the  land,  empty-handed." 

t  <^ui  d«§moralisera  le  plus  I'arm^e  Allemande. 


CHANZY'S  ADVANCE.  273 

On  New  Year's  Day  orders  were  telegraphed  to 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  to  recross  the  Loir  and  march 
against  General  Chanzy  without  delay,  as  being  the 
nearest  and  most  imminently  dangerous  enemy.  To 
effect  this  the  Second  Army  was  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  of  the  Grand  Duke 
of  Mecklenburg  (17th  and  22nd  Divisions)  and  the  2nd 
and  4th  Divisions  of  cavalry.  The  5th  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion was  dispatched  to  protect  the  advance  on  the  left 
flank. 

Only  the  25th  (Hessian)  Division  was  to  be  left  in 
Orleans  to  receive  General  Bourbaki,  and  to  keep  a 
lookout  on  Gien.  To  provide  against  a  possible  ad- 
vance of  the  Ai'my  of  the  Loire,  General  von  Z  astro w 
was  posted  at  Armangon  with  the  Seventh  Corps ;  the 
Second  Corps  was  detached  from  the  besieging  force 
and  sent  forward  towards  Montargis. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  expected  to  get  three  of  his 
corps  on  the  Vendome-Moree  line  by  the  6th  of  Janu- 
ary, and  to  move  the  Thirteenth  from  Chartres  on  Brou. 

THE  ADVANCE   ON   LE-MANS. 

The  Germans  had  hoped  to  find  the  enemy  in  winter 
quarters;  but  General  Chanzy  had  provided  against 
surprise  by  strong  outposts.  Nogent-le-Eotrou  on  his 
left  was  held  by  General  Rousseau's  division,  and  a 
large  force  of  volunteers;  strong  detachments  were 
posted  from  Vibraye  and  St.  Calais,  as  far  as  the  Braye 
stream,  where  General  Jouffroy  had  come  to  a  stand 
after  the  last  action  at  Vendome ;  on  his  right  he  had 
General  Barry  at  La-Chartre,  and  de  Curten's  division 
at  Chateau-Renault. 

The  wings  of  the  German  army  came  into  collision 
with  these  forces  on  the  5th  of  January. 

General  Baumgarth,  on  the  German  left,  had  brought 

AC 


274  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

three  battalions,  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  two 
batteries,  as  far  as  St.  Amand.  The  57th  had  stormed 
Villeporcher,  on  the  road  to  Chateau-Eenault,  had  re- 
tired before  four  battalions  of  the  French,  and  then 
had  recaptured  and  held  it.  This  much,  at  any  rate, 
was  now  clear :  a  not  inconsiderable  force  of  French 
was  assembled  in  front  of  the  left  wing  of  the  German 
army,  now  marching  westward.  In  following  up  this 
movement  General  Baumgarth  was  now  deputed  to 
insure  its  safety,  and  with  this  object  was  reinforced 
by  the  addition  of  the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  and  the 
1st  Cavalry  Brigade. 

The  44th  Brigade  on  the  right,  in  its  advance  on 
Nogent-le-Rotrou,  had  had  a  sharp  encounter.  They 
stormed  the  enemy's  position  at  La-Fourche,  and  seized 
three  guns,  with  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  The 
main  body  of  the  corps  reached  Beaumont-les-Autels 
and  Brou,  but  the  cavahy  failed  to  penetrate  the  woods 
to  the  north  of  Nogent. 

(January  6th.)  By  six  in  the  morning  the  advanced 
guard  of  General  Baumgarth's  detachment  was  on  the 
march  to  Prunay,  but  the  main  body  could  not  follow, 
ha^dng  to  face  a  strong  attack  at  about  half -past  nine. 
With  a  view  to  observing  the  enemy,  the  German  in- 
fantry were  opened  out  to  great  intervals  between 
Villeporcher  and  Ambloy,  and  only  a  small  reserve 
remained  at  La  None.  The  engagement  soon  assumed 
wider  proportions,  and  the  Germans  with  difficulty 
maintained  the  Les-Haies — Pias  line,  being  seriously 
threatened  by  the  envelopment  of  their  left  wing, 
which  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  were  now  able  to  join, 
but  could  only  come  into  action  with  one  horse  battery. 
The  reserve,  however,  moved  up  along  the  high-road 
to  Chateau-Renault  and  repulsed  the  French,  who  had 
already  made  their  way  into  Les-Haies.    But  when 


BETWEEN   ORLEANS   AND  LE-MANS.  275 

they  renewed  the  attack  in  close  columns  and  brought 
up  foui'  batteries  against  the  place,  the  Germans  were 
obliged  to  retii'e  behind  the  Brenne. 

Meanwhile  the  16th  Regiment,  which  had  ah'eady 
got  as  far  as  Ambloy  on  the  march  to  Yendome,  had 
turned  back  to  St.  Amand  to  support  Greneral  Baum- 
garth,  and  the  38th  Brigade  of  infantry  deployed  be- 
tween Neuve  St.  Amand  and  St.  Amand  with  a  strong 
force  of  cavahy  on  each  wing.  But  as  by  some  mis- 
take the  town  was  evacuated,  the  Greneral  of  the  6th 
Division  of  cavahy,  Duke  William  of  Mecklenburg, 
ordered  a  retreat.  The  infantry  had  already  come  to 
a  stand  at  Huisseau  and  there  found  quarters.  The 
advanced  guard  fell  back  on  Ambloy;  the  cavalry 
partly  on  Ambloy  and  partly  on  Villeromain. 

During  the  engagement  at  St.  Amand  the  Tenth 
Corps  had  advanced  on  Montoire,  in  two  columns, 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Loire,  leaving  a  battalion 
before  Vendome  on  the  right,  to  secure  the  egress  of 
the  Third  Corps  at  this  spot. 

When  the  20th  Division  reached  St.  Rimay,  at  about 
one  o'clock,  they  found  the  hills  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  Loir  occupied  by  Greneral  Barry's  troops.  All 
the  German  batteries  were  brought  up  to  the  southern 
ridge  of  the  valley  and  soon  drove  the  French  off  the 
broad  slopes ;  but  the  defile  of  Les-Roches  in  the  front 
remained  quite  unassailable.  The  ruined  bridge  at 
Lavardin,  lower  down  the  stream,  was  therefore  made 
practicable  with  pontoons.  The  19th  Division  had 
meanwhile  reached  that  place,  several  battalions 
crossed  from  the  south  to  attack  Les-Roches,  and  easily 
dislodged  the  French.  As  darkness  came  on,  prevent- 
ing any  further  advance,  the  corps  found  quarters  in 
and  about  Montoire. 

The  General  in  command  of  the  Third  Corps  had 


276  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

intended  this  day  to  make  a  lialt  before  Vendome,  and 
only  push  forward  his  advanced  guard  as  far  as  the 
Azay;  but  this  detachment  met  ere  long  with  such 
stout  opposition,  that  the  main  force  was  compelled  to 
advance  to  their  assistance.  General  de  Jouffroy,  with 
the  idea  of  helping  General  de  Curten,  had  started  to 
renew  the  attack  on  Vendome,  so  the  advanced  guard 
of  the  5th  Division,  on  reaching  Villiers  at  about  half- 
past  one,  found  the  10th  Battalion  of  Jagers,  which 
had  been  marching  at  the  same  time  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Loir,  engaged  at  Villiers  in  a  sharp  fight 
which  had  already  lasted  four  hours.  They  brought 
their  two  batteries  up  to  the  plateau  to  the  north  of 
the  village,  and  the  48th  Regiment  made  its  way  to 
the  ridge  of  the  lower  Azay  valley,  though  its  broad 
meadow  slopes  were  swept  by  the  French  long-range 
rifles  and  the  artillery  which  fired  down  the  valley. 
And  here  the  French  sent  over  swarms  of  sharp-shoot- 
ers to  continue  the  attack. 

The  8th  Regiment  (German)  was  presently  brought 
up,  and  after  a  short  fight  on  the  right  took  possession 
of  Le-Gue-du-Loir ;  then  further  reinforcement  arrived 
in  the  10th  Infantry  Brigade,  and  by  degrees  the 
Prussian  guns  numbered  thirty-six.  The  French  artil- 
lery could  not  face  their  fire,  and  within  half  an  hour 
it  was  turned  on  the  infantry.  At  about  half -past  four 
the  German  battalions  got  across  the  vaUey,  seized  the 
vineyards  and  farms  on  the  opposite  hills,  and  stormed 
Mazange.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  the  French 
retired  to  Lunay. 

Further  to  the  right  (German)  the  6th  Division,  on 
leaving  Vendome  at  eleven  o'clock,  found  the  battalion 
left  by  the  Tenth  Corps  at  Courtiras  fighting  hard 
against  a  very  superior  force  of  the  French.  The  11th 
Brigade  advanced  upon  the  Azay  intrenchment,  though 


BETWEEN   OKLEANS  AND  LE-MANS.  277 

not  without  heavy  loss,  and  when,  at  about  half-past 
three,  the  12th  also  came  up,  the  artillery  was  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  place ;  Azay  was  stormed,  the  river 
was  crossed,  and  they  established  themselves  on  the 
heights  beyond.  The  French  repeatedly  returned  to  the 
charge,  but  were  successfully  repulsed,  and  by  five 
o'clock  fighting  was  over  and  the  French  driven  back. 

The  Third  Army  Corps  took  up  quarters  between 
the  Azay  stream  and  the  Loir.  A  detachment  was 
told  off  to  occupy  Danze,  higher  up  the  river.  They 
had  lost  thirty-nine  officers  and  above  400  men,  but 
had  also  taken  400  prisoners. 

In  the  course  of  the  day  the  Ninth  Corps  crossed  the 
Upper  Loir  at  Freteval  and  St.  Hilaire,  without  opposi- 
tion, and  proceeded  along  the  high-road  to  St.  Calais, 
as  far  as  Busloup.  The  Thirteenth  remained  at  Un- 
verre,  Beaumont,  and  La  Foui'che. 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  had  not  been  led  into  any 
change  of  purpose  by  the  attack  on  St.  Amand  and 
the  obstinate  fight  at  the  Azay.  The  Thirteenth  Corps 
were  expected  to  reach  Montmirail,  and  the  Eleventh 
to  be  at  Epuisay,  both  by  the  11th  of  January ;  the 
Third  were  to  continue  the  attack  on  the  French  at 
Braye.  But  after  the  reverse  experienced  at  St. 
Amand,  the  presence  of  a  strong  French  force  on  the 
left  flank  could  not  be  suffered  to  pass  unnoticed. 
Duke  Wilham  was  given  verbal  orders,  at  the  head- 
quarters at  Vendome,  to  return  forthwith  to  St.  Amand 
with  the  6th  Division  of  cavahy,  and  General  von 
Voigts-Rhetz  was  ordered  to  support  General  Baum- 
garth,  if  necessary,  with  his  whole  corps. 

The  country  between  the  Loir  and  the  Sarthe, 
through  which  the  Germans  must  march,  offers  pecul- 
iar difficulties  to  an  invading  force  and  great  advan- 
tages for  its  defence. 


278  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

The  roads  leading  to  Le-Mans  are  all  intersected  at 
right  angles  by  numerous  streams  flowing  through 
broad  and  somewhat  deep  meadow  valleys.  Groves, 
villages,  and  country-houses  with  walled  parks  cover 
the  cultivated  high  ground ;  vineyards,  orchards,  and 
gardens  are  enclosed  by  hedges,  ditches,  or  fences. 
Hence  almost  the  whole  burthen  of  the  struggle  in 
view  had  to  be  borne  by  the  infantry;  there  was  no 
space  for  deploying  cavalry,  and  the  use  of  artillery 
must  be  extremely  limited,  since  in  a  country  so  closely 
overgi'own  only  one  gun  could  be  brought  to  bear  at  a 
time.  The  enemy's  centre  could  only  be  approached 
by  four  high-roads,  and  the  communications  between 
the  columns,  starting  at  least  six  miles  apart,  were 
confined  to  the  cross-roads,  which  were  almost  impass- 
able from  the  severity  of  the  season  and  the  hostility 
of  the  inhabitants.  Anything  like  mutual  support 
was,  at  first,  quite  out  of  the  question. 

Under  these  conditions  their  movements  could  only 
be  guided  by  general  instructions,  and  the  officers  must 
be  left  free  to  act  on  their  own  responsibility.  Special 
orders  for  each  day,  though  they  were  indeed  issued, 
might,  in  many  cases,  be  impossible  to  execute.  The 
Commander-in-chief  could  not  foresee  in  what  relation 
the  various  corps  might  stand  to  e^h  other  after  a 
day's  fight.  Reports  could  only  come  in  at  a  late  hour 
of  the  night,  and  the  orders  previously  drawn  up  often 
came  to  hand  when  the  troops,  to  utilize  the- short  day, 
had  already  set  out  on  the  march. 

(January  7th.)  In  obedience  to  orders  from  head- 
quarters. General  Voigts-Rhetz  sent  that  part  of  the 
19th  Division  which  had  already  reached  Vendome 
back  to  the  support  of  St.  Amand.  The  38th  Brigade 
had  reached  this  place  early  in  the  day,  and  General 
von  Hartmann,  who  had  taken  the  command  of  it, 


BETWEEN   OELEANS   AND   LE-MANS.  279 

marched  out,  the  cavahy  forming  a  right  and  left  wing, 
by  the  high-road  to  Chateau-Renault. 

The  advancing  column  found  the  enemy  at  Ville- 
chauve,  at  about  midday.  A  thick  fog  prevented  the 
employment  of  the  artillery,  and  it  was  at  the  cost  of 
many  killed  that  Villechauve,  Pias,  and  some  other 
farms  were  seized  from  the  French.  Villeporcher  and 
the  adjacent  hamlets  were  in  their  possession,  and  at 
about  two  o'clock  they  came  out  and  attacked  on  the 
high-road  with  a  force  of  several  battalions.  The 
weather  had  cleared,  and  it  was  soon  evident  that  this 
move  was  only  intended  to  screen  the  beginning  of  a 
retreat  of  the  French  to  the  westward. 

The  Germans  were  quartered  on  the  spot,  and  the 
reinforcements  sent  to  their  aid  remained  at  St.  Amand. 

The  Tenth  Corps,waiting  for  their  return,  did  not  quit 
their  quarters  at  La-Chartre;  only  the  14th  Brigade 
of  cavalry  went  on  to  La-Richardiere  to  maintain  com- 
munication with  the  Third.  But  they  did  not  succeed 
in  taking  the  village  with  only  dismounted  troopers. 

General  von  Alvensleben  hoped  to  come  upon  the 
French  on  that  side  of  the  Braye,  and  to  get  round 
their  left  wing  so  as  to  join  the  Tenth  Corps,  who  had 
promised  him  assistance.  The  Third  Corps  made  their 
way  towards  Epuisay,  leaving  one  brigade  at  Mazange, 
and  as  soon  as  news  reached  them  on  the  march,  that 
the  French  had  abandoned  Lunay  and  Fortan,  that 
brigade  also  proceeded  to  Fortan. 

Epuisay  was  found  to  be  strongly  occupied,  for  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  retreating  from 
Busloup,  had  just  arrived  there.  It  was  not  till  half- 
past  one  that  the  French  were  expelled  from  the  little 
town,  having  barricaded  the  streets;  and  even  after 
crossing  the  Braye  they  fought  hard,  under  shelter  of 
various  villages  and  farmsteads. 


280  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

A  long  fusillade  on  both  sides  was  kept  up  through 
the  thick  fog ;  but  at  last,  at  about  four  o'clock,  the 
12th  Grerman  Brigade  got  forward  to  the  ridge  of  the 
valley.  The  9th  Brigade  took  possession  of  Savigny 
without  meeting  any  serious  opposition,  and  Souge 
was  stormed  in  the  dusk. 

The  corps  had  lost  forty-five  men  and  taken  200 
prisoners.  It  found  quarters  behind  the  Braye,  but 
placed  outposts  on  the  western  bank. 

The  Ninth  Corps  retired  for  the  night  to  Epuisay, 
though  two  corps  lost  their  way  in  one  of  the  few  roads 
in  the  neighborhood.  On  the  right,  the  2nd  Division 
of  cavalry  went  off  to  Mondoubleau,  to  join  the  Thir- 
teenth Corps.     The  French  retreated  to  St.  Calais. 

The  order  from  head-quarters,  that  the  Thirteenth 
Corps  were  to  march  on  Montmirail,  had  been  issued 
on  the  hypothesis  that  it  would  have  reached  Nogent- 
le-Rotrou  by  the  6th,  whereas  it  had  in  fact,  as  has 
been  shown,  remained  at  La-Fourche,  Beaumont,  and 
Unverre.  The  Grand  Duke,  who  had  expected  a  stout 
resistance,  did  not  set  out  to  attack  Nogent  till  the  7th. 
When  the  22nd  Division  reached  the  spot,  they  found 
all  the  villages  deserted  in  the  valley  of  the  Upper 
Huisne,  and  entered  the  town  without  any  fighting,  at 
about  two  o'clock.  They  took  up  quarters  there ;  the 
4th  Cavalry  Division  went  to  Thirion-Gardais,  and 
only  the  advanced  guard  went  to  search  for  the  enemy. 
They  found  the  wood  by  Le-Gibet  strongly  occupied 
by  the  French,  and  did  not  succeed  in  getting  there  till 
night-fall.     The  French  retired  to  La-Ferte-Bernard. 

The  17th  Division  had  at  first  gone  with  the  reserve ; 
but  at  one  o'clock,  in  consequence  of  the  reports 
brought  in,  the  Grand  Duke  diverted  it  to  Autlion  on 
the  south;  and  in  order  to  follow  instructions  from 
head-quarters  as  closely  as  possible  he  pushed  at  least 


BETWEEN   OKLEANS   AND  LE-MANS.  281 

a  detachment  of  two  battalions,  two  cavalry  regiments, 
and  one  battery  on  towards  Montmirail,  under  the 
command  of  Greneral  von  Ranch. 

(January  8th.)  Finding,  on  the  morning  of  the  8th, 
that  the  French  had  made  no  further  attempt  on  St. 
Amand,  Greneral  von  Hartmann,  at  nine  o'clock,  sent 
back  the  troops  told  off  for  his  support.  At  ten 
o'clock  he  received  instructions  to  join  the  Eighteenth 
Corps  also ;  but  the  French  still  held  Villeporcher  and 
the  wood  lying  behind  it,  and  were  also  di*awn  up 
across  the  road  to  Chateau -Renault  in  a  very  ad- 
vantageous position  behind  the  river  Brenne.  The 
General  perceived  the  necessity  of  making  a  stand  at 
this  spot,  and  took  the  best  means  to  that  end  by  act- 
ing himself  on  the  offensive.  Supported  by  the  fire  of 
his  battery,  and  with  the  cavahy  on  either  flank,  six 
companies  of  the  6th  Regiment  marched  on  Ville- 
porcher, drove  the  defence  into  the  wood  of  Chateau- 
Renault,  and  took  100  prisoners.  On  the  left,  the  9th 
Uhlans  rode  down  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique.  Not  till 
darkness  had  set  in  did  General  von  Hartmann  retire 
in  the  direction  of  Montoire. 

General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  had  already  set  out  from 
thence  very  early  in  the  day.  The  night's  frost  had 
covered  the  roads  with  ice,  which  greatly  impeded  any 
movement.  The  road  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Loir 
was  in  many  places  broken  up.  It  leads  up  and  down 
a  series  of  abrupt  hollows,  and  on  emerging  from  these 
the  advanced  guard  found  themselves  face  to  face  with 
a  force  of  about  1000  Gardes  Mobiles,  who  had  taken 
up  a  position  in  front  of  La-Chartre.  Their  mitrail- 
leuses were  soon  forced  to  a  hasty  retreat  by  the  fire 
of  two  field-pieces,  but  it  was  only  after  a  prolonged 
struggle  that  the  German  infantry,  moving  with  diffi- 
culty, succeeded  in  entering  the  town,  where  they  took 


282  THE   FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

up  their  quarters.  Two  battalions,  whicli  were  sent 
further  on  the  road,  had  to  fight  for  their  night's  lodg- 
ing ;  all  through  the  night  shots  were  being  exchanged 
with  the  French  in  the  neighborhood,  and  230  prison- 
ers were  taken. 

The  39th  Brigade,  which  left  Ambloy  in  the  morning 
to  follow  the  corps,  only  got  as  far  as  Souge. 

General  von  Schmidt  was  sent  to  the  right,  to  estab- 
lish communications  with  the  Third  Corps.  He  was 
met  at  Vance  by  a  brisk  fire.  The  squadron  which  led 
the  van  made  way  for  the  horse  battery,  and  a  volley 
of  grape-shot  di'ove  the  dismounted  cuirassiers  behind 
the  hedges  for  shelter.  When  two  more  guns  could 
be  got  into  position,  a  few  rounds  of  canister  dispersed 
a  long  column  of  French  cavahy  in  every  direction. 

Colonel  von  Alvensleben  pursued  the  French  cavalry 
with  the  15th  Eegiment  of  Uhlans  till  they  came  upon 
a  body  of  infantry  guarding  the  stream  of  Etang-fort. 
The  brigade  stayed  at  Vance,  after  putting  about  100 
French  out  of  action. 

Of  the  Third  Corps,  the  6th  Division  had  gone  for- 
ward by  St.  Calais.  The  French  tried  to  line  the 
trenches  on  greatly  cut-up  roads ;  but  they  did  not 
await  a  serious  attack,  and  made  off,  for  the  most  part 
in  carts  which  were  in  waiting.  The  5th  Division, 
proceeding  in  a  parallel  line  on  the  left,  met  with  no 
opposition ;  but  the  state  of  the  roads  made  the  march 
very  difficult.  The  corps  halted  at  Bouloire.  The  9th, 
coming  up  behind  them,  entered  St.  Calais. 

The  Grand  Duke  had  moved  both  divisions  of  the 
Thirteenth  Corps  on  La-Ferte-Bernard.  On  their  way 
they  came  across  none  but  stragglers,  but  they  found 
the  roads  in  such  a  state  that  not  till  four  in  the  after- 
noon did  they  reach  the  town  and  settle  into  quarters. 
The  French  had  retired  to  Connerre.     The  4th  Cavalry 


BETWEEN   OELEANS  AKD  LE-MANS.  283 

Division  was  to  secure  the  right  flank  on  the  further  ad- 
vance, but  could  not  get  as  far  as  Belleme ;  on  the  other 
hand,  General  von  Rauch's  detachment,  dispatched 
to  Montmu-ail,  surprised  the  French  in  Vibraye,  and 
took  possession  of  the  bridge  there  over  the  Braye. 

By  the  evening  of  that  day  the  forces  forming  the 
German  right  and  left  wings  were  at  an  equal  distance 
from  Le-Mans,  on  the  single  high-road  which  leads 
across  from  La-Ferte-Bernard  by  St.  Calais  and  La- 
Chartre ;  the  Third  Corps  was  fui'ther  in  advance,  with 
an  interval  of  a  long  march.  A  closer  combination  of 
the  forces  could  only  be  assui-ed  by  a  further  advance 
along  the  converging  highways.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  therefore  issued  an  order,  at  ten  o'clock  that 
evening,  for  the  Tenth  Corps  to  march  next  day  to 
Parigne-l'Eveque,  the  Third  to  Ardenay,  and  the  Thir- 
teenth as  far  ahead  as  Montfort,  each  sending  an  ad- 
vanced guard  beyond  those  points.  The  Ninth  was  to 
follow  in  the  centre,  while  General  von  Hartmann  was 
to  protect  Vendome  with  the  38th  Brigade  and  the  1st 
Division  of  cavalry. 

But  the  mere  distance  was  too  gi-eat  to  allow  of  the 
wings  being  brought  so  rapidly  to  the  points  desig- 
nated; and  on  the  9th  of  January  snow-storms,  ice- 
bound roads,  and  a  thick  fog  still  further  impeded 
their  progress. 

(January  9th.)  General  von  Hartmann  marched  his 
infantry  brigade  on  Chateau  Renault,  and  entered  the 
town  by  one  o'clock.  Curten's  division  (French)  had 
started  early  in  the  day  for  St.  Laurent. 

The  Tenth  Corps,  though  incomplete,  retreated  this 
day,  in  two  columns ;  General  von  Woyna's  detachment 
was  to  march  from  Pont-de-Braye  by  Vance,  the  re- 
mainder of  the  corps  from  La  Chartre  via  Brives,  to 
meet  at  Grand-Luce. 


284  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

The  20th  Division  had  scarcely  set  out,  by  this 
route,  from  L'Homme,  when  they  came  under  a  sharp 
fire  of  shell  and  bullets.  In  this  place  there  happened, 
for  once,  to  be  room  for  three  batteries  to  advance,  but 
in  the  heavy  snow-fall  aim  was  out  of  the  question. 
The  German  infantry,  however,  by  degrees  drove  the 
French  out  of  various  hamlets  and  farmsteads,  and 
back  across  the  Brives.  To  pursue  them  beyond  that 
stream  a  bridge  must  have  been  thrown  across,  with 
some  loss  of  time,  and  then  Chahaignes  would  have 
had  to  be  seized. 

But  in  the  narrow  valley  which  lay  before  them  they 
expected  some  rather  hot  work.  The  nature  of  the 
road  was  such  that  the  artillerymen  and  cavahy  had 
to  dismount  and  lead  the  horses.  The  Greneral  in 
command  rode  on  a  gun-carriage;  his  staff  went  on 
foot.  Some  horses  which  had  fallen  in  front  stopped 
the  way  for  the  column ;  the  artillery  were  then  sent 
back  to  try  next  day  to  come  on  by  the  Vance  road. 

To  facilitate  the  march  of  the  20th  Division,  General 
von  Woyna  had  been  instructed  to  deviate  from  his 
direct  road  and  attack  the  enemy's  left.  When  he  ap- 
proached the  hollow,  there  was  no  sound  of  fighting 
there,  and  the  detachment  was  turned  back  at  Vance ; 
but  at  Brives,  at  about  half-past  three,  the  main 
column  met  with  fresh  resistance,  being  received  with 
a  brisk  fire  from  the  heights  north-east  of  the  village. 
Not  even  the  infantry  could  move  beyond  the  high- 
road, so  there  was  no  alternative ;  they  must  march 
straight  on.  Meanwhile,  however,  the  30th  Brigade 
came  up  and  drove  off  the  enemy. 

It  was  half-past  six  in  the  evening,  and  quite  dark, 
when  Colonel  von  Valentin!  set  out  for  St.  Pieri'e  with 
four  battalions,  and  there  took  100  French  prisoners 
and  a  loaded  baggage-train  of  100  wagons. 


BETWEEN   OKLEANS   AND   LE-MANS.  285 

The  Tenth  Corps  spent  the  night  with  its  van  as  far 
forward  as  Brives  and  Vance,  but  its  rear  straggled  as 
far  back  as  the  valley  of  the  Loir.  Nor  had  the  14th 
Brigade  of  cavalry  been  able  to  make  any  headway. 

Of  the  Third  Corps,  the  6th  Division  had  proceeded 
by  the  high-road,  beyond  Bouloire,  with  the  artillery 
corps ;  the  5th  had  moved  on,  on  the  left,  by  cross- 
roads. 

The  advanced  guard  of  the  Third  Corps,  after  a  smart 
brush,  had  expelled  the  French  from  a  position  in  front 
of  Ardenay,  but  at  two  o'clock  had  to  repel  a  deter- 
mined attack  there.  After  General  de  Jouffroy  had 
withdrawn  to  the  south  of  St.  Calais,  General  Chanzy 
had  pushed  the  division  under  Paris  forward  from 
thence  towards  Le-Mans.  He  had  taken  up  a  position 
near  Ardenay,  occupying  the  chateau  on  the  right,  and 
placing  four  guns  and  two  mitrailleuses  on  the  left 
close  to  La-Butte.  To  oppose  these  there  was  only 
room  on  the  road  for  two  German  field-pieces,  which, 
however,  in  the  course  of  half  an  hour  had  silenced  the 
mitrailleuses,  and  then  carried  on  the  unequal  contest 
with  the  greatest  obstinacy.  At  about  four  o'clock  five 
companies  of  the  12th  Brigade  stormed  the  chateau, 
while  others,  crossing  the  meadow-land  to  the  right, 
forced  their  way  through  a  clump  of  trees  to  La-Butte. 
As  night  came  on  the  French  tried  to  effect  a  general 
attack  along  the  high-road ;  but  this  was  repulsed,  and 
the  Brandenburgers,  defying  the  steady  firing  of  the 
defenders,  took  La-Butte  and  Ardenay  wdth  a  rush 
and  loud  cheers,  without  firing  a  shot.  The  French 
were  driven  back  into  the  valley  of  the  Narais,  losing 
many  prisoners. 

On  the  right  a  detachment,  consisting  of  one  bat- 
talion, two  squadrons,  and  two  guns,  had  advanced  with 
the  6th  Division.    They  drove  before  them  numbers 


286  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

of  franctireurs,  but  at  La-Belle-Inutile  they  met 
with  more  serious  resistance.  The  post  had  already 
been  carried  by  the  24th,  who  possessed  themselves  of 
a  large  ammunition  and  provision  train,  and  took 
above  100  unwounded  prisoners.  Count  zu  Lynar 
then  prepared  the  village  for  defence. 

The  5th  Division  had  met  with  no  opposition,  but 
the  state  of  the  roads  had  seriously  delayed  its  prog- 
ress. It  was  not  till  the  afternoon  that  the  head 
reached  the  Narais  at  Gue  de  I'Aune  and  took  up 
quarters,  there  and  to  the  rear  as  far  as  St.  Mars  de 
Locquenay.  The  advanced  guard  went  on,  however, 
to  La  Buzardiere,  thus  forming  the  van  of  the  whole 
army ;  Parigne-l'Eveque,  on  their  left  flank,  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  French. 

The  Ninth  Corps  had  followed  the  Third  to  Boulou^e. 

No  orders  from  head-quarters  had  as  yet  reached 
La-Ferte  when,  at  nine  in  the  morning,  the  Grand 
Duke  marched  on  Connerre  with  the  Thirteenth  Corps. 
Soon  after  midday  the  17th  Division  came  upon  the 
French  near  Sceaux,  and  after  an  obstinate  struggle, 
advancing  all  the  time,  drove  them  first  out  of  the  vil- 
lages and  then  off  the  road.  The  French,  who  had 
retreated  to  Connerre  by  forced  night  marches,  lost 
above  500  prisoners  in  this  small  affair.  But  the  short 
day  was  closing  in  and  the  advanced  guard  halted  at 
dusk  at  Duneau.  A  detachment,  on  going  further, 
found  Connerre  occupied  by  the  French,  and  many 
watch-fires  were  blazing  in  the  valley  of  the  Due. 
The  main  force  of  the  German  infantry  found  quar- 
ters in  and  around  Sceaux. 

Ranch's  detachment,  being  ordered  to  rejoin  the 
corps,  took  possession  of  Le-Croset,  and  of  the  bridge 
over  the  Due  near  that  village,  and  then  expelled  the 
French  from  Thorigne. 


BETWEEN  OELEANS  AND  LE-MANS.  287 

The  French  stayed  in  Connerre  only  till  the  evening ; 
then,  leaving  a  company  in  occupation,  they  continued 
their  retreat.  This  inevitably  led  them  from  the  left 
bank  of  the  Huisne  through  the  quarters  taken  up  by 
the  Third  German  Corps,  who  were  disturbed  all  night 
by  wandering  detachments  of  French  soldiers,  even  at 
Nuille,  where  the  head-quarters  of  the  division  were 
established. 

On  the  extreme  German  right  the  4th  Division  of 
cavalry  had  occupied  Belleme,  after  driving  out  the 
French  battalion,  which  had  likewise  been  ordered 
thither. 

By  this  day  the  centre  of  the  Second  Army  Corps 
had  also  got  within  two  miles  of  Le-Mans,  fighting  all 
the  way ;  while  the  two  wings  were  still  at  some  dis- 
tance behind.  As  it  was  probable  that  the  French 
would  give  battle  in  some  strong  position  beyond  the 
Huisne,  it  seemed  advisable  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
Tenth  and  Thirteenth  Corps  ;  on  the  other  hand,  this 
was  giving  the  French  time  to  collect  their  forces  also. 
By  attacking  at  once,  two  of  their  divisions,  now  at 
Chateau  Renault  and  Le-Chartre,  could  scarcely  be 
brought  up  quickly  enough,  and  the  rest  of  their  army, 
now  concentrating  on  Le-Mans,  were  involved  in  fight- 
ing at  a  disadvantage  on  all  sides.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  therefore  sent  the  Third  Corps  to  scour  the 
country  beyond  Ardenay ;  the  Tenth  was  to  advance 
on  Parigne,  and  the  Thirteenth  on  St.-Mars-la-Bruyere, 
though  that  place  could  scarcely  be  reached  from  the 
positions  actually  occupied  by  the  corps  that  night. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  army  assembled  near  Le-Mans 
was  still  acting  on  the  offensive  on  January  6th; 
General  Jouffroy  advancing  on  Vendome,  and  Curten 
on  St.  Amand.  But  on  the  7th  the  French  found 
their  whole  front,  ten  miles  in  length,  reduced  to  the 


288  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAK. 

defensive.  General  Rousseau,  on  the  left  wing,  had 
evacuated  Nogent-le-Rotrou,  and,  without  being  hardly 
pressed,  began  his  retreat  by  a  night  march  to  Con- 
nerre.  In  the  centre,  the  crossing  of  the  Braye  was 
wrested  from  General  Jouffroy;  he  retired  from  St. 
Calais,  not  on  Le-Mans,  but  to  join  General  Barry  to 
the  south.  On  the  right,  General  de  Curten  abandoned 
Chateau-Eenault,  and  set  out,  unpursued,  on  the  road 
past  Chateau-du-Loir.  To  bring  about  some  concerted 
movement  of  the  three  divisions  of  his  right  wing, 
General  Chanzy  placed  them  under  the  superior  orders 
of  Admiral  Jaureguiberry ;  he  sent  the  Paris  Division 
on  to  Ardenay  by  the  road  General  Jouffroy  had 
abandoned,  and  reinforced  General  Rousseau  on  the 
left,  by  ordering  three  di\dsions  to  support  him  on 
either  side  of  his  line  of  retreat.  General  Jouffroy 
was  to  return  to  Parigne-l'Eveque,  and  a  division  was 
sent  to  meet  him  there  and  at  Change. 

General  de  Curten  succeeded  on  the  9th  in  checking 
the  progress  of  the  left  German  wing  for  some  time 
close  to  Chahaignes ;  but  Paris's  division  was  driven 
back  on  Ardenay,  and  General  Rousseau,  thus  sur- 
rounded, abandoned  Connerre  the  same  evening.  The 
two  divisions  of  the  right  wing  withdrew  to  Jupilles 
and  Nuille-Pont-Pierre. 

Under  these  circumstances  General  Chanzy's  com- 
mands were  that  on  the  10th  Jouffroy's  divisions 
should  fall  back  on  Parigne-l'Eveque,  and  the  Paris 
Division  march  once  more  towards  Ardenay.  He  sent 
the  remaining  three  divisions  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps 
to  meet  General  Rousseau,  with  instructions  to  retake 
Connerre  and  Thorigne. 

These  intended  attacks  on  both  sides  gave  rise  to 
the  fierce  battle  which,  on  the  German  side,  was  fought 
by  the  Third  Corps  single-handed. 


BATTLE  OF  LE-MANS.  289 

BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS. 

(lOth,  11th,  and  12tli  of  January.) 

(January  10th).  The  fight  at  Parigne  and  Change. — 
As,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country,  deep  columns 
could  not  deploy  without  great  loss  of  time.  General 
von  Alvensleben  advanced  on  a  wider  front  of  small 
subdivisions,  moving  with  intervals  in  front  of  and 
between  Gue-de-1'Aune  and  Ardenay,  with  the  9th  and 
11th  Infantry  Brigades  next  to  Change.  On  his  right 
the  12th  marched  along  the  high-road  to  Le-Mans ;  on 
his  left  the  10th  was  to  start  from  Volnay  if  Parigne 
were  found  abandoned  by  the  French,  and  leaving  that 
place  on  their  left,  were  also  to  make  for  Change. 

Parigne  had,  in  fact,  been  deserted  by  the  French, 
but  had  been  re-occupied  before  daj^break  by  De- 
planque's  division ;  and  before  the  German  troops  had 
started,  the  far-advanced  posts,  towards  the  wood  of 
Loudon,  were  smartly  attacked  by  the  French.  The 
greater  part  of  the  9th  Brigade  had  to  be  brought  up 
by  degrees  between  Blinieres  and  the  edge  of  the  wood, 
but  only  seven  guns  could  be  brought  into  play  against 
the  strong  French  artillery.  General  von  Stiilpnagel 
decided  to  reserve  his  strength  for  the  struggle  at 
Change,  and  not  to  carry  on  a  sustained  contest  here, 
which  must  be  decided  as  soon  as  the  10th  Brigade  on 
the  left  should  make  its  appearance. 

This  brigade,  delayed  by  the  difficulties  of  the  march, 
did  not  reach  Challes  till  noon;  but  it  brought  two 
batteries  to  strengthen  the  German  artillery,  which 
now  cleared  the  way  for  the  infantry  attack  on  Parigne, 
which  stood  on  high  ground.  In  half  an  hour  the  bat- 
talions rushed  on  the  place  with  shouts  of  "  Hurrah 
for  Brandenburg,"  taking  a  gun  which  the  enemy  had 


290  THE  FEANCO-GEEM-iN  WAE. 

abandoned,  and  two  mitrailleuses  still  being  served. 
When  the  French  retiu-ned  to  try  to  recover  them  they 
were  repulsed,  and  lost  another  field-piece,  two  colors, 
and  several  wagons.  After  losing  2150  prisoners  they 
fled  to  the  shelter  of  the  forest  of  Ruaudin.  To  keep 
a  watch  here.  General  von  Stiilpnagel  left  two  bat- 
taUons  at  Parigne,  and  proceeded  at  once  to  Change  in 
two  columns.  In  front  of  this  village,  at  about  three 
o'clock,  the  11th  Brigade  had  met  with  a  violent  resist- 
ance by  the  Gue-Perray  from  the  other  brigades  of 
Deplanque's  division.  The  35th  Regiment  of  the  2nd 
Battalion  lost  nine  officers  and  above  100  men  in  a 
severe  struggle  at  Les-Gars.  The  General  in  command, 
who  was  on  the  spot,  dislodged  both  flanks  of  the 
enemy  from  strong  positions,  and  on  the  left  two  com- 
panies succeeded  in  crossing  the  stream  at  La  Gou- 
driere. 

These  at  four  o'clock  came  into  contact  with  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  9th  Brigade,  which  Colonel 
Count  von  der  Groeben  had  brought  on  from  Parigne, 
taking  possession  of  the  Chateau  of  Girardrie  on  the 
way.  As  the  two  companies  of  the  11th  Brigade  sent 
up  to  the  right  reached  Auvigne  at  the  same  time, 
the  "  General  Advance  "  was  sounded.  Auvigne  was 
stormed,  the  bridge  north  of  Gue-la-Hart  was  crossed, 
and  that  village  taken  after  a  hard  fight.  About  1000 
prisoners  were  again  taken  from  the  flying  French. 

It  was  already  dark,  and  Change,  the  goal  of  the 
struggle,  was  not  yet  won.  But  when  a  barricade 
outside  the  village  had  been  demolished,  it  was  found 
that  the  10th  Brigade  were  already  in  possession. 
This  brigade,  on  its  way  along  the  high-road  from 
Parigne,  had  met  with  resistance  both  at  Chef-Raison 
and  PaiUerie.  Having  only  two  guns,  they  failed  to 
silence  the  French  artillery,  but  General  von  Stiilpnagel 


BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS.  291 

left  a  battalion  here  too,  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  hur- 
ried forward  with  part  of  the  brigade  to  support  the  Ger- 
mans at  Gue-la-Hart ;  the  rest  were  to  attack  Change. 

Here  the  French  had  already  been  for  the  most  part 
dismissed  to  quarters,  but  they  soon  formed  and  offered 
a  determined  resistance.  There  was  a  long  and  fierce 
street-fight,  which  ended  in  about  an  hour's  time,  by 
the  whole  garrison  of  800  men,  who  had  crowded  into 
the  market-place,  surrendering  as  prisoners. 

The  12th  Brigade  had  at  last  got  off  from  Ardenay, 
but  not  till  eleven  o'clock ;  they  proceeded  unchecked 
along  the  high-road  as  far  as  St.  Hubert,  where  they 
seized  an  abandoned  commissariat  train.  Having 
aligned  themselves  with  the  rest  of  their  corps,  they 
halted  for  a  while,  but  soon  after  they  were  attacked 
by  French  artillery ;  and  the  enemy  again  advancing 
along  the  high- way.  General  von  Buddenbrock  like- 
wise advanced  to  the  attack,  and  drove  the  French  out 
of  Champagne,  some  across  the  Huisne,  and  some  back 
on  the  hills  behind  the  village.  Two  guns  then  suc- 
cessfully defied  the  fire  of  the  French  artillery  near 
Lune-d'Auvours,  and  the  infantry  expelled  them  from 
that  shelter  also. 

Further  to  the  right  a  German  battalion  had  taken 
St.-Mars-la-Bruyere  after  a  slight  skirmish,  and  was 
subsequently  joined  there  by  General  Count  zu  Lynar. 

Thus  the  Third  Corps  had  by  this  time  taken  more 
than  5000  prisoners  and  many  valuable  trophies,  by 
equal  skill  and  good  fortune ;  it  had  indeed  left  450 
men  for  dead. 

The  Tenth  Corps  had  started  that  same  day  from 
Vance  and  Brives,  and  had  reached  Grand-Luce ;  but 
Dot  till  two  o'clock,  unobstructed  by  the  French,  but 
along  very  heavy  roads.  Here  they  took  up  their 
quarters.    The  Ninth  Corps  remained  at  Nuille. 


292  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

Of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  the  17th  Division  had  con^ 
tinned  its  advance  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Huisne, 
and  had  found  Connerre  aheady  deserted  by  the 
French.  But  on  the  further  side  of  the  river,  the 
heights  of  Cohernieres,  the  railway  station  and  the 
wood  on  the  north,  were  occupied  by  the  2nd  Division 
of  the  French  Twenty-first  Corps.  General  von  Ranch 
led  two  battalions  to  attack  them  from  the  south,  while 
from  the  east  the  22nd  Division  was  brought  up,  hav- 
ing crossed  the  Huisne  at  Sceaux  and  gone  on  to  Beille 
along  the  right  bank.  The  French  made  a  stout  resist- 
ance, and  the  fight  lasted  with  varying  fortunes  till 
darkness  came  on.  The  Chateau  of  Couleon  and  sev- 
eral villages  at  the  foot  of  the  wooded  hills  were  taken 
by  the  Germans,  but  the  French  maintained  their  hold 
on  the  heights  and  their  position  at  Cohernieres. 

The  17th  Division  had  meanwhile  continued  their 
advance,  along  roads  frozen  till  they  were  as  smooth 
as  glass,  and  reached  La-Belle-Inutile ;  the  22nd  passed 
the  night  at  Beille. 

This  division  had  that  morning  sent  a  detachment 
to  Bonnetable,  whither  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  had 
already  proceeded.  The  12th  Cavahy  Brigade  followed 
as  far  as  Belleme.  Colonel  von  Beckedorff  then 
marched  forward  to  Chanteloup,  whence  he  drove  out 
the  French  in  spite  of  an  obstinate  defence. 

General  Chanzy  had  resolved  on  a  decisive  engage- 
ment before  Le-Mans.  Cui'ten's  division  had  not  yet 
arrived,  and  only  a  part  of  Barry's  had  come  up,  still 
the  army  from  the  camp  at  Coulie  amounted  to  10,000 
men.  The  right  wing  of  the  French  position  rested  on 
the  Sarthe ;  the  centre  extended  above  a  mile  along  the 
Chemin-aux-Boeuf s,  and  the  left,  making  a  slight  bend, 
rested  on  the  Huisne.  Barry's  division,  already  weak- 
ened  by  reverses,   and  General  Lalande's  National 


BATTLE   OP  LE-MANS.  293 

Guards — an  ill-disciplined  and  ill-armed  troop — were 
placed  on  the  right,  where  the  danger  was  least.  De- 
planque's  and  Roquebrune's  divisions,  with  Desmai- 
son's  brigade  and  Jouifroy's  division,  held  the  centre 
and  the  left,  Jouffroy  facing  General  von  Alvensleben. 
Behind  this  line  Bouedec's  division  and  Colonel  Marty's 
troops  were  placed  in  reserve.  These  50,000  to  60,000 
men,  under  Admiral  Jaureguiberry,  very  sufficiently 
defended  the  position  between  the  two  rivers,  which 
was  well  protected  by  earthworks  at  the  most  impor- 
tant points.  Five  other  divisions,  under  the  command 
of  General  de  Colomb,  stood  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river,  about  two  miles  distant,  the  Paris  Division  at 
Yvi*e ;  Gougeard's  still  occupying  the  heights  of  Au- 
vours  to  the  north  of  Champagne,  Rousseau's  at  Mont- 
fort  and  Pont-de-Gesnes,  Collin's  in  a  bow-shaped 
position  at  Lombron,  while  ViUeneuve's,  quite  on  the 
flank,  faced  Chanteloup. 

(January  11th.)  On  this  day  the  Third  German 
Army  Corps  was  standing  exactly  opposite  the  main 
body  of  the  French  forces.  It  could  not  for  the  pres- 
ent hope  for  any  support  from  the  corps  on  its  wing, 
and  had  a  hard  struggle  before  it. 

On  the  left,  the  Tenth  Corps  was  stiU  at  Grand  Luce 
that  morning,  and  on  the  right  the  Thirteenth  Corps 
had  been  detained  on  the  previous  day  by  the  obsti- 
nate resistance  of  the  French,  who  had  held  their  own 
between  Les  Cohernieres  and  La  Chapelle,  and  occu- 
pied Le  Chene  in  their  front. 

The  22nd  Division  had  been  thrown  into  great  con- 
fusion in  the  course  of  the  struggle  in  the  wood,  and 
it  was  not  tiU  they  had  been  reformed  and  the  enemy's 
position  had  been  reconnoitred  by  both  the  Generals 
of  Division  that  the  fighting  could  be  renewed,  at 
about  eleven  o'clock. 


294  THE  PRAlfCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Two  battalions  of  the  17tli  Division  and  one  battery 
had  been  left  in  a  post  of  observation  in  front  of  Pont- 
de-Gesnes,  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Hnisne;  on 
the  northern  side,  the  Mecklenburg  battalions  stormed 
Cohernieres  in  the  afternoon,  and  after  a  sharp  con- 
test, in  conjunction  with  the  Hessians  forced  their  way 
to  the  westward  as  far  as  the  Gue  and  on  towards 
Lombron  at  about  four  o'clock. 

Further  to  the  right,  two  companies  of  the  90th  Eegi- 
ment  of  the  22nd  Division  had  meanwhile  taken  Le 
Chene,  in  spite  of  a  stout  defence ;  the  83rd  Regiment, 
after  a  sharp  fire  from  the  guns,  had  taken  the  farms 
of  Flouret  and  La  Grande  Metairie.  Colonel  von 
Beckedorff,  on  being  relieved  at  Chanteloup  by  the 
4th  Division  of  cavalry,  had  diiven  the  French  out  of 
St.  Celerin  and  advanced  to  La-Chapelle-St.-Remy,  to 
the  right  of  the  division,  which  occupied  a  large  extent 
of  ground  behind  the  points  it  had  seized. 

The  Mecklenburg  Grenadiers  had  held  their  own  for 
a  long  time  at  Le-Gue  and  La-Brosse  against  superior 
numbers  attacking  from  Pont-de-Gesnes ;  and  the 
main  body  of  the  17th  Division  retired  that  evening 
on  Connerre. 

But  the  more  completely  General  von  Alvensleben 
was  thrown  on  his  own  resources,  the'^more  important 
it  seemed  to  keep  the  troops  in  close  connection.  A 
strong  force  of  the  enemy  was  on  his  flank,  nay,  almost 
in  his  rear,  on  the  hiUs  of  Auvours,  and  only  kept  at 
bay  by  the  12th  Brigade,  which,  being  thus  engaged, 
could  not  at  present  advance  to  his  assistance. 

And  it  was  there  that  the  battle  began.  The  French 
had  repossessed  themselves  of  Champagne,  and  their 
artillery  formed  line  under  cover  of  the  ridge.  When 
their  fire  had  been  somewhat  checked  by  four  of  the 
German  guns,  two  battalions  advanced  to  the  attack. 


BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS.  295 

It  was  not  till  eleven  o'clock,  after  an  obstinate  con- 
test, that  the  French  were  driven  back  to  the  heights, 
and  the  bridge  over  the  Hnisne  was  taken.  Greneral 
von  Buddenbrock  now  placed  two  battalions  in  a  post 
of  observation,  sent  a  third  to  Lnne-d'Anvonrs,  and  by 
noon  returned  with  the  rest  of  the  brigade  to  rejoin 
the  corps. 

Meanwhile  the  conflict  had  been  raging  with  such 
fury  all  along  the  front  that,  at  twelve  o'clock,  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  sent  orders  from  St.  Hubert  to  Gen- 
eral Voigts-Rlietz,  to  proceed  with  all  speed  to  the 
field  with  the  Tenth  Corps;  and  at  the  same  time 
General  von  Manstein  was  instructed  to  seize  the 
heights  of  Auvours  with  the  Ninth. 

It  was  one  o'clock  before  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
Ninth  marched  up  the  hollow  way  through  deep  snow- 
drifts. They  were  followed  by  two  battalions  of  the 
12th  Brigade,  bringing  up  two  batteries  with  the  great- 
est difficulty.  The  German  infantry  plunged  into  the 
wood,  which  was  full  of  French  soldiers,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Villiers ;  the  11th  Regiment  of  Fusiliers  seized 
three  mitrailleuses  that  were  being  served,  and  as  soon 
as  the  French  had  abandoned  the  position,  turned 
them  on  the  wood. 

Further  to  the  left,  at  about  three  o'clock,  two  bat- 
talions of  the  85th  Regiment  were  detached  from  the 
main  body  of  the  18th  Division,  to  proceed  to  the 
western  end  of  the  ridge,  supported  by  the  Jagers  and 
two  batteries  which  were  posted  at  Les-Hetres.  To 
protect  them  two  companies  moved  on  to  La-Lune, 
hindering  the  French  from  crowding  down  on  the  high- 
road. But  in  opposition  to  this  movement  the  French 
opened  a  severe  fire  from  their  elevated  batteries 
behind  Yvre ;  notwithstanding  this,  the  Holsteiuers  on 
the  left  rushed  on  a  French  battery  and  seized  three  of 


296  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAK. 

its  guns.  On  the  right  they  took  possession  of  a 
neighboring  farmstead ;  and  soon  after  five  the  French 
had  vanished  from  the  high  ground  to  the  western 
ridge. 

Here,  however,  a  strong  counter-attack  had  to  be 
met  that  same  evening,  for  part  of  Grougeard's  divis- 
ion marched  up  the  slope  from  Yvi'e.  Their  further 
advance  was  effectually  stopped ;  but  they  could  not 
be  prevented  from  remaining  there  for  the  evening  and 
night.  Still,  by  this  struggle  the  18th  Division  had 
kept  open  the  rear  and  flank  of  the  Third  Corps.  It 
was  again  required  that  evening  to  secure  the  crossing 
of  the  Huisne  during  the  night  for  use  next  day ;  so 
three  battalions  and  one  battery  went  down  to  the 
northern  bank  and  repulsed  the  French  troops  in  pos- 
session of  the  bridge.     The  division  had  lost  275  men. 

Greneral  von  Alvensleben  had  postponed  the  advance 
of  the  Third  Corps  till  eleven  o'clock,  hoping  for  the 
arrival  of  the  12th  Brigade. 

During  the  night  the  French  completed  the  works 
on  the  skirts  of  the  wood  and  took  up  a  position 
there ;  they  also  occupied  the  high  bank  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  river,  where  they  had  brought  up  sev- 
eral batteries.  Thus  a  direct  attack  would  involve 
heavy  loss,  and  it  was  impossible  tb  outflank  such 
extensive  lines.  General  von  Alvensleben  therefore 
decided  on  advancing,  at  fh'st  only  against  the  enemy's 
left  wing,  and  sent  forward  the  11th  Brigade.  The 
10th  and  9th  remained  in  reserve  for  the  present,  at 
Change  and  Gue-la-Hart.  The  12th,  released  at  Mont- 
Auvours,  were  also  advancing,  but  by  a  cii'cuitous 
route,  because  the  high-road  was  everywhere  com- 
manded by  the  batteries  above. 

The  11th  Brigade,  scarcely  3000  strong,  followed  the 
course  of  the  Grue-Perray  streamlet,  round  the  northern 


BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS.  297 

end  of  the  wood.  To  protect  it  against  the  French 
columns  which  threatened  it  from  the  heights,  the 
35th  Regiment  formed  line  on  the  brook  and  occupied 
the  Chateau  of  Les- Arches.  The  20th  tried  to  get  for- 
ward by  the  cattle-path,  and  while  holding  the  Cha- 
teau of  Les-Noyers  and  the  bridge  there  over  the 
Huisne,  drove  off  the  French  by  sheer  hard  fighting, 
as  far  as  Les-G-ranges.  But  they  presently  returned 
with  so  strong  a  force  that  the  whole  brigade  was 
gradually  brought  up  into  the  firing  line.  Les-Grranges 
was  lost  and  retaken  several  times  with  heavy  loss, 
particularly  of  officers ;  but  the  Brandenburgers  fought 
steadily  on. 

On  their  left  the  10th  Brigade  now  made  its  appear- 
ance, having  come  up  from  Change  at  one  o'clock.  By 
two,  the  52nd  Regiment  had  possession  of  the  farm  of 
Le-Pavillon,  of  the  wooded  slope  in  front  and  the  farm 
of  Grand- Anneau,  but  their  loss  was  severe.  Strong 
columns  of  the  French  coming  up  from  Pontlieue  were 
driven  back,  two  batteries  were  got  forward  under 
heavy  fire  from  the  Chassepots  to  within  800  paces  of 
Le  Tertre,  and  yet  the  12th  Regiment  did  not  succeed 
in  getting  into  the  farmstead  till  two  battalions  of  the 
9th  Brigade  had  come  to  their  assistance  from  Change. 
The  position  was  taken  by  storm  at  about  five  o'clock, 
with  the  help  of  the  8th  Regiment  of  the  Grrenadier 
Life  Guards.  The  52nd  Regiment,  having  spent  all  its 
ammunition,  had  to  be  taken  out  of  action,  but  the 
battalion  of  Grenadiers  rushed  down  on  the  cattle- 
path,  taking  two  French  guns  which  were  firing  on 
them,  after  a  desperate  conflict;  but  the  enemy's 
repeated  attempts  to  recover  them  were  steadily  frus- 
trated. A  battery  which  the  French  were  bringing  up 
on  the  western  side  of  the  wood  was  driven  back  by 
rapid  volleys. 


298  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

"WTien  it  was  found  that  the  35th  Regiment  must  be 
brought  back  from  the  Gue-Perray  to  support  the 
20th,  the  French  recovered  possession  of  Les-Arches. 
Here  the  12th  Brigade  had  arrived  from  Auvours  at 
two  o'clock,  only  three  battalions  strong;  the  64th, 
however,  recaptured  the  chateau  after  a  short  fight. 
The  overwhelming  storm  of  fire  from  the  artillery  and 
musketry  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  hindered 
the  Germans  from  getting  up  their  guns,  and  it  was 
only  with  great  difficulty  and  the  loss  of  many  gun- 
ners that  the  pieces  were  brought  away  again;  but 
every  attack  on  the  position  by  the  French  from  Yvre 
was  steadily  repulsed. 

It  was  now  quite  dark,  but  the  firing  had  not  ceased. 
The  Third  Corps  had  taken  600  prisoners,  but  had 
lost  500  killed.  It  had  fought  its  way  into  the  heart  of 
the  French  position,  and  its  outposts  were  in  close 
proximity  to  the  enemy's  front.  And  now,  though 
late,  strong  reinforcements  arrived. 

The  Tenth  Corps  had  moved  from  Grand-Luce  to 
the  westward  early  in  the  day,  to  block  the  high-road 
from  Tours  to  Le-Mans,  but  the  frozen  state  of  the 
ground  again  delayed  them  on  the  way,  so  that  they 
only  reached  Teloche  in  the  afternoon. 

The  sound  of  firing  to  the  northward  left  them  in 
no  doubt  that  General  von  Alvensleben  was  fighting  a 
great  battle.  The  orders  sent  from  head-quarters  at 
St.  Hubert  reached  General  Voigts-Rhetz  at  noon ;  but 
he  then  judged,  and  very  rightly,  that  his  assistance 
would  now  be  more  effective  on  the  enemy's  flank  than 
on  the  field  where  the  Third  Corps  were  engaged.  So 
in  spite  of  the  exhausted  state  of  his  men,  who  had  had 
no  hot  meal  on  the  way,  he  at  once  pushed  forward. 

To  protect  himself  against  Curten's  division,  prob- 
ably at  Chateau-du-Loir,  he  dispatched  one  battahon 


BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS.  299 

to  Ecommoy.  It  was  received  with  firing  from  tlie 
houses,  surrounded  in  the  darkness,  and  compelled  to 
withdi-aw  from  the  place ;  but  it  kept  the  road  clear  in 
the  rear  of  the  corps. 

The  head  of  the  20th  Division  found  Mulsanne  feebly 
defended,  and  di'ove  the  detachment  back  beyond  the 
cutting  of  La  Monnerie. 

The  nature  of  the  country  here  afforded  great  ad- 
vantages to  the  French.  Ditches  and  fences  were  good 
cover  for  firing  from,  farmsteads  and  copses  excellent 
positions  for  defence.  Only  eight  guns  could  be 
brought  to  bear  against  the  enemy's  artillery;  but 
nevertheless  four  battalions  (Westphalians  and  Bruns- 
wickers)  persistently  repelled  the  French,  and  by  night- 
fall had  got  as  far  as  Point-du-Jour.  The  conflict  only 
ceased  at  the  cattle-path  by  Les-Mortes-Aures.  Here 
the  French  held  the  whole  plain  before  them,  by  the 
continuous  running  fire,  kept  up  from  behind  lines  of 
shelter-trenches  rising  one  above  the  other. 

The  battle  wavered  for  a  long  time,  but  the  German 
left  presently  gained  ground.  The  1st  Battahon  of  the 
17th  Eegiment  rushed  on  the  enemy,  who  returned 
their  fire  at  the  shortest  possible  range,  and  then  made 
for  the  wood ;  and  when  the  drums  of  the  1st  Battalion 
of  the  56th  Eegiment  were  heard  at  Point-du-Jour, 
beating  the  charge,  the  French  carried  away  their 
mitrailleuses  and  evacuated  Les-Mortes-Aures. 

This  battalion  had  received  orders  to  end  the  struggle 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Captain  von  Monbart  led 
the  attack  at  the  double  in  close  order ;  all  the  com- 
panies at  hand  joined  in  it,  and  in  spite  of  a  steady  fire 
from  the  cover  of  the  wood,  La-Tuilerie  was  carried  by 
half -past  eight ;  and  here  the  brigade  reformed,  while 
the  37th  stood  ready  to  support  it  at  a  spot  beyond 
at  Mulsanne.    The  French  vanished  in  the  darkness. 


300  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

The  constant  roll  of  wheels,  the  noise  of  departing 
railway  trains,  and  a  confusion  of  cries  announced 
their  flight.  Still  the  prisoners,  who  were  brought  in 
in  numbers,  all  agreed  that  a  strong  force  was  encamped 
in  the  woods.  Watch-fires  blazed  there  through  the 
night,  and  instead  of  resting,  the  troops  must  have 
been  preparing  to  meet  a  fresh  attack.  By  about  half- 
past  ten  the  outposts  reported  the  approach  of  a  strong 
force  of  the  French  from  Pontlieue. 

Hitherto  the  Germans  had  only  had  to  deal  with 
National  Guards  under  General  Lalande  at  this  point, 
a  force  not  much  to  be  relied  on ;  but  the  Admiral  now 
sent  Bouedec's  division  against  La-Tuilerie,  with  Gen- 
eral Roquebrune's  to  support  their  advance. 

The  battalions  in  the  first  lines  were  under  fire  for 
above  an  hour  in  a  perfect  storm  of  projectiles,  but  no 
serious  attack  was  attempted. 

According  to  French  reports,  their  officers  strove  in 
vain  to  induce  their  troops  to  advance ;  they  constantly 
gave  way.  And  a  subsequent  effort  with  the  Garde 
Mobile  was  equally  fruitless. 

Still,  there  was  to  be  no  rest.  At  two  in  the  morn- 
ing the  din  of  fighting  again  made  itseK  heard  on  the 
right.  Deplanque's  division  had  been  disturbed  by  a 
flanking  force  of  the  40th  Brigade,''  who  had  been 
marching  along  the  road  from  Euaudin  to  Pontlieue, 
to  be  at  hand  in  case  of  need ;  without  returning  the 
enemy's  fire,  they  had  attacked  the  detachment  holding 
Epinettes  and  took  possession  of  it,  close  to  the  cattle- 
path. 

(January  12th.)  Only  the  Third  and  Tenth  Corps 
could  be  reckoned  on  for  the  inevitable  battle  next  day. 
The  other  two  could  only  afford  indirect  assistance  by 
keeping  part  of  the  French  forces  otherwise  engaged. 

Of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  the  17th  Division  was  to 


BATTLE   OF  LE-MANS.  301 

proceed  via  Lombron  to  St.  Corneille,  without  allowing 
themselves  to  be  drawn  into  a  fray  with  the  enemy- 
still  occupying  the  banks  of  the  Huisne ;  the  22nd  was 
ordered  from  La-Chapelle  to  Savigne.  The  little  river 
Gue  could  easily  be  held,  and  part  of  the  artiUery  was 
left  at  Connerre  with  the  7th  Brigade  of  cavalry. 

In  their  advance  the  Germans  found  that  the  enemy 
had  already  abandoned  Lombron,  Pont-de-Gesnes,  and 
Montfort.  Scattered  arms  and  equipment  betrayed 
how  hastily  they  had  fled. 

Several  stragglers  were  brought  in,  and  it  was  not 
till  reaching  the  Merdereau,  at  about  noon,  that  the 
17th  Brigade  met  with  any  opposition.  An  attack 
from  all  sides  dislodged  the  French  from  the  Chateau 
of  Hyre  and  from  St.  Corneille  at  about  four  o'clock, 
and  500  French  were  taken  prisoners.  They  were  then 
driven  back  behind  the  Parance,  where  the  advanced 
guard  halted  at  dusk. 

Colonel  von  Beckedorff's  detachment  of  the  22nd 
Division  had  marched  on  Chanteloup  from  Sille,  re- 
pulsing the  French  on  La-Croix,  where  a  large  body  of 
their  troops  made  a  stand.  But  when,  after  a  long 
delay,  the  main  body  of  the  division  arrived,  the  Ger- 
mans attacked  at  once.  Whole  regiments  of  French 
here  laid  down  their  arms,  and  3000  men  surrendered, 
with  several  officers. 

An  attempt  of  the  German  cavalry  to  get  across  the 
Sarthe  to  break  up  the  railway  communication  was, 
however,  unsuccessful. 

The  force  occupying  the  ridge  of  Auvours  had  sur- 
rendered in  a  body.  The  35th  Brigade  marched  up  to 
Villiers,  but  patrols  sent  ahead  brought  news  that  the 
French  had  retired  behind  the  Huisne.   • 

When  the  noise  of  fighting  at  St.  Corneille  was  heard 
at  midday,  the  brigade  was  ordered  to  proceed  north- 


302  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN   "WAE. 

ward  to  support  the  ITtli  Division  engaged  there.  The 
84th  Eegiment,  passing  by  La-Commune,  lent  valuable 
assistance  in  the  attack  on  Chateau-Hyre.  Outposts 
were  left  by  the  Parance  for  the  night,  but  the  main 
body  of  the  brigade  returned  to  Fatines,  and  the  36th 
took  up  quarters  between  Villiers  and  St.-Mars-la- 
Bruyere. 

By  the  battle  of  the  previous  day  the  French  position 
before  Le-Mans  had  been  forced ;  but  they  still  stood 
firm  behind  the  Huisne,  and  as  their  left  wing  had 
been  driven  back  on  their  centre,  that  point  had  been 
considerably  strengthened.  StiU,  the  stream  must  be 
crossed,  the  steep  slope  must  be  climbed,  where  every 
hedge  of  the  terraced  vineyards  was  held  by  strong  fir- 
ing lines,  and  where  the  heights  were  crowned  with 
batteries.  The  ford  by  Yvre,  on  the  left,  was  very 
strongly  protected,  and  the  ground  in  front  of  the  wood 
of  Pontlieue  had  been  made  impassable  in  many  places 
by  abatis.  Against  such  a  position  the  artiUery  could 
do  little,  and  the  cavahy  nothing,  while  deep  snow 
hampered  every  movement  of  the  infantry.  Greneral 
von  Alvensleben  therefore  decided  for  the  present  on 
acting  only  on  the  defensive  with  his  right  wing,  while 
with  his  left  he  prepared  to  support  General  von 
Voigts-Rhetz  in  his  advance. 

The  troops  were  roused  from  their  short  rest  at  six 
in  the  morning.  Two  companies  of  French  were  mak- 
ing their  way  towards  the  bridge  at  Chateau-les-Noyers 
with  powder-bags,  but  they  were  compeUed  to  retreat, 
leaving  the  explosives  behind  them.  At  about  eight 
o'clock  the  French  made  a  determined  attack  on  the 
outposts  of  the  12th  Regiment,  quartered  in  the  wood, 
and  drove  them  in  as  far  back  as  Le-Tertre.  Again 
the  fight  raged  furiously  round  this  farmstead,  which 
was  almost  demolished  by  shell.     One  by  one  the  last 


BATTLE  OF  LE-MANS.  303 

battalions  of  the  lOth  Brigade  were  drawn  into  the 
struggle,  while  detachments  whose  ammunition  was 
exhausted  were  ordered  out  of  it.  Only  four  guns 
could  fire  with  any  effect,  but  by  eleven  o'clock  the 
French  volleys  gradually  died  away,  and  they  were 
seen  to  retire  on  Pontheue.  The  battalions  of  the  left 
wing  pursued,  and  came  out  on  the  Parigne  road  in 
immediate  touch  with  the  Tenth  Corps. 

General  von  Yoigts-Ehetz  had  left  two  battalions  at 
Mulsanne,  for  protection  from  Ecommoy ;  the  whole 
corps,  after  many  unavoidable  detachments  had  been 
detailed  from  it,  was  assembled  by  about  half -past 
seven  to  march  forward  on  Pontlieue.  The  main  body 
of  the  20th  Division  was  to  diverge  along  the  Mulsanne 
road  to  go  to  La-Tuilerie.  Three  battahons  of  the  19th 
Division  were  to  meet  at  Ruaudin  to  strengthen  the 
detachment  occupying  Epinettes,  while  two  battalions 
and  the  14th  Cavalry  Brigade  took  the  road  to  Parigne, 
with  the  corps'  artillery,  which  could  be  of  no  service 
in  the  plain  further  to  the  left. 

Reinforcements  had  meanwhile  arrived  at  Ruaudin, 
and  Greneral  von  Woyna  made  his  way  without  hin- 
drance through  the  woods  to  La-Source,  where  he 
halted  at  one  o'clock,  having  formed  line  on  the  20th 
Division.  These  had  already  brought  a  heavy  battery 
into  action,  driving  back  the  French  mitraiUeuses  be- 
yond Pontlieue.  On  the  right,  a  hght  battery  of  the 
19th  Division  was  brought  up  to  La-Source,  and  ten 
horse-artillery  guns  as  far  as  the  Parigne  road.  The 
atmosphere  was,  however,  so  thick  that  their  fire  could 
only  be  directed  by  the  map. 

At  two  o'clock  Greneral  von  Kraatz  advanced  in  close 
column  on  Pontlieue,  whither  General  von  Woyna  was 
now  also  marching.  The  southern  side  of  the  village 
was  taken  after  a  short  struggle  5  but  on  the  further 


304  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAB. 

side  of  the  Huisne  the  French  held  the  houses  along 
the  river-bank,  and  just  as  the  Grermans  had  reached 
the  bridge  it  was  blown  up.  The  demolition,  however, 
was  not  complete,  and  the  foremost  battalions  got 
across  over  the  debris  to  get  at  the  enemy.  Two  made 
their  way  down  the  high  street,  one  turned  to  the  left, 
to  the  railway  station,  whence  came  the  sound  of  sig- 
nals for  departing  trains.  There  was  nothing  to  hinder 
the  iron  railway -bridge  from  being  blown  up,  and  by 
this  means  many  prisoners  were  taken,  besides  150 
provision  wagons  and  1000  hundred-weight  of  flour. 

The  artillery  were  next  directed  to  fire  on  the  town 
of  Le-Mans. 

Meanwhile  the  detachments  which  had  become  mixed 
up  in  the  fight  in  the  wood  had  reformed,  and  joined 
the  Third  Corps.  After  a  ration  of  meat,  the  first  for 
three  days,  had  been  served  out  to  all  the  troops,  the 
10th  Brigade  resumed  its  march.  The  battahon  of 
Brandenburg  Jagers  crossed  the  river  by  the  paper- 
mill  of  L'Epau,  and  two  batteries  at  Chateau-Funay 
contributed  to  the  fii'ing  on  Le-Mans. 

When,  soon  after,  the  infantry  entered  the  town,  a 
fierce  struggle  began  in  the  streets,  blocked  as  they 
were  by  the  baggage-trains  of  the  French.  Access  to 
the  houses  had  to  be  cleared  by  artiHery ;  a  large  num- 
ber of  French  were  taken  prisoners,  and  a  vast  quantity 
of  supplies  seized.  The  fighting  went  on  till  night-fall, 
and  then  the  Tenth  Corps  and  half  of  the  Third  took 
up  alarm  quarters  in  the  town.  The  6th  Division  took 
possession  of  Yvre,  which  the  enemy  had  abandoned, 
and  placed  outposts  at  Les-Noyers  and  Les- Arches  on 
the  further  side  of  the  Huisne. 

The  actions  fought  by  the  French  on  this  day  had 
been  arranged  for  the  sole  purpose  of  giving  the  army 
time  to  set  out. 


BATTLE  OF  LE-MANS.  305 

On  learning  from  Admiral  Jaureguiberry  that  every 
effort  to  get  the  troops  to  advance  had  failed,  and  that 
the  last  reserves  were  shattered,  Greneral  Chanzy  had, 
at  eight  that  morning,  issued  orders  for  a  general  re- 
treat on  Alen^on.  Here  the  Minister  of  War  had 
arranged  for  the  simultaneous  arrival  of  two  divisions 
of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  from  Carentan. 

The  march  of  the  Second  Army  on  Le-Mans  had 
been  a  series  of  seven  days'  incessant  fighting.  It  had 
fallen  at  a  season  when  the  winter  was  most  severe. 
Smooth  ice  and  snow-drifts  had  hampered  every  move- 
ment. Bivouacking  was  out  of  the  question;  the 
troops  had  to  seek  their  night  quarters  often  at  a  dis- 
tance of  some  miles  in  their  rear ;  their  re-assembhng 
in  the  morning  wasted  precious  hours,  and  then  the 
shortness  of  the  day  prevented  their  taking  full  ad- 
vantage of  their  successes.  Whole  battalions  were 
employed  merely  in  guarding  the  prisoners.  The  roads 
were  in  such  a  state  that  baggage  could  not  be  brought 
up ;  officers  and  men  alike  marched  in  insufficient  cloth- 
ing and  on  reduced  rations.  But  spii'it,  endurance, 
and  discipline  had  conquered  every  difficulty. 

The  Germans  had  sacrificed  in  this  prolonged  strug- 
gle 3200  men  and  200  officers,  the  larger  half  belonging 
to  the  Third  Corps  alone.  Several  companies  fought 
under  the  command  of  non-commissioned  officers. 

The  French  estimated  their  losses  at  6200  men,  and 
20,000  taken  prisoners;  seventeen  guns,  two  colors, 
and  an  abundant  supply  of  materiel  remained  as 
trophies  in  the  hands  of  the  \actors. 

After  such  severe  efforts  the  troops  imperatively 
needed  some  rest.  The  orders  from  head-quarters 
were  that  the  operations  were  not  to  be  extended  be- 
yond a  certain  area  of  country;  aod  the  Second  Army 

might  almost  immediately  be  required  on  the  Seine 

20 


306  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

and  the  Loire.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  therefore 
determined  to  follow  up  the  retreating  enemy  with 
only  a  small  force. 

On  the  French  side,  if  each  corps  was  to  have  an 
independent  road  for  escape  to  Alen^on,  two  corps 
must  necessarily  start  to  the  westward.  And  on  the 
evening  of  the  last  day's  fight  the  Sixteenth  Corps  had 
reached  Chauffour  on  the  Laval  road,  and  the  Seven- 
teenth was  at  Mayenne  on  the  way  to  Conlie,  each 
protected  by  its  rear-guard.  The  Twenty-first  was 
assembled  at  Ballon,  to  the  east  of  the  Sarthe.  From 
these  points  all  were  to  march  northwards.  General 
Chanzy  still  deluded  himself  with  the  hope  of  getting 
on  by  Evreux  to  the  assistance  of  the  besieged  capital. 
He  would  have,  indeed,  to  make  a  wide  circuit — a  bow 
to  which  the  Germans  could  easily  have  formed  the 
string  in  a  much  shorter  time ;  and  in  the  condition  in 
which  his  troops  now  were,  across  a  country  where  all 
arms  could  be  brought  into  action,  they  must  have 
been  annihilated.  In  short,  the  conquered  army  was 
already  driven  to  the  west  of  the  Sarthe. 

After  distributing  rations  to  men  and  horses.  Gen- 
eral von  Schmidt  set  forth  at  midday  on  the  13th  with 
four  battalions,  eleven  squdarons,  and  ten  guns,  and 
reached  Chauffour  after  some  skirmishing.  The  Thir- 
teenth Corps  (German)  advanced  to  the  Sarthe,  the  17th 
Division  sending  their  outposts  across  the  river  at 
Neuville,  and  the  22nd  driving  the  French  out  of 
Ballon,  whence  they  retired  completely  routed  to  Beau- 
mont. The  Twenty-first  Corps  (French)  had  taken  up 
quarters  this  day  at  Sille.  The  National  Guards  from 
Brittany  fled  wildly  to  Coron,  and  thence  back  into 
their  own  province.  They  were  joined  by  the  troops 
left  in  camp  at  Conlie,  after  they  had  plundered  the 
camp.    The  Seventeenth  Corps  also  went  off,  without 


PUKSUIT  NORTHWAEDS.  307 

halting  by  the  Vegi'e,  as  they  had  been  ordered  to  do, 
but  marching  straight  on  to  Ste.  Suzanne.  The  Six- 
teenth withdrew  on  Laval,  leaving  Barry's  division  at 
Chassille  to  protect  theu'  rear.  Numbers  of  abandoned 
baggage- wagons,  and  cast-away  arms,  testified  to  the 
condition  of  the  defeated  army. 

On  the  14th  the  French  were  driven  out  of  Chassille. 
The  Sixteenth  Corps  were  by  this  time  in  dire  confu- 
sion; they  retired  during  the  night  to  St.-Jean-sur- 
Erve.  In  the  camp  at  Conlie  8000  rifles  had  been 
abandoned,  with  5,000,000  cartridges,  and  various 
other  warlike  stores. 

The  Grand  Duke  had  marched  on  AlenQon  along  the 
right  bank  of  the  Sarthe.  The  French  advanced  guard 
of  the  22nd  Division  made  a  slight  stand  at  Beaumont 
and  lost  1400  prisoners. 

On  the  following  day  General  von  Schmidt  made 
further  progress  on  the  road  to  Laval,  but  he  found 
that  the  French  had  concentrated  at  St.  Jean  and  had 
posted  a  strong  force  of  artillery  on  the  heights  beyond 
the  Erve.  The  Oldenburg  Regiment  forced  its  way  as 
far  as  the  church  of  the  little  town,  and  the  Bruns- 
wickers  drove  the  enemy  back  on  Ste.  Suzanne,  higher 
up  the  river,  but  there  the  pursuit  ended. 

Although  Barry's  and  Deplanque's  divisions  had 
now  no  more  than  6000  fighting  men,  by  the  French 
estimate,  and  Curten's  division  had  not  yet  come  up, 
the  German  force  at  hand  was  very  considerably  in- 
ferior. The  rest  of  the  Tenth  Corps  was  moving  up 
to  their  support,  but  had  as  yet  only  reached  Chassille. 
A  battahon  proceeding  from  Conlie  came  into  conflict 
at  Sille  with  the  Twenty-first  Corps  (French)  assembled 
there,  and  sustained  heavy  loss.  The  22nd  Division 
of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  also  met  with  serious  oppo- 
sition  before   reaching  Alen^on,  from   the   National 


308  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

Gruards  and  Volunteers  under  Lipowski ;  so  the  attack 
on  the  town  was  postponed  till  next  day. 

But  on  the  following  morning  the  French  position 
in  AlenQon  was  evacuated,  as  well  as  Sille  and  St. 
Jean.  The  places  were  at  once  occupied  by  the  G-er- 
mans,  and  Greneral  von  Schmidt  marched  on,  close  to 
Laval.  Numerous  stragglers  from  the  retreating  army 
were  taken  prisoners. 

Curten's  division  had  now  reached  the  western  bank 
of  the  Mayenne,  and  there  the  remnants  of  the  Army 
of  the  Loire  re-assembled.  Reduced  to  half  its  origi- 
nal strength,  and  very  greatly  demoralized,  it  would 
be  liors  de  combat  for  some  time  to  come,  and  the 
object  of  the  German  march  on  Le-Mans  was  fully 
attained. 

To  the  north  of  Paris,  however,  the  French  were 
again  preparing  to  attack.  It  was  needful  to  withdraw 
those  divisions  of  the  First  which  were  still  on  the 
Lower  Seine,  in  the  direction  of  the  Somme;  and 
orders  came  from  head-quarters  that  the  Thirteenth 
Corps  of  the  Second  Army  should  march  on  Rouen. 
On  the  Upper  Loire  two  French  detachments  had  been 
sent  to  attack  the  Hessians  holding  positions  about 
Briare,  and  had  di'iven  them  back,  on  the  14th,  to 
Ouzouer;  while  from  Sologne  cam^  a  report  of  the 
advance  of  a  newly-constitued  French  Army  Corps — 
the  Twenty-fifth. 

The  Glerman  Ninth  Corps,  after  evacuating  and  raz- 
ing the  camp  at  Conlie,  was  therefore  sent  to  reinforce 
Orleans.  The  remainder  of  the  Second  Army,  the 
Third  and  Tenth  Corps,  with  the  three  cavalry  divis- 
ions— about  27,000  foot,  9000  horse,  and  186  guns — 
were  assembled  under  Prince  Frederick  Charles  round 
Le-Mans.  The  cavalry,  placed  as  a  corps  of  observa- 
tion in  the  front  and  on  the  flanks,  had  several  small 


OPEEATIONS   ON   THE   SOMME.  309 

skirmishes,  but   no   further   serious  hostilities  were 
attempted. 

The  4th  Cavahy  Division  held  Alengon  on  the  right, 
and  on  the  left  Gleneral  von  Hartmann  entered  Tours 
without  any  opposition. 

OPEEATIONS  ON  THE  NOKTH  OF  PAEIS  DUKING  JANUAEY. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  New  Year  a  considerable 
part  of  the  First  Army  (German)  was  engaged  in  in- 
vesting Peronne,  which  would  have  afforded  a  safe 
passage  for  the  debouching  of  the  French  over  to  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Somme.  General  Barnekow  had 
laid  siege  to  the  little  town  with  the  3rd  Reserve  Divis- 
ion and  the  31st  Brigade  of  infantry.  Hitherto  it  had 
only  been  kept  under  observation  by  cavahy,  but  re- 
cent circumstances  had  raised  it  to  importance.  So 
much  of  the  Eighth  Corps  as  was  available  on  the 
Somme  formed,  for  the  protection  of  the  besiegers 
on  the  north,  a  wide  curve  from  Amiens  as  far  as 
Bapaume. 

The  First  Corps,  posted  at  Rouen,  at  first  consisted 
only  of  three  brigades;  but  the  Fourth  was  on  the 
march  from  Peronne,  where  it  had  now  been  relieved. 
No  reinforcement  of  the  First  Army  had  been  effected ; 
the  14th  Division,  after  reducing  Mezieres  and  taking 
Rocroy,  had  received  fresh  orders  from  Versailles 
which  transferred  it  to  another  field  of  action. 

General  Faidherbe  had  concentrated  his  troops  from 
the  rest-camp  south  of  Arras,  behind  the  Scarpe,  and 
had  begun  his  forward  march  on  2nd  January.  He 
advanced  with  the  Twenty-second  Corps  to  the  rehef 
of  Peronne  through  Bucquoy.  The  Twenty-third  fol- 
lowed by  the  high-road  to  Bapaume.  As  early  as 
haK-past  ten  the  Derroja  Division  of  the  former  corps 
obliged  the  3rd  Cavahy  Division,  as  well  as  those 


310  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAK. 

battalions  of  the  32nd  Brigade  which  had  been  at- 
tached to  it,  to  retire  on  Miraumont,  pursuing  it,  how- 
ever, only  as  far  as  Achiet-le-Petit. 

The  other  diAdsion,  unded  General  Bessol,  had  only 
advanced  towards  Achiet-le-Grand  in  the  afternoon. 
There  he  was  opposed  for  several  hours  to  two  com- 
panies of  the  68th,  a  detachment  of  hussars,  and  two 
guns,  who  retired  towards  evening  on  Avesnes.  The 
French  did  not  pursue,  but  established  outposts  at 
Bihucourt. 

Payen's  division  had  deployed  at  Behagnies,  on  the 
high-road,  and  its  batteries  opened  fire  on  Sapignies, 
where,  however.  General  von  Strubberg  had  posted 
five  battalions.  These  met  the  attack,  and  at  two 
o'clock  entered  Behagnies  with  a  rush,  took  240  pris- 
oners, and  prepared  the  village  for  defence.  The 
enemy  withdrew  to  Ervillers,  and  there  once  again 
showed  front,  but  attempted  no  further  attack. 

The  other  division  of  his  Twenty-third  Army  Corps, 
consisting  of  mobiUzed  National  Guards,  under  General 
Eobin,  had  pressed  forward  on  the  left  on  Mory. 
There  was  only  one  battalion  and  a  squadron  of  hus- 
sars to  oppose  them.  By  extending  their  line  on  the 
heights  of  Beugnatre,  they  succeeded  in  deceiving  the 
enemy  as  to  their  numerical  strength.  The  latter 
marched  and  counter-marched,  and  also  brought  up 
artillery,  but  did  not  attempt  an  attack,  and  remained 
at  Mory. 

The  30th  Brigade  and  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division  took 
up  their  position  for  the  night  in  and  about  Bapaume. 
The  29th  Brigade  occupied  the  neighboring  villages  on 
the  right  and  the  left  of  the  Arras  road. 


BATTLE  OF  BAPAUME.  311 


BATTLE  OF  BAPAUME. 

(January  3rd.) 

General  Faidherbe  had  brought  his  forces  close  up  to 
a  position  covered  by  the  siege  of  Peronne.  His  four 
divisions  consisted  of  fifty-seven  battalions,  opposed 
by  only  seventeen  German  battalions.  He  decided  on 
the  3rd  to  push  on  in  four  columns  to  Grevillers,  Bief- 
villers,  on  the  high-road,  and  to  Favreuil  on  the  east. 

But  General  von  Goeben  was  not  inclined  to  give  up 
his  position  at  Bapaume.  During  the  occupation  of 
Favreuil,  General  von  Kummer  brought  up  the  30th 
Brigade  in  front  of  the  town,  and  behind  it  the  29th, 
of  which,  however,  three  battalions  were  left  in  the 
villages  to  left  and  to  the  right.  A  reserve  was  estab- 
hshed  further  to  the  rear,  at  Transloy,  whither  the  8th 
Rifle  Battalion,  with  two  batteries,  was  detached ;  and 
General  von  Barnekow  received  orders  to  hold  three 
battalions  and  the  26th  Division  of  foot  in  readiness 
at  Sailly-Saillisel,  without  raising  the  blockade.  Then 
the  division  under  Prince  Albrecht,  Jun. — three  bat- 
talions, eight  squadrons,  and  three  batteries — advanced 
on  Bertincourt,  near  to  the  battle-field.  In  this  order, 
in  severe  cold  and  gloomy  weather,  they  were  to  await 
the  attack  of  the  French. 

General  Count  von  der  Groeben  had  already  sent  the 
7th  Cavalry  Brigade  against  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
but  it  did  not  succeed  in  forcing  its  way  through  those 
villages  that  were  occupied  by  the  enemy's  infantry. 

At  Beugnatre,  the  right  wing  of  the  Robin  Division 
was  met  by  so  sharp  a  fire  from  two  battalions  of  the 
65th,  and  two  horse  artillery  batteries  that  had  joined 
them  from  Transloy,  that  it  withdrew  again  on  Mory, 
and  the  garrison  of  Favreuil  was  reinforced  by  two 


312  THE   FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAB. 

battalions  and  two  batteries  against  the  approach  of 
the  Payen  Division,  which  was  marching  down  the 
high-road  to  the  east  of  that  place.  The  first  French 
gun  that  came  out  of  Sapignies  was  immediately  de- 
stroyed, but  several  batteries  soon  became  engaged  on 
both  sides,  and  the  French  entered  Favreuil  and  St. 
Aubin. 

The  40th  Regiment  advanced  to  these  places  at  noon 
from  Bertincourt,  and,  after  a  lively  action,  occupied 
them ;  yet  had  to  evacuate  Favreuil  again,  and  a  bat- 
tery of  horse  artillery  took  up  a  position  alongside  of 
the  2nd  Regiment  of  Uhlans  of  the  Guard  close  to 
Fremicourt,  which  secured  the  right  of  the  division. 

On  the  left,  Bessol's  division  had  driven  the  weak 
garrison  out  of  Biefvillers.  The  1st  Battalion  of  the 
33rd  Regiment,  which  had  set  out  to  retake  that  place, 
became  hotly  engaged;  it  lost  all  but  three  of  its 
ofl&cers,  and  had  to  retire  upon  Avesnes.  The  Derroja 
Division  had  also  taken  part  in  this  fight.  The  French 
now  brought  a  strong  force  of  artillery  to  the  front, 
and  extended  their  firing-line  to  the  south  nearly  as 
far  as  the  road  to  Albert. 

Therefore,  at  midday,  Greneral  von  Kummer  decided 
to  confine  himself  to  the  local  defence  of  Bapaume. 
With  some  sacrifice,  the  artillery  covered  the  move  of 
the  infantry  thither.  The  1st  Heavy  Battery,  which 
was  the  last  to  withdi'aw,  lost  2  officers,  97  men,  and 
36  horses ;  their  guns  could  only  be  got  away  with  the 
help  of  the  infantry. 

The  29th  Brigade  now  prepared  for  an  obstinate 
defence  of  the  old  city  wall.  The  30th  was  posted  be- 
hind the  place,  and  the  French  advanced  leisui-ely  as 
far  as  the  suburb.  Then  there  was  a  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities. Greneral  Faidherbe  hoped  to  take  the  toAvn  by 
further  investing  it,  without  exposing  it  to  the  horrors 


BATTLE   OF  BAPAUME.  313 

of  a  bombardment  su(^li  as  precedes  the  taking  of  a 
place  by  storm.  A  brigade  of  the  Derroja  Division 
endeavored  to  advance  through  Tilloy,  but  met  there 
with  stubborn  resistance  from  the  Rifle  battahon  and 
two  batteries  which  had  arrived  from  Peronne,  At 
the  same  time,  twenty-four  guns  of  the  batteries  that 
were  posted  behind  Bapaume  opened  fire  on  the  ad- 
vancing columns,  which  then  withckew,  at  half-past 
three,  by  the  road  to  Albert.  They  soon  resumed  the 
attack,  and  succeeded  in  entering  Tilloy.  All  the 
neighboring  batteries  now  opened  fire  iipon  this  place. 
Greneral  von  Mirus,  who,  when  the  3rd  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion had  passed  through  Miraumont,  had  been  left  be- 
hind there,  seeing  no  enemy  in  his  front,  but  hearing 
the  fighting  at  Bapaume,  advanced  from  the  west,'  and 
General  von  Strubberg  from  the  town,  to  resume  the 
attack.  The  French  did  not  await  their  arrival,  and 
were  driven  both  out  of  the  suburb  and  Avesnes.  The 
French  detachments  encamped  for  the  night  at  Grevil- 
lers,  Bihucourt,  Favreuil,  and  Beugnatre,  thus  sur- 
rounding Bapaume  on  three  sides.  The  day  had  cost 
the  Germans  52  ofiicers  and  698  men,  and  the  French 
53  officers  and  2066  men. 

But  only  by  di'awing  on  every  available  resource  of 
the  Eighth  Army  Corps  had  it  been  possible  to  with- 
stand the  preponderating  attack  of  the  enemy.  It  had 
not  yet  been  possible  to  provide  fresh  ammunition, 
and  General  von  Goeben  decided  to  immediately  shift 
the  battle-field  to  behind  the  Somme.  This  movement 
was  being  executed  when  the  patrols  brought  informa- 
tion that  the  enemy  was  also  evacuating  its  neighbor- 
ing position. 

The  French  troops,  as  yet  unaccustomed  to  active 
service,  had  suffered  extremely  from  the  day's  fighting 
and  the  severe  cold  of  the  ensuing  night.    General 


314  THE   FKANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

Faidherbe  could  perceive  that  the  forces  before  Peronne 
had  been  withdrawn  to  Bapaume,  and  that  the  Ger- 
mans thus  reinforced  would  assume  the  defensive. 
His  first  object,  the  raising  of  the  siege,  had  been  ob- 
tained, and  the  Greneral  thought  it  best  not  to  endan- 
ger his  success  by  a  second  encounter.  He  led  his 
corps  back  in  the  direction  of  Arras. 

Of  the  German  cavaky,  the  8th  Cuirassiers  succeeded 
in  breaking  through  a  French  square.  The  15th 
Division  withdrew  behind  the  Somme  to  close  under 
Peronne,  and  the  Saxon  cavahy  joined  the  right  wing 
at  St.  Quentin. 

ACTIONS    ON   THE   LOWEE   SEINE. 

Exactly  at  the  same  time  the  other  corps  of  the 
First  Army  was  engaged  with  the  enemy  on  the  Lower 
Seine,  The  French  had  not  taken  up  any  new  posi- 
tion on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  but  they  held  the 
wooded  heights  of  Bois-de-la-Londe,  which  surround 
the  southern  defile  of  the  Httle  river-peninsula  of 
Grand-Couronne.  Here  General  von  Bentheim,  with  a 
view  of  gaining  ground  in  this  direction,  had  posted 
half  of  the  First  Army  Corps,  and  advanced  on  the  4th 
of  January  on  Les  Moulineaux.  Before  daybreak  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von  HliUessem  surprised  the  enemy's 
outposts,  stormed  the  fort  of  Chateau  Eobert-le-Diable, 
and  took  prisoners  those  who  had  sought  refuge  amid 
the  ruins  of  the  castle ;  and  the  heights  of  Maison  Bru- 
let  were  scaled  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy,  who 
lost  two  guns  on  this  occasion.  After  renewed  fight- 
ing at  St.  Ouen,  the  French  withdrew  on  Bourgachard 
in  the  afternoon,  pursued  towards  six  in  the  evening 
by  half  a  squadron  of  dragoons,  two  guns,  and  a  com- 
pany driven  on  wagons,  who  took  from  them  two  12- 
pounders  set  up  on  the  approach  to  Rougemontier, 


FIGHTING  ON  THE  LOWEE  SEINE.  315 

disabling  the  gunners  and  capturing  an  ammunition 
wagon. 

After  a  slight  skirmish,  the  enemy  had  been  driven 
out  of  Bourgtheroulde  and  thrown  back  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Brionne.  However,  the  French  right  wing  at 
Elbeuf  had,  during  the  night,  hastily  withdrawn  from 
a  position  rendered  precarious  by  the  wavering  of  the 
remaining  detachments.  The  affair  had  cost  5  officers 
and  160  men.  The  loss  of  the  French  must  have  been 
equal,  besides  which  they  lost  300  prisoners  and  4 
guns. 

General  Roye  posted  his  troops  behind  the  Eille 
on  the  Pont-Audemer — Brionne  line,  but  the  Grermans 
now  held  Bourgachard,  Bourgtheroulde,  and  Elbeuf 
strongly  garrisoned,  with  three  battalions  in  readiness 
at  Grand-Couronne  for  further  security.  The  other 
troops  returned  to  Rouen.  /  An  attempted  passage  of 
the  French  from  the  northern  bank  of  the  Somme  had 
already  been  averted  at  Fauville,  whence  they  again 
withdrew  to  Harfleur. 

Meanwhile  it  had  not  escaped  the  observation  of  the 
Eighth  Army  Corps  that  this  time  the  French  did  not 
seek  to  intrench  themselves  in  the  northern  forts,  but 
that  they  halted  south  of  Arras,  thus  betraying  an  in- 
tention to  shortly  renew  the  attack  on  the  investing 
forces  of  Peronne. 

General  von  Goeben  therefore  decided  to  pass  over 
to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Somme,  to  their  protec- 
tion, and  to  take  up  a  flank  position  whose  front  the 
enemy  would  have  to  cross  in  its  advance. 

On  January  6th,  after  the  troops  had  had  one  day's 
rest,  and  the  ammunition  had  been  replenished,  the  30th 
Brigade  advanced  on  Bray,  the  29th  on  Albert.  In 
close  vicinity  to  the  enemy  was  the  36th  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion at  Bapaume,  behind  them  the  cavahy  brigade  of 


316  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

the  Guard.  To  secure  the  left  flank  Lieutenant-Colonel 
von  Pestel  occupied  Acheux,  and  the  3rd  Reserve 
Division  of  the  investing  corps  advanced  west  of  the 
position  on  Feuilleres.  The  Corps  Artillery  remained 
meanwhile  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Somme,  for  it 
almost  seemed  as  if  the  enemy  were  preparing  an  at- 
tack on  Amiens. 

But  during  the  next  day  the  French  did  not  under- 
take anything  of  importance,  and  on  the  9th  Peronne 
feU. 

OCCUPATION   OF  PEEONNE. 

For  fourteen  days  this  little  place  had  been  invested 
by  eleven  battalions,  sixteen  squadrons,  and  ten  bat- 
teries. Flooded  meadows  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other 
walls  with  medieval  towers  had  secured  it  against  sur- 
prise ;  yet  it  was  commanded  on  all  sides  by  overhang- 
ing heights. 

Still  the  fire  of  fifty-eight  German  guns  had  not  done 
much  damage,  and  in  any  case  must  soon  have  been 
given  up  for  want  of  ammunition ;  the  fire  with  capt- 
ured French  materiel  remained  without  result.  The 
fort  continued  its  fire,  and  its  garrison  of  only  3500 
men  even  attempted  sorties.  As  before  mentioned,  on 
the  day  of  the  battle  of  Bapaume,  a  portion  of  the 
besieging  troops  had  been  obliged  to  Vithdraw  to  the 
support  of  the  Eighth  Army  Corps,  and  in  the  un- 
certainty as  to  the  result  of  this  fight  it  had  been 
necessary  to  take  precautions  for  the  parking  of  the 
siege  materiel.  The  troops  that  remained  behind  were 
in  marching  order,  and  part  of  the  heavy  guns  had 
been  withdrawn.  But  the  garrison  of  the  place  kept 
on  its  guard. 

Two  days  later  a  siege-train  of  fifty-five  heavy  guns 
arrived  at  La-Fere.  A  second,  of  twenty-eight,  laden 
with  French  ammunition,  was  on  the  way  from  Me- 


OCCUPATION   OF   PEKONNE.  317 

zieres.  The  preliminaries  of  a  regular  siege  were  ac- 
complished, and  when  at  last,  on  the  8th  of  January,  a 
large  ammunition-transport  arrived,  the  Commandant 
was  summoned  to  give  up  a  defence  that  had  become 
hopeless. 

On  the  10th  of  January  General  von  Barnekow  en- 
tered the  fortress  so  amply  provided  with  arms,  am- 
munition, and  provisions.  The  garrison  were  made 
prisoners. 

On  the  7th  of  January,  his  Majesty  the  King  had 
summoned  General  von  Manteuffel  to  another  part  of 
the  theatre  of  war,  and  had  given  the  supreme  com- 
mand of  the  First  Army  Corps  to  General  von  Goeben. 

Freed  from  all  care  as  to  Peronne,  his  only  mission 
thenceforward  was  the  protection  of  the  siege  of  Paris. 
For  this  purpose  the  Somme,  whose  passages  were  all 
in  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  formed  a  natural  bul- 
wark, behind  which  even  the  attack  of  a  superior 
enemy  could  be  met.  And  some  reinforcements  now 
arrived  for  the  Eighth  Army  Corps.  The  peaceful 
condition  of  the  Lower  Seine  permitted  of  two  infan- 
try regiments  and  two  batteries  being  sent  from  thence 
to  Amiens.  At  head-quarters  an  infantry  brigade  of 
the  Meuse  Ai'my  Corps  was  held  in  readiness,  which  in 
case  of  need  was  to  precede  them  by  rail. 

It  was  still  a  matter  of  uncertainty  where  the  enemy 
would  strike  the  first  blow.  General  von  Goeben, 
therefore,  spread  his  forces  behind  the  Somme  on  a 
ten-mile  line,  still  holding  the  places  he  had  acquired 
to  the  front  of  the  river,  so  that  if  needful  he  could 
proceed  to  attack.  In  the  middle  of  the  month,  the 
portions  of  the  Ninth  Army  Corps  under  the  command 
of  General  Count  von  der  Groeben  occupied  Amiens, 
Corbie,  and  the  Hallue  line  in  a  flank  position.  The 
15th  Division,  holding  Bray,  took  up  its  quarters  south 


318  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAR. 

of  this  place.  Next  to  them,  on  the  left  of  Peronne, 
were  the  36th  Reserves,  to  the  right  the  16th  Division, 
and  the  3rd  Reserve  Cavalry  Brigade,  holding  Roi^el 
and  Vermand,  in  front.  The  12th  Cavahy  Division 
was  at  St.  Quentin. 

The  French  Army  had  already  begun  to  move  on  the 
Cambrai  high-road,  and  its  Twenty-second  Corps  had 
forced  back  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division  first  out  of  Ba- 
paume  and  Albert  and  then  back  on  the  Hallue.  The 
Twenty-third  followed  the  same  road,  and  their  goal 
really  appears  to  have  been  Amiens.  But  a  reconnois- 
sance  had  enlightened  them  as  to  the  difficulty  of 
attacking  in  that  direction,  besides  which  a  telegram 
from  the  War  Minister  announced  that  the  Paris  Army 
would  make  a  last  supreme  effort  to  break  the  bonds 
of  the  blockade,  and  the  Army  of  the  Nord  was  enjoined 
to  draw,  as  far  as  possible,  the  attention  of  the  enemy's 
forces  towards  itself  and  away  from  the  capital. 

According  to  these  orders,  General  Faidherbe  decided 
to  advance  on  St.  Quentin  without  delay,  whither  the 
Isnard  Brigade  was  already  marching  from  Cambrai. 
The  attack  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Germans,  consist- 
ing for  the  time  being  solely  of  cavalry,  endangered 
their  communications,  while  the  vicinity  of  the  north- 
ern forts  offered  the  French  Army  shelter,  and  also 
gi'eater  liberty  of  action. 

But  General  von  Goeben  had  foreseen  this  with- 
drawal of  the  enemy  on  the  left,  and  had  concentrated 
all  his  forces  to  meet  it. 

The  convalescents  who  were  fit  for  service  were 
attached.  Only  weak  detachments  were  left  at  Amiens, 
and  through  the  approach  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps, 
from  the  Sarthe  to  the  Lower  Seine,  it  was  easy  to 
transfer  the  3rd  Grenadier  Regiment  and  a  heavy  bat- 
tery to  the  Somme. 


ADVANCE  ON   ST.   QUENTIN.  319 

The  withdrawal  of  the  French  from  Albert  and  the 
march  of  their  army  corps  on  Comhles  and  Sailly-Sail- 
lisel  were  soon  reported  by  the  reconnoitring  of  the 
cavah-y.  A  newly-formed  Pauly  Brigade  occupied 
Bapaume,  and  the  Isnard  Brigade  entered  St.  Quentin, 
when  Greneral  zur  Lippe,  according  to  orders  received, 
retired  on  Ham.  At  this  juncture,  General  von  Goe- 
ben  set  out  in  an  eastern  direction,  using  the  roads  on 
both  banks  of  the  Somme  so  that  he  might  the  sooner 
come  up  with  the  enemy. 

(January  17th.)  On  the  17th,  the  12th  Cavalry  Bri- 
gade advanced  on  La-Fere,  the  16th  on  Ham.  The 
3rd  Reserve  Division  and  the  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the 
Guard  arrived  at  Nesle;  the  15th  Division  and  the 
Corps  Artillery,  at  Villers-Carbonnel.  An  Army  Re- 
serve had  been  formed  out  of  the  troops  last  from 
Rouen,  which  followed  to  Harbonnieres.  On  the  north- 
ern bank,  the  detachment  under  Count  von  der  Groe- 
ben  advanced  close  to  Peronne, 

The  four  French  divisions  had  so  far  advanced  on 
Vermand  that  they  were  enabled  to  effect  a  junction 
next  day  at  St,  Quentin.  The  Twenty-third  Army 
Corps  was  to  retire  straight  upon  the  town,  the  Twenty- 
second  to  cross  the  Somme  lower  down,  and  take  up  a 
position  south  of  St.  Quentin. 

(January  18th.)  On  the  German  side,  the  16th  and 
the  3rd*  Reserve  Division  advanced  on  Jussy  and 
Flavy,  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Somme,  the  Army 
Reserves  on  Ham.  The  12th  Cavalry  Division  at  Ven- 
deuil  found  the  country  east  of  the  Oise  stiU  free  from 
the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  15th  Division  was  to  cross 
the  Somme  at  Brie,  and  advance,  together  with  the 
troops  of  General  Count  von  der  Groeben,  on  Vermand 
and  Etreillers,  with  a  view  of  obtaining  touch  of  the 


320  THE   FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

approaching  enemy.  General  von  Kummer  had  been 
enjoined,  in  case  he  found  that  the  French  had  taken 
up  a  position,  merely  to  watch  them  and  foUow  them 
should  they  retire  north,  but  should  they  march 
towards  the  south,  to  attack  them  in  force. 

At  half -past  ten,  the  29th  Brigade  came  up  on  this 
side  of  Tertry  with  the  rear-guard  of  the  Twenty- 
second  Corps  and  its  train.  The  hussars  broke 
through  one  of  the  screening  battalions,  drove  the 
wagons  in  the  greatest  disorder  back  on  Caulaincourt, 
but  had  to  abandon  prisoners  and  loot  under  the  fire 
of  the  approaching  infantry.  The  French  brigade  had 
changed  front,  and  now  advanced  to  the  attack  of  Tres- 
con.  This  was  resisted  by  the  65th  Eegiment  and 
three  batteries  until  after  two  o'clock,  when  G-eneral 
du  Bessol,  who  had  just  arrived  on  the  scene  of  action, 
ordered  the  march  on  St.  Quentin  to  be  resumed. 

The  Twenty-third  had  also  halted  and  detached  a 
brigade  against  the  left  flank  of  the  15th  Division. 
This,  however,  on  reaching  Cauvigny  Farm,  came 
upon  the  German  battalions,  which,  after  protracted 
firing,  pursued  the  retreating  enemy  and  entered  Cau- 
laincourt at  half -past  three,  making  100  prisoners  and 
capturing  fourteen  provision  wagons. 

Meanwhile  Count  von  der  Groeben  had  hastened 
forward  at  the  sound  of  firing.  The  General  realized 
that  he  could  help  most  efficaciously  by  marching 
straight  on  Yermand.  Four  battalions  marched  on 
Poeuilly,  which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  when 
the  4th  Grenadiers  came  up  to  the  assault  the  French 
retreated,  losing  some  prisoners.  Many  Gardes  Mo- 
biles were  dispersed  by  the  Uhlans.  But  at  Vermand 
the  whole  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  had  begun  its 
march. 

Count  von  der  Groeben  therefore  posted  his  troops 


BATTLE  OP   ST.   QUENTIN.  321 

behind  the  Poeuilly  ground,  thereby  occasioning  the 
retiring  troops  to  immediately  front  whenever  pressed. 
The  15th  Division  had  taken  up  quarters  at  Beauvois 
and  Caulaincourt. 

The  sole  aim  which  the  French  Generals  appear  to 
have  had  in  view  on  that  day  was  to  reach  St.  Quentin. 
They  neglected  the  opportunity  of  falling  with  their 
two  corps  upon  the  single  15tli  Division.  The  Twenty- 
third  Corps  passed  the  night  in  and  westward  of  St. 
Quentin,  and  likewise  the  Twenty-second,  after  cross- 
ing the  Somme  at  Serancourt,  south  of  that  town.  A 
further  advance  either  on  Paris  or  on  the  German 
line  of  communications  depended,  now  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  so  close  upon  them,  on  the  issue  of  a  bat- 
tle ;  and  this,  General  Faidherbe  wished  to  await  at  St. 
Quentin. 

It  was  important  that  he  should  make  a  stand  there, 
in  case  the  Paris  Army  succeeded  in  breaking  through 
the  blockade.  The  ground  offered  certain  advantages 
— the  heights  in  front  of  the  town  facilitated  firing  and 
offered  covered  shelter  to  the  reserves.  Although  the 
Somme  divided  the  army  in  two  halves,  the  Bridge  of 
St.  Quentin  secured  to  both  mutual  aid.  The  enemy 
also  occupied  two  sides  of  the  river,  and  including  the 
now  newly-joined  Isnard  and  Pauly  Brigades,  they 
counted  40,000  men,  against  an  enemy  numerically 
weaker.  The  Germans,  all  counted,  numbered  32,580 
combatants,  nearly  6000  being  cavahy. 

BATTLE   OF   ST.    QUENTIN. 

(19th  January.) 

General  von  Goeben  had  ordered  the  general  attack 
for  the  19th. 

General  von  Barnekow  advanced  along  the  southern 
21 


322  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

bank  of  the  Somme  (during  the  occupation  of  Seran- 
court)  with  the  16th,  and  the  3rd  Reserve  Division 
from  Jussy  on  Essigny;  the  12th  Cavahy  Division 
advanced  on  the  road  which  led  to  La  Fere. 

The  French  columns  were  still  marching  to  take  up 
their  position  so  as  to  have  the  town  on  their  rear ; 
and  they  already  occupied  Grrugies.  While  the  32nd 
Brigade  marched  north  to  Essigny — the  Reserve  Divis- 
ion halting  behind  the  place — the  31st  Brigade  started 
at  a  quarter  to  ten  for  Grugies. 

This  attack  was  flanked  by  the  French  brigade  under 
Gislain,  which  had  meanwhile  occupied  the  positions 
of  Contescourt  and  Castres.  Its  front  was  met  by  the 
brigades  under  Foerster  and  Pittie. 

The  fii'e  of  the  approaching  German  batteries  was 
at  once  returned  vigorously  from  Le-Moulin-de-Tout- 
Vent.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  second  battalion  of  the 
69th  Regiment  formed  into  company  columns,  to  cross 
the  entirely  open  ground  towards  the  heights  between 
them  and  Grugies;  but  the  attempt,  which  was  re- 
newed four  times,  was  frustrated  by  the  annihilating 
cross-fire  of  the  enemy.  The  isolated  battalion  was 
nearly  exhausted,  and  only  on  being  joined  by  six  fresh 
companies  of  the  29th  Regiment  did  it  succeed  in  forc- 
ing the  French  back,  after  a  desperate  hand-to-hand 
fight ;  but  the  latter  made  a  stand  before  Grugies  and 
its  sugar  factory. 

On  the  right  wing,  the  12th  Cavahy  Division  had 
preceded  the  others  on  the  La-Fere  road.  The  French 
brigade  under  Aynes,  which  had  hitherto  been  held 
in  reserve,  pushed  forward  at  the  double  to  meet  it,  and 
as  Count  zur  Lippe  could  dispose  of  but  one  battalion 
of  infantry,  the  movement  was  arrested  at  Cornet- 
d'Or.  But  when,  at  noon,  they  were  joined  by  rein- 
forcements from  Tergnier,  the  Saxon  Rifles  stormed 


BATTLE   OF   ST.    QUENTIN.  323 

the  park  on  tlie  high-road,  and  the  Schleswig-Holstein 
Fusihers  stormed  La-Neuville.  The  French,  after  los- 
ing many  prisoners,  were  vigorously  pursued  back  to 
the  outskirts  of  St.  Quentin,  the  first  place  which 
afforded  them  shelter. 

Meantime,  the  31st  Brigade  was  engaged  in  a  hot  fire 
on  both  sides  of  the  railway  line  before  Grugies ;  behind 
its  right  wing  was  posted  the  32nd,  in  the  valley  near 
the  high-road,  where  it  suffered  severely  from  the 
enemy's  shrapnel.  On  the  left,  the  advancing  detach- 
ment had  not  succeeded  in  entering  Contescourt ;  and 
now  the  French  at  Grugies  made  so  determined  and 
overwhelming  an  attack,  that  the  16th  Division  had  to 
be  withdi'awn  as  far  as  Essigny. 

When,  after  twelve  o'clock.  General  Faidherbe  joined 
the  Twenty-third  Corps,  he  had  every  reason  to  hope 
that  the  Twenty-second  Corps  would  be  able  to  main- 
tain its  position.  But  certainly  the  most  important 
result  was  to  be  looked  for  on  the  northern  portion  of 
the  battle-field. 

Here  Robin's  division  had  taken  up  a  position  be- 
tween Fayet  and  Francilly.  The  brigade  under  Isnard 
had  joined  it  on  the  left,  the  brigade  under  Lagrange 
of  Payen's  division  extended  its  line  as  far  as  the 
Somme.  At  Gricourt  the  Michelet  brigade  remained 
behind  in  reserve,  and  the  brigade  under  Pauly  secured 
the  communications  in  rear. 

As  early  as  eight  o'clock  General  Count  von  der 
Groeben  (on  the  German  left)  set  out  on  the  Roman 
road  from  Poeuilly  with  eight  battalions  and  twenty- 
eight  guns ;  on  the  left  the  cavahy  brigade  accompanied 
the  march. 

The  East-Prussians  immediately  drove  the  French 
out  of  Holnon  and  Selency,  and  then  advanced  against 
Fayet  and  up  the  heights  of  Moulin-Coutte.    A  gun 


324  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN   WAE. 

that  was  being  served,  ammunition  wagons,  and  many 
prisoners  were  then  taken  from  the  enemy. 

By  degrees  the  twenty-eight  guns  all  reached  the 
mill  on  the  height  and  opened  a  duel  with  the  artillery 
of  Robin's  division.  But  after  half  an  hour  the  ammu- 
nition failed,  for  the  wagons  which  had  been  sent  on 
the  previous  day  to  the  Eighth  Corps  had  not  yet  come 
up  to  the  relief.  The  batteries,  which  were,  moreover, 
suffering  from  the  fire  of  the  infantry,  had  to  retire  on 
Holnon,  and  as  Francilly  was  still  occupied  by  the 
enemy  in  flank  and  rear,  a  further  advance  was  tem- 
porarily postponed. 

On  the  right,  General  von  Kummer  with  the  15th 
Division  had  ah'eady  begun  the  march  from  Beauvois, 
and  had  reached  Etreillers  at  ten.  The  King's  Hus- 
sars, after  driving  back  the  enemy's  horse,  di*ew  up 
near  to  L'Epine-de-Dallon,  and  the  29th  Brigade  en- 
tered Savy.  North  of  that  place  three  batteries  opened 
fire  against  the  artillery  of  Pay  en's  division,  and  then 
the  65th  Regiment  advanced  to  the  attack  of  the  sur- 
rounding woods.  The  smaller  one  to  the  south  was 
taken,  but  here,  as  at  Francilly,  the  Isnard  Brigade 
established  itself  in  the  larger  one  to  the  north. 

At  noon  the  brigade  under  Lagrange  advanced  on 
the  small  wood  and  soon  entered  it,  but  was  again 
driven  back  by  the  65th. 

The  33rd  Regiment  was  posted  in  readiness  to  secure 
the  threatened  right  flank  of  the  29th  Brigade,  and 
with  those  already  under  fire  was  joined  by  two  heavy 
batteries  which  had  just  come  with  the  Corps  Artillery 
from  Savy.  At  the  same  time  the  30th  Brigade  ad- 
vanced from  Roupy  on  the  right  of  the  29th. 

Meanwhile,  Colonel  von  Massow  had,  at  one  o'clock, 
again  assumed  the  offensive  against  the  much  more 
advanced  enemy's  left.     Six  companies  of  the  44th 


BATTLE  OF  ST.   QUENTIN.  325 

Regiment  advanced  on  Fayet,  and  opening  fire  at  the 
shortest  range,  drove  the  French  from  the  field.  They 
were  followed  by  two  batteries,  who  resumed  action 
against  the  great  artillery  position  at  Moulin-de-Cepy. 

General  Paulze  D'lvoy,  who  saw  his  communications 
with  Cambrai  in  such  imminent  danger,  had  already 
summoned  the  brigade  under  Michelet  from  its  reserve 
post,  west  of  the  town,  and  thus  reinforced  now  ad- 
vanced on  Fayet.  Those  Prussian  detachments  that 
were  in  the  place  had  to  be  withdrawn  to  Moulin- 
Coutte ;  but  the  further  advance  of  the  enemy  towards 
this  height  was  met  by  a  flank  attack  on  Selency,  and 
at  the  same  time  the  farm  of  Bois-des-Roses  was  car- 
ried.    The  French  again  withdrew  on  Fayet. 

There,  at  Francilly,  and  in  the  northern  stretch  of 
wood,  they  held  their  own  until  half -past  one,  while 
at  that  time,  on  the  G-erman  side,  the  three  brigades 
had  been  brought  up  into  the  fighting  line.  The  Army 
Reserve  had,  indeed,  advanced  from  Ham  on  Roupy, 
but  General  von  Goeben,  who  had  from  that  spot 
observed  the  slow  progress  of  the  16th  Division,  had 
already  sent  this  Reserve  through  Serancourt  to  its 
relief  at  eleven  o'clock. 

Colonel  von  Boecking,  with  his  three  battalions, 
three  squadrons,  and  two  batteries,  advanced  from 
there  against  Contescourt.  Hastening  forward  with 
the  cavalry,  he  brought  his  artillery  into  action ;  the 
41st  Regiment,  upon  its  arrival,  immediately  moved 
forward  to  the  attack.  In  communication  with  the 
battalion  of  the  19th  Regiment  which  was  already  on 
the  spot,  the  French  were  at  one  o'clock  driven  out  of 
that  place  and  out  of  Castres,  with  the  loss  of  many 
prisoners,  towards  the  heights  of  Grugies.  Against 
these  heights  the  fire  of  the  artillery  was  now  directed, 
having  gradually  been  increased  to  thirty  guns. 


326  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

So  as  to  yet  further  dispute  the  position,  General 
Lecomte  reinforced  Grislain's  brigade  by  several  bat- 
talions withdrawn  from  the  brigades  of  Pittie  and 
Aynes. 

The  East-Prussian  Regiment  succeeded,  nevertheless, 
by  half-past  two  o'clock,  although  itself  attacked  on 
all  sides,  in  hurling  back  the  enemy  into  the  hollow  in 
front  of  Grugies. 

Colonel  von  Boecking's  vigorous  attack  was  conspic- 
uous along  the  whole  line. 

With  a  view  to  again  undertaking  a  general  advance, 
General  von  Barnekow  now  ordered  up  his  last  reserves 
from  Essigny,  when  towards  three  o'clock  Pittie's  bri- 
gade unexpectedly  pressed  forward  along  the  line  of 
railway.  With  his  right  under  the  fire  of  the  artillery 
posted  at  Castres,  he  allowed  his  left  to  be  surprised 
by  the  charge  of  five  squadrons  of  the  reserve  cavalry 
at  Urvilliers.  Simultaneously  Colonel  von  Hartzberg 
now  advanced  with  the  32nd  Brigade,  and  drove  the 
enemy  back  to  Moulin-de-Tout-Vent. 

But  Foerster's  brigade,  south  of  Grugies,  had  held 
out  stubbornly,  although  now  seriously  threatened  on 
the  left  from  Giff ecourt,  as  well  as  by  the  12th  Cavahy 
Division.  With  the  retreat  of  Pittie's  brigade  now 
completely  exposing  their  left  flank,  and  their  last 
troops  exhausted  by  a  long  struggle,  the  French  found 
themselves  finally  forced  to  vacate  their  hard-contested 
position. 

The  31st  Brigade  advanced  along  the  railway  line  as 
far  as  the  sugar  factory,  and  Colonel  von  Boecking 
drove  the  last  French  detachments  out  of  Grugies. 
He  then  opened  his  attack  upon  Moulin-de-Tout-Vent 
with  his  artillery.  Up  these  heights  the  41st  Battalion, 
ordered  up  from  Essigny,  and  the  32nd  Brigade  ad- 
vanced in  a  combined  attack.     The  French  did  not  hold 


BATTLE   OF   ST.   QUENTIN.  327 

out  much,  longer,  and  were  soon  in  retreat.  The  entire 
German  front,  with  the  12th  Cavahy  Division  on  its 
right,  moved  forward  on  to  the  town,  which  now  also 
suffered  from  the  fire  of  the  artillery  posted  at  Gauchy. 
The  cavalry  repeatedly  broke  through  the  retreating 
portions  of  the  enemy's  force ;  and  the  railway  station 
and  suburb,  in  which  was  found  the  rear-guard  only  of 
the  Twentieth  French  Corps,  fell  after  a  short  struggle. 

Whilst  on  the  southern  portion  of  the  field  of  battle 
the  action  took  this  turn,  the  attack  on  the  northern 
side  had  also  been  renewed. 

Already  by  two  o'clock  the  28th  Regiment  from 
Roupy  had  carried  the  farm-house  of  I'Epine-de-Dallon, 
on  the  Ham  road ;  and  almost  simultaneously  Count 
von  der  Groeben's  infantry  came  up  to  resume  the 
offensive. 

Whilst  on  the  right  some  companies  of  the  4th  and 
44th  Regiments  opposed  the  debouching  of  the  French 
out  of  the  extensive  woods.  Major  von  Elpons,  with 
six  companies  of  the  Crown  Prince  Grenadiers,  ad- 
vanced from  Holnon  and  Selency  upon  Franeilly,  and, 
notwithstanding  the  hot  fire  of  the  defenders,  forced 
an  entrance  into  this  most  straggling  village,  in  which 
many  prisoners  were  made.  As,  however,  the  East- 
Prussian  Regiment  advanced  yet  further  south  of  the 
Roman  road,  it  had  in  its  turn  to  sustain  a  formidable 
attack. 

To  cover  their  threatened  line  of  retreat,  Michelet's 
brigade  from  Foyet  once  -more  advanced,  and  Pauly's 
brigade  also  marched  upon  Moulin-Coutte.  This  posi- 
tion, which  had  in  the  meantime  been  strengthened  by 
artillery,  was,  however,  obstinately  contested  by  the 
44th  Regiment,  and  when  the  Grenadier  companies 
poured  in  from  the  left  of  the  Roman  road,  the  enemy's 
attack  was  here  again  repulsed. 


328  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

Meanwhile  the  29th  Brigade,  followed  by  the  30th^ 
had  begun  to  move  on  St.  Quentin,  having  the  33rd 
Regiment  on  its  right  and  the  65th  Regiment  on  the 
left.  The  latter  regiment  now  took  complete  posses- 
sion of  the  more  extensive  of  the  woods,  and  forty- 
eight  guns  were  driven  up  on  both  sides  of  the  road 
from  Savy.  The  further  advance  of  the  infantry  was 
effected  in  company  column  and  in  extended  order,  for 
the  troops  were  suffering  severely  from  the  heavy 
grenade  fire  brought  to  bear  upon  them  by  the  French. 
Howeverj  the  Lagrange  and  Isnard  brigades  did  not 
await  the  assault,  and  at  four  o'clock  retired  on  St. 
Quentin  with  the  loss  of  one  gun. 

The  French  artillery  once  more  came  into  action  at 
Rocourt,  but  at  five  o'clock  had  quickly  to  abandon 
the  position,  and  the  French  now  confined  themselves 
to  the  defence  of  the  barricaded  entrances  into  the 
suburbs  of  St.  Martin. 

Six  Prussian  batteries  were  brought  up  against 
these,  and  the  29th  Brigade  was  for  some  time  engaged 
under  a  hot  fire  of  the  strongly  manned  buildings  and 
gardens ;  whereupon  several  companies  from  Rocourt 
established  themselves  in  the  suburb,  in  which  street- 
fighting  was  still  continued,  even  when  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  von  Hiillessem  had  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
bridge  over  the  canal,  and  entered  the  town  itself. 

By  four  o'clock,  General  Faidherbe  had  already  con- 
cluded that  the  Twenty-third  Corps  would  in  all  prob- . 
ability  be  unable  to  hold  its  position.  Under  these 
circumstances,  his  choice  was  limited  between  a  night 
retreat,  or  throwing  himself  into  St.  Quentin.  He  had 
not  yet  come  to  any  decision,  when  he  met  in  the  town 
Greneral  Lecointe,  who  reported  that  he  had  abandoned 
the  defence  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Somme.  Thanks  to 
the  resistance  still  offered  by  the  Twenty-third  Corps 


BATTLE   OF   ST.   QUENTIN.  329 

on  the  north,  the  Twenty-second  was  enabled  to  re- 
tire unmolested  on  Le-Cateau. 

The  officer  in  supreme  command  now  ordered  Geu' 
eral  Paulze  d'lvoy  to  retire  on  that  place,  but  the  latter 
only  received  the  order  at  six  in  the  evening,  when  the 
brigades  on  the  right  wing — Pauly's  and  Michelet's — 
had  already  been  routed  in  the  direction  of  Cambrai. 
The  more  obstinately  the  two  remaining  brigades  now 
defended  the  subui'b  of  St.  Martin,  the  more  critical 
for  them  must  prove  the  result  of  the  action.  Attacked 
in  rear  by  the  battalion  under  Colonel  von  Boecking, 
the  gi'eater  portion  were  made  prisoners.  The  41st 
Eegiment  alone  took  54  officers  and  2260  men  prisoners, 
besides  capturing  4  guns.  General  Faidherbe  only 
escaped  a  similar  fate  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  inhabitants. 

The  action  only  ceased  at  haK-past  six  that  evening, 
and  the  troops  passed  the  night  in  the  town  and  in  the 
captured  villages. 

The  hard-won  victory  had  cost  the  Germans  96  offi- 
cers and  2304  men;  3000  wounded  Frenchmen  were 
found  on  the  scene  of  action,  and  the  number  of  un- 
wounded  prisoners  exceeded  9000. 

According  to  theory,  pursuit  should  invariably  fol- 
low on  a  victory — a  law  recognized  by  all,  and  particu- 
larly acquiesced  in  by  novices ;  and  yet,  in  practice  it 
is  seldom  observed.  Military  history  points  to  few 
examples,  such  as  the  well-known  one  of  La-Belle- 
Alliance.  It  requires  a  very  strong  and  pitiless  will  to 
impose  fresh  exertions  and  dangers  upon  a  body  of 
troops  who  have  marched,  fought,  and  fasted  for  ten 
or  twelve  hours,  instead  of  the  longed-for  rest  and 
food.  But  given  the  existence  of  this  supposed  will, 
pursuit  will  yet  depend  on  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  victory  has  been  obtained.    It  wiU  be  diffi- 


330  THE   FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

cult  of  execution  when  all  the  units  on  the  field  of 
battle,  as  at  Koniggratz,  have  become  so  intermixed 
that  it  requires  hours  to  again  reform  them  into  tactical 
bodies ;  or  when,  as  at  St.  Quentin,  all,  even  the  troops 
last  committed  to  action,  have  become  so  entangled 
that  not  one  single  tactically  complete  infantry  force 
is  available.  "Without  the  support  of  such  a  body, 
cavahy  at  night  will  be  delayed  by  every  obstacle  and 
every  small  post  of  the  enemy,  and  by  itself  can  sel- 
dom fulfil  the  task. 

General  von  Goeben  did  not  pursue  the  enemy  till 
the  following  day.  His  advanced  cavahy  fought  up  to 
the  suburbs  of  Cambrai  and  the  glacis  of  Landrecies, 
without  meeting  with  any  resistance,  and  they  brought 
in  merely  some  hundred  stragglers.  The  infantry 
divisions  pursued  within  one  mile  (thi*ee  English)  of 
Cambrai.  Against  this  fortress  nothing  could  be  un- 
dertaken through  want  of  siege  material,  and  there 
was  no  military  advantage  to  be  derived  in  extending 
further  north.  Among  the  news  to  hand,  it  transpired 
that  a  considerable  portion  of  the  French  Northern 
Army  had  retired  upon  Lille,  Douai,  and  Valenciennes. 
As  fresh  enterprises  were  consequently  not  to  be  ex- 
pected, General  von  Goeben  brought  ^lis  force  back  to 
the  Somme,  where  towards  the  end  of  the  month  they 
entered  upon  their  winter  quarters,  between  Amiens 
and  St.  Quentin. 

On  the  Lower  Seine,  the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg 
had  entered  Eouen  with  the  Thirteenth  Corps  on  the 
25th,  after  having  encountered  on  the  march  only  a 
few  franctireurs.  Although  General  Loysel  had  in- 
creased his  force  to  nearly  30,000  through  the  reinforce- 
ments from  Cherbourg,  he  had  remained  entirely  in- 
active. 

General  von  Goeben  had  in  view  the  transfer  to  the 


SIEGE  OF  BELFORT.  331 

Army  of  the  Somme  of  that  portion  of  the  First  Corps 
still  before  Rouen;  but  this  was  disapproved  of  by 
telegram  from  head-quarters,  who,  on  political  grounds, 
ordered  its  further  retention  there. 

OPERATIONS  AT  THE   SOUTH-EASTERN   SEAT   OF  WAR  UP   TO 
17TH   OF  JANUARY. 

Investment  ofBelfort. — At  the  south-eastern  seat  of 
war,  the  forces  detailed  to  operate  against  Belf ort  had 
only  been  gradually  brought  together  under  cover  of 
the  Fom'teenth  Army  Corps. 

The  town  is  surrounded  by  a  bastioned  enceinte. 
The  citadel,  standing  upon  high  rocks,  has  the  advan- 
tage of  a  great  command,  and  for  more  effective  fire 
its  surrounding  works  are  terraced.  On  the  left  bank 
of  the  Savoureuse  newly  erected  lines  of  works  pro- 
tected the  suburb  and  railway  station.  On  the  adjacent 
heights  to  the  north-east  the  forts  of  La-Miotte  and 
La- Justice,  connected  to  the  main  work  by  continuous 
lines,  enclosed  a  spacious  intrenched  camp.  The  two 
forts  of  Les-Perches  might  certainly  have  threatened 
the  safety  of  the  site,  approaching  the  citadel  as  they 
do  on  the  south,  to  within  only  1000  metres,  from 
whence  the  works  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  come 
under  the  direct  fire  of  its  guns.  But  here  two  walled 
forts  had  been  erected  before  the  advent  of  the  enemy, 
and  besides  these  the  adjoining  woods  and  positions, 
as  for  instance  Perouse  and  Danjoutin,  had  been  in- 
trenched ;  nor  was  the  fortress  deficient  in  bomb-proof 
places.  It  was  armed  with  341  heavy  guns,  and  pro- 
visioned for  five  months.  As  immediately  after  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  the  Seventh  French  Corps 
had  vacated  Alsace,  only  about  5000  Gardes  Mobiles 
remained  behind  in  Belf  ort,  whose  garrison,  however, 
increased  by  the  National  Guard,  now  exceeded  17,000. 


332  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN   WAE. 

The  far-seeing  Commandant,  Colonel  Denf ert,  exerted 
all  his  resources  mainly  in  the  occupation  in  force  of 
the  zone  in  his  immediate  front.  The  advanced  detach- 
ments were  every  day  assigned  fresh  operations,  which 
the  artillery  of  the  fortress  had  to  support  at  extreme 
ranges. 

Opposed  to  him.  General  von  Tresckow  could,  in  the 
first  place,  only  dispose  of  twenty  weak  Landwehr 
battalions,  five  squadrons,  and  six  field  batteries,  mak- 
ing an  aggregate  of  barely  15,000.  At  first,  he  had  to 
confine  himself  to  a  mere  investment.  The  troops 
intrenched  themselves  in  the  distantly  radiating  vil- 
lages, and  were  called  upon  to  repel  many  sorties. 

Orders  had  been  received  from  army  head-quarters 
to  undertake  the  regular  investment  of  the  fortress. 
To  Greneral  von  Mertens  was  entrusted  the  direction 
of  the  engineer  duties,  and  to  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scheliha,  the  command  of  the  artillery. 

The  difiiculties  of  the  undertaking  were  apparent. 
The  rocky  nature  of  the  soil  could  not  but  increase  the 
labor  of  throwing  up  earthworks,  and  the  cold  season 
was  approaching.  The  assault  could  only  be  delivered 
successfully  on  the  south  of  the  main  work — the  for- 
midable citadel.  At  this  period  only  fifty  heavy  guns 
were  available,  and  the  infantry  was  not  even  strong 
enough  to  efiiciently  invest  the  place  on  all  sides. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  left  to  the  discre- 
tion of  Greneral  von  Tresckow  to  attempt  the  possibility 
of  reducing  Belfort  by  mere  bombardment.  Towards 
this  purpose  the  attack  was  chiefly  directed  on  the 
western  side,  in  which  quarter,  after  the  enemy's  gar- 
rison had  been  driven  out  of  Valdoye,  the  infantry 
occupied  Essert  and  Bavilliers,  as  well  as  the  adjacent 
wooded  heights. 

On  December  2nd,  seven  batteries  were  constructed 


SIEGE   OF   BELFOKT.  333 

on  the  plateau  between  these  two  villages,  by  3000  men, 
under  cover  of  two  battalions.  The  hard-frozen  ground 
added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  task ;  yet,  notwithstand- 
ing the  moonlight  night,  these  operations  would  appear 
to  have  escaped  the  attention  of  the  besieged.  When 
on  the  following  morning  the  sun  had  dispersed  the 
fog  and  lit  up  the  fortress,  fire  was  opened  upon  it. 

The  fortress  replied  at  first  but  feebly,  but  afterwards 
with  increasing  vigor,  from  the  entire  line  of  works, 
up  to  within  4000  metres  of  the  forts  of  La-Miotte  and 
La-Justice,  and  the  losses  in  the  trenches  were  con- 
siderable. 

Nevertheless,  four  fresh  batteries  were  constructed 
in  advance  of  Bavilliers,  and  on  the  fall  of  La-Tuilerie 
the  infantry  pressed  on  until  within  150  metres  of  the 
enemy's  most  advanced  trenches. 

They  succeeded  also  in  causing  a  conflagration  within 
the  town;  but  the  ammunition  was  soon  exhausted, 
whilst  from  the  high  citadel  an  effective  fire  was  un- 
ceasingly kept  up,  and  there  were  constantly  renewed 
sorties  on  the  part  of  the  garrison  to  be  repelled.  It 
was  now  clear,  after  all  previous  attempts  had  failed, 
that  no  assault  could  prove  successful  unless  systemat- 
ically carried  out. 

Colonel  von  Ostrowski,  to  the  south,  had,  on  Decem- 
ber 13th,  carried  the  French  positions  of  Adelnans  and 
the  wooded  heights  of  Le-Bosmont  and  La-Brosse.  To 
the  east  of  the  latter  place  two  batteries,  and  on  the 
northern  skirt  four  additional  batteries  had  been 
thrown  up,  not  without  great  difficulty  arising  from 
thaw  having  bogged  the  soil.  On  January  7th  fifty 
guns  opened  fire. 

The  superiority  of  the  artillery  of  the  attack  was 
soon  manifest.  Fort  Bellevue  suffered  severely,  and 
the  fire  from   Basses-Perches  was  entirely  silenced. 


334  THE   FKANCO-GEKMAN   WAK. 

But  more  important  than  all,  the  village  of  Danjoutin, 
strongly  garrisoned  and  intrenched  by  the  enemy, 
opposed  all  further  advance.  During  the  night  of  the 
8th  January,  seven  companies  attacked  this  position 
on  the  northern  side,  at  the  same  time  occupying  the 
railway  embankment.  With  empty  riiEles,  the  Land- 
wehr  posted  themselves  against  the  hot  fire  of  the 
French,  and  broke  into  the  streets  up  to  the  church 
itself.  The  supports  hastening  from  the  fort  were 
driven  back  at  the  railway  embankment,  but  the  fight 
went  on  around  the  buildings  in  the  southern  quarter 
of  the  village  till  towards  noon.  Of  the  defenders, 
twenty  ofS.eers  and  700  men  were  taken  prisoners. 

Typhus  and  small-pox  had  broken  out  in  Belf ort ; 
but  with  the  besieging  force  also  the  number  of  the 
sick  reached  a  considerable  figure,  caused  by  arduous 
work  undertaken  in  inclement  weather. 

As  a  rule,  the  battahons  could  only  muster  500 
strong,  and  this  led  General  von  Tresckow  to  devote 
half  the  number  to  securing  the  investment  from  with- 
out, principally  on  the  south. 

Trustworthy  intelligence  estimated  the  French 
strength  at  Besangon  at  62,000.  Although  hitherto 
entirely  inactive,  they  now  evinced  a  strong  desire  to 
press  on  to  the  relief  of  the  hard-pressed  fortress,  by 
the  line  of  the  Doubs. 

The  fortified  castle  of  Montbeliard  was  held  by  one 
battalion,  and  armed  with  heavy  guns.  Between  the 
Doubs  and  the  Swiss  frontier,  at  Delle,  General 
Debschitz  had  taken  up  a  position  with  eight  battahons, 
two  squadrons,  and  two  batteries,  and  General  von 
Werder  concentrated  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Noroy, 
Aillevans,  and  Athesans,  to  oppose  in  strength  any 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  garrison. 

From  January  5th  onwards  there  were  fought  before 


FREYCINET'S   TACTICS.  335 

Vesoul  a  series  of  engagements,  in  which  the  besiegers 
advanced  from  the  south  and  west  up  to  within  a  dis- 
tance of  one  mile  of  that  town.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  that  very  considerable  forces  were  engaged  in 
these  operations.  East  of  the  Ognon,  the  enemy's 
posts  were  advanced  as  far  as  Rougemont,  although  in 
lesser  force.  In  these  actions  500  were  taken  prisoners ; 
and  it  was  at  once  evident  that  besides  the  Eighteenth, 
also  the  Twenty-fourth  and  Twentieth  Corps  formed 
part  of  Boui'baki's  army ;  and  this  circumstance  sud- 
denly threw  a  new  light  upon  a  totally  changed  phase 
of  the  war. 

TRANSFEE  OF  THE  FRENCH  EASTERN  ARMY  TO  THE  SOUTH- 
EASTERN SEAT  OF  WAR,  TOWARDS  THE  END  OF  DECEM- 
BER. 

As  had  been  foreseen  at  army  head-quarters  at  Ver- 
saiUes,  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  bring  about  a 
combined  action  between  the  forces  of  Chanzy  and 
Bourbaki.  As  we  have  alreadj^  seen,  the  advance  of 
the  former  (Chanzy)  was  met  by  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  akeady  on  the  Loir,  and  Bourbaki  had  pre- 
pared his  advance  by  Montargis  to  the  relief  of  Paris. 
But  he  delayed  its  execution  until  the  19th  December, 
when  the  Second  German  Army  had  already  returned 
to  Orleans,  from  its  expedition  to  Le-Mans.  General 
Bourbaki  then  perceived  the  fact  that  the  Second 
Army  would,  upon  his  further  advance,  fall  on  his 
flank,  and  he  the  more  readily  fell  in  with  another 
plan,  devised  by  Monsieur  de  Freycinet,  and  favored 
by  the  Dictator  Gambetta. 

This  was  for  the  Fifteenth  Corps  to  remain  at 
Bourges  and  to  secure  that  place  by  intrenched  posi- 
tions at  Vierzon  and  Nevers;  the  Eighteenth  and 
Twentieth  were  to  proceed  to  Beaune  by  railway,  and^ 


336  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

in  conjunction  with  Garibaldi  and  Cremer,  70,000 
strong,  to  occupy  Dijon.  The  newly-formed  Twenty- 
fourth  Corps  was  also  to  be  moved  by  railway  from 
Lyons  to  Besangon,  where,  in  combination  with  the 
forces  already  there,  it  would  attain  a  strength  of 
50,000.  Co-operating  then  with  the  "victorieux  de 
Dijon,"  it  would  be  easy  to  raise  the  siege  of  Belfort, 
"meme  sans  coup  ferir."  It  was  considered  that  the 
mere  presence  in  that  place  of  this  large  force,  greatly 
exceeding,  as  it  did,  100,000,  would  preclude  any  at- 
tacks upon  the  Northern  forts ;  in  any  case,  there  was 
the  certainty  of  cutting  through  the  enemy's  various 
hues  of  communication,  and  later  on,  the  prospect  of 
a  combined  action  with  Faidherbe. 

The  movements  by  rail  from  the  Loire  to  the  Saone 
had  already  commenced  by  December  23rd.  In  the 
absence  of  aU  preparations,  many  interruptions  in 
the  traffic  naturally  occurred,  and  the  troops  suffered 
severely  from  the  intense  cold  and  from  want  of  neces- 
sary comforts.  After  Chagny  and  Chalons-sur-Seine 
had  been  reached,  and  it  was  ascertained  that  the  Ger- 
mans had  akeady  evacuated  Dijon,  it  was  decided  to 
again  embark  the  troops  so  as  to  bring  them  nearer  to 
Besan(,'on,  whence  arose  a  fresh  delay ;  and  it  was  only 
in  the  beginning  of  the  new  year  that  the  Eastern 
Army  was  in  readiness,  between  Dijon  and  Besan^on. 
The  Fifteenth  Corps  was  also  ordered  up,  but  it  took 
fourteen  days  to  get  so  far. 

The  comprehensive  plan  of  Freycinet,  and  his  san- 
guine expectations,  had  been  favored  by  the  circum- 
stance that  the  transfer  of  a  large  contingent  of  the 
army  to  a  distant  place  in  the  seat  of  war  had  been 
kept  from  the  knowledge  of  the  Second  Army,  as  well 
as  from  that  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  and  army  head- 
quarters,  for  a  fortnight.    Rumors  and  newspaper 


NEW  PHASE   OF  THE  WAR.  337 

articles  had  no  doubt  somewhat  before  this  given  inti- 
mations, but  General  von  Werder's  telegram  of  the  5th 
January  was  the  first  really  authentic  announcement, 
by  which  it  was  known  beyond  doubt  that  the  Germans 
now  stood  face  to  face  with  a  changed  aspect  of  the 
situation.  In  Versailles,  arrangements  were  at  once 
made  and  steps  taken  for  the  formation  of  a  new 
Southern  Army, 

There  was  available  for  this  purpose  the  Second 
Corps  at  Auxerre,  under  General  von  Zastrow,  which 
during  this  period  of  uncertainty  had  constantly  oper- 
ated between  the  Saone  and  Yonne,  according  as  the 
one  or  the  other  appeared  to  be  threatened.  The 
supreme  command  of  these  two  corps,  to  which  was 
afterwards  added  the  Fourteenth,  was  entrusted  to 
General  von  Manteuffel.  General  von  Werder  could 
not  be  immediately  reinforced,  and  for  a  time  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  was  thrown  upon  its  own  resources. 

Notwithstanding  their  advantage,  the  French  did 
more  manoeuvring  than  fighting.  General  Bourbaki 
aimed  at  surrounding  the  left  wing  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  and  thus  entirely  cutting  it  off  from  Belfort. 

On  5th  January  the  Eighteenth  Corps  had  advanced 
by  Grandvelle,  and  the  Twentieth  by  Echenoz-le-Sec, 
on  Vesoul ;  but,  as  we  have  seen,  they  had  there  met 
wdth  opposition,  and  as  the  corps  diverging  to  the  right 
to  Esprels  heard  that  Villersexel  was  occupied  by  the 
Germans,  the  Commander  determined  upon  a  still  more 
easterly  and  circuitous  route.  On  the  8th  the  two 
corps  of  the  left  wing  marched  off  to  the  right,  the 
Eighteenth  to  Montbozon,  the  Twentieth  to  Rouge- 
mont ;  the  Twenty-fourth  went  back  on  Cuse.  At  the 
same  time  General  Cremer  received  orders  to  move 
from  Dijon  on  Vesoul.  On  the  9th,  therefore,  the 
Twenty-fourth  and  Twentieth  Corps  lay  near  Ville- 
22 


338  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

chevreux  and  Villargent  on  the  Arcey-Villersexel  road, 
whilst  the  head  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  reached  that 
latter  place  and  Esprels. 

Greneral  von  Werder  had  no  alternative  but  to  follow 
this  flank  movement  in  all  haste.  He  ordered  the 
Baden  Division  to  Athesans,  the  4th  Reserve  Division 
to  Aillevans,  and  von  der  Goltz's  brigade  to  No^'oy-le- 
Bourg.    The  trains  were  marched  on  Lure. 

ACTION   OF  VILLEESEXEL. 

(January  9th.) 

On  January  9th,  at  seven  in  the  morning,  the  Reserve 
Division  was  sent  from  Noroy  on  to  Aillevans,  and 
commenced  bridging  the  Ognon,  to  admit  of  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  march.  A  flanking  part  of  the  25th 
Regiment,  sent  to  operate  on  the  right,  was  fired  on  at 
Yillersexel,  and  the  attempt  to  carry  the  stone  bridge 
at  that  place  failed  shortly  after.  The  French  had 
occupied,  with  two  and  a  half  battalions,  the  town, 
situated  on  a  height,  on  the  further  bank  of  the  river. 
Shortly  afterwards  reinforcements  came  up  on  the 
German  side.  Two  batteries  opened  fire  upon  the 
place  and  upon  the  still  advancing  enemy.  The  25tli 
Regiment  crossed  the  river  and  brokeNinto  the  walled- 
in  park  and  into  the  castle.  At  one  o'clock  the  French 
were  driven  out  of  the  town,  with  the  loss  of  many 
prisoners,  and  a  cessation  of  hostilities  ensued. 

The  Prussian  contingent  had  been  seriously  threat- 
ened in  flank  by  the  advance  from  Esprels  of  the  1st 
Division  and  the  reserve  artillery  of  the  French  Eight- 
eenth Corps.  General  von  der  Goltz,  however,  op- 
posed them  by  occupying  the  village  of  Moimay. 

He  also  sent  to  Villersexel  nine  companies  of  the 
30th  Regiment,  to  the  relief  of  the  25th  Regiment,  so 


ACTION   OF   VILLEKSEXEL.  339 

as  to  allow  the  latter  to  rejoin  its  own  division  in  the 
forward  march.  His  combined  brigade  was  eventually 
to  form  the  rear-guard  to  the  entire  column. 

General  von  Werder,  who  observed  the  considerable 
force  in  which  the  French  moved  on  Villersexel  from 
the  south,  had  concluded  that  there  was  less  to  be 
gained  by  forcing  his  own  passage  across  the  Ognon 
than  by  opposing  that  of  the  French,  who  saw  in  it 
facilities  for  a  nearer  approach  to  Belfort.  He  there- 
fore recalled  the  infantry  already  issuing  from  the 
southern  quarter  of  the  town,  and  sent  it  with  the 
batteries  to  the  northern  side  of  the  river.  Here  the 
main  body  of  the  4th  Reserve  Division  took  up  a  de- 
fensive position,  and  the  Baden  Division  was  stopped 
in  its  march  at  Arpenans  and  Lure,  to  come  to  the 
reinforcement  it  now  stood  greatly  in  need  of. 

It  was  already  evening  when  large  columns  of  the 
French  advanced  on  Villersexel  and  sheUed  the  town 
with  their  artillery. 

Favored  by  the  darkness,  the  French  found  their 
way  into  the  park  and  castle,  from  which  the  German 
garrison  had  already  been  withdrawn ;  and  as  the 
general  condition  of  things  did  not  seem  to  necessitate 
the  occupation  of  Villersexel,  the  commanding  officer 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  place.  Though  hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  this  move  had  been  nearly  com- 
pleted, when  orders  arrived  from  General  von  Werder 
to  hold  the  town. 

At  once  four  battalions  from  the  Reserve  Division 
advanced  to  the  renewed  attack.  The  25th  Regiment 
turned  about  at  the  bridge  over  the  Ognon  and  joined 
them.  The  Landwehr  rushed  into  the  lower  floor  of 
the  large  castle,  but  the  French  defended  the  upper 
floors  and  the  cellar.  On  the  stairs  and  in  the  passages 
of  the  already  burning  buildings  there  ensued  a  hot 


340  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

and  changeful  combat,  and  the  fight  was  maintained 
in  the  streets.  Not  till  the  General  in  command  was 
left  to  his  own  free  will,  and  ordered  a  cessation,  were 
dispositions  made  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  for 
gradual  retirement,  which  was  completed  by  three. 
The  Reserve  Division  then  recrossed  the  bridge  at 
Aillevans,  and  occupied  St.  Sulpice  on  its  right. 

Greneral  von  der  Goltz  had  contested  Moimay  until 
evening. 

Of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  only  15,000  had  been  en- 
gaged, of  whom  26  officers  and  553  men  were  killed. 
The  French  losses  included  27  officers  and  627  men ; 
but  they  left  behind  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans  700 
unwounded  prisoners.  Those  who  chiefly  took  part 
in  these  operations  were  the  Eighteenth  and  Twentieth 
Corps;  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  on  account  of  the 
fighting  behind  it,  had  discontinued  its  march  from 
Arcey  to  Sevenans.  Detachments  of  the  gradually  in- 
coming Fifteenth  Corps  moved  from  the  south  in  the 
direction  of  Belfort. 

On  the  morning  of  10th  January,  General  von  Wer- 
der  massed  his  corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Aillevans,  ready 
to  engage  the  enemy  should  the  latter  attempt  an 
advance  on  Villersexel.  But  an  attack  was  not  made, 
and  thus  the  march  was  resumed  thai  same  morning. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  French  in  three  corps  were  as 
near  to  Belfort  as  the  Germans  were  with  three  divis- 
ions. To  cover  the  retreat,  the  Reserve  Division  took 
up  a  position  at  Athesans,  and  on  the  following  day 
all  the  commands  had  reached  and  occupied  the  Lisaine 
line.  On  the  right,  by  Frahier  and  Chalonvillars,  stood 
the  Baden  Division ;  in  the  centre,  the  Reserve  Brigade, 
between  Chagey  and  Couthenans ;  on  the  left,  the  Re- 
serve Division,  at  Hericourt  and  Tavey.  On  the  south. 
General  von  Debschitz  watched  from  Delle,  and  Colonel 


ADVANCE  ON  THE  LISAINE.  341 

von  Bredow  from  Arcey;  and  to  the  west,  at  Lure, 
was  Colonel  von  Willisen,  with  the  detachment  from 
Vesoul  of  eight  companies,  thirteen  squadrons,  two 
batteries. 

It  would,  in  fact,  have  been  possible  to  pass  between 
the  enemy  and  Belfort. 

The  French  leader  had,  under  the  intoxicating 
impression  of  a  victory,  resigned  himself  to  inactivity. 
"  Le  General  Billot,"  he  reported  to  the  Grovernment  at 
Bordeaux,  "a  occupe  Esprels  et  s'y  est  maintenu." 
We  know  that  he  was  never  attacked  there  at  all,  and 
that  he  did  not  succeed  in  driving  away  General  von 
der  Goltz  from  the  vicinity  of  Moimay.  "  Le  General 
Clinchant  a  enleve  avec  un  entrain  remarquable  Viller- 
sexel ; "  but  the  fight  of  the  9th  was,  as  regards  the 
Germans,  maintained  with  only  a  portion  of  the  Four- 
teenth Corps,  to  secure  the  right  flank  in  the  march  of 
the  main  body.  Wliilst,  then,  these  moves  were  zeal- 
ously continued,  the  French  army  remained  stationary 
for  two  days,  ready  for  action  and  with  the  confident 
expectation  that  the  enemy,  described  as  beaten,  would 
return  to  the  attack. 

Only  on  the  13th  did  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps 
advance  on  Arcey,  the  Twentieth  on  Saulnot,  and  the 
Eighteenth  follow  up  to  Sevenans.  The  Fifteenth  was 
to  support  an  attack  on  Arcey  by  Ste.  Marie. 

General  von  Werder  had  utilized  this  interval,  and 
preceded  the  troops  to  test  the  possibility  of  taking 
up  a  position  on  the  Lisaine,  and  to  take  counsel  with 
General  von  Tresckow. 

An  inspection  showed  that  at  Frahier  the  Lisaine 
becomes  an  unimportant  streamlet,  flowing  through  a 
broad  grassy  hollow,  and  thence  to  Chagey  through 
steep  wooded  slopes.  At  Hericourt  the  valley  opens 
out  into  a  wide  plain,  which  is,  however,  commanded 


342  THE  PRANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

by  the  rocky  heights  of  Mont-Vaudois.  Lower  down 
the  wooded  heights  follow  the  river  as  far  as  Mont- 
beliard,  which  forms  a  strong  base  where  the  line  closes 
by  the  Allaine. 

The  wooded  nature  of  the  plain,  west  of  the  Lisaine, 
would  necessarily  increase  the  assailant's  difficulties 
in  deploying  large  masses,  and  with  a  long  artillery 
column.  It  is  true  that  during  the  prevailing  severe 
cold  the  river  was  everywhere  frozen  over ;  but  only 
two  high-roads  ran  in  the  direction  by  which  the 
French  army  in  the  valley  were  marching  down  the 
stream  on  Montbehard  and  on  Hericourt.  The  other 
ways  down  were  narrow,  hollow  roads,  rendered  diffi- 
cult by  frost. 

General  von  Tresckow  had  already  occupied  the 
most  important  position  with  siege-guns,  the  Castle  of 
Montbeliard  with  six,  and  the  neighboring  height  of 
La-Grange-Dame  with  five  heavy  guns.  Seven  of 
them  were  placed  on  Mont-Vaudois  and  near  Heri- 
court; besides  these,  twenty-one  others  commanded 
the  valley  of  the  Allaine  as  far  as  Delle,  on  the  south. 

All  the  troops  that  could  be  spared  from  the  invest- 
ing force  were  withdrawn  from  before  Belfort.  Still 
there  remained  the  important  consideration  that  the 
available  forces  might  not  suffice  to  entirely  cover  the 
whole  of  the  Lisaine  line.  The  right  wing  was  the 
locally  weakest  portion  of  the  whole  position,  but  here 
there  was-  the  least  danger  of  the  enemy's  main  attack, 
for  the  many  needs  of  the  numerous  but  inadequately 
equipped  French  army  made  the  nearest  possible  vicin- 
ity of  one  of  the  railroads  a  necessity.  The  Vesoul 
line,  over  Lure,  was  broken  in  many  places,  and  the 
Besan^on  line  led  to  the  strong  left  wing.  The  country 
north  of  Chagey  might  therefore  be  held  by  weaker 
forces,  and  a  reserve  was  formed  out  of  the  largest  part 


THE   LINE   OF  THE  LISAINE.  343 

of  the  Baden  Division,  which  was  distributed  in  rear 
of  centre  and  left  between  Mandrevillars,  Brevilliers, 
and  Charmont. 

The  respite  accorded  by  the  enemy  was  turned  to 
account  with  the  utmost  eagerness  for  the  digging  of 
rifle-pits,  the  building  of  batteries,  the  restoring  of 
telegraph  and  relay  lines,  the  improvement  of  roads, 
and  the  providing  of  victuals  and  ammunition. 

(January  13th.)  On  the  morning  of  the  13th  the 
posting  of  the  3rd  Reserve  Division  was  begun  at 
Arcey,  Ste.  Marie,  and  Gonvillars.  They  were  in- 
structed to  withdraw  before  a  superior  force,  but  to 
hold  their  own  long  enough  to  entail  the  deployment 
of  the  French  columns.  The  duel  with  the  widely 
dispersed  French  artillery  was  therefore  prolonged  for 
some  time ;  then,  after  a  three  h<j)urs'  obstinate  resist- 
ance, a  new  position  was  taken  up  behind  the  stream 
of  the  Rupt,  and  the  retreat  on  Tavey  delayed  until 
four  in  the  afternoon.  The  advanced  guard  of  Gen- 
eral von  der  Goltz,  after  a  whole  brigade  had  deployed 
against  it,  also  took  up  a  position  on  the  same  level, 
at  Couthenans. 

Along  the  Allaine  line  the  French  had  not  succeeded 
in  driving  General  von  Debschitz's  detachment  south 
of  Dasle  and  Croix. 

(January  14th.)  On  the  14th,  General  von  Willisen, 
with  fifty  dismounted  dragoons,  drove  back  the  enemy 
who  were  advancing  on  Lure,  and  then  retired  with 
his  detachment  on  Ronchamp. 

The  French  army  did  not,  even  on  that  day,  under- 
take a  serious  attack.  It  lay  massed  with  the  Fifteenth, 
Twenty-fourth,  and  Twentieth  Corps,  and  hardly  a 
mile  (German)  from  the  German  left  and  centre.  The 
right  was  supposed  by  General  Bourbaki  to  rest  upon 
Mont-Vaudois.    His  plan  was  to  cross  the  Lisaine 


344  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

above  this  place  in  force,  and  to  facilitate  the  front 
attack  by  surrounding  the  enemy.  The  Eighteenth 
Army  Corps  and  the  division  under  Cremer  were  told 
off  for  this  purpose.  The  di*awback  to  this  judicious 
arrangement  was  that  the  two  above-mentioned  detach- 
ments, destined  by  the  officer  in  supreme  command 
to  open  the  fight  on  the  14th,  had  to  advance  by 
the  longest  line  of  march.  On  this  day  the  leading 
troops  of  the  Eighteenth  Army  Corps  barely  succeeded 
in  reaching  Lomont,  by  difficult  hill  and  woodland 
passes,  and  the  Cremer  brigade  had  only  then  begun 
to  advance  from  Vesoul.  A  postponement  to  the  15th 
was  thereupon  determined. 

On  the  German  side,  a  general  attack  of  the  superior 
enemy  was  hourly  expected,  and  Oeneral  von  Werder 
felt  himself  bound  to  telegraph  the  extreme  seriousness 
of  his  position  to  Versailles.  The  rivers,  being  frozen, 
were  passable,  and  the  duty  of  covering  Belfort  cur- 
tailed the  liberty  of  his  movements  and  endangered  the 
existence  of  his  corps.  He  earnestly  prayed  that  a 
decision  might  be  arrived  at  as  to  whether  Belfort  was 
still  to  be  held. 

At  the  army  head-quarters  it  was  considered  that 
any  further  withdrawal  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps 
would  have  the  immediate  effect  of  liaising  the  siege 
and  causing  the  loss  of  the  considerable  materiel  which 
had  been  provided  for  it;  that  it  was  impossible  to 
foresee  where  such  a  line  of  action  would  end;  and 
that  it  could  but  delay  the  co-operation  of  the  army 
advancing  by  forced  marches  under  Oeneral  von 
Manteuffel.  At  three  o'clock  p.m.  on  the  15th  of 
January  a  positive  order  was  conveyed  to  General  von 
Werder  to  accept  battle  in  front  of  Belfort.  He  was, 
as  was  only  fair,  relieved  of  the  moral  responsibility 
of  the  consequences  of  a  possibly   disastrous   issue. 


BATTLE    OF   THE   LISAINE.  345 

But  before  this  order  could  reach  him,  the  General  had 
already  decided  on  its  execution. 

BATTLE   OF  THE  LISAINE. 

(January  15th  to  17th.) 

(January  15th.)  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  of 
January,  the  French  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  with  two 
divisions  augmented  by  artillery,  advanced  on  Mont- 
behard,  a  third  followed  in  reserve.  The  East-Prussian 
Landwehr  battahons,  which  had  pushed  forward  as  far 
as  the  farm  of  Mont-Che  vis  and  Ste.  Suzanne,  held 
their  position  for  a  long  time,  advanced  to  the  attack 
of  their  own  accord,  and  drove  the  heads  of  the  enemy's 
columns  back  upon  the  stream  of  the  Rupt.  But  when 
the  latter,  during  the  afternoon,  posted  themselves  in 
force  along  the  edge  of  the  wood,  they  were  at  two 
o'clock  ordered  back  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Lisaine. 
The  neighboring  town  of  Montbeliard,  entirely  com- 
manded by  the  surrounding  heights,  was  voluntarily 
evacuated,  and  the  fortified  castle  alone  held.  But  east 
of  Montbeliard  General  von  Gliimer  with  the  1st  Baden 
Brigade  took  up  a  position,  and  had  four  field-batteries 
besides  siege-guns  brought  up  to  the  plateau  of  La- 
Grange-Dame. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  day  the  French,  after  con- 
tinuous but  ineffectual  bombardments  from  eight  bat- 
teries, took  possession  of  the  town,  but  did  not  make 
any  further  advance. 

Neither  had  they  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Lisaine 
at  Bethoncourt.  An  officer  and  sixty  men,  who  sought 
cover  within  a  walled  cemetery  from  the  sharp  fire  of 
the  defenders,  were  taken  prisoners. 

Further  to  the  north  the  French  Twenty-fourth 
.Corps  continued  to  advance,  but  it  was  two  o'clock  be- 


346  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

fore  their  columns  succeeded  in  deploying  out  of  the 
wood.  Four  battalions  did,  indeed,  succeed  in  enter- 
ing and  occupying  the  \dllage  of  Bussurel,  situated  on 
the  western  bank  of  the  Lisaine,  but  their  further 
advance  was  frustrated  by  the  fire  of  the  defenders 
posted  behind  the  railway  embankment  and  by  that  of 
the  Baden  battalions  and  batteries  drawn  from  the 
main  reserve. 

Hericourt,  but  one  mile  from  Belfort,  on  the  great 
high-road  of  Besancon,  became  a  place  of  importance 
in  the  German  line.  Here  the  enemy  on  the  hither 
side  of  the  Lisaine  was  met  by  the  right  wing  of  the 
4th  Eeserve  Division. 

The  little  wooded  height  of  Mougnot,  which  forms 
a  sort  of  bridge-head  at  the  narrow  gorge  through 
which  the  road  passes,  had  been  fortified  by  abatis, 
batteries,  and  rifle-pits,  the  town  in  the  rear  prepared 
for  defence,  and  the  base  of  the  heights  on  either  side 
studded  with  artillery.  Four  East-Prussian  Landwehr 
battalions  were  joined  on  the  right  by  the  Reserve 
Brigade,  which  held  the  slopes  of  Mont-Vaudois  as  far 
as  Luze. 

At  about  ten  o'clock  the  French  artillery  deployed 
on  the  open  heights  close  to  the  line  of  approach  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Tremoins.  Upon  their  infantry 
advancing  on  the  left  over  Byans,  the  detachment 
which  till  then  had  been  left  at  Tavey  went  back  to 
Hericourt  in  reserve,  and  the  enemy's  first  attack  on 
Mougnot  was  repulsed  by  the  garrison  and  by  the  fire 
of  sixty-one  guns  on  the  further  bank  of  the  river. 
The  attempt  was  not  repeated  on  that  day,  and  the 
French  confined  themselves  to  a  sharp  but  ineffectual 
cannonade. 

According  to  the  instructions  left  behind  by  Greneral 
Bourbaki,  the  French  were  to  await  the  result  of  the 


BATTLE   OF  THE  LISAINE.  347 

great  encircling  movement  which  was  to  be  carried 
out  by  General  Billot  with  the  Eighteenth  and  by  the 
Cremer  divisions.  As,  however,  these  latter  had  not 
yet  put  in  an  appearance,  the  main  reserve  had  to  be 
brought  forward  left  of  Coisevaux  to  secure  G-eneral 
Clinchant's  flank. 

The  orders  from  head-quarters  had  only  reached  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  at  midnight.  The  latter  had,  more- 
over, to  effect  a  heavy  march  over  deeply  snowed-up 
woodland  paths.  This  entailed  intercommunications, 
not  only  between  the  wing-columns  of  the  1st  and  3rd 
Divisions,  but  even  with  the  division  under  Cremer  at 
Lyoffans.  This  division  had,  by  dint  of  the  greatest 
exertion,  reached  Lure  during  the  night,  and  could  not 
get  beyond  Beverne  until  nine  in  the  morning.  A 
fresh  delay  was  occasioned  by  the  order  to  bring  up 
in  front  of  the  infantry  the  artillery  (even  the  reserve 
artillery,  which  brought  up  the  rear),  and  thus  it  hap- 
pened that  the  Eighteenth  Corps  did  not  succeed  in 
deploying  two  of  its  divisions  against  Luze  and  Chagey 
till  between  12  and  2  p.m. 

The  1st  Division  occupied  Couthenans  with  one  bat- 
talion, and  brought  up  five  batteries  on  the  decline 
behind  the  heights  to  the  north  of  that  place. 

But  the  fire  from  the  bank  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river  prevented  their  further  ascent,  and  after  the  lapse 
of  a  short  time  several  of  these  detachments  had  but 
two  guns  left  fit  for  action,  although  the  Germans, 
with  regard  to  the  difficulty  of  procuring  fresh  ammu- 
nition, had  used  it  as  sparingly  as  possible.  At  three 
o'clock  there  was  a  pause  in  the  firing,  which  was 
resumed  on  the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  when  the 
artillery  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  took  part  in  it. 
An  infantry  attack  on  a  larger  scale  was  not  yet  at- 
tempted. 


348  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

There  was  scarcely  more  purpose  in  the  movement 
of  the  3rd  Division  against  Chagey,  which  was  only 
occupied  by  a  Baden  battalion ;  yet  it  was  here  that 
the  enveloping  movement  of  the  German  right  wing 
by  way  of  Mont-Vaudois  was  to  take  place.  The 
wood  adjoining  the  first  houses  of  the  village  and  its 
steepness  was  the  only  difficulty  attached  to  the  descent 
of  the  hill.  Two  French  battalions  suddenly  appeared 
from  the  gorge  that  lay  south  of  it  and  drove  in  the 
Baden  outposts ;  the  further  attack  was  to  be  supported 
from  Couthenans  on  the  south,  but  the  infantry  ad- 
vancing from  thence  found  itseK  forced  to  turn  back 
by  the  fire  from  the  opposite  bank.  Only  after  a 
renewed  effort  did  the  Zouaves  succeed  in  entering 
Chagey,  where  a  hard  fight  began  amid  the  houses. 
Meanwhile  two  Baden  battalions  arrived,  who,  at  five 
o'clock,  di'ove  the  enemy  out  of  the  villages  back  into 
the  wood.  Fresh  reinforcements  hastened  to  their 
support  from  the  reserve  near  at  hand,  the  short  win- 
ter's day  was  over,  and  during  the  night  the  French 
attempted  nothing  further.  The  2nd  Division  of  the 
French  corps  had  only  arrived  as  far  as  Beverne,  the 
cavalry  had  not  moved  from  Lyoffans. 

The  Cremer  division  had,  despite  its  late  arrival  at 
Lure,  continued  the  march  in  the''  early  morning. 
After  the  above-mentioned  halts  and  intercommunica- 
tions the  9tli  Brigade  advanced  on  Etobon,  and  there 
at  noon  an  engagement  took  place  with  a  detachment 
of  General  von  Degenfeld.  When  the  2nd  Brigade 
came  up,  the  first  moved  forward  through  the  Wood 
of  Thui-e,  to  cross  the  Lisaine  above  Chagey.  The 
roads  had  first  of  all  to  be  partly  made  practicable  by 
pioneers,  which  occasioned  considerable  delay.  The 
2nd  Brigade  then  followed  in  the  dark,  leaving  a  recon- 
noitring party  behind  at  Etobon.    A  fresh  collision 


BATTLE  OF  THE  LISAINE.  349 

with  some  Baden  contingents  determined  General 
Cremer  to  extinguish  all  the  watch-fires.  His  troops 
remained  under  arms  throughout  the  hard  winter  night. 

On  the  German  side,  all 'who  were  not  told  off  for 
guard  found  shelter  in  the  neighboring  villages,  only 
the  pioneers  were  kept  at  work  with  their  pickaxes. 
The  actions  had  cost  both  sides  about  600  men,  with- 
out bringing  about  any  decisive  result ;  but  every  day 
was  a  gain  to  the  defenders. 

General  von  Werder,  on  the  heights  north  of  Heri- 
court,  had  received  constant  reports  as  to  the  issue 
from  the  head-quarter  Staff  officers,  who  had  been 
posted  in  various  places,  by  which  the  reinforcements 
from  the  reserves  could  be  regulated.  Still  the  reserve 
ammunition  was  a  cause  of  anxiety,  as  a  transport 
announced  from  Baden  had  not  yet  arrived. 

General  Bourbaki  informed  his  Government  that  he 
had  taken  Montbeliard  (of  course  without  the  castle), 
occupied  the  villages  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Lisaine, 
and  that  he  would  attack  on  the  16th.  He  had  learned 
from  General  Billot  that  the  German  right  wing  ex- 
tended far  across  Mont-Vaudois,  whence  he  gathered 
that  they  had  been  considerably  reinforced ;  he  esti- 
mated the  enemy  at  80,000  to  100,000  men.  Meanwhile 
he  looked  forward  to  obtaining  good  results  by  extend- 
ing the  encircling  movement  further  to  the  west. 

(January  16th.)  At  half -past  six  on  the  morning  of 
the  16th  the  Germans  once  more  got  under  arms  in 
the  same  positions  as  the  previous  day. 

The  French  began  the  attack  with  their  right  wing 
again.  From  the  loop-holed  houses  they  fired  on  the 
Landwehr  company  stationed  at  the  castle  of  Mont- 
beliard, causing  some  loss  among  the  latter  as  well  as 
among  the  working  gunners.  The  summons  to  sur- 
render was  disregarded,  and  the  fire  of  the  fort  artillery 


350  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

used  to  sucli  good  purpose  against  two  batteries  that 
had  just  appeared  on  the  neighboring  height,  that  these 
were  obhged  to  retire,  leaving  behind  them  two  guns. 
Neither  could  they  advance  from  a  new  position  they 
had  taken  up  at  the  farm  of  Mont-Chevis,  where  they 
were  reinforced  by  three  batteries,  for  the  fire  from 
La-Grange-Dame,  although  they  continued  the  can- 
nonade until  dark.  No  attempt  was  made  from  Mont- 
beliard  to  break  the  German  line. 

Further  to  the  left  the  reinforced  1st  Division  of  the 
French  Fifteenth  Corps  advanced  on  Bethoncourt.  At 
one  o'clock  the  fire  of  their  artillery  from  Mont-Chevis 
and  Byans  obliged  a  Baden  battery  to  limber  up,  and 
it  was  then  brought  to  bear  on  the  village.  Meanwhile 
large  bodies  had  been  massed  in  the  neighboring  forest, 
and  at  three  o'clock  advanced  out  of  it.  General  Glii- 
mer  had  abeady  sent  reinforcements  to  the  threatened 
spot.  Two  determined  attempts  to  carry  the  place  by 
rushes  close  up  to  the  position  were  frustrated  by  the 
annihilating  artillery  and  rifle  fire  of  the  defenders. 
A  third  attack  with  a  whole  brigade,  at  four  o'clock, 
was  not  even  permitted  to  approach.  The  losses  on 
the  French  side  were  considerable,  the  snowy  field  was 
strewn  with  the  slain.  Some  unwounded  prisoners 
were  also  taken. 

One  division  of  the  Twenty-fourth  French  Army 
Corps  had  taken  up  a  covered  position  in  the  woods 
behind  Byans,  and  as  they  had  already  occupied  Bus- 
surel  on  the  previous  day,  the  German  line  of  defence 
in  the  rear  of  the  railway  embankment  appeared  to  be 
threatened  from  the  immediate  vicinity.  The  General 
in  command  therefore  sent  General  Keller,  with  two 
Baden  fusilier  battalions  and  one  heavy  battery,  from 
Brevilliers  in  this  direction.  The  latter  joined  the  two 
battalions  who  had  been  engaged  on  the  slope  of  the 


BATTLE   OF  TEE  LISAINE.  351 

hill  since  morning.  The  fire  from  five  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  was  soon  silenced  by  the  unerring  grenades 
of  the  German  guns.  At  noon  the  French  artillery 
retired  from  Byans,  leaving  here  also  two  guns,  which 
could  only  be  brought  away  later.  The  infantry,  one 
division  strong,  had  only  threatened  to  break  the  line, 
without  proceeding  to  carry  it  out. 

The  Twentieth  Corps  brought  up  two  divisions 
against  the  Hericourt — Luze  line.  A  thick  fog  covered 
the  valley,  and  the  early  cannonade  was  at  first  scarcely 
answered  by  the  Germans.  To  obtain  some  insight 
into  the  plans  of  the  enemy,  two  companies  of  the  for- 
mer had  advanced  on  the  height  west  of  St.  Valbert, 
surprising  the  opponents  who  were  advancing  from 
Byans  with  so  rapid  a  fire  that  they  turned  back.  But 
soon  after,  at  half -past  nine,  several  battalions  from 
Tavey  attempted  to  carry  the  Mougnot.  Two  attacks 
were  frustrated  by  the  steady  resistance  of  the  Land- 
wehr  battalions,  and  a  third  attempt  directed  against 
the  southern  defile  of  Hericourt  had  no  result.  About 
four  o'clock  the  infantry  again  massed  against  the 
Mougnot,  but  renouncing  further  attacks  under  the 
fire  from  Mont  Salamou  confined  themselves  till  even- 
ing to  an  ineffectual  cannonade. 

At  Chagey  two  divisions  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps 
found  themselves  face  to  face  with  the  Germans.  They 
did  not  attempt  anything. 

The  slackness  with  which,  on  the  16th  January,  the 
action  against  the  whole  front  from  Montbeliard  to 
Chagey  was  conducted,  points  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  French  were  everywhere  awaiting  the  issue  of  the 
plan  of  encircling  the  German  right  wing. 

This  task  now  devolved  on  General  Cremer.  The 
2nd  Division  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  joined  him  at 
Etobon. 


352  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

Two  divisions  advanced  thence  on  Chenebier,  where 
General  von  Degenfeld  was  with  two  battahons,  two 
batteries,  and  one  squadron.  There  could  be  no  doubt 
as  to  the  result.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  Penhoat  divis- 
ion of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  advanced  from  the  west 
to  encircle  northwards,  and  Cremer's  division,  for  the 
purpose  of  barring  the  defenders'  retreat  on  Belfort, 
advanced  from  the  south,  the  wood  of  La-Thure  cover- 
ing his  approach.  The  batteries  of  both  divisions  were 
brought  up  on  its  northern  edge,  where  they  opened 
fire.  After  firing  had  continued  for  two  hours,  the 
masses  of  infantry  advanced  from  three  sides.  Under 
General  Cremer's  personal  guidance  the  Baden  fusiliers 
were  driven  from  the  south  to  the  north  of  the  village, 
and  as  here  the  surrounding  movement  through  the 
wood  of  Montedin  had  become  practicable.  General  von 
Degenfeld  was,  after  an  obstinate  resistance,  obliged 
to  begin  the  retreat  in  a  northerly  direction  through 
Frahier.  Thence  he  again  turned  south-east  and  took 
up  a  position  in  front  of  Chalonvillars,  on  the  high- 
standing  mill  of  Rougeot,  where,  at  six  o'clock,  he  was 
joined  by  Colonel  Bayer  with  strong  reinforcements. 
The  French  did  not  pursue ;  the  Cremer  division,  which 
had  lost  1000  men,  retired,  on  the  contrary,  on  the 
wood  of  La-Thure,  while  the  Penhoat"-di vision  confined 
itself  to  the  occupation  of  Chenebier. 

Accordingly  the  German  line  of  defence  was  not 
broken  on  this  day ;  still,  its  extreme  right  wing  had 
been  driven  back  to  within  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of 
Belfort. 

The  fortress  celebrated  the  victory  of  French  arms 
by  a  feu-de-joie,  but  made  no  serious  attack  on  the 
investing  forces,  akeady  weakened  by  the  dispatch  of 
reinforcements,  who,  however,  on  their  side,  quietly 
continued  the  construction  of  batteries. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  LISAINE.  353 

General  von  Werder,  desirous  above  all  of  setting 
the  scene  of  action  back  to  his  right  wing,  could  only 
hold  in  reserve  four  battalions,  four  squadi'ons,  and 
two  batteries,  bringing  up  these  from  the  least  exposed 
places,  and  even  from  Belfort,  to  Brevilliers  and  Man- 
drevillars.  At  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  General 
Keller  was  ordered  to  retake  Chenebier.  To  this 
end  he  left  Mandi-evillars  with  two  Baden  battalions, 
reached  Moulin-Eougeot  at  midnight,  and  found  Fra- 
hier  abeady  occupied  by  Colonel  Bayer. 

(January  17th.)  On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  eight 
battalions,  two  squadi'ons,  and  four  batteries  had  as- 
sembled there.  Three  of  these  detachments  advanced 
on  the  northern,  three  on  the  southern  part  of  Chene- 
bier ;  the  others  remained  in  reserve  at  the  mill,  where 
also  three  15-pounders  had  been  set  up. 

At  half-past  4  a.m.  the  first  coluifin,  advancing  in 
breathless  silence,  surprised  an  outpost  of  the  enemy 
at  Echevanne,  but  it  was  unavoidable  that  the  rifle  fire 
at  Chenebier  should  draw  the  attention  of  the  French 
to  the  danger  by  which  they  were  menaced.  Even 
north  of  the  place,  in  the  wood,  the  Germans  met  with 
serious  resistance ;  and  the  danger  that  in  the  dark- 
ness and  the  dense  undergrowth  their  troops  might  fall 
on  each  other  obliged  them  to  withdi*aw  them  to  the 
outer  edge  of  the  wood. 

The  other  column,  advancing  through  the  valley  of 

the  Lisaine,  had  advanced  at  the  double  as  soon  as  the 

first  shots  were  heard.    The  2nd  Battalion  of  the  4th 

Baden  Regiment  rushed  with  cheers  into  the  southern 

part  of  Chenebier,  where  a  wild  fight  ensued.    But 

daybreak  showed  that  the  heights  on  the  west  of  the 

village  were  strongly  occupied,  and  that  columns  of 

all  arms  were  approaching  from   Etobon.      At  8.30 

Colonel  Payen  was  compelled  to  retire  from  the  half- 
23 


354  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAB. 

conquered  village,  and  take  up  a  position  at  the  wood 
of  Feiy,  to  cover  the  road  to  Belfort  through  Chalon- 
villars ;  he  took  with  him  400  prisoners. 

At  the  same  time  the  right  column,  strengthened  by 
a  battalion  of  the  reserve,  had  renewed  the  attack  on 
the  wood,  and  in  a  battle  which  lasted  for  two  hours, 
with  heavy  losses  on  both  sides,  at  last  took  possession 
of  it.  But  the  attempt  to  get  into  the  barricaded  and 
strongly-defended  village  was  vain. 

A  destructive  fire  met  every  attack ;  one  single  round 
of  mitrailleuse,  for  instance,  killed  twenty-one  of  the 
assailants.  At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Greneral 
Keller  therefore  collected  his  troops  at  Frahier,  where 
they  were  supported  by  four  batteries. 

With  such  inferior  strength,  and  after  failing  in  this 
attempt,  it  was  useless  to  think  of  driving  the  enemy 
beyond  Chenebier ;  the  only  thing  to  do  was  to  hinder 
his  further  advance  on  Belfort.  The  end  was  fully 
achieved ;  the  French  did  not  pursue.  Instead  of  out- 
flanking the  Grerman  right,  they  seemed  chiefly  con- 
cerned for  their  own  left.  They  defended  Chenebier 
stoutly,  but  gave  up  all  further  offensive  movements. 

In  the  expectation  of  such  an  attack  succeeding, 
Greneral  Bourbaki's  plan  seems  to  have  been  to  engage 
the  enemy  in  front  only,  and  so  detain  him.  Even 
during  that  night  the  Germans  were  alarmed  at 
Bethoncourt  and  before  Hericourt,  while  they,  on 
their  part,  disturbed  the  French  at  Bussurel  and  in 
the  wood  of  La-Thure.  The  infantry  fire  went  on  for 
hours,  and  numerous  detachments  had  to  spend  the 
cold  winter's  night  under  arms.  In  the  morning  two 
divisions  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  (French)  advanced 
on  Cliagey  and  Luze,  supported  by  the  Army  Reserve 
artillery,  but  they  could  not  come  up  with  the  Grer- 
mans,  so  several  repeated  attacks  on  those  places  were 


BATTLE   OF   THE   LISAINE.  355 

without  result.  Firing  went  on  incessantly  from  one 
o'clock.  In  front  of  Hericourt  there  was  a  mutual 
shelling,  and  Bussurel,  held  by  the  French,  was  in 
flames. 

To  drive  the  French  out  of  Montbeliard,  the  town 
was  fired  on  from  La-Grange-Dame  and  from  the 
chateau  till  the  inhabitants  begged  that  it  might  be 
spared,  declaring  that  the  position  was  abandoned, 
which  subsequently  proved  to  be  false.  Ten  battalions 
of  the  French  Fifteenth  Corps  advanced  from  the 
woods  in  the  forenoon,  and  tried  to  push  on  past  Mont- 
beliard, but  suffered  severely  from  the  flanking  fire  of 
the  heavy  guns  at  La-Grange-Dame ;  only  a  few  got 
into  the  valley  of  the  Lisaine.  The  western  road  from 
Montbeliard,  and  the  hills  immediately  in  front  of  it, 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  French,  but  the  attack 
ceased  at  about  two  in  the  afternoon. 

Further  to  the  south.  General  von  Debschitz's  posts 
in  front  of  AUaine  had  easily  checked  the  advance  of 
the  French  detachments. 

The  Germans  were  now  convinced  that  no  further 
attack  would  be  attempted. 

The  condition  of  the  French  troops,  not  yet  inured 
to  war,  was,  in  fact,  serious.  They  had  been  obliged 
to  bivouac  in  bitter  weather,  sometimes  under  arms, 
and  for  the  most  part  without  food.  Their  losses  were 
enormous,  and  the  superior  officers  who  were  invited 
to  meet  the  Generals  at  three  in  the  afternoon,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Chagey,  expressed  their  objections  to 
a  yet  more  extensive  movement  to  the  left,  since  sup- 
plies would  be  impossible,  and  there  would  be  danger 
of  the  Germans  cutting  off  the  communications  from 
the  side  of  Montbeliard.  On  this  came  the  news  that 
the  heads  of  General  von  Manteuffel's  corps  had  already 
reached  Fontaine-Frangaise,  and  was  near  to  Gray. 


356  THE  PRANCO-GEKMAN   WAE. 

Under  these  circumstances  General  Bourbaki 
thought  he  must  decide  on  a  retreat.  He  telegraphed 
to  the  Government  that  by  the  advice  of  his  Generals, 
and  to  his  deep  regret,  he  had  been  compelled  to  take 
up  a  position  further  in  the  rear,  and  only  hoped  that 
the  enemy  might  follow  him.  Hence  this  experienced 
General  can  have  felt  no  doubt  that  his  army,  after 
faihng  in  the  attack  on  the  Lisaine,  could  only  escape 
a  very  critical  position  by  a  steady  retreat. 

(January  18th.)  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  the 
Germans  were  in  the  positions  they  had  secured  the 
day  before,  and  under  arms,  the  French  in  full  force 
along  the  whole  front.  It  was  a  significant  fact  that 
they  were  busily  employed  on  the  construction  of 
earthworks.  They  had  evacuated  Montbeliard  the 
evening  before,  and  now  held  the  country  to  the  west 
of  the   town  strongly  manned  and  fortified. 

During  this  day  nothing  occurred  but  a  shelling  and 
small  skirmishes.  General  Keller  had  come  up  on  the 
right  German  wing  with  reinforcements,  and  as  the 
enemy  retired  to  Etobon  in  the  afternoon  he  was  able 
to  re-occupy  Chenebier.  Further  north.  Colonel  von 
Willisen  again  marched  on  Ronchamp.  Coutenans 
was  taken  possession  of  in  the  centre,  and  the  enemy 
driven  out  of  Byans  by  artillery  fire ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Germans  could  not  yet  penetrate  the  woods. 
On  the  southern  bank  of  the  Allaine  General  von 
Debschitz's  detachment  drove  the  enemy  back  beyond 
the  line  of  Exincourt — Croix. 

In  the  three  days'  fighting  on  the  Lisaine  the  Ger- 
mans had  lost  1200,  the  French  from  4000  to  5000 
men. 

In  spite  of  many  detachments  having  to  be  drafted 
off,  and  of  the  threatening  attitude  of  the  enemy,  the 
siege-works  were  uninterruptedly  carried  on  outside 


BOMBAEDMENT   OF  PAKIS.  357 

Belfort,  and  as  soon  as  the  investing  forces  were  again 
reinforced  Gleneral  von  Werder  followed  the  retiring 
French  to  Etobon,  Saulnot,  and  Arcey. 

THE   BOMBAEDMENT    OF   PAKIS. 

(January,  1871.) 

In  the  place  of  the  Second  Corps,  now  engaged  with 
the  Army  of  the  South,  the  First  Bavarian  Corps  had 
come  up,  of  which  Grambetta  had  said,  "  Les  Bavarois 
n'existent  plus."  It  had  made  such  good  use  of  its 
time  of  rest  south  of  Longjumeau  that  by  the  begin- 
ning of  the  New  Year  it  was  already  17,500  strong, 
with  108  guns.  It  was  drawn  up  between  the  Sixth 
Prussian  Corps  and  the  Wiirtemberg  Division  on  both 
banks  of  the  Seine.  The  Wiirtembergers  extended 
from  Ormesson  to  the  Marne,  and  between  that  river 
a,nd  the  Sausset  were  the  Saxons,  so  as  to  diminish  the 
front  of  the  Guards'  Corps  now  that  the  Moree  was 
frozen  over  and  afforded  no  protection. 

The  observation  of  such  a  huge  stronghold  made 
great  demands  on  the  endurance  of  the  troops. 

By  extending  their  works  more  and  more  outside 
Villejuif  and  Bruyeres,  the  French  threatened  to  out- 
flank the  Second  Bavarian  Corps.  To  avert  such  an 
attack  the  Sixth  was  obliged  to  keep  a  strong  detach- 
ment constantly  in  readiness  at  L'Hay. 

The  supports  on  the  south  could  not  in  any  way  be 
protected  against  the  fire  of  the  heavy  fortress  guns, 
nor  the  outposts  against  that  of  the  Chassepots.  They 
consequently  could  often  not  be  relieved  for  several 
days,  and  the  relief  was  usually  effected  at  night.  The 
less  the  success  of  the  French  arms  in  the  open  field, 
the  more  lavish  were  they  in  the  expenditure  of  ammu- 
nition from  their  works. 


358  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

Mont-Valerien  hurled  its  giant  shells  to  a  distance 
of  from  seven  to  eight  kilometres  (from  four  to  five 
miles  English),  but  this  perpetual  cannonade,  to  whose 
din  the  ear  was  soon  accustomed,  did  little  damage. 

The  Artillery  Attack  on  the  Southern  Front. — Till 
Mont-Avron  was  carried,  the  Germans  had  only  been 
able  to  bring  field-guns  to  bear  against  the  French 
fortress  artillery.  But  early  in  January  their  prepara- 
tions had  at  last  got  so  far  forward  that  seventeen 
batteries,  which  had  long  been  completed,  could  be 
armed  with  heavy  guns  against  the  southern  front. 
A  battery  stood  apart  on  the  left  wing  in  the  park  of 
St.  Cloud,  to  the  north  of  Sevres;  four  more,  close 
together,  on  the  steep  slope  of  the  hill  to  the  west  of 
Meudon;  five  crowned  the  plateau  of  Moulin-de-la- 
Tour,  where  the  mill,  serving  to  guide  the  aim  of  the 
French,  had  been  blown  up.  Four  more  batteries  were 
constructed  in  a  lower  position  between  Fontenay  and 
Bagneux.  Two,  between  Chevilly  and  La-Rue,  pro- 
tected the  German  troops  against  a  flank  movement 
from  Villejuif,  with  the  field  artillery  of  the  Second 
Bavarian  and  Sixth  Corps.  Covered  ways  were  pre- 
pared, and  intermediate  depots  were  supplied  with 
ammunition  from  the  great  magazines  at  Villacoublay. 

Colonels  von  Rieff  and  von  Ramni  conducted  the 
artillery  attack  under  General  von  Kameke  and  Gen- 
eral Prince  Hohenlohe;  General  Schulz  directed  the 
engineering  works.  The  men  served  twenty-four 
hours  in  the  batteries,  and  then  took  two  days'  rest. 
The  officers  had  but  one  day's  rest. 

The  heavy  guns  were  brought  into  position  behind 
masked  batteries  on  January  3rd  by  daylight,  without 
any  interference ;  in  all  the  others  by  night,  after  the 
outposts  had  been  di-iven  in.  Thus,  on  the  morning 
of  the  4thj  98  guns  were  ready  to  open  fire :  28  on  Issy, 


BOMBAEDMENT   OF   PAPJS.  359 

28  on  Vanves,  and  18  on  Montrouge ;  10  against  tlie 
emplacements  between  the  first  two  forts.  But  a  thick 
fog  hid  every  object,  and  it  was  not  tiU  January  5th, 
at  8.30  in  the  morning,  that  the  signal  was  given  for 
opening  fire. 

The  enemy  replied  at  once.  There  were  in  Fort 
Valerien  106  guns,  in  Issy  90,  in  Vanves  84,  and  in 
Montrouge  52 ;  there  were  about  70  in  the  sectors  of 
the  ramparts  which  came  under  fire  and  at  ViUejuif, 
16-cm.  guns  for  the  most  part ;  so  the  attack  at  first 
was  under  great  difficulties.  But  when,  at  about  noon, 
all  the  batteries  had  opened  fire,  the  situation  gradually 
improved,  and  the  greater  accuracy  of  the  Grerman  aim 
began  to  teU.  Issy  was  almost  silenced  by  two  o'clock, 
nine  guns  were  destroyed  in  Vanves  and  had  lost  thirty 
gunners ;  only  Montrouge  stiU  replied  with  any  vigor. 
The  artillery  from  the  ramparts  now  opened  fire,  but 
the  forts  never  again  got  the  best  of  it.  Some  gun- 
boats coming  up  by  Point-du-Jour  very  soon  had  to 
retire. 

The  field-guns  of  the  Second  Bavarian  and  Sixth 
Corps  were  also  so  effective  that  no  attack  was  at- 
tempted from  the  works  at  ViUejuif,  nor  was  a  shot 
fired  on  the  batteries  at  Bagneux.  A  number  of  parapet 
guns  and  the  long-range  Chassepots  looted  from  the 
French  did  such  good  service  that  the  enemy  were 
driven  further  and  further  in.  The  German  outposts 
took  possession  of  the  trenches  of  Clamart,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  night  turned  their  front  towards  the 
forts. 

Only  a  few  15-cm.  shells  were  thrown  into  the  city 
as  a  serious  announcement ;  the  first  thing  to  be  done 
was  to  batter  down  the  outworks,  and  for  some  few 
days  all  the  firing  was  directed  on  them.  The  most 
serious  counter-attack  was  from  Montrouge  and  from 


360  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

a  mortar-battery  in  a  very  advantageous  position  be- 
hind the  high  railway  embankment  to  the  east  of  Issy ; 
next,  from  the  south  front  of  the  ramparts,  almost  a 
mile  (German)  long  in  a  straight  line.  Foggy  weather 
on  some  days  necessitated  a  suspension  or  entire  cessa- 
tion of  firing.  But  meanwhile  the  German  advanced 
lines  were  from  750  to  450  metres  nearer  to  the  fortifi- 
cations. New  batteries  were  constructed  further  for- 
ward, and  armed  with  thirty-six  guns  out  of  those  left 
in  the  rear. 

(January  10th.)  The  French  garrison  were  all  this 
time  very  active.  On  January  10th  they  succeeded  in 
the  dark  hours  in  carrying  the  weakly-occupied  posi- 
tion at  Clamart.  They  placed  three  battalions  in  the 
place,  and  dug  a  shelter-trench  of  1200  metres  towards 
Chatillon. 

(January  13th.)  The  Second  Army  of  Paris  was 
still  encamped  outside  the  town  to  the  east  and  north, 
from  Nogent  to  AuberviUers.  After  some  small  alarms, 
on  the  evening  of  the  13th  some  strong  detachments 
advanced,  under  cover  of  a  hot  fire  from  the  forts  from 
Courneuve  and  Drancy  on  Le-Bourget.  But  the  troops 
in  occupation  were  on  the  alert,  and  being  reinforced 
at  once  by  several  companies,  repulsed  the  repeated 
attempts  of  the  French  to  storm  it  till  two  o'clock  in 
the  morning. 

(January  14th.)  On  this  day  the  French  renewed  the 
attempt  on  Clamart  with  500  marine  infantry  and 
several  battalions  of  the  National  Guard.  When  these 
last  had  assembled  at  the  railway  station  near,  with 
a  great  deal  of  noise,  their  advance  was  reported 
soon  after  midnight.  The  fight  lasted  about  an  hour, 
and  ended  with  the  retreat,  or  flight,  of  the  attacking 
party.  Patrols  pursued  them  close  up  to  the  trenches 
of  Issy. 


RETALIATION   FROM   THE   FORTS.  361 

The  distance  was  so  great  that  the  fire  from  the 
ramparts  had  not  yet  perceptibly  moderated.  Battery 
No.  1,  isohited  in  the  park  of  St.  Cloud,  suffered  most, 
being  shelled  by  two  batteries,  from  Poiut-du-Jour  and 
from  Mont-Valerien.  The  steep  slope  behind  the  bat- 
tery made  it  easy  for  the  enemy  to  take  aim.  The 
breastwork  was  repeatedly  breached,  and  it  was  only 
the  most  zealous  devotion  which  enabled  the  struggle 
to  be  continued  at  this  point.  The  French  also  poured 
a  heavy  fire  into  batteries  Nos.  19  and  21,  pushed  for- 
ward into  a  particularly  dangerous  position  under 
Fort  Vanves.  The  fire  from  the  ramparts,  coming 
from  a  long  range  to  the  breastwork,  was  plunging  and 
breaking  through  the  platforms,  and  a  great  many 
gunners  were  wounded  or  killed.  The  powder  maga- 
zine blew  up  in  two  of  the  batteries,  wounding  both 
the  officers  in  command,  besides  several  other  superior 
officers. 

To  the  east  of  Paris,  the  fifty-eight  German  guns 
placed  there  after  the  reduction  of  Mont-Avi'on  were 
opposed  to  151  of  the  French.  The  Germans,  never- 
theless, soon  proved  their  superiority ;  the  forts  only 
occasionally  opened  fire;  the  French  withdrew  their 
outposts  to  the  works,  and  altogether  vacated  the 
peninsula  of  St.  Maui*.  By  degrees  the  heavy  siege- 
guns  could  be  removed  from  hence  to  the  banks  of 
the  Moree. 

The  forts  to  the  south  had  meanwhile  suffered  se- 
verely. The  ruin  at  Issy  was  visible  to  the  naked  eye ; 
fire  broke  out  repeatedly,  and  the  powder  magazine 
had  to  be  cleared  out  at  great  risk  in  the  night  of 
January  16th.  Fort  Vanves  had  lost  seventy  men ;  it 
opened  fire  usually  every  morning,  but  soon  became 
silent.  Montrouge,  on  the  contrary,  on  some  days 
fired  as  many  as  500  rounds  from  eighteen  guns.     But 


362  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

here,  too,  the  casemates  no  longer  afforded  any  shelter^ 
and  one  of  the  bastions  was  a  heap  of  ruins. 

In  spite  of  the  steady  fire  from  the  ramparts,  part 
even  of  Paris  was  distressed  by  the  15-cm.  shells.  An 
elevation  of  30  degrees,  through  a  peculiar  contrivance, 
sent  the  shot  into  the  heart  of  the  city.  From  300  to 
400  shells  were  fired  daily. 

Under  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  the  G-overn- 
ment,  after  repeated  deliberations,  decided  on  another 
great  enterprise,  to  be  directed  this  time  against  the 
German  batteries  at  Chatillon.  The  assembled  Gen- 
erals agreed,  indeed,  that  such  sorties  could  promise 
no  results  without  the  co-operation  of  an  army  out- 
side; but,  on  the  8th,  Gambetta  had  announced  the 
"  victory  "  of  the  Army  of  the  North  at  Bapaume,  and 
had  promised  that  both  the  Armies  of  the  Loire  should 
advance.  Hereupon  General  Trochu  advised  that  they 
should  at  least  await  the  moment  when  the  investing 
army  should  be  weakened  by  detailing  further  detach- 
ments ;  but  he  was  opposed  by  the  other  members  of 
the  Government,  especially  by  Monsieur  Jules  Favre. 
He  explained  that  the  Maires  of  Paris  were  indignant 
at  the  bombardment,  that  the  representatives  of  the 
city  must  be  allowed  some  insight  into  the  military 
situation,  and,  above  all,  that  negotiations  ought  long 
since  to  have  been  entered  into. 

Finally,  on  January  15th,  it  was  determined  that  the 
German  lines  should  be  broken  through  at  Montretout, 
Garches,  and  Buzanval. 

While  confusion  and  dissensions  thus  prevailed  in 
Paris,  the  unity  of  the  German  nation  was  proclaimed 
at  Versailles  under  the  Emperor  Wilham. 


ATTACK  ON  MONT-VALERIEN.  363 

BATTLE   OF   MONT-VALEEIEN. 

(January  19tli.) 

The  sortie  was  to  be  effected  on  January  19tli.  On 
that  day,  as  we  have  seen,  General  Faidherbe  marched 
on  St.  Quentin,  on  the  way  to  Paris,  and  the  army 
which  was  to  make  the  sortie  was  standing  on  the 
eastern  and  northern  fronts  of  the  capital.  The  at- 
tempt to  break  through  was,  however,  made  on  the 
opposite  side.  In  fact,  the  peninsula  of  Gennevilliers 
was  the  only  ground  on  which  large  masses  of  troops 
could  be  deployed  without  being  exposed  for  hours, 
while  they  were  being  assembled,  to  the  fire  of  the 
German  artillery. 

Two  days  previously  the  mobilized  National  Guard 
had  relieved  the  divisions  told  off  for  the  sortie,  from 
the  positions  they  held ;  90,000  men  in  three  columns 
were  to  attack  at  the  same  time.  General  Vinoy  on 
the  left,  supported  by  the  fire  from  the  rampart,  was 
to  carry  the  height  of  Montretout ;  General  Bellemare 
in  the  centre  was  to  advance  on  Garches;  General 
Ducrot  on  the  right,  on  the  Chateau  of  Buzanval. 

The  attack  was  to  begin  at  six  in  the  morning,  but 
blocks  occurred  at  the  bridges  of  Asnieres  and  Neuilly, 
as  no  explicit  orders  had  been  issued  for  crossing  them. 
When,  at  seven  o'clock,  the  signal  to  advance  was  made 
by  gun-fire  from  Mont-Valerien,  only  the  head  of  Gen- 
eral Vinoy's  force  was  formed  up,  the  other  columns 
had  not  yet  deployed,  and  the  last  detachments  tailed 
back  as  far  as  Courbevoix.  Before  they  had  reached 
the  rendezvous  the  left  wing  was  already  marching 
fifteen  battalions  on  St.  Cloud. 

These  at  first  met  only  isolated  posts  and  patrols, 
eighty-nine  men  in  all,  who  rushed  into  the  gorge  of 


364  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

the  work  of  Montretout,  and  there  made  a  stand  for 
some  time ;  they  then  fought  their  way  out  with  great 
bravery,  but  some  of  them  were  taken  prisoners. 
There,  and  on  the  north  of  St.  Cloud,  the  French  at 
once  prepared  for  defence. 

The  centre  column,  under  Greneral  Bellemare,  also 
took  possession  without  difficulty  of  the  hill  of  Maison- 
du-Cure. 

Not  till  now,  nearly  nine  o'clock,  did  the  first  sup- 
ports of  the  German  outposts  appear  on  the  scene. 
Till  within  a  short  time  the  patrols  had  been  able  to 
report  nothing  but  thick  fog;  but  reports  from  the 
right  and  left  wings  announced  that  a  serious  attack 
was  threatened  on  the  whole  front  from  St.  Cloud  to 
Bougival.  The  Fourth  Corps  were  called  out,  and 
G-eneral  von  Kirchbach  joined  the  9th  Division.  To 
the  German  right,  in  the  park  of  St.  Cloud,  stood  the 
17th  Brigade,  to  the  left,  behind  the  Porte-de-Long- 
boyau,  the  20th ;  the  other  troops  of  the  corps  advanced 
from  their  quarters  at  Versailles  and  the  villages  to 
the  north  of  it  on  Jardy  and  Beauregard.  The  Crown 
Prince  ordered  six  battalions  of  the  Landwehr  Guard 
and  a  Bavarian  brigade  on  Versailles,  and  himself  rode 
to  the  Hospice  of  Brezin ;  the  King  went  to  Marly. 

The  French  meanwhile  had  seized  the  foremost 
houses  at  Garches,  and  made  their  way  here  and  there 
through  the  breaches  in  the  east  wall  into  the  park  of 
the  Chateau  of  Buzanval.  The  5th  Jager  Battalion, 
supported  by  single  companies  of  the  58th  and  59th 
Regiments,  drove  the  enemy  back  on  Garches,  occu- 
pied the  cemetery  on  the  north,  and  still  reached  the 
advanced  posts  at  La-Bergerie  in  good  time.  The 
other  divisions  under  General  von  Bothmer  carried  on 
a  persistent  fight,  by  order  from  head-quarters,  on  the 
skirts  of  the  park  of  St.  Cloud,  merely  to  gain  time. 


FIGHTING  AT   ST.  CLOUD.  365 

By  haK-past  nine  they  had  repnlsed  an  attack  by  Belle- 
mare's  column,  stopped  the  advance  of  the  French  up 
the  Eue-Imperiale  of  St.  Cloud,  and  even  returned  the 
attack  from  the  Grille-d'Orleans  and  the  Porte-Jaune. 
It  was  in  vain  that  five  French  battalions  tried  to 
storm  La-Bergerie.  A  squad  of  engineers  had  tried 
with  great  self-sacrifice  to  demolish  the  wall  which 
surrounded  the  enclosure,  but  the  dynamite  was  frozen 
and  would  not  explode,  and  the  Jagers  held  the  posi- 
tion steadfastly  throughout  the  day. 

The  attacks  of  the  French  had  hitherto  been  at- 
tempted with  no  help  from  their  artillery.  That  of 
Greneral  Vinoy  had  been  seriously  delayed  by  running 
into  the  centre  column,  and  now  lingered  in  the  rear 
to  meet  a  possible  attack  at  Briqueterie.  General  Belle- 
mare's  batteries  tried  to  get  up  the  slope  of  the  hill 
of  Grarches,  but  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  horses 
compelled  them  to  take  up  a  position  at  Fouilleuse. 
Meanwhile  the  batteries  of  the  9th  Division  (German) 
came  up  one  by  one,  and  by  noon  thirty-six  guns  had 
opened  fire.  In  St.  Cloud  a  hot  street-fight  was  going 
on.  General  Ducrot  alone,  on  the  French  right  wing, 
had  opened  the  battle  with  his  strong  force  of  artillery, 
which  he  got  into  position  on  both  sides  of  Rueil.  The 
tirailleurs  then  advanced,  and  made  their  way  through 
the  park  of  Buzanval  to  the  western  waU,  but  were  then 
driven  back  by  the  50th  Eegiment  of  Fusiliers. 

At  half -past  ten  the  chief  attack  was  made  at  this 
point,  and  supported  by  part  of  the  central  column. 
Only  a  non-commissioned  of&cer's  detachment  met  the 
attack  at  Malmaison,  but  at  the  eastern  road  from 
Bougival,  at  La-Jouchere  and  Porte-de-Longboyau,  it 
found  the  20th  Infantry  Brigade,  which  had  already 
been  reinforced.  General  von  Schmidt  still  kept  the 
reserve  of  the  10th  Division  in  the  rear  at  Beauregard. 


366  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

A  murderous  fire  from  the  well-protected  Grerman  in- 
fantry checked  the  rush  of  the  French,  and  converted 
it  by  midday  into  a  steady  fire  action,  the  German 
artillery  joining  in  with  great  effect.  Two  batteries  of 
the  10th  Division  at  St.  Michel  were  strengthened  by 
two  of  the  Guards'  brought  up  from  St.  Germain  to 
Louvenciennes ;  a  third  advanced  on  Chatou  and  di'ove 
an  armor-plated  train  on  the  station  north  of  Rueil 
to  retire  rapidly  on  Nanterre.  Four  batteries  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  finally  opened  fire  from  Carrieres,  with- 
out heeding  the  guns  of  Valerien,  shelling  the  compact 
masses  of  French  infantry,  who  still  held  Rueil  in  the 
rear. 

At  two  o'clock  the  French  decided  on  renewing  the 
attack.  When  two  of  their  batteries  had  bombarded 
Porte-de-Longboyau  a  brigade  marched  on  this  place, 
and  a  second  on  the  western  wall  of  the  park  of  Buzan- 
val ;  a  third  followed  to  give  support.  Equally  bold, 
but  equally  unsuccessful,  was  the  attempt  of  a  party 
of  engineers,  one  officer  and  ten  men,  to  blow  up  part 
of  the  wall ;  they  were  all  killed.  The  attacking  col- 
umns had  advanced  to  within  200  paces,  but  now  thir- 
teen companies  met  them  from  the  German  side,  and, 
firing  on  them  at  the  most  effective  range,  stopped 
their  advance,  and  presently  routed  the  French  in  spite 
of  a  valiant  effort  on  the  part  of  their  officers. 

They  found,  however,  a  good  support  in  the  park- 
wall,  which  had  been  prepared  for  defence  with  great 
skill  and  with  the  utmost  rapidity.  The  attack  of  some 
companies  from  Brezin  and  La-Bergerie  on  this  wall 
was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

But  the  strength  of  the  French  attack  was  already 
broken.  Even  by  three  o'clock  a  retreat  was  observ- 
able in  the  left  wing,  and  as  dusk  fell  they  began  gi-adu- 
ally,  in  the  centre,  to  withdi-aw  from  the  heights  of 


FIGHTING  AT   ST.  CLOUD.  367 

Maison-du-Cure.  When  Colonel  von  Kothen  pursued, 
with  a  small  force,  several  battalions  indeed  fronted, 
and  even  attempted  a  counter-attack ;  but  timely  sup- 
port arrived  from  La-Bergerie,  Garches,  and  Porte- 
Jaune,  and,  seconded  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries,  the 
Grermans  continued  the  pursuit.  The  King's  Grena- 
diers drove  the  enemy  almost  as  far  back  as  Fouil- 
leuse. 

Still,  the  Germans  had  not  succeeded  in  repossess- 
ing themselves  of  the  works  at  Montretout.  The  chief 
difficulty  arose  from  their  having  been  unable  to  ad- 
vance through  the  town  of  St.  Cloud.  As,  however, 
these  positions  were  indispensable  for  the  protection  of 
the  right  wing,  General  von  Kirchbach  gave  orders 
that  they  were  to  be  carried  either  that  evening  or 
early  next  morning. 

General  von  Sandrart  decided  on  immediate  action, 
and  at  eight  that  evening  five  batteries  advanced  to 
the  attack.  Only  a  few  French  were  found  in  the 
earthworks,  and  these  were  taken  prisoners ;  but  in  the 
town  the  struggle  was  severe.  Finally  the  Germans 
had  to  restrict  themselves  to  blockading  the  houses 
occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  French  also  held  the  wall 
of  the  park  of  Buzanval  all  through  the  night.  The 
Landwehr  Guard  and  the  Bavarian  Brigade  were  there- 
fore assigned  quarters  in  Versailles,  to  form  a  strong 
reserve  close  at  hand  in  case  of  need  on  the  following 
day.  The  remainder  of  the  troops  withdi'ew  into  their 
former  quarters. 

At  half-past  five  General  Trochu  had  ordered  a 
retreat.  He  perceived  that  a  prolonged  struggle  could 
not  succeed,  especially  as  the  National  Guard  were 
mutinous.  The  brave  defenders  of  St.  Cloud  were  for- 
gotten in  these  orders ;  they  did  not  surrender  till  the 
day  after,  when  artillery  opened  fire  on  the  houses  they 


368  THE  PKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

had  occupied.  Even  the  park- wall  was  held  till  the 
following  morning. 

The  French  attack  of  January  19th  had  failed  before 
reaching  the  enemy's  main  position.  The  reserves  in 
readiness  on  the  German  side  had  not  been  brought 
into  action.  The  Fifth  Corps  alone  had  driven  in  an 
enemy  of  four  times  its  own  strength.  It  lost  40  offi- 
cers and  570  men;  the  French  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  145  officers  and  3423  men,  besides  44  offi- 
cers and  458  men  taken  prisoners. 

When  the  fog  lifted,  at  about  eleven  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  20th,  they  were  seen  retreating  on 
Paris,  in  long  columns,  across  the  peninsula  of  Grenne- 
vilhers. 

THE  BOMBAKDMENT  OF  PAEIS   TILL  THE  AKMISTIOE. 

After  the  repulse  of  this  last  struggle  for  release  on 
the  part  of  the  garrison,  the  bombardment  was  renewed 
on  the  north  as  well  as  the  south  and  west. 

The  siege-guns  no  longer  needed  against  the  smaller 
fortresses  and  on  the  Marne  were  parked  to  this  end  at 
Villiers-le-Bel.  The  Army  of  the  Meuse  had  prepared 
abundant  material  for  constructing  batteries,  and  re- 
quisitioned above  600  wagons.  Already  twelve  bat- 
teries were  placed  in  lines  betweeii  Le-Bourget  and 
Lac-d'Enghien,  and  the  guns  were  mostly  brought  up 
at  night.  By  January  21st  eighty-one  heavy  guns 
were  ready  for  action,  and  Colonel  Bartsch  opened  fire 
at  nine  that  morning  on  La-Briche,  Double-Couronne, 
and  Fort-de-l'Est. 

The  forts,  now  exposed  to  the  fire  of  143  heavy  guns, 
replied  briskly,  and  on  the  foUowing  day  the  thick 
weather  prevented  the  Germans  from  opening  fire  again 
till  the  afternoon.  But  the  ground  in  front  was  clear 
of  the  French,  and  the  outposts  of  the  German  Guards 


THE  BOMBAKDMENT   CONTINUED.  369 

and  Fourth  Corps  took  possession  of  Villetaneuse  and 
Temps-Perdu. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  fire  was  opened  on  St. 
Denis,  with  every  endeavor  to  spare  the  Cathedral,  and 
many  places  were  set  in  flames. 

By  the  23rd  the  steady  fire  of  the  Germans  had  per- 
ceptibly reduced  the  vigor  of  the  French  artillery. 
La-Briche  was  silenced,  and  the  other  forts  only  fired 
an  occasional  salvo. 

During  the  night  of  the  25th  four  batteries  were 
advanced  to  within  from  1800  to  1200  metres  of  the 
enemy's  outworks.  Engineering  works  could  now  be 
begun,  and  a  row  of  new  batteries  was  constructed,  for 
which,  however,  there  was  never  any  need. 

The  effect  of  this  six  days'  bombardment  was  de- 
cisive. 

The  forts  had  suffered  greatly.  On  this  side — unlike 
the  south  front — they  lacked  the  support  of  the  ram- 
parts behind  them,  and  they  had,  too,  no  bomb-proof 
space.  The  temporary  galleries  were  shattered  by 
shell,  the  powder-magazines  were  in  the  greatest  dan- 
ger, and  the  garrisons  were  devoid  of  shelter.  The 
inhabitants  of  St.  Denis  fled  to  Paris  in  crowds,  and 
the  insufficient  security  of  the  battered  works  were  no 
longer  a  protection  against  assault  if  the  city  held  out 
any  longer. 

The  attack  on  the  north  front  had  cost  the  Germans 
one  officer  and  twenty-five  men;  the  French  stated 
their  loss  at  180. 

The  fire  of  the  forts  on  the  east  front  was  kept 
under,  and  the  Wiirtemberg  Field  Artillery  was  enough 
to  prevent  the  French  from  again  getting  a  foothold 
on  the  peninsula  of  St.  Maur. 

The  south  front  meanwhile  suffered  more  and  more 
from  the  steady  bombardment.    The  ramparts  and  the 


370  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

mortar-pits  behind  the  railway  were  still  active,  but  in 
the  forts  the  barracks  were  in  ruins,  partly  battered 
in  and  partly  burnt  down,  and  the  men  had  to  take 
shelter  in  the  empty  powder-magazines.  The  ramparts 
were  too  much  choked  for  free  circulation,  the  para- 
pets afforded  no  protection.  In  Vanves  the  gaps  were 
filled  up  with  sand-bags ;  in  Issy,  on  the  southern  cur- 
tain, five  blocks  of  casemates  in  the  outer  wall  were 
demohshed.  Even  the  isolated  ravelin-walls  of  Vanves 
and  Montrouge  were  destroyed,  forty  guns  dismounted, 
and  seventy  gun-carriages  wrecked. 

The  whole  situation  of  France,  political  and  mili- 
tary, and  above  all  that  of  Paris,  was  such  as  to  cause 
the  Government  the  gravest  anxiety. 

Since  the  return  of  Monsieur  Thiers  from  his  diplo- 
matic tour  it  was  certain  that  no  mediatory  influence 
would  be  exerted  by  any  foreign  power.  The  suffer- 
ings of  the  capital  were  now  very  great.  Scarcity  and 
high  prices  had  for  some  time  been  a  bm-then  to  the 
inhabitants ;  their  provisions  were  exhausted,  and  even 
the  army  stores  of  the  garrison  had  been  encroached 
on.  Fuel  was  lacking  in  the  bitter  cold,  and  petroleum 
was  an  inefiicient  substitute  for  gas.  When  the  long- 
deferred  bombardment  began  on  the  south  side  of 
Paris,  the  people  took  refuge  in  tha,  cellars  or  fled  to 
the  remoter  quarters  of  the  town ;  and  when  the  north- 
ern side  was  also  shelled  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Denis 
crowded  into  the  capital. 

The  great  sortie  of  the  19th  had  proved  a  total  fail- 
ui-e,  and  no  relief  was  to  be  hoped  for  from  outside 
since  Gambetta  had  sent  news  of  the  defeat  at  Le- 
Mans.  The  Paris  Army,  of  whose  inactivity  he  com- 
plained, was  reduced  to  a  third  of  its  original  strength 
by  cold,  sickness,  and  desertion.  The  horses  had  to  be 
killed  to  provide  meat  for  the  inhabitants,  and  General 


THE  CONDITION   OF  PAEIS.  371 

Trocliu  declared  any  further  offensive  movements  to 
be  quite  hopeless ;  the  means  even  of  passive  resistance 
were  exhausted. 

Hitherto  the  Grovernment  had  been  able  to  keep  the 
populace  in  a  good  humor  by  highly-colored  reports, 
but  now  the  disastrous  state  of  affairs  could  no  longer 
be  concealed.    Everything  they  could  do  was  wrong. 

There  was  a  large  body  of  people  in  Paris  who  were 
but  little  affected  by  the  general  distress.  Those  mem- 
bers of  the  civilian  class  who  had  been  equipped  for 
the  defence  of  their  country  were  fed  and  well  paid  by 
the  authorities,  without  having  too  much  to  do  for  it. 
They  were  joined  by  all  the  dubious  social  elements, 
whose  interest  it  was  to  foment  disorder;  these  had 
been  quite  content  with  the  state  of  affairs  as  they  had 
been  on  September  4th,  and  these  formed  the  mob 
which  was  presently  to  assume  the  hideous  aspect  of 
the  Commune.  Ah-eady  some  popular  gatherings  had 
been  only  dispersed  by  force  of  arms,  and  even  a  part 
of  the  National  Gruard  had  given  signs  of  some  muti- 
nous outbreak. 

The  revolutionary  clubs,  too,  supported  by  the  press, 
demanded  further  active  measures,  even  a  sortie  en 
masse  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  Paris.  Thus  the  feeble 
Government,  dependent  as  it  was  on  popular  favor 
alone,  was  under  pressure  from  the  impossible  demands 
of  an  ignorant  mob  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other, 
the  inexorable  coercion  of  facts. 

There  was  absolutely  no  escape  but  by  capitulation ; 
every  delay  increased  the  necessity,  and  left  them  at 
the  mercy  of  harder  terms.  Unless  all  the  railways 
were  at  once  thrown  open  for  the  delivery  of  supplies 
from  a  considerable  distance,  the  horrors  of  famine 
were  imminent  for  more  than  two  million  souls ;  and 
later  it  might  not  be  possible  to  meet  it.    Yet  no  one 


372  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

dared  utter  the  fatal  word  surrender,  no  one  would 
take  the  responsibility  of  the  inevitable. 

A  great  council  of  war  was  held  on  the  21st.  As  all 
the  elder  Generals  pronounced  any  further  offensive 
measures  to  be  quite  impossible,  it  was  proposed  that 
the  younger  military  authorities  should  be  consulted, 
but  no  decision  was  arrived  at.  As,  however,  some 
one  must  be  made  answerable  for  every  misfortune. 
General  Trochu,  hitherto  the  most  popular  member  of 
the  Government,  was  degraded  from  his  position  as 
Governor,  and  the  chief  command  was  entrusted  to 
General  Vinoy.  General  Ducrot  resigned  his  com- 
mand. 

All  this  did  nothing  to  improve  the  situation,  so  on 
the  23rd  Monsieur  Jules  Favre  made  his  appearance 
at  Versailles  to  negotiate  at  any  rate  for  an  armistice. 

The  German  Emperor  was  ready  to  meet  this  re- 
quest; but  of  course  some  guarantee  must  be  given 
that  the  capital,  after  obtaining  supplies,  would  not 
renew  its  resistance.  All  the  forts  were  to  be  given 
up,  including  Mont-Valerien  and  the  city  of  St.  Denis, 
and  the  disarmament  of  the  ramparts  was  demanded 
and  acceded  to. 

All  hostilities  were  to  be  suspended  on  the  evening 
of  the  26th,  so  far  as  Paris  was  concerned,  and  all 
ways  of  ingress  to  be  thrown  open.  A  general  armis- 
tice of  twenty-one  days  was  to  begin  from  the  31st  of 
January,  exclusive,  however,  of  the  departments  of 
Doubs,  Jura,  and  Cote-d'Or,  and  of  the  fortress  of  Bel- 
fort,  where,  at  the  time,  operations  were  being  car- 
ried on,  in  which  both  sides  were  equally  hopeful  of 
success. 

This  armistice  gave  the  Committee  of  National 
Defence  time  enough  to  call  a  freely-elected  National 
Assembly  together  at   Bordeaux,  whose  business  it 


TERMS   OF   THE  ARMISTICE.  373 

would  be  to  decide  whether  the  war  should  be  con- 
tinued, or  on  what  conditions  peace  could  be  concluded. 
The  election  of  the  deputies  was  unimpeded  and  unin- 
fluenced even  in  the  parts  of  the  country  occupied  by 
German  troops. 

The  regular  forces  of  the  Paris  garrison,  troops  of 
the  line,  marines,  and  Gardes  Mobiles  were  to  lay  down 
their  arms  at  once ;  only  12,000  men  and  the  National 
Guard  were  to  retain  them  for  the  preservation  of 
order.  The  garrison  were  interned  for  the  time  of  the 
armistice;  afterwards  they  were  to  be  regarded  as 
prisoners.  As  to  their  transfer  to  Germany,  where 
every  possible  place  was  already  overflowing  with 
prisoners,  that  question  was  postponed  in  expectation 
of  a  probable  peace. 

The  forts  were  occupied  on  the  29th  without  opposi- 
tion. 

The  French  Army  gave  up  602  guns,  1,770,000  stand 
of  arms,  and  above  1000  ammunition  wagons ;  the  for- 
tress surrendered  1362  heavy  guns,  1680  gun-car- 
riages, 860  limbers,  3,500,000  cartridges,  4000  hun- 
dred-weight of  powder,  200,000  sheUs,  and  100,000 
round-shot. 

The  blockade  of  Paris,  which  had  lasted  132  days, 
was  over,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  German  forces 
detained  outside  the  walls  were  released  to  end  the  war 
in  the  open  field. 


VI. 

THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  WAR  IN  THE  SOUTH  AND 

WEST. 

THE  AKMY  OF  THE   SOUTH  UNDEK  GENERAL  VON   MAN- 
TEUFFEL. 

The  two  army  corps  under  Greneral  von  Manteuffel 
consisted  altogether  of  fifty-six  battalions,  twenty 
squadi'ons,  and  168  guns.  When  he  arrived  at  Chatil- 
lon-sui*- Seine  on  January  12th,  the  Second  Corps  was 
on  the  right,  and  the  Seventh  on  the  left  of  Noyers, 
extending  to  Montigny  over  ten  miles  (Grerman).  One 
brigade,  under  General  von  Dannenberg,  which  had 
already  had  several  frays  with  portions  of  the  French 
Army  of  the  Vosges,  had  advanced  on  Vilaines  to  cover 
the  right  flank. 

Several  good  roads  led  from  these  quarters  converg- 
ing on  Dijon ;  to  Vesoul,  on  the  contrary,  the  roads 
were  bad,  and  deep  in  snow  down  the  southern  slopes 
of  the  wild  plateau  of  Langres.  The  Commander-in- 
chief,  nevertheless,  took  this  fine  of^ march,  to  afford 
G-eneral  von  Werder  indirect  assistance  at  least,  as 
soon  as  possible,  by  coming  up  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
who  threatened  him. 

The  advance  was  between  the  two  towns  of  Dijon 
and  Langres,  both  strongly  occupied  by  the  French. 
"Wooded  heights  and  deep  ravines  separated  the 
columns  and  prevented  any  mutual  support ;  each  had 
to  provide  for  its  own  safety  on  every  side.  The  troops 
had  severe  fatigues  to  encounter,  and  badly  as  they 
needed  rest  none  could  be  granted,  nor  could  the  evil 


ADVANCE   ON   THE  DOUBS.  375 

plight  of  their  boots  and  the  horses'  shoes  be  in  any 
way  remedied. 

On  January  14th  the  march  began  in  a  thick  fog 
and  bitter  cold,  along  roads  frozen  as  smooth  as  glass. 

To  keep  up  the  supplies  was  absolutely  essential, 
and  the  8th  Brigade  had  from  the  first  to  be  left  in  the 
rear  to  secure  the  all-important  railway  line  from 
Tonnerre  by  Nuits  and  Chatillon,  until  communications 
could  be  established  via  Epinal. 

On  the  very  first  day  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
Seventh  had  a  fight  before  Langres.  A  detachment  of 
the  garrison  of  15,000  men  was  repulsed  on  the  fortress 
with  the  loss  of  a  standard,  and  a  detachment  was 
therefore  left  behind  to  observe  the  place.  Under  its 
protection  the  corps  marched  past  the  fortress  next 
day,  while  the  Second  advanced  as  far  as  the  Ognon. 

The  weather  changed  during  the  night  of  the  15th. 
Fourteen  degrees  of  frost  (Centigrade)  gave  way  to 
storm  and  rain.  The  water  lay  on  the  frozen  roads, 
and  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  the  Seventh 
Corps  reached  Prauthoy  and  the  Second  Moloy,  closing 
up  to  the  left. 

On  the  18th,  the  left  wing  advanced  on  Frettes  and 
Champhtte,  to  the  south-east,  the  right  assembled  at 
Is-sui'-Tille,  and  its  advanced  guard,  after  marching 
fifty  kilometres  (thirty-one  EngUsh  miles),  reached  the 
bridges  at  Oray.  On  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  corps 
there  had  been  some  fighting,  but  the  heavy  march 
across  the  mountains  was  over,  and  they  were  in  the 
cultivated  valley  of  the  Saone. 

G-eneral  von  Manteuffel  had  already  received  news 
of  the  happy  issue  of  the  first  day's  fighting  on  the 
Lisaine.    Later  telegrams  from  General  von  Werder 
reported  that  the  French  Army  of  the  East  would  prob 
ably  be  obliged  to  retire  under  difficulties,  and  the 


376  THE   FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

German  General  at  once  determined  to  cut  off  its  re- 
treat on  the  Doubs  below  Besan^on. 

The  defeated  French  Army  was  still  greatly  superior 
in  number  to  the  German  force,  and  the  troops  must 
again  be  called  upon  for  severe  exertions.  They 
must  again  cross  a  thinly-populated  and  mountainous 
country,  where  it  would  be  a  matter  of  great  difficulty 
to  procure  food  and  the  shelter  needful  during  the  bit- 
ter winter  nights.  They  must  also  leave  hostile  forces 
in  the  rear,  under  very  insufficient  observation  at 
Langres,  Dijon,  and  Auxonne.  However,  in  spite  of 
every  obstacle,  the  advance  in  this  new  direction  was 
begun  on  the  19th. 

The  first  difficulty  might  be  the  crossing  of  the 
Saone,  here  very  deep  and  sixty  metres  wide,  and  full 
of  drifting  ice ;  but  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Second 
Corps  had  found  Gray  abandoned  by  the  French  and 
both  the  bridges  uninjured,  and  had  taken  possession 
of  the  place.  The  head  of  the  Seventh  Corps  crossed 
the  river  by  the  railway  bridge  at  Savoyeux,  which 
was  found  intact,  and  by  a  pontoon  bridge  thrown 
across  higher  up. 

On  the  following  day  both  corps  advanced  in  a 
southerly  direction,  the  Seventh  on  Gy,  the  Second  on 
Pesmes.  Here  they  crossed  the  Ogdon  after  driving 
off  by  artillery  fire  a  French  detachment,  which  tried 
to  oppose  the  construction  of  the  bridge. 

On  the  21st,  the  advanced  guard  found  Dole  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy.  General  von  Kobhnski  attacked 
at  once ;  in  spite  of  a  violent  street-fight,  in  which  the 
townspeople  took  part,  the  grenadiers  of  the  Second 
Regiment  made  their  way  through  the  town  and  seized 
a  train  on  the  other  side,  of  230  wagons  of  provisions 
and  necessaries,  intended  for  Besan^on,  and  left  stand- 
ing in  the  railway  station.    As  the  Doubs  was  thus 


BOURBAKI'S   MOVEMENTS.  377 

crossed  at  this  point,  so  the  Seventh  Corps  forced  a 
passage  across  the  Ognon  at  Marmay  and  Pin. 

Greneral  von  Werder  had  been  told  off  to  follow  close 
on  the  heels  of  the  French  retreat,  and  while  he  held  his 
own  in  front  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  the  2nd  Baden 
Brigade  had  advanced  on  the  right  wing  on  Etobon, 
while  Colonel  von  Willisen  and  his  twelve  squadi'ons 
had  marched  on  by  Lure.  On  the  left,  Colonel  von 
Zimmermann  with  the  East-Prussian  Landwehr  had 
driven  the  French  out  of  Ste.  Marie.  These  detach- 
ments everywhere  found  cast-away  arms  and  portions 
of  equipment,  and  hundreds  willingly  gave  themselves 
up  as  prisoners. 

During  the  next  few  days  Greneral  von  Werder 
effected  a  general  change  of  front  to  the  left  and  south. 
The  right  wing  held  Villersexel,  and  it  was  the  left 
wing  only  that  met  the  enemy  at  Isle-sur-Doubs,  and 
afterwards  in  greater  numbers,  at  Clerval  and  Baume- 
les-Dames. 

General  Bourbaki  had  quitted  the  Lisaine  on  the 
18th.  The  Twenty-fourth  Corps  (French)  alone  were 
left  on  the  Doubs  with  orders  to  defend  the  defiles  in 
the  steep  mountain-path  of  Lomont  on  the  east  of 
Clerval,  towards  the  north ;  all  the  other  troops  with- 
drew between  the  Doubs  and  the  Ognon,  with  Cremer's 
division  as  a  rear-guard.  The  Ognon  might  have 
formed  a  natural  cover  for  the  right  flank  of  the  French 
Army,  and  orders  had  been  given  for  the  destruction 
of  all  the  bridges ;  but  we  have  seen  how  little  they 
had  been  obeyed. 

On  the  21st  the  Fifteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps  had 
arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of  Baume-les-Dames,  the 
Eighteenth  at  Marchaux ;  and  here,  having  Besangon 
close  in  his  rear.  General  Bourbaki  was  anxious  to 
await  the  next  step  of  the  enemy.    In  order  to  con« 


378  THE   FKANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

centrate  his  forces  more  completely,  the  Commandant 
of  the  place  was  desired  to  send  up  all  the  battahons 
he  could  spare  of  the  Gardes  Mobiles,  on  Blamont,  so 
as  to  release  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps.  Nine  battalions 
of  the  mobilized  National  Guard  had  before  this  reached 
Besan^on,  and  might  have  relieved  the  corps,  but  they 
were  armed  with  Enfield  rifles,  for  which  there  was  no 
ammunition  in  store.  Thus  they  would  only  have 
added  to  the  mouths  to  fill,  and  General  RoUand  had 
simply  sent  them  back  again.  The  Commissary-Gen- 
eral declared  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  continue 
any  longer  to  bring  up  the  supplies  ordered  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  army,  and  what  proved  decisive 
was  the  news  received  this  day  that  not  only  was  the 
line  of  the  Ognon  lost,  but  that  the  Germans  had 
crossed  the  Doubs.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
French  Commander-in-chief  determined  to  continue 
his  retreat  on  Besangon  and  there  cross  to  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Doubs  so  as  not  to  be  compelled  to  give 
battle  with  the  river  in  his  rear.  The  train  was  sent 
off  during  the  night,  but  above  all  things  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  was  ordered  at  once  to  take  possession  of  Quin- 
gey,  and  hold  that  position  to  the  last  man,  to  keep 
open  the  communications  of  the  corps  with  the  interior. 
All  the  other  corps  were  to  concentrate  round  Besan- 
gon,  even  the  Twenty-fourth,  which  consequently  gave 
up  the  Lomont  passes. 

General  Bourbaki  reported  his  situation  to  the  Min- 
ister of  War,  who  held  out  hopes  of  support  from  that 
portion  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  now  remaining  on  the 
Loire.  Assistance  could  have  been  more  easily  and 
effectually  given  from  Dijon. 

The  Government  had  concentrated  a  very  consider- 
able force  on  that  town  to  replace  Cremer's  division, 
which  had  joined  the  Army  of  the  East,  and  to  defend 


BOURBAKI'S  MOVEMENTS.  379 

the  ancient  capital  of  Burgundy  as  a  point-d'appui  for 
the  operations  of  General  Bourbaki.  A  corps  of  20,000 
men  was  to  hold  the  place;  a  very  inappropriately- 
named  Army  of  the  Vosges,  more  than  40,000  strong, 
was  to  manoeuvre  in  the  field.  But  all  this  did  little 
to  hinder  the  toilsome  advance  of  the  Grermans  over 
the  mountains.  The  detachments  forming  a  corps  of 
observation  allowed  themselves  to  be  driven  in  by 
General  von  Kettler,  who  followed  the  movements  of 
the  corps  on  the  right  flank,  and  they  retired  on  Dijon. 

Colonel  Bombonnel,  at  Gray,  urgently  but  vainly 
begged  for  assistance  to  enable  him  to  defend  the 
passages  of  the  Saone ;  his  applications  were  refused 
because  Dijon  was  in  too  great  peril,  and  it  was  not 
till  the  Prussians  had  already  crossed  the  river  that 
Garibaldi  began  to  move. 

He  advanced  on  the  19tli  in  three  columns  on  Is-sur- 
Tille,  where  only  a  part  of  the  4th  Infantry  Division 
were  now  left.  But  he  moved  forward  only  a  mile 
(German).  Garibaldi  did  no  more  than  observe  a 
reconnoissance  party  which  advanced  to  meet  him, 
from  the  hill  at  Messigny,  and  he  then  retired  on  Dijon 
with  his  troops,  to  the  sound  of  the  Marseillaise. 

However,  at  General  von  Manteuffel's  head-quarters 
the  enemy  was  held  in  too  small  estimation,  when 
General  von  Kettler  was  simply  ordered  to  go  and 
"  take  Dijon." 

The  city  had  been  fortified  with  the  greatest  care. 
Strong  earthworks  and  other  works  of  defence  pro- 
tected it  to  the  northward ;  more  especially  had  Talant 
and  Fontaine-les-Dijon  been  converted  into  two  in- 
dependent forts  and  armed  with  heavy  guns  which 
commanded  every  approach  on  that  side.  The  whole 
constituted  a  position  which  could  be  held  against  a 
much  larger  force  than  the  five  and  a  half  battalions 


380  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

of  the  8th  Brigade  with  which  General  Kettler  advanced 
to  the  attack. 

Fighting  at  Dijon,  January  21st  and  22nd. — They  had 
reached  Turcey  and  St.  Seine,  and  on  the  21st  advanced 
in  two  columns  from  the  west  on  Dijon,  still  three 
miles  away ;  from  Is-sur-TiUe  on  the  north.  Major  von 
Conta  was  approaching  with  a  small  reinforcement. 
Some  companies  of  volunteers,  indeed,  the  "Franc- 
tireurs  de  la  Mort,"  the  "  Compagnie  de  la  Revanche," 
and  others,  had  been  driven  out  of  the  villages  on  the 
way  without  any  great  difficulty,  and  beyond  the  deep 
ravine  of  the  Suzon ;  the  village  of  Plombieres  on  the 
right  had  been  defended  with  spirit  and  stormed,  and 
Daix  carried  on  the  left ;  but  in  front  of  the  fortified 
position  of  the  French,  and  under  fire  of  theu*  heavy 
batteries,  the  bold  advance  was  forced  to  come  to  a 
standstill.  Major  von  Conta  had  also  marched  on, 
through  continuous  fighting,  but  failed  to  come  up 
with  the  brigade  before  dark.  General  von  Kettler, 
recognizing  the  enormous  superiority  of  the  French, 
finally  restricted  himself  to  repulsing  their  sorties. 

The  French  had  lost  seven  officers  and  430  men  in 
prisoners  alone ;  but  the  battle  had  also  cost  the  bri- 
gade nineteen  officers  and  322  men.  The  troops  had 
performed  a  severe  march  in  bad  weather,  along  heavy 
roads,  and  had  no  hot  food  either  before  or  after  the 
fight ;  and  ammunition  too  could  only  be  supplied  by 
a  column  which  was  expected  to  come  up  next  day. 
Nevertheless  General  von  Kettler  did  not  hesitate  to 
remain  for  the  night  in  the  position  he  had  gained, 
immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy,  and  then  to  seek 
quarters  in  the  nearest  villages. 

The  French  allowed  him  to  do  so  without  any  serious 
opposition.  Such  complete  inactivity  made  General 
von  Kettler  suspect  that  the  main  body  of  the  French 


A  DESPEKATE   ATTEMPT.  381 

had  perhaps  retked  by  Auxonne  to  the  support  of  the 
Army  of  the  East,  and  he  determined  to  bring  them 
back  on  Dijon  by  a  renewed  attack. 

On  the  23rd,  at  eleven  o'clock,  by  a  flank  march  along 
the  enemy's  front,  after  his  advanced  guard  had  routed 
a  detachment  of  Grardes  Mobiles,  he  reached  the  farm 
of  Valmy  on  the  Langres  road,  and  advanced  on  that 
place  with  his  two  batteries  against  the  village  of 
Pouilly,  which  was  walled  and  strongly  occupied. 
Here,  as  was  almost  always  the  case  when  they  had 
buildings  to  defend,  the  French  made  a  stout  resistance. 
The  61st  Regiment  had  to  storm  each  house  in  turn, 
and  it  was  not  till  the  chateau  was  in  flames  that  the 
strong  party  of  defenders,  who  had  taken  refuge  in 
the  top  story,  surrendered  to  the  Germans. 

Beyond  this  place  the  enemy  were  found  to  have 
intrenched  themselves  between  Talant,  which  had  been 
regularly  fortified,  and  a  large  factory-building  on  the 
high-road.  Here  the  German  advance  was  checked  till 
the  remainder  of  the  regiment  came  up  from  Valmy, 
and  the  defenders  were  diiven  in  at  various  points, 
and  back  on  the  suburb. 

It  was  evident  that  the  French  were  still  at  Dijon 
in  full  force ;  but  now  unfortunately  a  tragic  episode 
took  place,  for  the  storming  of  the  factory  was  insisted 
on — a  huge  building,  almost  impregnable  for  infantry 
unaided.  When  all  the  senior  ofiicers  had  been  killed, 
a  first-lieutenant,  whose  horse  had  been  shot  and  he 
himself  wounded,  took  the  command  of  the  2nd  Bat- 
talion. No  sooner  had  the  5th  Company,  only  forty 
strong,  appeared  from  the  neighboring  quarry,  than 
they  came  under  a  hot  fire  from  all  sides.  Their  leader 
was  at  once  wounded,  and  the  sergeant  who  carried 
the  colors  fell  dead  after  a  few  steps ;  so  did  the  second- 
lieutenant  and  the  battalion  adjutant,  who  again  raised 


382  THE  FKANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

the  standard.  It  wa  passed  from  hand  to  hand,  first 
to  the  officers,  then  to  the  men ;  every  bearer  fell.  The 
brave  Pomeranians  nevertheless  rushed  on  the  build- 
ing, but  there  was  no  entrance  on  that  side,  and  at  last 
the  under-officer  retreated  on  the  quarries  with  the 
remnant  of  the  little  band.  Here,  for  the  first  time, 
the  colors  were  missed.  Of  their  own  accord  they 
went  out  again  in  the  darkness  to  seek  them,  but  only 
one  man  returned  unwounded.  It  was  not  tiU  after- 
wards that  they  were  found  by  the  French,  shot  to 
ribbons,  in  a  pool  of  blood,  under  the  dead. 

These  were  the  only  German  colors  lost  throughout 
the  war,  and  only  thus  were  these  lost. 

Of  the  French,  eight  officers  and  150  men  were  taken 
prisoners,  and  the  brigade  had  again  lost  sixteen  offi- 
cers and  362  men.  It  mustered  at  Pouilly,  and  re- 
mained under  arms  till  eight  o'clock  to  be  prepared  for 
possible  pursuit;  then  quarters  were  found  in  the 
neighboring  villages. 

The  Movements  of  the  Army  of  the  South. — The  order 
to  take  Dijon  could  not  be  executed;  but  the  bold 
advance  of  this  small  brigade  had  reduced  the  hostile 
army  to  inactivity,  so  that  General  von  Manteuffel 
could  advance  unopposed. 

His  intention  was  to  reach  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat 
to  the  south  of  Besan^on. 

There  were  but  few  roads  to  the  south  of  France 
available  for  troops,  through  the  ravined  and  terraced 
hills  of  the  western  Jura.  The  most  direct  connection 
was  by  the  road  and  railway  to  Lons-le-Saulnier,  on 
which  Quingey  and  Byans  were  important  points  to 
guard.  Further  to  the  east,  by  a  wide  detour,  a  road 
runs  by  Ornans,  Salins,  and  Champagnole  to  St.  Lau- 
rent and  Morez. 

On  the  other  hand,  several  ways  centre  in  Pontarlier, 


FIGHTING  ON   THE  DOUBS.  383 

traversing  the  rocky  passes,  peculiar  to  that  formation, 
known  locally  as  Cluses ;  they  are  breaches  in  the  long 
ridge,  connecting  the  lateral  valleys.  From  Pontarlier 
one  road  only  runs  past  Mouthe  and  in  suspicious 
proximity  to  the  Swiss  frontier. 

(January  22nd.)  On  this  day  the  advanced  guard 
of  the  13th  Division  marched  from  Audeux  to  St.  Vit, 
and,  after  breaking  up  the  railway  and  plundering 
several  loaded  wagons,  down  the  river  on  Dampierre. 
On  their  way  four  bridges  over  the  Doubs  were  found 
uninjured  and  were  occupied.  The  advanced  guard 
of  the  14th  Division  advanced  from  Emagny  to  observe 
Besan(?on.  The  Second  Corps,  diverging  on  Dole,  sent 
reconnoitring  parties  out  beyond  the  river. 

(January  23rd.)  The  concentric  movement  of  all  the 
contingents  of  the  German  Army  was  continued. 

General  Debschitz,  approaching  from  the  north,  in 
passing  Roches  found  only  the  abandoned  camping- 
place  of  the  Twenty-fourth  French  Corps.  The  4th 
Reserve  Division  occupied  L'Isle  without  opposition, 
and  met  no  resistance  till  it  reached  Clerval  and 
Baume. 

On  the  Ognon  the  Baden  Division  drove  the  French 
out  of  Montbazon. 

In  the  centre  of  the  army  the  Seventh  Corps  pushed 
the  advanced  guard  of  the  14th  Division  forward  on 
Dannemarie,  near  Besangon.  A  fight  ensued  which 
resulted  only  in  a  cannonade,  lasting  till  night.  The 
13th  Division,  on  the  contrary,  which  had  crossed  the 
Doubs  at  Dampierre,  advanced  on  Quingey. 

Only  one  French  brigade  had  been  able  to  come  up 
by  railway,  for  want  of  rolling  stock,  and  the  last  trains 
were  received  at  the  Byans  station  with  Prussian  shell. 
These  troops  were  in  such  evil  plight  that  they 
were  unable  even  to  place  outposts.    They  abandoned 


384  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

Quingey  almost  without  a  struggle,  and  their  retreat, 
almost  a  flight,  on  Besan9on  and  beyond  the  Loue, 
stopped  the  advance  of  reinforcements  already  on  the 
way.  Thus  800  prisoners  and  a  train  of  400  convales- 
cents fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Prussian  advanced 
guard,  who  at  once  broke  up  the  railway  at  Abbans- 
dessous. 

On  the  right  wing,  the  head  of  the  Second  Corps  had 
advanced  in  the  valley  of  the  Loue  on  the  southern 
bank.  Various  cuttings  on  this  road  had  been  pre- 
pared for  defence,  but  were  undefended.  It  was  not 
till  it  reached  Villers-Farlay  that  it  met  a  strong 
detachment  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  evening  of  this  day,  of  the  French  forces  the 
Twentieth  Corps  was  on  the  north  of  Besangon  and 
the  Eighteenth  on  the  west,  at  the  distance  of  about  a 
Grerman  mile.  Cavalry,  artillery,  and  the  train  were 
passing  through  the  town  or  encamped  on  the  glacis 
of  the  fortress.  The  Twenty-fourth  Corps  was  on  the 
march  hither,  and  the  2nd  and  3rd  Divisions  of  the 
Fifteenth  were  in  possession  of  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Doubs  at  Baume  and  Larnod ;  but  the  1st  Division 
had  not  succeeded  in  holding  Quingey.  Thus  the  most 
direct  and  important  line  of  communications  of  the 
army  was  cut,  and  its  position,  by  this  fresh  disaster, 
seriously  aggravated.  Projects  and  counsels  from 
Bordeaux,  on  which  it  was  impossible  to  act,  abounded, 
but  did  not  mend  matters ;  and  on  the  24th  General 
Bourbaki  summoned  the  superior  officers  to  a  council 
of  war. 

(January  24th.)  The  Generals  declared  that  they 
had  scarcely  half  their  number  of  men  under  arms, 
and  these  were  more  inclined  to  fly  than  to  fight. 
General  Pallu  alone  thought  he  might  answer  for  the 
men  of  the  army  reserve.    The  Commissary-General 


A  COUNCIL  OF  WAB.  385 

reported  that,  unless  they  could  seize  the  stores  in  the 
place,  the  supplies  in  hand  would  last  for  four  days  at 
most.  G-eneral  Billot  was  in  favor  of  attempting  to 
fight  a  way  through  to  Auxonne,  but  he  declined  to 
take  the  command-in-chief,  which  was  offered  him. 
The  exhaustion  of  the  troops  and  their  insubordination, 
which  was  evidently  increasing,  gave  little  hope  of  the 
success  of  offensive  operations.  So  there  was  no  alter- 
native but  to  retire  on  Pontarlier,  as  the  Commander- 
in-chief  had  proposed. 

This,  even,  was  seriously  threatened.  To  clear  the 
country  to  the  northward  General  Bourbaki  ordered 
the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  to  advance  once  more  and 
hold  the  passes  of  the  Lomont.  On  the  south  the  Fif- 
teenth was  to  defend  the  deep  mountain  ravine  of  the 
Loue,  and  General  Cremer  was  more  especially  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  army  on  the  right  flank  which 
was  most  threatened.  For  this  difficult  task  a  division 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  placed  under  his  command, 
as  well  as  his  own  force,  and  the  army  reserve,  as  the 
most  trustworthy  of  the  troops.  The  Eighteenth  and 
the  remainder  of  the  Twentieth  were  to  await  march- 
ing orders  at  Besan^on. 

At  the  German  head-quarters,  where  of  course  the 
plans  of  the  French  could  not  be  known,  various  con- 
tingencies had  to  be  reckoned  on. 

If  the  French  remained  at  Besan^on  there  would  be 
no  need  to  attack  them  there;  the  place  was  not 
adapted  for  a  large  army,  and  its  supplies  could  not 
hold  out  long.  That  they  would  again  attempt  to 
advance  northwards  was  scarcely  likely ;  they  would  be 
leaving  all  their  resources  in  their  rear,  and  must 
encounter  the  larger  part  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  (Ger- 
man) on  the  banks  of  the  Ognon. 

An  attempt  to  cut  a  way  past  Dijon  seemed,  on  the 


386  THE  PEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

whole,  more  probable.  But  this  would  be  opposed  at 
St.  Vit  by  the  13th  Division,  at  Pesmes  by  Colonel 
von  Willisen's  detachment,  and  finally  by  General  von 
Kettler. 

Thus  the  retreat  on  Pontarlier  seemed  the  most 
likely  course ;  and  to  hinder  their  advance  on  that  side 
must  be  the  duty  of  the  Second  Corps,  so  long  as  the 
Seventh  was  employed  in  observing  the  main  body  of 
the  French  collected  at  Besangon,  and  in  checking 
their  sorties  on  both  sides  of  the  river. 

The  Commander-in-chief  therefore  confined  himself 
to  giving  general  instructions  to  the  superior  officers, 
expressly  authorizing  them  to  act  on  their  own  judg- 
ment under  such  circumstances  as  could  not  be  fore- 
seen. 

Greneral  von  Werder  was  ordered  to  advance  by 
Marnay  and  obtain  touch  with  the  Baden  Division  and 
von  der  Goltz's  brigade,  and  distribute  them  in  the 
first  instance  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Doubs.  The 
4th  Reserve  Division  was  to  restore  the  bridges  at 
L'Isle  and  Baume,  and  cross  over  to  the  left  bank. 
Colonel  von  Willisen  joined  the  Seventh  Corps  to  sup- 
ply the  lack  of  cavalry.  The  Second  Corps  was  as- 
sembled behind  Villers-Farlay. 

(January  25th.)  Extensive  reco^moissances  were 
arranged  for  next  day.  That  of  the  Seventh  Corps 
resulted  in  a  sharp  skirmish  at  Vorges.  The  head  of 
the  Second  Corps  met  the  French  at  Salins  and  at 
Arbois,  but  found  that  they  had  not  yet  reached 
Poligny. 

(January  26th.)  The  advanced  guard  of  the  Second 
Corps  marched  on  Salins.  The  forts  of  St.  Andre  and 
Belin,  on  high  ground  near  that  town,  fronted  on 
Switzerland,  but  they  also  commanded  the  plain  to  the 
south  and  west  in  the  enemy's  line  of  march.     Salins 


FKENCH  KETEEAT  ON  PONTARLIEK.        387 

is  a  strong  key  commanding  the  road  to  St.  Laurent, 
and  as  long  as  it  could  be  held  would  at  the  same  time 
secure  the  retreat  of  the  columns  marching  from  Be- 
sangon  on  Pontarlier. 

The  two  field  batteries  of  the  advanced  guard  could, 
of  course,  do  little  against  the  heavy  guns  of  the  forts ; 
but  the  fusiliers  of  the  2nd  Regiment  advanced  in 
rushes  of  small  detachments  up  the  narrow  ravine, 
scaled  the  steep  walls  on  that  side,  and,  supported  by 
the  two  battalions  of  grenadiers,  forced  their  way,  by 
about  half-past  two,  into  the  railway  station  and 
suburb  of  St.  Pierre.     They  lost  3  of&cers  and  109  men. 

Soon  after  this  G-eneral  von  Koblinski  arrived,  via 
St.  Thiebaud,  with  the  42nd  Regiment.  As,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  representations  of  the  Maire,  the  Com- 
mandant had  abandoned  the  idea  of  bombarding  the 
town,  the  advanced  guard  could  take  up  its  quarters 
there ;  the  main  body  of  the  3rd  Division  retreated  from 
under  the  fire  of  the  forts  on  Monchard,  and  the  defile 
was  closed  against  all  comers.  It  would  have  to  be 
turned  on  the  south. 

On  that  side  the  4th  Division  already  occupied  Ar- 
bois,  its  head  marching  on  Pont-d'Hery ;  it  found  Po- 
ligny  and  Champagnole  on  the  right  still  unoccupied. 

The  Seventh  Corps  had  reconnoitred  both  banks  of 
the  Doubs,  and  had  found  the  enemy  in  strong  posi- 
tions at  Busy  and  at  Vorges. 

The  4th  Reserve  Division  advanced  along  the  south- 
ern bank  as  far  as  St.-Juan-d'Adam,  near  Besan(,'on ; 
the  remainder  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  marched  on 
Etuz  and  Marnay. 

General  von  Kettler's  report  of  the  fighting  on  the 
21st  and  23rd  determined  G-eneral  von  Manteuffel  to 
make  a  renewed  attempt  on  Dijon.  He  detailed  Gen- 
eral Hann  von  Weyhern  to  this  duty,  placing  him  in 


388  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAB. 

command  of  the  8th  Brigade,  with  Colonel  von  Wil- 
lisen's  troops  and  Degenfeld's  Baden  brigade. 

On  the  French  side,  Greneral  BressoUes  had  started 
on  the  24th,  in  obedience  to  orders,  to  take  possession 
of  the  passages  of  the  Doubs  and  the  defiles  of  Lomont. 
At  first,  with  d'Aries'  division,  he  had  marched  on 
Baume ;  but  as  d'Aries  could  not  succeed  even  in  driv- 
ing in  the  Glerman  outposts  from  Pont-les-Moulins,  he 
retired  on  Vercel.  In  consequence  of  this,  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th,  Carre's  division,  which  had  found 
the  defiles  of  the  Lomont  unoccupied,  also  retired  on 
Pierre-Fontaine.  Comagny's  division  had  already  re- 
treated on  Morteau,  and  was  quietly  making  its  way 
on  Pontarlier. 

Greneral  Bourbaki  was  greatly  disturbed  by  this 
failure  of  his  right  wing ;  more  than  was  needful,  per- 
haps, since,  in  fact,  only  one  German  division  stood  to 
the  north  of  him,  which  at  most  could  di'ive  his  rear- 
guard back  on  Pontarlier,  while  the  main  force  of  the 
enemy  threatened  him  far  more  seriously  on  the  west. 
He  nevertheless  ordered  a  renewed  advance,  on  the 
26th,  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  which  was  now  to 
be  supported  by  the  Eighteenth.  But  the  march 
through  Besan^on  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  alone,  over 
streets  covered  with  ice,  took  up  the  whole  of  the  day 
which  should  have  been  devoted  to  the  attack,  so  that 
nothing  came  of  the  scheme. 

The  Army  Reserve  had  reached  Ornans,  and  had 
formed  up.  The  two  other  divisions  advanced  on  the 
road  to  Salins,  but  heard,  while  on  the  march,  that  the 
Germans  had  just  carried  that  place.  They  therefore 
occupied  Deservillers  and  Villeneuve-d'Amont,  to  keep 
open  the  roads  from  thence  to  Pontarliers. 

The  War  Minister,  meanwhile,  had  emphatically 
refused  his  consent  to  the  general  retreat  of  the  army, 


FRENCH  RETREAT  ON  PONTARLIER.         389 

without  any  regard  to  the  imperative  necessities  of  the 
case. 

The  military  dilettanteism  which  fancied  it  could 
control  the  army  from  Bordeaux  is  characteristically 
expressed  in  a  telegi'am  of  the  afternoon  of  the  25th. 
Monsieur  de  Freycinet  gives  it  as  his  "firm  convic- 
tion"* that  if  General  Bourbaki  would  collect  his 
troops,  and,  if  necessary,  come  to  an  understanding 
with  Graribaldi,  he  would  be  strong  enough  to  fight  his 
way  out,  either  by  Dole,  or  by  Monchard,  or  by  Grray, 
or  by  Pontarlier  (north  of  Auxonne).  The  choice  was 
left  to  him. 

Still  more  amazing  was  the  suggestion  that  if,  indeed, 
the  state  of  the  troops  prohibited  a  long  march,  they 
should  take  the  railway  from  Chagey,  under  the  eye, 
no  doubt,  of  the  pursuing  enemy. 

But  such  communications  could  only  avail  to  shake 
the  brave  commander's  seK-confidence.  The  disastrous 
reports  which  poured  in  from  all  sides,  and  the  state 
of  the  troops,  which  he  had  seen  for  himself  as  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  marched  through  the  town,  crushed 
his  last  hope  and  led  him  to  attempt  his  own  life. 

The  Commander-in-chief  had  of  course  to  bear  the 
blame  of  the  total  failure  of  a  campaign  planned  by 
Freycinet;  his  dismissal  from  the  command  was  al- 
ready on  its  way.  Greneral  Clinchant  was  appointed  in 
his  stead,  and  under  these  disastrous  circumstances 
took  the  command  of  the  army. 

All  the  generals  were,  no  doubt,  most  anxious  to 
avoid  bringing  their  weary  and  dispirited  troops  face 
to  face  with  the  enemy.  Every  line  of  retreat  was 
closed,  excepting  only  that  on  Pontarlier.  The  new 
Commander-in-chief  had  no  choice  but  to  carry  out 
the  plans  of  his  predecessor.    He  at  once  ordered  the 

*  Conviction  bien  arret^e. 


390  THE  FKANCO-GERMAN  WAB. 

further  marcli.  He  liimself  proceeded  to  Pontarlier. 
In  that  strong  position  he  hoped  to  be  able  at  least  to 
give  the  troops  a  short  rest.  No  large  body  of  the 
Germans  had  been  met  with  so  far,  the  ammunition 
columns  had  got  safely  through,  and  if  they  could  but 
reach  the  defiles  of  Vaux,  Les-Planches,  and  St.  Lau- 
rent before  the  enemy,  and  hold  them,  there  was  still  a 
possibility  of  escape  to  the  southwards. 

On  the  evening  of  the  27th  PouUet's  division  was  at 
Levier,  nearest  to  the  Grermans,  the  two  other  divisions 
under  General  Cremer,  with  the  Fifteenth  and  Twen- 
tieth Corps,  were  echelonned  on  the  road  between  Or- 
nans  and  Sombacourt ;  the  Eighteenth  Corps  was  alone 
on  the  eastern  road  by  Nods.  The  Twenty-fourth,  in 
a  miserable  condition,  extended  to  Montbenoit,  with  its 
head  at  Pontarlier ;  two  divisions  were  still  in  Besan^on. 

On  this  day  General  von  Fransecky  collected  the 
main  body  of  the  Second  Corps  at  Arbois,  and  rein- 
forced General  du  Trossel's  lines  at  Pont  d'Hery. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  relieved  the  14th  Division  of 
the  Seventh  Corps  at  St.  Vit;  this  advanced  to  the 
right  of  the  13th  Division  into  the  ravine  of  the  Loue, 
which  the  French  had  already  abandoned. 

On  the  north.  General  von  Debschitz  held  Blamont 
and  Pont-du-Roide,  while  General  von  Schmeling  kept 
watch  on  Besan^on  from  St.  Juan,  and  General  von 
der  Goltz  marched  on  Arbois  to  form  a  reserve. 

(January  28th.)  Suspecting  that  the  French  were 
akeady  on  the  march  by  Champagnole  on  St.  Lau- 
rent, General  Fransecky,  to  cut  off  that  line  of  retreat, 
advanced  on  the  following  day  in  a  southerly  direction 
with  the  Second  Corps. 

General  du  Trossel  reached  Champagnole  without 
opposition,  and  sent  his  cavalry  down  the  road  on 
Pontarher.    Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Guretzky  arrived 


FKENCH  KETEEAT  ON  PONTAKLIEE.        391 

at  Nozeroy  with  a  squadron  of  the  11th  Dragoons,  and 
found  the  place  occupied ;  but  he  seized  fifty-six  com- 
missariat-wagons, and  stole  the  field  treasure-chest, 
taking  the  escort  prisoners. 

The  5th  and  6th  Brigades  advanced  on  Pohgny  and 
Pont-du-Navoy. 

'  The  13th  Division  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  being  re- 
lieved at  Quingey  by  the  Baden  troops,  assembled  at 
La-Chapelle,  while  the  14th  advanced  on  Deservillers. 
Its  head,  at  Bolandoz,  did  not  meet  the  enemy,  but 
found  his  camp-fires  still  smouldering,  so  that  the  main 
body  of  the  French  was  not  overtaken  that  day. 

General  Clinchant  had  in  fact  moved  his  corps  closer 
on  Pontarlier.  But  it  soon  became  evident  that  sup- 
plies could  not  be  counted  on  for  any  long  stay.  Gen- 
eral Cremer  received  orders  that  night  to  advance  at 
once  on  Les-Planches  and  St.  Laurent  with  three 
cavalry  regiments,  akeady  on  the  road  to  Mouthe. 
The  mountain  roads  were  deep  in  snow,  but  he  reached 
the  points  designated,  by  a  forced  march,  by  the  next 
afternoon.  The  Twenty-fourth  Corps  and  a  brigade 
of  PouUet's  division  followed  next  day,  this  last  plac- 
ing two  battalions  to  occupy  Bonnevaux  at  the  entrance 
to  the  defile  of  Vaux.  On  the  evening  of  the  28th  the 
rest  of  the  French  army  was  distributed  as  follows : 
The  Eighteenth  Corps  was  behind  the  Drugeon  at 
Houtaud  close  before  Pontarlier ;  the  1st  Division  of 
the  Fifteenth  had  advanced  to  Sombacourt,  beyond  the 
stream,  the  3rd  Division  was  in  the  town.  On  the  left 
the  2nd  and  3rd  Divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  held 
the  villages  from  Chaffois  to  Frasne,  and  on  the  right 
the  Army  Reserve  occupied  Byans. 

General  von  Manteuffel  had  ordered  a  general  ad- 
vance for  the  29th  on  Pontarlier,  where  the  French  at 
last  must  certainly  be  found. 


392  THE   FE.iNCO-GERMAN   WAE.  ' 

(January  29tli.)  General  Koblinsky,  of  the  Second 
Corps,  had  set  out  from  Poligny  before  daylight. 
When  he  reached  Champagnole  and  had  assembled  the 
whole  of  the  5th  Brigade,  he  advanced  at  about  seven 
o'clock.  General  du  Trossel  with  the  7th  Brigade 
reached  Censeau  without  finding  the  enemy. 

On  the  right  Colonel  von  WedeU  had  marched  from 
Pont-du-Navoy  on  Les-Planches  with  four  battalions 
of  the  6th  Brigade.  He  found  only  dismounted  troop- 
ers, posts  probably  left  by  General  von  Cremer,  who 
were  easily  dispersed  by  the  Jagers.  Detachments 
were  then  sent  out  on  all  sides,  and  everywhere  met 
with  scattered  troops ;  but  at  Foncine-le-Bas  the  head 
of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  was  found,  and  Colonel 
von  Wedell  now  cut  off  their  line  of  retreat,  the  last 
that  had  been  left  open. 

With  the  rest  of  the  Second  Corps  General  von  Hart- 
mann  marched  unopposed  on  Nozeroy. 

The  14th  Division  of  the  Seventh  Corps  had  not 
received  the  order  to  advance  on  Pontarlier  till  some- 
what late;  it  did  not  start  from  Deservillers  till  the 
afternoon,  and  only  reached  Levier  at  three  o'clock, 
where,  at  the  same  hour,  the  head  of  the  13th  Divis- 
ion also  arrived  from  Villeneuve-d'^mont,  the  state 
of  the  roads  having  greatly  delayed  them  on  the 
march. 

The  advanced  guard  of  three  battahons,  haK  a 
squadron,  and  one  battery,  had  met  only  stragglers  on 
their  way,  and  General  von  Zastrow  commanded  them 
to  advance  on  the  Drugeon.  Through  the  woods  on 
the  left  of  the  road  compact  detachments  of  the  French 
were  retiring  on  Sombacourt,  and  Major  von  Breder- 
low,  with  the  1st  Battahon  of  the  77th  Eegiment,  made 
a  flank  movement  on  that  village.  The  2nd  Company, 
under  Captain  von  Vietinghof,  made  its  way  in  by 


NEWS   OF  THE  AEMISTICE.  393 

Sept-Fontaines  with  loud  cheers,  and  was  at  first  sur- 
rounded by  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy ;  however,  the 
other  companies  soon  came  to  its  assistance.  The  1st 
Division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  (French)  was  com- 
pletely routed  without  the  reserve  close  at  hand  in 
Byans  having  come  to  its  support.  Fifty  officers, 
including  two  generals,  were  taken  prisoners,  with 
2700  men;  ten  guns,  seven  mitrailleuses,  forty-eight 
wagons,  319  horses,  and  3500  stand  of  arms  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Hanoverian  battalion  which  was  left 
in  occupation  of  Sombacourt. 

The  remainder  of  the  advanced  guard  had  meanwhile 
advanced  on  Chaffois,  where  the  road  opens  out  from 
the  mountain  gorge  into  the  broad  vaUey  of  the  Dru- 
geon.  The  place  was  occupied,  as  we  have  seen,  by 
the  2nd  Division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  (French). 

Colonel  von  Cosel  attacked  at  once.  Three  com- 
panies of  the  53rd  Regiment  surprised  the  French 
picket  and  seized  the  first  houses  in  the  village,  but 
then  the  mass  of  the  French  Eighteenth  Corps  stopped 
their  further  advance.  By  degrees  all  the  forces  at 
hand  became  engaged,  as  well  as  the  reinforcements 
brought  up  from  the  main  body  of  the  14th  Division. 
The  fight  had  lasted  with  great  obstinacy  for  an  hour 
and  a  half,  when  suddenly  the  French  ceased  firing 
and  laid  down  their  arms.  They  appealed  to  the  ar- 
mistice already  agreed  on. 

Monsieur  Jules  Favi'e  had,  in  fact,  telegraphed  to 
Bordeaux  at  a  quarter  past  eleven  on  the  night  of  the 
28th,  that  an  armistice  of  twenty-one  days  had  been 
concluded,  without  adding  that,  with  his  consent,  the 
three  eastern  departments  had  been  excepted  from  it. 
The  information,  in  this  imperfect  form,  was  trans- 
mitted to  the  civil  authorities  by  the  Chambers  at 
12.15  at  noon  of  the  29th ;  but  Monsieur  Freycinet  did 


394  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

not  forward  it  to  the  military  authorities,  whom  it 
principally  concerned,  till  3.30  in  the  afternoon. 

Thus  could  General  Clinchant,  in  all  good  faith, 
transmit  to  General  Thornton,  in  command  of  the  di- 
vision at  Chaffois,  a  message  which,  as  regarded  the 
Army  of  the  East,  was  altogether  incorrect.  He  at  once 
sent  a  staff  officer  to  the  Prussian  advanced  guard,  who 
were  still  firing,  requiring  them  to  cease  on  the  strength 
of  the  official  message. 

General  von  Manteuffel,  at  Arbois,  had  received,  at 
five  in  the  morning,  full  particulars  from  head-quar- 
ters of  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  by  which  the  army 
in  the  south  was  to  continue  operations  till  further 
orders.  General  orders  announcing  this  to  all  the 
troops  were  at  once  sent  out,  but  did  not  reach  the 
Seventh  Corps  till  evening. 

Nothing  was  known  there  of  any  armistice;  how- 
ever, the  news  might  be  on  the  way,  and  General  von 
Zastrow  granted  the  temporary  cessation  of  hostilities, 
and  even  released  his  prisoners,  but  without  their 
arms. 

Chaffois,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  farmsteads, 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  14th  Division  (German), 
who  found  such  quarters  there  as  they  might ;  the  13th 
retired  to  the  villages  from  Sept-Fontaines  to  Deser- 
villers. 

(January  30th.)  In  full  confidence  in  the  news  from 
the  seat  of  Government,  General  Clinchant,  on  the 
30th,  stopped  the  retreat  of  his  army.  The  newly- 
appointed  Commander  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps, 
General  Comagny,  also  gave  up  his  intended  attempt 
to  cut  his  way  with  10,000  men  through  Colonel  von 
Wedell's  small  brigade  at  Foncine.  The  other  corps 
remained,  after  the  unfortunate  issue  of  the  evening's 
fight,  close  pressed  at  Pontarlier ;  but  detachments  of 


A  MISAPPEEHENSION.  395 

troopers  were  sent  out  one  by  one  on  the  roads  to  Be- 
sangon  and  St.  Laurent,  to  establish  a  line  of  demarca- 
tion, and  also  to  keep  up  communications  with  the 
fortress  and  with  the  south. 

After  receiving  the  general  orders  at  about  eleven 
at  night,  General  Zastrow  informed  the  French  in  his 
front  of  the  resumption  of  hostilities,  but  restricted 
his  immediate  demands  to  the  complete  evacuation  of 
Chaffois,  which  was  agreed  to.  Otherwise  the  corps 
remained  where  it  was,  and  inactive. 

General  du  Trossel,  of  the  Second  Corps,  had  set 
out  very  early  from  Censeau,  but  the  appearance  of  a 
French  flag  of  truce,  and  his  fear  of  offending  against 
the  law  of  nations,  here  too  occasioned  considerable 
delay.  The  woods  of  Frasne  were  not  clear  of  the 
French  till  evening.  Lieutenant-Colonel  von  Guretzky 
made  his  way  into  the  village  with  quite  a  small  force, 
and  took  the  twelve  officers  and  1500  men  who  held  it 
prisoners,  with  two  colors.  The  5th  Brigade  then  also 
arrived  at  Frasne ;  the  rest  of  the  corps  occupied  the 
same  quarters  as  on  the  previous  day. 

A  flag  of  truce  had  also  been  sent  to  Les-Planches, 
but  Colonel  von  Wedell  had  simply  dismissed  the 
bearer.  The  outposts  of  the  Foui'teenth  Corps  did  the 
same. 

On  the  north  of  Pontarlier,  General  von  Schmeling 
advanced  on  Pierre-Fontaine,  General  von  Debschitz 
on  Maiche. 

(January  31st.)  On  the  morning  of  this  day  the 
French  Colonel  Varaigne  made  his  appearance  at  Gen- 
eral von  Manteuffel's  head-quarters  at  ViUeneuve  to 
propose  that  a  cessation  of  hostilities  for  thirty-six 
hours  should  be  agreed  upon,  till  all  doubts  could  be 
removed ;  but  this  was  refused,  as  the  German  General 
had  no  doubts  whatever.    Permission  was  granted  for 


396  THE  FRANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

a  direct  application  to  Versailles,  but  it  was  at  the 
same  time  explained  that  the  movements  of  the  Army 
of  the  South  would  not  be  suspended  till  the  arrival  of 
the  answer. 

On  this  day,  however,  the  Second  Army  Corps 
marched  only  on  Dompierre  on  a  line  with  the  Seventh, 
its  advanced  guard  pushing  forward  to  the  Drugeon 
on  Ste.  Colombe  and  La-Riviere.  Thence,  in  the  even- 
ing, a  company  of  Colberg's  Grenadiers  crossed  the 
steep  mountain  ridge  and  descended  on  La  Planee, 
where  it  took  500  prisoners.  On  the  right  a  flanking 
detachment  of  two  battalions  and  one  battery  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Liebe  marched  unopposed  up  the 
gorge  from  Bonnevaux  to  Vaux,  taking  2  officers  and 
688  men  prisoners.  The  French  then  abandoned  the 
defile  of  Granges-Ste.-Marie  and  retired  on  St.  Antoine 
in  the  mountains. 

The  corps  had  found  every  road  strewn  with  cast- 
away arms  and  camp  utensils  and  had  captured  4000 
men  in  all. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  had  been  informed  that  hos- 
tilities were  resumed,  the  14th  Division  of  the  Seventh 
Corps  extended  on  the  left  along  the  Drugeon  as  far 
as  La-Vrine,  whence  a  connection  was  eifected  with 
the  4th  Reserve  Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at 
St.  Gorgon.  The  13th  Division  advanced  on  Sept- 
Fontaines.  Pontarlier  was  now  completely  surrounded, 
and  General  von  Manteuffel  had  fixed  February  1st  for 
the  attack.  The  Second  Corps  was  to  advance  from 
the  south-west,  the  Seventh  from  the  north-west ;  Gen- 
eral von  der  Goltz  was  to  remain  at  Levier  with  a 
reserve  force. 

Meanwhile  the  French  Commander-in-chief  had  con- 
ceived doubts  as  to  whether  the  communications  from 
Government  were  perfectly  correct.    The  passes  over 


FIGHT  AT  LA-CLUSE.  397 

the  mountains  to  the  south  were  now  lost,  and  an 
escape  in  that  direction  was  no  longer  to  be  hoped  for. 
General  Clinchant  had  already  sent  back  the  baggage 
and  ammunition  columns,  the  sick  and  the  exhausted, 
through  La-Cluse  under  shelter  of  the  forts  of  Joux 
and  Neuv.  And  when  in  the  afternoon  a  message  from 
Bordeaux  announced  that  in  fact  the  Army  of  the  East 
had  been  excluded  from  the  armistice,  the  Commander- 
in-chief  called  a  council  of  war.  Every  Greneral  present 
declared  that  he  could  no  longer  answer  for  his  troops. 
He  himself  therefore  went  out  the  same  evening  to 
Les-Verrieres,  to  conclude  negotiations  he  had  aheady 
opened,  by  which  on  the  following  day,  February  1st, 
the  army  was  to  cross  the  frontier  into  Switzerland  by 
three  separate  roads. 

To  cover  this  retreat,  the  Army  Reserve  was  to  hold 
Pontarlier  till  all  the  baggage-trains  had  crossed  the 
ridge  at  La-Cluse,  and  the  Eighteenth  Corps  was  to 
occupy  a  position  between  the  two  forts.  Fortifica- 
tions were  at  once  begun.  So  much  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  as  had  failed  to  get  beyond  Morez  with  the 
cavalry  was  to  try  to  cross  into  Switzerland  at  any 
available  point. 

(February  1st.)  When  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
Second  Corps  (German)  marched  on  Pontarlier  from 
Ste.  Colombe  it  met  with  but  slight  resistance  at  the 
railway  station.  Colberg's  Grenadiers  took  possession 
of  the  town  without  a  struggle,  took  many  prisoners, 
and  then  found  the  roads  beyond  entirely  blocked  by 
guns  and  wagons. 

They  were  toiling  along  with  great  difficulty  through 
deep  snow.  Just  in  front  of  La-Cluse  the  road  winds 
up  between  high  walls  of  rock  to  a  large  cirque  formed 
by  the  Doubs,  which  is  completely  commanded  by  the 
fortified  castle  of  Joux  on  an  isolated  knoll  of  rock. 


398  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

On  debouching  into  this  valley  the  foremost  companies 
were  received  by  a  hot  fire.  Four  guns,  dragged  up 
with  the  greatest  difficulty,  could  do  nothing  against 
the  heavy  guns  of  the  fort,  so  the  French  themselves 
attacked. 

Colberg's  Fusihers  had  meanwhile  scaled  the  heights 
to  the  left,  followed  by  the  2nd  Battalion  of  the  regi- 
ment and  a  battalion  of  the  49th,  who  drove  the  French 
out  of  the  farmsteads  and  rifts  on  the  plateau.  The 
steep  cliff  on  the  right  was  also  scaled,  several  files  of 
the  49th  Eegiment  clambered  down  the  slopes  above 
La-Cluse,  and  Colberg's  Grenadiers  advanced  to  the 
foot  of  Fort  Neuv. 

To  take  the  castle  by  storm  was  obviously  impossi- 
ble, and  the  nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  almost  to 
prohibit  the  escape  of  a  defeated  enemy.  Of  the  French 
twenty-three  officers  and  1600  men  were  taken,  and 
400  loaded  wagons ;  of  the  Oermans  nineteen  officers 
and  365  men  were  killed,  mostly  of  Colberg's  regiment. 
The  troops  spent  the  night  on  the  field. 

As  no  large  force  could  be  brought  into  action  at 
La-Cluse,  General  von  Fransecky  had  ordered  the  main 
body  of  the  corps  to  march  to  the  south  on  Ste.  Marie. 
To  avoid  the  necessity  of  crossing  ^the  chain  of  the 
Jura,  General  von  Hartmann  marched  first  on  Pontar- 
lier  to  avail  himseK  of  the  better  roads  from  thence, 
but  there  he  was  detained,  the  fight  at  La-Cluse  having 
assumed  unexpected  proportions.  The  Seventh  Corps 
and  the  4th  Reserve  Division  also,  which  had  reached 
the  Doubs  at  noon,  were  equally  unable  to  get  at  the 
enemy. 

During  the  whole  day  the  French  columns  were 
crossing  the  Swiss  frontier.  The  Army  Reserve  in 
Pontarher  was  from  the  beginning  carried  away  by 
the  tide  of  baggage-wagons  and  di'ivers,  and  only  joined 


GENERAL  WEYHEEN'S   MAECH  ON  DIJON.  399 

the  Eighteenth  Corps  on  reaching  La-Cluse.  During 
the  night  they  both  followed  in  the  general  line  of  re- 
treat. Only  the  cavalry  and  a  few  hundred  men  of 
the  First  Division  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  reached 
the  department  of  I'Ain,  the  next  to  the  south ;  80,000 
French  crossed  on  to  Swiss  soil. 

General  Manteuffel  had  transferred  his  head-quar- 
ters to  Pontarlier.  Only  then,  and  not  till  night,  did 
he  hear  from  Berlin  of  the  agreement  between  General 
Clinchant  and  the  Swiss  Colonel  Herzog. 

General  von  Manteuffel  had  achieved  the  important 
success  of  his  three  weeks'  campaign  through  a  suc- 
cession of  fights,  but  without  a  pitched  battle  since 
quitting  the  Lisaine,  simply  by  marches ;  such  marches, 
indeed,  as  none  but  well-seasoned  troops  could  have 
accomplished  under  bold  and  skilful  leadership,  under 
every  form  of  f atigile  and  hardship,  in  the  worst  season 
and  through  a  difficult  country. 

Thus  two  French  armies  were  now  prisoners  in  Ger- 
many, a  third  interned  in  the  capital,  and  the  fourth 
disarmed  on  foreign  soil. 

GENERAL   HANN  VON  WEYHEEN'S   MAECH   ON   DIJON. 

It  only  remains  to  glance  back  on  the  advance  on 
Dijon,  which  had  been  entrusted  to  the  command  of 
General  Hann  von  Weyhern  on  January  26th. 

On  that  same  day  Garibaldi  was  appealed  to,  to  take 
some  energetic  measure  against  Dole  and  Mouchard. 

To  support  him,  the  Government,  indefatigable  in 
the  evolution  of  new  forces,  were  to  send  15,000  Gardes 
Mobiles  under  General  Crouzat  from  Lyons  to  Lons- 
le-Saulnier,  and  a  Twenty-sixth  Corps  in  course  of 
formation  at  Chatellerault  was  to  be  detached  to 
Beaune.  As  it  was  beyond  doubt  that  General  von 
Manteuffel  had  marched  with  a  strong  force,  to  cut  off 


400  THE  FKANCO-GEKMAN  WAK. 

the  communications  of  the  Army  of  the  East,  an  order 
was  transmitted  on  the  27th  to  the  Commander  of  the 
torces  in  the  Vosges,  to  leave  only  from  8000  to  10,000 
men  in  Dijon  and  to  advance  at  once  with  the  main 
body  beyond  Dole. 

But  the  General  was  anxious  for  Dijon ;  he  occu- 
pied the  principal  positions  on  the  slopes  of  the  Cote- 
d'Or  and  detached  a  small  force  to  St.-Jean-de-Losne, 
behind  the  Canal-de-Bourgogne.  Nothing  had  as  yet 
been  seen  of  700  volunteers  who  had  marched  on 
Dole. 

Langres  had  shown  a  little  more  energy,  several,  and 
often  successful,  sorties  of  small  outpost  companies  and 
depot  troops  had  been  led  out  from  time  to  time. 

General  Hann  von  Weyhern's  purpose  of  attacking 
Dijon  from  the  south  had  to  be  abandoned,  because 
the  bridge  over  the  Saone  at  St.-Jean-de-Losne  had 
been  destroyed.  He,  therefore,  on  the  29th  crossed 
the  river  at  Apremont,  and  on  the  31st  assembled  his 
detachment  at  Arc-sur-Tille.  Here  again  General 
Bordone,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staif  of  the  Army  of 
the  Vosges,  vainly  appealed  to  the  supposed  armistice. 
On  the  31st,  General  von  Kettler  marched  as  an  ad- 
vanced guard  on  Varois.  To  cut  off  the  enemy's  com- 
munications with  Auxonne,  a  detachiQent  on  the  left 
held  the  bridge  over  the  Ouche  at  Fauverney.  The 
first  shells  drove  the  French  back  on  their  intrenched 
position  between  St.  Apollinaire  and  Mirande. 

When  the  attempt  to  bring  about  an  armistice  had 
failed.  General  Bordone  determined  to  evacuate  Dijon 
in  the  course  of  the  night  and  retire  on  to  really  neu- 
tral ground.  Thus,  on  February  1st,  the  head  of  the 
advanced  guard  found  the  outworks  abandoned,  and 
General  von  Kettler  marched  in  without  any  opposi- 
tion, just  as  the  last  train  of  French  troops  moved  out 


OCCUPATION   OF  THE  DEPAHTMENTS.  401 

of  the  railway-station.     Sombernon  and  Nuits  were 
also  occupied  on  the  2nd. 

OCCUPATION   OF  THE  DEPARTMENTS   OF  THE  DOUBS,  JUEA, 
AND   COTE-D'OE. 

Nothing  now  remained  for  General  von  Manteuffel 
but  to  effect  a  military  occupation  of  the  Departments 
he  had  invaded,  and  to  protect  them  from  without. 

General  Pelissier  was  still  within  their  limits,  having 
reached  Lons-le-Saulnier  from  Lyons  with  the  15,000 
Gardes  Mobiles  joined  by  the  battalions  sent  back 
from  Besan(jon  by  General  Eolland,  numerically  a  by 
no  means  insignificant  force,  but  of  no  gi'eat  practical 
use.  The  commanders  were  recommended  to  retire 
and  avoid  further  bloodshed ;  and  they  did  so,  as  soon 
as  some  detachments  of  the  Second  Corps  (German) 
advanced  on  Lons-le-Saulnier  and  St.  Laurent.  Others 
occupied  Mouthe  and  Les-AUemands,  where  twenty- 
eight  guns  had  been  abandoned  by  the  French.  The 
Swiss  frontier  was  watched  by  eight  battalions  for 
security.  The  forts  of  Salins,  the  little  fortress  of 
Auxonne,  and  Besangon  from  the  east  side,  were  kept 
under  observation. 

Although  the  Department  of  Haute-Marne  was  in- 
cluded in  the  armistice,  the  commandant  of  Langres 
had  refused  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the  Govern- 
ment. So  this  place  had  to  be  invested,  and  perhaps 
besieged.  General  von  der  Goltz  was  first  ordered  to 
march  on  it,  and  General  von  Krenski  was  already 
advancing  with  seven  battalions,  two  squadrons,  and 
two  batteries  with  a  siege  train  from  Longwy,  which 
he  had  reduced  to  capitulation  on  January  25th,  after 
a  bombardment  of  six  days'  duration.  But  it  was  not 
called  into  requisition  at  Langres. 

General  von  Manteuffel  aimed  at  no  further  tactical 
26 


402  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

results ;  lie  was  anxious  to  save  Ms  troops  from  further 
losses,  and  to  afford  them  all  possible  respite  after 
their  unusual  exertions.  Not  till  now  was  the  baggage 
brought  up,  even  that  of  the  staff  officers  having  been 
necessarily  left  behind  during  the  advance  through  the 
Jura.  The  troops  were  distributed  for  the  sake  of  com- 
fort in  roomy  quarters,  but  in  readiness  for  action  at 
any  moment,  the  Second  Corps  in  Jura,  the  Seventh 
in  Cote-d'Or,  the  Fourteenth  in  Doubs.  But  the  siege 
of  Belfort  was  to  be  stringently  carried  on. 

THE   SIEGE   OF   BELFORT. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  on  the  Lisaine  the  forces 
investing  Belfort  were  increased  to  27  battalions,  6 
squadrons,  6  field  batteries,  24  companies  of  garrison 
artillery,  and  6  companies  of  sappers  and  miners ;  in 
all  17,602  infantry,  4699  artillery,  and  1166  engineers 
=23,467  men,  with  707  horses  and  34  field-guns. 

While  the  town  was  invested  on  the  north  and  west 
by  only  a  few  battalions,  the  main  force  was  assembled 
to  the  south  and  east. 

On  January  20th,  the  batteries  on  the  east  opened  a 
hot  fire  on  Perouse.  Colonel  Denfert  inferred  that  an 
attack  was  imminent,  and  put  four  battalions  of  his 
most  trusted  troops  into  the  village,  Vhich  was  forti- 
fied for  an  obstinate  defence. 

At  about  midnight,  two  battalions  of  the  67th  Regi- 
ment advanced  from  Chevremont  without  firing  a  shot 
on  the  Haut-Taillis  wood.  Only  inside  it  there  was  a 
determined  struggle,  but  the  French  were  driven  back 
on  the  village,  and  the  sappers  immediately  intrenched 
the  skirt  of  the  wood  towards  Perouse  under  a  heavy 
fire  from  the  fort. 

Half  an  hour  later  two  Landwehr  battalions  advanced 
from  Bessoncourt  to  the  copse  on  the  north  of  the 


SIEGE   OF  BELFOET.  403 

village.  They  were  received  with  a  sharp  fire,  but 
made  their  way  onward  over  abatis,  pits,  and  wire-en- 
tanglements, driving  the  enemy  back  into  the  quarries. 

A  brisk  fire  was  now  opened  on  both  sides,  but  the 
67th  presently  renewed  the  attack,  and  without  allow- 
ing themselves  to  be  checked  at  the  earthworks,  forced 
their  way  into  Perouse.  They  took  possession  of  the 
eastern  end  of  the  straggling  village  at  about  half- 
past  two,  and  the  party  defending  the  quarries  find- 
ing themselves  threatened,  retreated.  At  five  o'clock, 
Colonel  Denfert  surrendered  the  western  part  of  the 
position,  which  was  now  occupied  by  the  Germans. 

They  had  lost  eight  officers  and  178  men ;  the  French 
left  five  ofiicers  and  ninety-three  men  prisoners. 

(January  21st  to  27th.)  The  next  day  the  first 
parallel  was  thrown  up  along  a  front  of  1800  metres 
from  Donjoutin  to  Haut-Taillis.  Five  battalions  and 
two  companies  of  sappers  were  engaged  in  this  work, 
and  undisturbed  by  the  French;  but  the  rocky  soil 
prohibited  its  being  constructed  of  the  usual  width. 

General  von  Tresckow  already  believed  that  he  might 
proceed  to  storm  the  two  forts  of  Perches.  Two  half- 
closed  redoubts  with  perpendicular  ditches  cut  three 
metres  deep  out  of  the  rock,  casemated  traverses  and 
bomb-proof  block-houses  in  the  gorge,  insured  protec- 
tion for  the  defenders.  They  were  armed  with  seven 
12-cm.  guns  in  each.  The  works  were  connected  by 
trenches,  behind  which  a  reserve  force  was  in  readiness. 

On  the  right  flank  this  position  was  protected  by  a 
battalion  and  counter-batteries  in  Le-Fourneau;  on 
the  left  the  wood,  which  was  not  more  than  600  paces 
distant,  was  cleared,  and  wire-entanglements  between 
the  stumps  formed  an  almost  impenetrable  obstacle. 
In  front  the  gentle  slope  of  the  hill  was  under  the 
cross-fire  of  the  two  forts. 


404  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

As  soon  as  the  construction  of  the  parallel  was  suffi- 
ciently advanced,  on  the  evening  of  the  26th,  to  allow 
of  its  being  occupied  by  larger  detachments,  the  storm- 
ing was  begun.  Two  columns  of  one  battalion,  one 
company  of  sappers,  and  two  guns  proceeded  to  the 
attack  at  daybreak  on  January  27th.  Two  companies 
of  Schneidemiihl's  Landwehr  Battalion  advanced  on 
the  front  of  Basses-Perches  and  threw  themselves  on 
the  ground  within  sixty  to  100  metres  in  front  of  the 
works.  A  party  of  sharp-shooters  and  a  few  sappers 
got  to  the  ditch  and  unhesitatingly  leaped  in ;  the  two 
other  companies,  going  round  the  fort  to  the  left,  had 
reached  the  rear,  and  here  too  the  men  jumped  into 
the  ditch  of  the  gorge.  But  the  French,  who  had  been 
driven  out  of  their  shelter-trenches,  had  now  re-assem- 
bled, and  the  battalion  advanced  from  Le-Fourneau. 
All  the  forts  of  the  place  opened  fire  on  the  clear  and 
unprotected  space  in  front  of  the  parallel,  and  an  at- 
tempt to  cross  it  on  the  part  of  the  reserve  force  failed. 
The  7th  Company  of  the  Landwehr  Battalion  were 
surrounded  by  superior  numbers,  and  after  a  brave 
struggle  were  for  the  most  part  taken  prisoners.  Most 
of  the  men  in  the  ditch  were  still  able  to  escape. 

The  advance  of  the  right  column  against  Hautes- 
Perches  also  failed.  It  had  to  cross  1000  metres  of 
open  ground.  An  attempt  to  smTound  the  fort  did 
not  succeed;  it  was  im}3ossible  to  get  through  the 
abatis  and  other  obstacles  under  the  fire  of  the  French. 

This  disastrous  attempt  to  storm  the  place  cost  10 
officers  and  427  men ;  the  slower  engineering  operations 
had  to  be  resumed. 

(January  28th  and  February  15th.)  As  the  Germans 
got  nearer  to  the  forts  the  flying  sap  could  be  carried 
forward  about  300  metres  every  night  without  any 
opposition  from  the  enemy.    In  spite  of  all  the  diffi- 


SIEGE  OF  BELFOET.  405 

culties  caused  by  the  nature  of  the  soil,  by  February 
1st  the  second  parallel  had  been  advanced  half-way  to 
the  forts  of  Les-Perches. 

As  the  Fort-de-la- Justice  was  a  particular  hindrance 
to  the  works,  two  batteries  had  to  be  constructed  to 
the  east  of  Perouse  to  bear  upon  it.  Four  mortar-bat- 
teries on  the  flank  of  the  parallel  could  now  fire  on 
Haute  and  Basse-Perches  at  very  short  range.  Three 
batteries  were  also  placed  in  the  Bois-des-Perches  to 
attack  the  castle,  and  one  on  the  skirt  of  the  wood  by 
Bavilliers  against  the  main  work.  Henceforward  1500 
shell  a  day  were  fired  on  the  fortress  and  outworks. 

But  the  progi^ess  of  the  attack  became  more  and 
more  difficult.  General  Debschitz,  by  retiring,  had  seri- 
ously reduced  the  working  strength  of  the  besieging 
force.  The  loss  in  sappers  was  particularly  serious, 
and  two  new  companies  had  to  be  brought  up  from 
Strasburg.  The  bright  moonlight  lighting  up  the 
sheets  of  snow  far  and  wide  made  it  impossible  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  flying  saps.  Sap-roUers  were  called  into 
requisition ;  the  heads  of  the  saps  had  to  be  protected 
by  sand-bags  and  the  sides  by  gabions,  while  the  earth 
for  filling  had  often  to  be  brought  from  a  long  distance 
in  the  rear. 

On  the  top  of  this,  on  February  3rd,  a  thaw  set  in, 
and  the  water  from  the  slopes  filled  the  trenches,  so 
that  all  intercourse  had  to  be  across  the  open  gi-ound. 
Torrents  of  rain  damaged  the  finished  works ;  the  para- 
pet of  the  first  parallel  gave  way  in  places  and  the  ban- 
quette was  washed  away.  The  arming  of  the  batteries 
was  most  laborious  with  the  ground  in  such  a  state, 
and  the  teams  of  the  columns  and  field  artillery  had  to 
be  employed  in  bringing  in  ammunition. 

Several  guns  had  become  useless  by  overheating, 
while  the  enemy,  by  rapidly  running  out  their  guns, 


406  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

firing,  and  then  running  them  back  again,  greatly  dis- 
turbed the  work.  Not  merely  was  it  necessary  to 
continue  the  shelling  of  Les-Perches  during  the  night, 
but  a  brisk  rifle  fire  had  to  be  kept  up.  Only  now 
and  then  did  the  batteries  newly  placed  in  the  parallels 
succeed  in  silencing  the  guns  of  Hautes-Perches.  Gun 
epaulments  were  erected  to  front  Fort  Bellevue, 
and  the  fortified  railway  station  and  Fort-des-Barres 
brought  into  action  again.  That  under  such  toil  and 
the  unfavorable  weather  the  health  of  the  troops  must 
have  suffered  severely  need  not  be  said ;  the  battalions 
could  often  only  muster  300  men  for  duty. 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  artillery  of  the  attack  had 
become  very  much  stronger  than  that  of  the  defenders, 
and,  in  spite  of  every  obstacle,  the  saps  were  pushed 
on  to  the  edge  of  the  ditch  of  Les-Perches. 

On  February  8th,  at  one  in  the  afternoon.  Captain 
Roese  had  the  sap  rollers  flung  into  the  ditch  of  Hautes- 
Perches,  sprang  into  it  with  five  sappers,  and  rapidly 
scaled  the  parapet  by  the  steps  hewn  in  the  escarp. 
He  was  immediately  followed  by  the  trench-guard,  but 
no  French  were  surprised  excepting  a  few  in  the  case- 
mated  traverses. 

The  situation  of  the  garrison  of  the  fort  had  in  fact 
become  most  critical.  Ammunition  could  only  be 
fetched  under  the  enemy's  fire,  water  only  be  had  from 
the  pond  at  Vernier,  and  only  boiled  inside  the  works. 
Colonel  Denfert  had  already  given  orders  to  conceal 
the  materiel.  Unseen  by  the  besiegers,  those  guns  of 
which  the  carriages  could  still  be  moved  had  been 
withdrawn,  and  only  one  company  left  in  each  fort, 
who,  in  case  of  a  surprise,  were  to  fire  and  escape. 
Nothing  was  to  be  found  in  the  abandoned  works  but 
wrecked  gun-carriages  and  four  damaged  guns.  This 
fort  was  at  once  so  adapted  that  its  front  should  face 


SIEGE  OF  BELFOKT.  407 

the  fortress,  but  at  three  o'clock  the  main  work  opened 
such  a  destructive  fire  on  the  lost  positions  that  the 
men  were  forced  to  take  shelter  in  the  ditches. 

The  garrison  in  Basses-Perches  attempted  some  re- 
sistance, but  supported  by  a  reserve  they  soon  retired 
on  Le-Fourneau,  leaving  five  guns  and  much  battered 
ordnance. 

Here  also  the  fire  from  the  main  work  at  first  pre- 
vented the  work  of  restoration,  but  four  15-cm.  mortars 
were  at  last  brought  into  the  fort,  and  two  9-cm.  guns 
placed  on  the  spur  of  the  hill  to  the  westward,  now 
directed  their  fire  on  Le-Fourneau  and  Bellevue. 
During  the  night  of  the  9th  the  works  were  connected 
by  a  shelter-trench  624  metres  long,  and  thus  a  third 
parallel  was  established. 

By  this  time  they  were  in  a  position  to  direct  the 
immediate  attack  on  the  castle,  and  on  this  the  bat- 
teries in  the  Bois-des-Perches  and  those  in  the  second 
paraUel  opened  fire.  Moitte,  Justice,  and  Bellevue 
were  shelled  simultaneously.  General  von  Debschitz 
had  returned,  and  the  investing  corps  was  by  this 
means  again  reinforced  to  its  full  numbers,  and  all  the 
conditions  were  improved  by  the  return  of  the  frost. 
By  the  13th  ninety-seven  guns  were  mounted  ready 
in  the  third  parallel. 

The  town  had  suffered  terribly  from  the  prolonged 
bombardment.  Nearly  all  the  buildings  were  damaged, 
fifteen  completely  burnt  down ;  also  in  the  adjoining 
villages  164  houses  had  been  destroyed  by  the  defend- 
ers themselves.  The  fortifications  showed  not  less 
visible  signs  of  destruction,  particularly  the  castle. 
The  stone  facing  of  their  walls  had  crumbled  into  the 
ditch.  Half  of  the  mantleted  embrasm-es  had  been 
shattered,  the  expense  powder  magazines  had  been 
blown  up,  and  a  number  of  casemated  traverses  broken 


408  THE   FKANCO-GERMAN  WAE. 

through.  The  guns  in  the  highest  positions  could  only 
be  reached  by  ladders.  The  original  strength  of  the 
garrison  had  been  372  officers  and  17,322  men,  but 
they  had  lost  32  officers  and  4713  men,  besides  336 
citizens.  The  place  was  no  longer  tenable ;  in  addition 
to  this  came  the  news  that  the  army  by  whom  they 
expected  to  be  relieved  had  laid  down  their  arms. 

Under  these  circumstances  General  von  Tresckow 
summoned  the  Commandant  after  such  a  brave  defence 
to  surrender  the  fort,  with  a  free  retreat  for  the  garri- 
son, this  stipulation  having  the  sanction  of  his  Majesty. 
The  French  Government  themselves  had  given  the 
Commandant  permission  to  accept  these  terms ;  how- 
ever, Colonel  Denfert  insisted  that  he  must  have  a 
more  direct  order.  To  procure  this  an  officer  was  sent 
to  Basle,  whilst  there  was  a  provisional  armistice. 

On  the  15th  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Versailles,  which 
extended  the  armistice  to  the  three  departments  which 
till  then  had  been  excluded  from  it,  and  also  to  Belf ort ; 
but  the  1st  article  demanded  the  surrender  of  that 
place. 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  definitive  treaty,  the  gar- 
rison, in  the  course  of  the  17th  and  18th,  with  its  arms 
and  trains,  left  the  precincts  of  the  fort,  and  passed  to 
L'Isle-sur-Doubs  and  St.  Hyppolyte  on  French  terri- 
tory. The  march  was  effected  in  echelons  of  1000  men 
at  intervals  of  5  km.,  the  last  accompanied  by  Colonel 
Denfert.  The  provisions  which  had  been  stored  in  the 
fort  were  carried  after  them  in  150  Prussian  baggage- 
wagons.  At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on  the  18th 
February,  Lieutenant-General  von  Tresckow  entered 
the  place  at  the  head  of  detachments  of  all  the  troops 
of  the  investing  corps. 

They  found  341  guns,  of  which  56  were  useless,  356 
gun-carriages,  of  which  119  were  shot  to  pieces,  and 


EVACUATION  OF  BELFOKT.  409 

22,000  stand  of  arms,  besides  considerable  supplies  of 
ammunition  and  provisions. 

The  siege  had  cost  the  Germans  88  officers  and  2049 
men,  245  of  whom  were  released  from  imprisonment 
by  the  capitulation.  Immediately  the  work  of  restor- 
ing and  arming  the  fort  began,  and  the  leveUing  of  the 
siege-works. 


VII. 

SURRENDER  AND   PEACE. 

THE   AKMISTICE. 

On  the  basis  of  the  agreement  of  the  28th  January 
a  line  of  demarcation  was  drawn,  from  which  both 
parties  were  to  withdraw  their  outposts  to  a  distance 
of  10  km.  The  line  ran  south  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Seine  as  far  as  the  Sarthe,  crossed  the  Loire  at  Saumur, 
following  the  Creuse,  turned  eastward  past  Vierzon, 
Clamecy  and  Chagny,  and  then  met  the  Swiss  frontier, 
after  passing  to  the  north  of  Chalons-sur-Saone  and 
south  of  Lons-le-Saulnier  and  St.  Laurent.  The  de- 
partments of  Pas-de-Calais  and  du  Nord,  as  well  as  the 
promontory  of  Havre,  were  particularly  excluded. 

The  remainder  of  the  forts  held  by  French  troops 
within  the  provinces  of  which  the  G-ermans  had  taken 
possession  were  allowed  a  radius  in  proportion  to  their 
importance. 

In  carrying  out  the  details  of  the  agreement  a  liberal 
interpretation  was  in  several  places  allowed.  The 
assent  of  those  members  of  the  National  Defence  Com- 
mittee who  were  in  Paris  was  obtained ;  but  the  dele- 
gates at  Bordeaux,  who  had  hitherto  conducted  the 
war,  at  first  held  aloof,  and,  indeed,  as  yet  had  not 
been  informed  of  the  stipulations.  Gambetta,  how- 
ever, suspended  operations,  but  could  give  the  com- 
manders no  more  precise  instructions. 

G-eneral  Faidherbe  was  thus  without  orders  with 
regard  to  the  evacuation  of  Dieppe  and  Abbeville. 


BELIEF  OF  PAEIS.  411 

General  von  Goeben,  however,  deferred  taking  posses- 
sion. On  the  west  of  the  Seine,  the  Grand  Duke  was 
forced  to  announce  that  the  non-recognition  of  the  hne 
of  demarcation  would  result  in  an  immediate  recom- 
mencement of  hostihties. 

The  Commandant  of  the  garrison  at  Langres  also 
raised  difficulties,  and  only  retreated  within  his  rayon 
on  the  7th  February,  as,  later  on,  did  General  Eolland 
in  Besangon.  Auxonne  refused  to  surrender  the  rail- 
way. Bitsch,  which  had  not  been  worth  the  trouble 
of  a  serious  attack,  rejected  the  convention ;  the  in- 
vestment had  therefore  to  be  strengthened,  and  only 
in  March,  when  threatened  with  a  determined  attack, 
did  the  garrison  abandon  its  peak  of  rock. 

Also  the  volunteers  did  not  acquiesce  at  once,  and 
there  were  skirmishes  with  them  in  various  places. 
But  after  the  conditions  were  finally  settled,  no  more 
serious  quarrels  took  place  between  the  inhabitants 
and  the  German  troops  during  the  whole  course  of  the 
armistice. 

All  the  German  corps  outside  Paris  had  occupied 
the  forts  lying  in  their  front,  more  particularly  the 
Fifth  that  of  Mont-Valerien,  and  the  Fourth  the  town 
of  St.  Denis.  The  ground  between  the  forts  and  the 
walls  remained  neutral  ground,  which  only  civihans 
were  allowed  to  cross,  along  particular  roads  placed 
under  control  of  German  examining  troo. 

In  their  anxiety  as  to  the  indignation  of  the  people, 
the  French  Government  had  so  long  hesitated  to  pro- 
nounce the  word  capitulation  that  now,  even  with  free 
ingi-ess  of  supplies,  Paris  was  threatened  with  an  out- 
break of  real  famine.  The  unnecessary  stores  in  the 
German  magazines  were  therefore  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  the  authorities.  The  Commander-in-chief,  the  Gov- 
ernment authorities,  and  the  mihtary  inspectors  re- 


412  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

ceived  orders  to  place  no  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
repairing  of  the  railways  and  roads  in  their  districts, 
and  they  were  even  allowed  to  make  use  of  the  rail- 
roads which  the  invaders  used  to  supply  their  own 
army,  under  German  direction.  Nevertheless,  the  first 
provision  train  only  arrived  in  Paris  on  February  3rd, 
and  it  was  the  middle  of  the  month  before  the  French 
had  succeeded  in  remedying  the  prevalent  distress  in 
the  capital. 

The  G-erman  prisoners  were  at  once  given  up.  The 
surrender  of  arms  and  military  materiel  followed  by 
degrees,  also  the  200  million  francs  ransom  imposed 
on  the  city. 

But  it  was  still  doubtful  if  the  party  of  war  "  a  ou- 
rance  "  in  Bordeaux  would  agree  with  the  arrangement 
of  the  Paris  Government,  and  if  at  last  the  National 
Assembly,  which  was  about  to  be  convened,  would 
accept  the  conditions  of  peace  made  by  the  conquerors. 
Such  measures  as  were  necessary  in  case  the  war 
should  break  out  again  were  therefore  taken  on  the 
French  as  well  as  on  the  German  side. 

The  distribution  of  the  French  army  at  the  close  of 
the  armistice  was  not  a  favorable  one. 

By  General  Faidherbe's  advice  the  whole  Army  of 
the  North  was  disbanded,  as  being  too  weak  to  face 
the  strength  of  the  forces  that  stood  opposite  to  them. 
After  the  Twenty-second  Corps  had  been  transported 
by  sea  to  Cherbourg,  the  Army  of  Bretagne,  under 
General  de  Colombo,  was  made  up  of  this,  with  the 
Twenty-seventh  and  part  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  and 
including  Lipowski's  volunteers,  CatheUneau's  and 
others,  amounted  to  150,000  men.  General  Loysel, 
with  30,000  ill-armed  and  inexperienced  Gardes  Mo- 
biles, remained  in  the  trenches  before  Havi^e. 

General  Chanzy,  after  his  retreat  on  Mayenne,  had 


PEECAUTIONAKY  MEASURES.  413 

made  a  movement  to  the  left,  in  order  to  assist  in  a 
new  plan  of  action  with  the  Second  Army  of  the  Loire, 
with  its  base  at  Caen,  which,  however,  was  never  car- 
ried out.  The  Eighteenth,  Twenty-first,  Sixteenth, 
and  Twenty-sixth  Corps  stood  between  the  Lower 
Loire  and  the  Cher  from  Angers  to  Chateauroux,  about 
100,000  men  strong,  the  Twenty-fifth  under  Greneral 
Pourcet  at  Bourges,  and  General  de  Pointe's  corps  at 
Nevers.  The  Army  of  the  Vosges  had  withdrawn  to 
the  south  of  Chalon-sur-Saone,  and  the  remainder  of 
the  Army  of  the  East  assembled  under  General  Cremer 
at  Chambery  as  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps. 

The  total  of  all  the  field  troops  amounted  to  534,452 
men.  The  volunteers,  even  the  most  reliable,  were 
dismissed,  and  the  National  Guard  were  for  the  present 
regarded  as  incapaUes  de  rendre  aiiciin  service  a  la 
guerre.  In  the  barracks,  the  manoeuvi'ing  camps,  and 
in  Algiers  there  were  still  354,000  men,  and  132,000 
were  on  the  muster-rolls  as  recruits  in  1871,  but  had 
not  yet  been  told  oif . 

If  the  war  should  be  persisted  in,  a  plan  for  limiting 
it  to  defensive  measures  in  the  south-east  of  France 
had  been  suggested,  for  which,  however,  according  to 
the  report  sent  on  February  8th  by  the  Committee  of 
Inquiry  to  the  National  Assembly,  scarcely  more  than 
252,000  men  in  fighting  condition  were  available.  The 
fleet,  besides,  had  given  up  so  considerable  a  number 
of  its  men  and  guns  for  service  on  land,  that  it  was  no 
longer  able  for  any  great  undertaking  at  sea. 

On  the  German  side  the  first  consideration  was  to 
restore  the  troops  to  their  war-standing,  and  make 
good  the  stores  of  materiel. 

The  forts  round  Paris  were  at  once  armed  on  the 
fronts  facing  the  city  walls.  In  and  between  these 
stood  680  guns,  145  of  which  had  been  taken  from  the 


414  THE  FBANCO-GEEMAK  WAK. 

French ;  they  were  more  than  enough  to  keep  the  rest- 
less population  under  control.  A  part  of  the  forces 
which  till  then  had  been  occupied  with  the  siege,  being 
no  longer  required,  were  removed,  in  order  that  all  the 
troops  might  have  better  accommodation.  Besides,  it 
seemed  desirable  to  strengthen  the  Second  Army  which 
faced  the  enemy's  principal  force ;  in  consequence  the 
Fourth  Corps  marched  on  Nogent-le-Rotrou,  the  Fifth 
on  Orleans,  and  the  Ninth,  which  was  relieved  there, 
on  Vendome ;  so  that  now  the  quarters  of  this  army 
extended  from  Alengon  to  Tours,  and  up  the  Loire  as 
far  as  Gien  and  Auxerre. 

The  First  Army  was  in  the  north  with  the  Eighth 
Corps  on  the  Somme,  and  on  both  sides  of  the  Lower 
Seine ;  in  the  south  the  Army  of  the  South  occupied 
the  line  of  demarcation  from  Baume  to  Switzerland, 
and  the  country  in  the  rear. 

At  the  end  of  February  the  invading  field-army 
standing  on  French  ground  consisted  of: — 

Infantiy     .      464,221  men  with  1674  guns. 
Cavahy      .       55,562  horses. 

Troops  in  garrison : — 

Infantry     .      105,272  men  with  68  guns. 
Cavahy      .  5,681  horses,    n 


Total    .      630,736  men  and  1742  guns. 

Reserve  forces  left  in  Germany: — 
3,288  officers. 
204,684  men. 
26,603  horses. 

Arrangements  were  made,  that  in  case  of  a  recom- 
mencement of  hostilities,  the  strongest  resistance  could 
be  made  at  all  points.  The  armistice  had  nearly 
reached  its  end,  and  the  troops  had  already  been  more 


NEGOTIATIONS   FOR  PEACE.  415 

closely  collected  to  be  ready  to  advance  first  of  all  on 
the  offensive,  towards  the  south,  when  the  clerk  of  the 
Council  announced  that  the  armistice  was  extended  to 
the  24th,  and  again  prolonged  to  midnight  on  the  26th. 

Considerable  difficulties  had  arisen  from  the  differ- 
ences of  opinion  with  regard  to  the  election  of  the 
National  Assembly,  between  the  Government  in  Paris 
and  the  Delegation  at  Bordeaux.  The  Germans  wished 
to  see  the  choice,  not  of  a  party,  but  of  the  whole 
nation,  expressed  by  a  free  suffrage.  But  Gambetta 
had  ruled,  contrary  to  the  conditions  of  the  armistice, 
that  all  those  who,  after  December  2nd,  1851,  had  held 
any  position  in  the  Imperial  Government  should  be 
regarded  as  ineligible.  It  was  not  till  the  Parisian 
Government  had  obtained  a  majority  of  votes  by  dis- 
patching several  of  its  members  to  Bordeaux,  and  till 
the  dictator  had  resigned  on  the  6th  February,  that 
the  voting  went  on  quickly  and  unhindered. 

The  deputies  were  already  assembled  in  Bordeaux 
by  the  12th.  M.  Thiers  was  elected  chief  of  the  execu- 
tive, and  went  to  Paris  on  the  19th  with  Jules  Favre, 
determined  to  end  the  aimless  war  at  any  cost. 

Negotiations  for  peace  were  opened,  and  after  five 
days'  violent  debating,  when  at  last  the  Germans  con- 
sented to  restore  Belfort  to  the  French,  the  prelimi- 
naries were  signed  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th. 

France  agreed  to  surrender  to  Germany  a  part  of 
Lorraine  and  Alsace,  with  the  exception  of  Belfort, 
and  a  war  indemnity  of  five  milliards  of  francs. 

The  evacuation  of  the  places  that  the  Germans  had 
taken  was  to  begin  immediately  on  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  and  be  continued  by  degrees  in  proportion 
as  the  money  was  paid.  As  long  as  the  German  troops 
remained  on  French  soil  they  were  to  be  fed  at  the 
expense  of  France.    On  the  other  hand,  no  further 


416  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN  WAE. 

requisitions  were  to  be  made  by  the  G-ermans.  Imme* 
diately  after  the  first  evacuation  the  French  forces  were 
to  retire  behind  the  Loke,  with  the  exception  of  40,000 
men  in  Paris  and  the  necessary  garrisons  in  the  for- 
tresses. 

After  the  ratification  of  these  preliminaries,  further 
terms  were  to  be  discussed  in  Brussels,  and  the  return 
of  the  French  prisoners  would  begin.  Thus  the  armis- 
tice was  prolonged  to  the  12th  of  March ;  but  it  was  in 
the  option  of  either  of  the  belligerent  powers  to  end  it 
after  the  3rd  March  by  giving  three  days'  notice. 

Finally,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  German  Army 
should  have  the  satisfaction  of  marching  into  Paris, 
and  remaining  there  till  the  ratification  of  the  treaty ; 
but  they  would  restrict  themselves  to  the  quarter  of 
the  town  lying  between  Point-du-Jour  and  the  Rue  du 
Faubourg-St.-Honore.  This  was  occupied  on  the  1st 
March,  after  a  parade  in  Longchamps  before  his 
Majesty  of  30,000  men,  consisting  of  11,000  of  the 
Sixth,  11,000  of  the  Second  Bavarian,  and  8000  of  the 
Eleventh  Army  Corps.  On  the  3rd  and  5th  of  March 
they  were  to  have  been  relieved  by  other  detachments 
of  the  same  strength,  but  M.  Thiers  succeeded  by  the 
1st  March  in  getting  the  National  Assembly  at  Bor- 
deaux to  accept  the  treaty,  after  the"  deposition  of  the 
Napoleonic  dynasty  had  been  voted.  The  exchange 
of  ratifications  took  place  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2nd, 
and  on  the  3rd  the  first  detachment  marched  back  into 
quarters. 

THE  KETUEN  MAECH   OF  THE   GEEMAN   AEMY. 

By  the  Third  Article,  the  whole  of  the  land  between 
the  Seine  and  the  Loire,  excepting  Paris,  was  to  be 
evacuated  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  by  both 
armies  J  the  right  bank  of  the  former  river,  on  the 


EETURN   MAECH  OF  THE  INVADEES.  417 

other  hand,  was  only  to  be  cleared  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  definitive  treaty  of  peace.  Even  then  the  six 
Eastern  departments  were  still  left  in  possession  of  the 
Germans  as  a  pledge  for  the  last  three  milliards ;  not, 
however,  occupied  by  more  than  50,000  men. 

The  order  of  march  was  drawn  up  at  head-quarters, 
with  a  view  no  less  to  the  comfort  of  the  troops  than 
to  the  reformation  of  the  original  order  of  battle,  and 
the  possibility  of  rapid  assembly  in  case  of  need. 

The  forces  told  off  for  permanent  occupation  of  the 
ceded  provinces  marched  thither  at  once. 

The  reserve  and  Landwehr  troops  in  Germany  were 
disbanded,  as  well  as  the  Baden  contingent,  which, 
however,  for  the  present  remained  there  as  a  mobilized 
force.  The  army  head-quarters  in  Lorraine,  Rheims, 
and  Versailles  were  broken  up,  and  their  authority 
handed  over  to  the  generals  in  command,  but  in  order 
to  maintain  order  in  the  rear  of  the  army,  the  Sixth 
and  Twelfth  Corps,  as  well  as  the  Wiirtemberg  Field 
Division,  were  placed  under  the  immediate  command 
of  the  army  head-quarters. 

By  March  31st  the  army  had  taken  possession  of  the 
newly-acquired  territory,  bounded  on  the  west  by  the 
Seine  from  its  source  to  its  mouth. 

The  First  Army  was  in  the  departments  of  Seine- 
Inferieure  and  Somme,  the  Second  in  front  of  Paris, 
in  the  departments  of  Oise  and  Seine-et-Marne,  the 
Third  in  the  departments  of  Aube  and  Haute-Marne, 
the  Army  of  the  South  in  the  last  hostile  districts. 
The  forts  of  Paris  on  the  left  bank  were  given  up  to 
the  French  authorities ;  the  siege-park  and  the  captured 
war  materiel  had  been  carried  off.  In  consideration 
for  the  wishes  of  the  French  Government,  in  order 
that  the  National  Assembly  might  be  allowed  as  early 
as  possible  to  sit  at  Versailles,  the  head-quarters  were 
27 


418  THE  FEANCO-GEEMAN   WAE. 

broken  up  and  transferred  to  Ferrieres,  even  sooner 
than  had  been  agreed.  On  the  15th  March  his  Majesty 
left  Nancy  for  Berlin. 

All  the  troops  that  were  left  before  Paris  were  placed 
under  the  command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony, 
and  General  von  Manteuffel  was  nominated  Com- 
mander of  the  Army  of  Occupation. 

At  the  moment  when  Prance  had  freed  herself  by  a 
heavy  sacrifice,  an  enemy  of  the  most  dangerous  char- 
acter appeared  from  within :  the  Commune  in  Paris. 

The  40,000  men  who  had  been  left  there  proved 
themselves  unequal  to  the  task  of  keeping  the  rebellious 
movement  under  control ;  even  during  the  siege  it  had 
on  several  occasions  betrayed  its  presence,  and  now 
broke  out  in  open  civil  war.  Large  masses  of  people, 
encouraged  by  the  National  Gruard  and  the  Oarde 
Mobile,  took  possession  of  the  guns  and  set  themselves 
up  in  armed  opposition  to  the  Grovernment.  M.  Thiers 
had  already,  by  the  18th  of  March,  summoned  to  Ver- 
sailles such  regiments  as  could  still  be  trusted,  to  with- 
draw them  from  the  dangers  of  party  influence,  and 
for  the  protection  of  the  National  Assembly  there. 
The  French  capital  remained  destroyed,  and  plundered 
by  the  French  troops. 

The  Germans  could  have  easily  and  quickly  put  an 
end  to  the  matter,  but  what  Government  would  allow 
its  rights  to  be  established  by  foreign  bayonets  I  The 
German  Commanders-in-chief  hmited  themselves  to 
forbidding  any  rebellious  disturbances  within  their 
own  district,  and  to  prevent  any  further  marching  into 
Paris  from  outside.  The  work  of  disarming,  which 
had  commenced,  was  interrupted;  the  troops  of  the 
Third  Corps  were  drawn  closer  to  the  forts,  and  the 
outposts  were  replaced  along  the  line  of  demarcation, 
where  200,000  men  could  be  collected  within  two  days. 


THE   COMMUNE  IN   PABIS.  419 

The  anthorities  in  Paris,  however,  announced  that 
any  attempt  to  arm  the  fronts  facing  the  Grermans 
would  result  in  an  instantaneous  bombardment  of  the 
city.  The  rebels,  however,  were  fully  occupied  in 
destroying  and  burning,  and  in  executing  their  supe- 
riors in  the  interior  of  Paris.  They  did  not  turn  against 
their  foreign  enemy,  but  against  the  Government 
chosen  by  the  nation,  and  prepared  for  an  attack  on 
Versailles. 

The  leaders  of  the  State  who  were  there,  bound  by 
the  conditions. of  the  treaty,  were  almost  defenceless; 
meanwhile  the  Germans  were  prepared  and  willing  to 
march  up  a  reinforcement  of  80,000  men,  troops  from 
Besan^on,  Auxerre,  and  Cambrai ;  and  their  transport 
would  be  furthered  by  the  German  troops  in  occupation 
of  the  districts  through  which  they  would  have  to 
pass. 

The  releasing  of  the  prisoners  had,  on  the  contrary, 
been  reduced.  And  these  were,  for  the  most  part,  the 
best  disciplined  of  the  forces ;  but  they  might  not  im- 
probably join  the  hostile  party,  so  at  first  only  20,000 
troops  of  the  line  were  set  free. 

General  MacMahon  marched  on  April  4th  with  the 
Government  troops  towards  Paris,  and  entered  the  city 
on  the  21st.  As  they  then  were  engaged  for  eight 
days  in  barricade  fighting,  and  troops  of  fugitives 
threatened  to  break  through  the  German  lines,  the 
Third  Army  was  ordered  to  form  in  closer  order.  The 
outposts  advanced  almost  to  the  gates  of  the  city,  and 
barred  all  communication  through  them  until,  at  the 
end  of  the  month,  Paris  was  again  in  the  control  of 
the  Government. 

In  the  meantime,  the  negotiations  commenced  in 
Brussels  and  continued  in  Frankfort  were  making 
rapid  progress,  and  by  the  10th  of  May  the  definite 


420  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

treaty  of  peace,  based  on  the  preliminaries,  was  ready 
to  be  signed.  The  ratification  on  both  sides  followed 
within  the  appointed  time  of  ten  days. 

Thus  a  war,  carried  on  with  such  a  vast  expenditure 
of  force  on  both  sides,  was  brought  to  an  end  by  in- 
cessant and  restless  energy  in  the  short  period  of  seven 
months. 

Even  in  the  first  four  weeks  eight  battles  took  place, 
under  which  the  French  Empire  collapsed,  and  the 
French  Army  was  swept  from  the  field. 

Fresh  forces,  massive  but  incompetent,  equalized  the 
original  numerical  superiority  of  the  Germans,  and  it 
needed  twelve  more  battles  to  secure  the  decisive  siege 
of  the  enemy's  capital. 

Twenty  fortified  places  were  taken,  and  not  a  single 
day  passed  without  a  struggle,  great  or  small. 

The  war  had  cost  the  Germans  many  victims ;  they 
lost :  6247  officers,  123,453  men,  1  flag,  and  6  guns. 

The  total  losses  of  the  French  were  incalculable ;  in 
prisoners  only  they  amounted  to : — 

In  Germany  .        .  11,860  officers,  371,981  men. 
In  Paris         .        .      7,456       "       241,686     " 
Disarmed  in  Switz-  ^ 

erland         .        .      2,192       "         88,381    " 


21,508  officers,  702,048  men. 

107  flags  and  eagles,  1915  field-guns,  and  5526  fort- 
guns  were  captured. 

Strasburg  and  Metz,  which  had  been  alienated  from 
Germany  in  a  time  of  weakness,  were  reconquered, 
and  the  German  Empire  had  risen  anew. 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 

MEMORAJSTDUM  ON  THE   COUNCILS   OF  WAR  SAID  TO   HAVE  BEEN 
HELD  DURING  THE  WARS   UNDER   KING  WILLIAM. 

In  the  accounts  of  historical  events,  as  they  are  handed  down 
to  posterity,  mistakes  assume  the  form  of  legends  which  it  is 
not  always  easy  subsequently  to  disprove. 

Among  others  is  the  fable  which  very  circumstantially 
ascribes  the  great  decisions  taken  in  the  course  of  the  German 
campaigns,  before  and  in  1870-71,  to  the  consultations  of 
councils  of  war  previously  convened. 

For  instance,  the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 

I  can  relate  in  a  few  lines  the  circumstances  under  which  an 
event  of  such  far-reaching  importance  had  birth. 

The  Master  of  the  Ordnance,  Feldzeugmeister  Benedek,  had, 
in  his  advance  to  the  northward,  to  secure  himself  against  the 
Second  Prussian  Army  marching  on  the  east  over  the  moun- 
tains of  Schleswig.  To  tliis  end  four  of  his  corps  had  one 
after  another  been  pushed  forward  on  his  flank,  and  had  all 
been  beaten  within  three  days.  They  now  joined  the  main 
body  of  the  Austrian  Army,  which  had  meanwliile  reached 
Dubenetz. 

Here,  then,  on  June  30th,  almost  the  whole  of  the  Austrian 
forces  were  standing  actually  within  the  line  of  operations 
between  the  two  Prussian  armies ;  but  the  First  was  already 
fighting  its  way  to  Gitschin,  designated  from  Berhn  as  the 
point  on  which  they  were  to  concentrate,  and  the  Second  had 
also  advanced  close  on  the  Upper  Elbe  ;  thus  they  were  both 
so  near  that  the  enemy  could  not  attack  the  one  without  the 
other  falling  on  his  rear.  His  strategic  advantages  were  nulli- 
fied by  the  tactical  disadvantage. 


424  THE   FEANCO-GEKMAN   WAE. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  having  ah-eady  lost  40,000 
men  in  previous  battles,  General  Benedek  gave  up  the  advance, 
and  during  the  night  of  June  30th  began  his  retreat  on  Konig- 
gratz. 

The  movement  of  six  army  corps  and  four  cavalry  divisions, 
marching  in  only  four  columns,  which  were  necessarily  very 
deep,  could  not  be  accompHshed  in  the  course  of  a  single  day. 
They  halted  in  close  order  between  Trotina  and  Lipa;  but 
when  on  July  2nd  they  were  still  there,  it  was  owing  to  the 
extreme  fatigue  of  the  troops,  and  the  difficulty,  nay,  impossi- 
bihty,  of  withdrawing  so  large  a  body  of  men  beyond  the  Elbe, 
under  the  eyes  of  an  active  enemy  and  by  a  limited  number  of 
passages.  In  fact,  the  Austrian  general  could  no  longer 
manoeuvre ;  he  must  fight. 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  neither  his  advance  on  Dubenetz 
nor  his  retreat  on  Lipa  was  known  to  the  Prussians.  These 
movements  were  concealed  from  the  Second  Army  by  the  Elbe, 
and  the  cavalry  of  the  First  at  that  time  constituted  a  useless 
mass  of  8000  horse  remaining  with  the  corps.  The  four 
squadrons  attached  to  each  infantry  division  were  of  course 
not  able  to  effect  the  reconnoissance,  as  subsequently  was  done 
in  1870  by  a  more  advantageous  plan  of  formation. 

Thus  at  head-quarters  at  Gitschin,  where  the  King  was, 
nothing  certain  was  known.  It  was  supposed  that  the  main 
body  of  the  hostile  army  was  still  advancing,  and  that  it  would 
draw  up  in  a  position  with  the  Elbe  in  its  front  and  the  wings 
at  the  fortress  of  Josephstadt  and  Koniggratz.  There  were 
these  two  alternatives — either  to  outflank  this  strong  position, 
or  attack  in  front. 

By  the  first  the  communications  of  the  Austrian  Army 
would  be  so  seriously  threatened  at  Pardubitz  that  it  might  be 
compelled  to  retreat.  But  to  secure  such  a  movement  the 
Second  Prussian  Army  must  take  the  place  of  the  First  and 
cross  over  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe.  At  the  same  time 
the  flank  movement  of  the  First  Army,  close  past  the  enemy's 
front,  might  easily  be  interfered  with,  if  passages  enough  had 
been  opened. 

In  the  second  case,  success  could  only  be  hoped  for  if  an 


APPENDIX.  425 

advance  of  the  Second  Army  on  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy's 
position  could  be  combined  with  the  attack  in  front.  For  this 
it  must  be  kept  on  the  left  bank. 

The  separation  of  the  two  armies,  which  was  for  the  present 
intentionally  maintained,  allowed  of  either  plan  being  followed ; 
but  mine  was  the  serious  responsibility  of  advising  his  Majesty 
which. 

To  keep  both  open  for  the  present,  General  von  Herwarth 
was  ordered  to  occupy  Pardubitz,  and  the  Crown  Prince  to 
remain  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  to  reconnoitre  along  that 
river  as  weU  as  the  Aupa  and  the  Metau,  and  remove  all 
obstacles  which  might  oppose  a  crossing  in  either  direction. 
At  last,  on  July  2nd,  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  ordered,  in 
the  event  of  his  finding  a  large  force  in  front  of  the  Elbe,  to 
attack  at  once.  But,  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  it  was 
announced  to  the  Prince  that  the  whole  Austrian  Army  had 
marched  on  the  Bistritz ;  and,  in  obedience  to  instructions,  he 
at  once  ordered  the  First  Army  and  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  to 
unite  close  in  front  of  the  enemy  by  daybreak  next  morning. 

General  von  Voigt-Rhetz  brought  the  news  at  eleven  o'clock 
in  the  evening  to  the  King  at  Gitschin,  and  he  sent  him  over 
to  me. 

This  news  settled  all  doubts  and  lifted  a  weight  from  my 
mind.  "  Thank  God !  "  I  said,  sprang  out  of  bed,  and  hastened 
across  to  the  King,  who  was  lodged  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Market  Place. 

His  Majesty  also  had  gone  to  rest  in  his  little  camp-bed. 
After  a  brief  explanation  on  my  part,  he  said  he  fully  under- 
stood the  situation,  decided  on  giving  battle  next  day  with  all 
three  armies  at  once,  and  desired  me  to  transmit  the  necessary 
orders  to  the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  at  once  to  cross  the  Elbe. 

The  whole  interview  with  his  Majesty  had  lasted  barely  ten 
minutes.     No  one  else  was  present. 

This  was  the  Council  of  War  before  Koniggratz. 

General  von  Podbielski  and  Major  Count  Wartensleben 
shared  my  quarters.  The  orders  to  the  Second  Army  were 
drawn  up  forthwith  and  dispatched  in  duplicate  by  two  differ- 
ent routes  before  midnight.     One,  carried  by  General  von 


426  THE  FEANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

Voigt-Rhetz,  informed  Prince  Frederick  Charles  of  the  steps  to 
be  taken ;  the  other  was  sent  direct  to  Koniginhof . 

In  the  course  of  his  night-ride  of  above  six  miles  (German), 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Count  Finckenstein  had  to  pass  the  out- 
posts of  the  Fii'st  Army  Corps,  which  was  most  to  the  rear. 
He  handed  to  the  officer  on  duty  a  special  letter  to  be  forwarded 
immediately  to  the  general  in  command,  ordering  an  immediate 
muster  of  the  troops  and  an  independent  advance,  even  before 
orders  should  reach  him  from  the  Crown  Prince. 

The  position  of  the  Austrians  on  July  3rd  had  a  front  of 
not  more  than  a  German  mile.  The  Prussian  armies  advanced 
on  it  in  a  semicircle  of  about  five  miles  in  extent.  But  while 
in  the  centre  the  Fu'st  and  Second  Corps  of  the  First  Ai"my 
stood  before  daylight  close  in  front  of  the  enemy,  on  the  right 
wing  General  von  Herwarth  had  to  advance  on  the  Bistritz 
from  Smidar,  in  the  dark,  by  very  bad  roads,  above  two  miles ; 
and  on  the  left,  orders  from  head-quarters  could  not  even  reach 
the  Crown  Prince  before  four  in  the  morning.  It  was  there- 
fore decided  that  an  engagement  was  to  be  fought  with  the 
centre  to  detain  the  Austrian  Army  for  some  hours. 

Above  all,  any  possible  offensive  move  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  must  here  be  met,  and  for  this  the  whole  Third  Coi-ps 
and  cavalry  stood  at  hand ;  but  the  battle  could  only  be  decided 
by  a  flank  movement  by  both  the  Prussian  wings  at  once. 

I  had  ridden  out  early  to  the  heights  above  Sadowa  with 
my  of&cers,  and  at  eight  o'clock  the  King  also  arrived  there. 

It  was  a  dull  morning,  and  from  time  to  time  a  shower  fell. 
The  horizon  was  dim,  far  on  the  right  the  white  clouds  of 
smoke  showed  that  the  head  of  the  First  Army  was  already 
fighting  some  way  off,  outside  the  villages  on  the  Bistritz.  On 
the  left,  in  the  woods  of  Swip,  brisk  rifle-fixing  was  audible. 
Behind  the  King,  besides  his  staff  were  his  royal  guests  with 
their  numerous  suites  of  adjutants,  equerries  and  led-horses, 
in  number  as  many  as  two  squadrons.  An  Austrian  battery 
seemed  to  have  selected  them  to  aim  at,  and  compelled  him  to 
move  away  with  a  smaller  following. 

Soon  after.  Count  Wartensleben  and  I  rode  through  Sadowa, 
which  the  enemy  had  already  abandoned.    The  van-guard  of 


APPENDIX.  427 

the  8tli  Division  had  drawn  np  the  guns  under  cover  of  the 
tirailleurs  who  had  been  sent  forward,  but  several  shells  fell 
there  from  a  large  battery  at  the  skii-t  of  the  wood.  As  we 
rode  down  the  road  we  admired  the  coolness  of  a  huge  ox 
which  went  on  its  way  heedless  of  the  shot,  and  seemed  deter- 
mined to  charge  the  enemy's  position. 

The  formidable  array  of  the  Thii'd  and  Tenth  Austrian 
Corps'  artillery  opposite  the  wood  now  prevented  any  attempt 
to  break  through  it,  and  I  was  in  time  to  countermand  an 
order  which  had  been  given  to  do  so. 

Meanwhile,  further  to  the  left,  General  von  Fransecky  had 
already  acted  on  the  offensive.  After  a  sharp  struggle  he  had 
driven  the  enemy  out  of  the  Swip  woods,  and  got  through  to 
the  fui'ther  side.  Against  him  he  had  the  Fourth  Austrian 
Corps ;  but  now  the  Second  and  part  of  the  Third  Corps  turned 
on  the  7th  Division ;  fifty-one  battalions  against  fourteen.  In 
the  thick  brushwood  aU  the  detachments  had  got  mixed,  indi- 
vidual command  was  impossible,  and,  in  spite  of  our  obstinate 
resistance,  whole  troops  were  taken  prisoners  and  others  dis- 
persed. 

Such  a  rabble  rushed  out  of  the  wood  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  King  and  his  staff  rode  up ;  his  Majesty  looked  on 
with  some  displeasure,*  but  the  wounded  officer  who  was  trying 
to  keep  his  httle  troop  together  at  once  led  them  back  into  the 
fight.  In  spite  of  heavy  losses,  the  division  got  possession  of 
the  northern  side  of  the  wood.  It  had  drawn  down  on  itself 
very  large  forces  of  the  enemy,  which  were  subsequently  miss- 
ing in  the  positions  they  ought  to  have  defended. 

It  was  now  eleven  o'clock.  The  head  of  the  First  Army 
had  crossed  the  Bistritz  and  taken  most  of  the  villages  along 
its  banks ;  but  these  were  only  the  enemy's  outposts,  which  he 
had  no  serious  intention  of  guarding.  His  main  corps  held  a 
position  in  the  rear  from  whence,  with  250  guns,  it  commanded 
the  open  plains  which  the  Prussians  must  cross  in  order  to 
attack.     On  the  right,  General  von  Herwarth  had  reached  the 

*  I  have  a  history  of  the  war,  published  at  Tokio,  in  the  Japanese  lan- 
guage, with  very  original  illustrations.  One  of  these  has  for  its  title, 
"  The  King  scolding  the  Army." 


428  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAR. 

Bistritz,  but  on  the  left  nothing  was  yet  to  be  seen  of  the 
Crown  Prince. 

The  battle  had  come  to  a  standstill.  In  the  centre  the  First 
Army  was  still  fighting  round  the  villages  on  the  Bistritz ;  the 
cavalry  could  not  get  forward,  and  the  artillery  found  no  good 
position  to  occupy.  The  troops  had  been  for  five  hours  under 
the  enemy's  hottest  fire,  without  food,  for  there  had  not  been 
time  to  prepare  it. 

Some  doubt  as  to  the  issue  of  the  battle  existed  probably  in 
many  minds ;  perhaps  in  that  of  Count  Bismarck  as  he  offered 
me  a  cigar.  As  I  was  subsequently  informed,  he  took  it  for  a 
good  sign  that  of  two  cigars  I  cooUy  took  the  best. 

The  King  asked  me  at  about  this  time  what  I  thought  of 
the  prospects  of  the  battle.  I  replied,  "  Your  Majesty  to-day 
will  not  only  win  the  battle,  but  decide  the  war." 

It  could  not  be  otherwise. 

"We  had  the  advantage  in  numbers,*  which  in  war  is  never  to 
be  despised ;  and  our  Second  Army  must  come  up  in  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  Austrians, 

At  about  1.30  a  white  cloud  was  seen  on  the  height  crowned 
with  trees  and  visible  from  afar,  on  which  our  field-glasses  had 
been  centred.  It  was  indeed  not  yet  the  Second  Army,  but 
the  smoke  of  the  fire  opened  on  its  advance.  The  joyful  shout, 
"  The  Crown  Prince  is  coming !  "  ran  through  the  ranks.     I 

*  During  a  long  peace  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  War  Minister's 
department  and  the  General  Staff  were  not  distinctly  defined.  The  pro- 
viding for  the  troops  in  peace  was  the  function  of  the  former,  and  in  war- 
time a  number  of  official  duties  which  could  only  be  superintended  by 
the  central  authorities  at  home.  Thus  the  place  of  the  Minister  of  War 
was  not  at  head-quarters,  but  at  Berlin.  The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
on  the  other  hand,  from  the  moment  when  the  mobilization  is  ordered, 
assumes  the  whole  responsibility  for  the  marching  and  transport  already 
prepared  for  during  peace,  both  for  the  first  assembling  of  the  forces  and 
for  their  subsequent  employment,  for  which  he  has  only  to  ask  the  con- 
sent of  the  Commander-in-chief — always,  with  us,  the  King. 

How  necessary  this  severance  of  authority  is,  I  learnt  in  June,  1866. 
Without  my  knowledge  the  order  had  been  given  for  the  Seventh  Corps 
to  remain  on  the  Rhine.  It  was  only  by  my  representations  that  the 
16th  Division  was  also  moved  up  into  Bohemia,  and  our  numerical  supe- 
riority thus  brought  up  to  a  decisive  strength. 


APPENDIX.  429 

sent  the  desired  news  to  General  von  Herwarth,  who,  meanwhile, 
had  carried  Problus  from  the  Saxons  in  spite  of  a  heroic  defence. 

The  Second  Army  had  started  at  7.30  in  the  morning ;  only 
the  First  Corps  had  waited  till  about  9.15.  The  advance  by 
bad  roads,  in  part  across  the  fields,  had  taken  much  time ;  the 
ridge  of  hills  stretching  from  Horenowes  to  Trotina,  in  the 
march,  if  efficiently  held  must  be  a  serious  obstacle ;  but  in 
their  eager  pursuit  of  Fransecky's  division  the  enemy's  right 
wing  had  wheeled  to  the  left,  so  that  it  lay  open  to  some  extent 
to  an  attack  in  the  rear. 

The  Crown  Prince's  progress  was  not  visible  to  us,  but  at 
about  haK-past  three  the  King  ordered  the  advance  of  the 
First  Army. 

As  we  came  out  of  the  wood  of  Sadowa  we  found  still  a  part 
of  the  great  battery  which  had  so  long  prevented  us  from 
debouching  there,  but  the  teams  and  gunners  lay  dead  by  the 
wrecked  guns.  There  was  nothing  else  to  be  seen  of  the 
enemy  for  a  long  way  round. 

The  Austrian  retreat  from  the  position,  stormed  on  both 
sides,  had  become  inevitable,  and  had,  in  fact,  been  effected 
some  time  since.  Their  capital  artillery,  firing  on  to  the  last 
moment,  had  screened  their  retreat  and  given  the  infantry  a 
long  start.  Crossing  the  Bistritz  seriously  delayed  the  prog- 
ress, especially  of  the  cavalry,  so  that  only  isolated  detach- 
ments came  up  with  the  enemy. 

"We  rode  at  a  smart  gaUop  across  the  wide  field  of  battle, 
without  looking  much  about  us  at  the  scene  of  horror.  On 
the  other  side  we  joined  our  three  armies,  which  had  at  last 
pushed  through  the  narrow  place  from  various  directions,  and 
got  much  mixed.  It  took  twenty-four  hours  to  remedy  the 
confusion  and  reform  the  companies ;  pursuit  was  at  that 
moment  impossible,  but  the  victory  was  complete. 

The  exhausted  men  at  once  sought  a  spot  to  rest  on  in  the 
villages  or  the  open  country,  where  best  they  might.  Any- 
thing that  came  to  hand  by  way  of  food  was  of  course  taken ; 
my  wandering  ox  probably  among  the  rest.  The  death-cries 
of  pigs  and  geese  were  heard ;  but  necessity  knows  no  law, 
and  the  baggage-wagons  were  natm-aUy  not  on  the  spot. 


430  THE  FEANCO-GEKMAN   WAR. 

The  King,  too,  remained  at  a  hamlet  on  the  field.  Only  I 
and  my  two  officers  had  to  ride  five  miles  back  to  Gitschin, 
where  the  oificers  were. 

We  had  set  out  at  four  in  the  morning,  and  had  been  four- 
teen hoiu's  in  the  saddle.  In  the  sudden  emergency  no  one 
had  thought  of  providing  liimself  with  food.  An  Uhlan  of 
the  2nd  Regiment  had  given  me  part  of  a  sausage ;  bread  he 
had  not  got.  On  om*  way  back  we  met  the  endless  train  of 
provision  and  ammunition  wagons,  often  extending  all  across 
the  road.  We  did  not  reach  our  quarters  till  midnight.  There 
was  nothing  to  eat  even  here  at  tliis  hour,  but  I  was  so  ex- 
hausted that  I  thi-ew  myself  on  my  bed  in  my  great-coat  and 
scarf,  and  f eU  asleep  instantly.  Next  morning  new  orders  had 
to  be  di-awn  out  and  laid  before  his  Majesty  at  Horitz. 

The  great  King  had  struggled  for  seven  years  to  reduce  the 
might  of  Austria,  and  his  more  fortunate  and  more  powerful 
grandson  had  achieved  it  in  as  many  weeks.  The  campaign 
had  proved  decisive  in  the  first  eight  days  from  June  27th  to 
July  3rd. 

The  war  of  1866  was  entered  on  not  because  the  existence 
of  Prussia  was  threatened,  nor  in  obedience  to  public  opinion 
and  the  voice  of  the  people :  it  was  a  struggle,  long  foreseen 
and  calmly  prepared  for,  recognized  as  a  necessity  by  the 
Cabinet,  not  for  territorial  aggrandizement  or  material  ad- 
vantage, but  for  an  ideal  end — the  estabhshment  of  power. 
Not  a  foot  of  land  was  exacted  from  conquered  Austria,  but  it 
had  to  renounce  all  part  in  the  hegemony  of  Germany. 

The  Imperial  family  alone  were  to  blame  if  the  old  Empire 
had  now  for  centuries  allowed  domestic  polities  to  override 
German  national  politics.  Austria  had  exhausted  her  strength 
in  conquests  south  of  the  Alps,  and  left  the  western  German 
pro\'inces  unprotected,  instead  of  following  the  road  pointed 
out  by  the  course  of  the  Danube.  Its  centre  of  gi-avity  lay 
out  of  Germany ;  Prussia's  lay  within  it.  Prussia  felt  itself 
called  upon  and  strong  enough  to  assume  the  leadership  of 
the  German  races.  The  regrettable  but  unavoidable  exclusion 
of  one  of  them  from  the  new  Empire  could  only  be  to  a  smaU 
extent  remedied  by  a  subsequent  alliance.     But  Prussia  has 


APPENDIX.  431 

become  immeasurably  greater  without  Austria,  than  it  was 
before  with  Austria. 

But  all  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  legends  of  which  I 
was  speaking. 

One  has  been  sung  in  verse,  and  in  fine  verse  too. 

The  scene  is  Versailles.  The  French  are  making  a  sortie 
from  Paris,  and  the  generals,  instead  of  leading  their  troops, 
are  assembled  to  consider  whether  head-quarters  may  safely 
remain  any  longer  at  Versailles.  Opinions  are  divided,  no 
one  dares  speak  out.  The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  who  is 
above  all  called  on  to  express  his  views,  remains  silent.  The 
consternation  seems  to  be  great.  Only  the  War  Minister  rises 
and  protests  with  the  greatest  emphasis  against  a  measui-e  so 
injurious  from  a  pohtical  and  mihtary  point  of  \'iew  as  a  re- 
moval. He  is  warmly  thanked  by  the  King  as  being  the  only 
man  who  has  the  courage  to  speak  the  truth  freely  and  fear- 
lessly. 

The  truth  is  that,  while  the  King  and  his  whole  escort  had 
ridden  out  to  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  the  Chamberlain  in  his 
over-anxiety  had  the  horses  put  to  the  royal  carriages,  and  this 
became  known  in  the  town ;  and  this  indeed  may  have  excited 
all  sorts  of  hopes  in  the  sanguine  inhabitants. 

Versailles  was  protected  by  four  army  corps.  It  never 
entered  anybody's  head  to  think  of  lea\dng  it.  I  can  positively 
assert  no  Council  of  War  was  ever  held  either  in  1866  or 
1870-71. 

Excepting  on  the  march  or  on  days  of  battle,  an  audience 
was  regularly  held  by  his  Majesty  at  ten  o'clock,  at  which  I, 
accompanied  by  the  Quartermaster- General,  laid  the  latest 
reports  and  news  before  him,  and  made  our  suggestions  on 
that  basis.  The  Chief  of  the  War  Cabinet  and  the  Minister 
of  War  were  also  present,  and,  so  long  as  the  head-quarters  of 
the  Third  Army  were  at  Versailles,  the  Crown  Prince  also,  but 
aU  merely  as  listeners.  The  King  occasionally  required  them 
to  give  him  information  on  one  point  or  another ;  but  1  do  not 
remember  that  he  ever  asked  for  advice  concerning  the  opera- 
tions in  the  field  or  the  suggestions  I  made. 

These,  which  I  always  discussed  beforehand  with  my  staff 


432  THE  FRANCO-GEEMAN  WAE. 

oflficers,  were,  on  the  contrary,  generally  maturely  weighed  by 
his  Majesty.  He  always  pointed  out  with  a  military  eye  and 
an  invariably  correct  estimate  of  the  position,  all  the  objections 
that  might  be  raised  to  their  execution ;  but  as  in  war  every 
step  is  beset  with  danger,  the  plans  laid  before  him  were  in- 
variably adopted. 


THE  END. 


l/i' 


'J 


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